HISTORY OF FAR EAST

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### HISTORY OF FAR EAST

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1.1.0. **Objectives**

*After studying this lesson the students will be able to:*

- know the opening of Chinese civilisation to the European;
- understand the reaction of Chinese towards the Europeans.
- assess the causes, nature, consequences of opium war in China.
- identify the causes, nature, consequences and significance of Taiping rebellion in Chinese history and;
- trace the response of Chinese towards the arrivals of Europeans in her soil.

1.1.1. **Introduction**

It is quite interesting to understand the history of the Western contact with the Far East in general and China in particular. European imperialism in China and the gradual Western influence on the Chinese society led to different response from them conservative as well as liberal elements in the Chinese society. This chapter discuss various incidents of Chinese history took place during the 19th century as a reaction against arrival of foreign powers in Chinese empire.

1.1.2. **Early Contact between the West and China:**

The early contact between the West and China can be traced to the early period of Christianity. During the early years of the Christian era a regular overland silk trade was carried on between China and the Roman Empire. There was a great demand for Chinese silk in the Roman Empire. However, China was not dependent on any of the Western products. It was during the seventh century that Christianity was introduced in China. The Nestorian missionaries of the Persian Church reached China in about 635 C.E during the rule of the Tang dynasty, they built churches in several cities. During the period of ‘Five Dynasties’ (907-960) and the Sung dynasty (960-1279) a fairly good amount of foreign trade was conducted between the West and China. As intermediaries, the Muslim Arab merchants regularly visited China. It is also said that even the Jewish merchants had a colony in China. There is a general belief that it was through the Arab traders that the Europeans acquired knowledge of the Chinese tea.

During the thirteenth century, the Mongol Empire established by Chinggis Khan extended from the western borders of Russia to the Pacific Ocean under his successors. This facilitated the opening of trade routes between China and Europe which had been closed for more than four centuries. A number of factors encouraged this new European interest in China. With the rapid spread of Islam, Christianity in Europe was threatened. Thus, the Christian Europe entertained a hope of a possibility of an alliance with the Mongols and the Chinese against the Muslims. A new demand for Eastern commodities in Europe was created as a result of the Crusades. Besides, the Roman Catholic Church entertained a desire to carry the 'true faith' to pagan China. Thus, fear, material gain and faith, encouraged the Europeans to revive their interest in China.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries regular religious, commercial and political embassies were sent from Europe to China during the Mongol rule. A Franciscan missionary, John de Plano Carpini was welcomed by Kublai Khan in 1246. Louis IX of France sent two political embassies in 1249 and 1252. Two Venetian merchants, Nicolo and Maffeo Polo reached the court of Kublai Khan in 1264. Later, in 1275, the Polo brothers along with Nicolo's son, Marco Polo visited China. After his return to Venice, Marco Polo's narration about his experience in China was published in the form of a book titled ‘The Book of Marco Polo’ also known as ‘The Description of the World’. This book stirred the imagination of the Europeans and made them to realize the great potential of trade with China.

1.1.3. **Sea Route to China:**

As the land routes to the Far East through Central Asia became unsafe due to the Turkish domination of the region, the Europeans began to explore the possibility of an alternative route through the seas to the East. Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese adventurer reached Calicut in India in 1498. Other Portuguese sailors who followed Vasco da Gama reached Malacca in Southeast Asia in 1511. Raphael Peresterela was the first Portuguese to reach the southern coast of China in 1516. Later, in 1557, the Portuguese established themselves at Macao, a small peninsula in Southern China. The Portuguese monopoly of trade with China was broken when the Spaniards reached China in 1575, followed by the Dutch in 1604, English in 1637 and the Americans in 1784. However, Russia was the first foreign country to conclude an agreement with China in 1689. By this agreement trade
between the two countries came to be regulated. Roman Catholic missionaries were not far behind the European traders. By their appeal to scientific and scholarly interests of the Chinese officials, the missionaries could find favour with them. In the seventeenth century Franciscan, Dominican and Augustinian missionaries entered China. In 1692, Emperor Kang Hsi issued a proclamation granting freedom of worship to the Roman Catholics throughout the empire. However, occasionally the missionaries were persecuted and were forced to return to Canton or Macao.

1.1.4. Chinese Reaction towards the Europeans

The Manchu rulers of China were prejudicial in their reaction to the presence of the Europeans in China. The Chinese were of the strong conviction that their country is the only true civilization in the world. They were willing to have contact with Europeans only on the assumption that they were 'barbarians'. The Europeans were required to acknowledge the superiority of the Chinese culture and the emperor of China. They were also required to present tribute to the emperor as a sign of submission. The foreign envoys did not enjoy the status of equality as the representatives of sovereign states. They had to observe the 'Kowtow', a practice of paying respect to the emperor by kneeling before him and bumping the head on the ground. The Chinese authorities imposed a number of restrictions on the Europeans. They were subjected to the Chinese laws and there were no fixed and uniform tariff laws.

The Manchu Emperors desired to limit and control foreign trade rather than eliminate it. This led to the development of the so-called the Canton system of trade. Accordingly, in 1757, Canton was declared as the only legal port for foreign trade with China. This trade was strictly regulated by the 'cohong' or a guild of Chinese merchants who paid the emperor handsomely for their monopoly power. The cohong fixed prices, collected duties, and levied numerous fees on foreign merchants, who were forbidden to interact with the Chinese people or even to learn the Chinese language.

1.1.5. East India Company’s Penetration into China:

In the eighteenth century the English East India Company enjoyed the monopoly of the Eastern trade. The Chinese silk, cotton and tea were in great demand in the European markets. For these, payment was made by spice and silver. Thus, the trade was favourable to China. The unequal balance of trade between the two countries created a lot of uneasiness among the British. The principal item of exchange was the Chinese tea, which had become the national drink of the British people during the eighteenth century. By the early nineteenth century, British ships were transporting millions of kilograms of tea back to England every year. Unfortunately, English merchants were unable to come up with products which they could sell to the Chinese in similar quantity. As a result in some years, 90 per cent of the cargo brought by the British ships to China consisted of silver bullion. The British considered such an imbalance of trade with China as unhealthy. In 1793 the British government sent a diplomatic mission to China demanding the abandonment of the Canton system and suggesting the opening of the entire China for the British trade. The Chinese officials refused to accept the British demands.

1.1.6. Opium Wars: Causes, course and consequences

The Opium Wars of 1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860 marked a new stage in China’s relations with the West. China’s military defeats in these wars forced its rulers to sign treaties opening many ports to foreign trade. The opium trade and the subsequent opium wars were the manifestation of the British imperialism in China. Opium became the tool by which the British traders eventually broke open the Chinese market. Realising the evil impact of opium on the people, the Chinese government had imposed a ban on the cultivation and import of opium in China. However, the ban was ineffective as the English merchants smuggled opium in large quantities into China with the connivance of corrupt Chinese officials. The opium, while addicting the Chinese population was also draining a huge amount of silver from China. The outflow of a large amount of Chinese silver disrupted Chinese finances and ruined Chinese economy.

1.1.6.1. Causes of First Opium War

Tensions Under the Canton Trade System: Under the system established by the Qing dynasty to regulate trade in the 18th century, Western traders were restricted to conducting trade through the southern port of Canton (Guangzhou). They could only reside in the city in a limited space, including their warehouses; they could not
bring their families; and they could not stay there more a few months of the year. Qing officials closely supervised trading relations, allowing only licensed merchants from Western countries to trade through a monopoly guild of Chinese merchants called the Cohong. Western merchants could not contact Qing officials directly, and there were no formal diplomatic relations between China and Western countries.

Western traders, for their part, mainly conducted trade through licensed monopoly companies, like Britain’s East India Company. Despite these restrictions, both sides learned how to make profits by cooperating with each other. As the volume of trade grew, however, the British demanded greater access to China’s markets. By 1800 the East India Company was buying 23 million pounds of tea per year at a cost of 3.6 million pounds of silver. Concerned that the China trade was draining silver out of England, the British searched for a counterpart commodity to trade for tea and porcelain. They found it in opium, which they planted in large quantities after they had taken Bengal, in India, in 1757.

British merchants blamed the restrictions of the Canton trade for the failure to export enough goods to China to balance their imports of tea and porcelain. Thus, Lord George Macartney’s mission to the court in Beijing in 1793 aimed to promote British trade by creating direct ties between the British government and the emperor. When he tried to raise the trade question, after following the tribute rituals, Macartney’s demands were rejected. Macartney’s failure, and the failure of a later mission (the Amherst embassy) in 1816, helped to convince the British that only force would induce the Qing government to open China’s ports.

Mandarins, Merchants & Missionaries: The opium trade was so vast and profitable that all kinds of people, Chinese and foreigners, wanted to participate in it. Wealthy literati and merchants were joined by people of lower classes who could now afford cheaper versions of the drug. Hong merchants cooperated with foreign traders to smuggle opium when they could get away with it, bribing local officials to look the other way. Smugglers, peddlers, secret societies, and even banks in certain areas all became complicit in the drug trade.

Opium, as an illegal commodity, brought in no customs revenue, so local officials exacted fees from merchants. Even missionaries who deplored the opium trade on moral grounds commonly found themselves drawn into it, or dependent on it, in one form or another. They relied on the opium clippers for transportation and communication, for example, and used merchants dealing in opium as their bankers and money changers.

The Daoguang Emperor & Commissioner Lin: By the 1830s, up to 20 percent of central government officials, 30 percent of local officials, and 30 percent of low-level officials regularly consumed opium. The Daoguang emperor (C.E 1821-50) himself was an addict, as were most of his court. As opium infected the Qing military forces, however, the court grew alarmed at its insidious effects on national defense. Opium imports also appeared to be the cause of massive outflows of silver, which destabilized the currency. While the court repeatedly issued edicts demanding punishment of opium dealers, local officials accepted heavy bribes to ignore them. In 1838, one opium dealer was strangled at Macao, and eight chests of opium were seized in Canton. Still the emperor had not yet resolved to take truly decisive measures.

As opium flooded the country despite imperial prohibitions, the court debated its response. On one side, officials concerned about the economic costs of the silver drain and the social costs of addiction argued for stricter prohibitions, aimed not only at Chinese consumers and dealers but also at the foreign importers. On the other side, a mercantile interest including southern coastal officials allied with local traders promoted legalization and taxation of the drug. Ultimately, the Daoguang emperor decided to support hardliners who called for complete prohibition, sending the influential official Lin Zexu to Canton in 1839. Lin was a morally upright, energetic official, who detested the corruption and decadence created by the opium trade. He was appointed Imperial Commissioner with full powers to end the opium trade in Canton. He arrived in Canton in March, 1839. Lin’s vigorous attempt to suppress the opium trade ultimately ended in disastrous war and personal disgrace.

Immediate cause: Lin Zexu’s reputation as a great patriot who attempted in vain to defy the Western imperialists rests largely on two striking actions. First of these acts took place in March 1839, when Lin, newly arrived in Canton, demanded that the British surrender their opium stocks. He then proceeded to reinforce this demand in dramatic ways. Two leading hong merchants (Howqua and Mowqua) were arrested and threatened with decapitation; trade in Canton was ordered stopped; Chinese servants and assistants were withdrawn from the
foreign factories; and some 350 foreigners were essentially consigned to tedious, uncomfortable detention for what amounted to six weeks. In these circumstances, the chief superintendent of British trade in China, Captain Charles Elliot, took responsibility for the opium and, in mid May, surrendered 21,306 chests to Lin. Beginning in early June, the opium was destroyed in a flamboyant public spectacle.

Lin’s apparent triumph of June 1839 turned out to be a delusion, for the British seized on the destruction of the opium to demand retaliation and redress. Tensions increased in July when six drunken British seamen on shore leave in Kowloon (Jiulong)-located near Hong Kong and across from Macao at the mouth of the Canton estuary-vandalized a temple and killed a local man in a brawl. When the British refused to hand over anyone for trial under Chinese justice, arguing that the Chinese would use torture to force confessions, Lin responded by stopping trade, poisoning some wells, and prohibiting sale of food to the foreigners. Rumors arose that the Chinese planned to seize British property in Macao, prompting an exodus to Hong Kong of scores of ships and around 2,000 foreigners.

All this precipitated the first skirmish of the still undeclared war. On September 4, 1839, after Captain Elliot and his interpreter Karl Gutzlaff failed to persuade Chinese naval officers in the straits between Hong Kong and Kowloon to let them purchase food and water, two small British warships opened fire on war junks anchored off Kowloon. Three junks were damaged before the British ran low on ammunition and withdrew. Casualties were low, and the confrontation amounted to a stalemate. Two months later, it became clear that all hope for a peaceful resolution of these rising tensions was out of reach.

1.1.6.2. Hostilities

The ensuing hostilities lasted for about three years; went through several fairly distinct military phases; introduced “gunboat diplomacy” to Asia in raw and undiluted form; and ended in August 1842 with the first of the “unequal treaties” that England and the other Western powers expanded on and maintained vis-à-vis China until World War II, almost exactly a century later.

Phase I of Hostilities: November 1839–January 1841: On November 3, 1839-still with no declaration of war having emanated from either side the unresolved Kowloon incident coupled with other complications precipitated a dramatic military confrontation at Chuanbi on Canton Bay. On this occasion, two British frigates the 28-gun Volage and 18-gun Hyacinth took on 29 Chinese vessels that were blockading the harbor. One junk was blown to bits by a lucky shot to its magazine, several other junks were sunk or heavily damaged, and only one British sailor was wounded as opposed to at least 15 Chinese killed. Despite this humiliation, Commissioner Lin’s report to the throne gave no hint of defeat and the emperor was persuaded that the Chinese had won a great victory.

In these volatile circumstances, a formal declaration of war against China was issued on January 31, 1840 not by London, but by British authorities in India acting on behalf of the home government. In the months that followed, a large British fleet was assembled for dispatch to China.

The forces dispatched to Canton in response to Captain Elliot’s entreaties arrived in June 1840 under the command of his cousin, Rear Admiral Sir George Elliot. The fleet consisted of 48 ships, 16 warships mounting 540 guns, four armed steamers, 27 transports, and a troop ship and carried fuel for both the steamers and the troops in the form of six million pounds of coal (3,000 tons) and 16,000 gallons of rum. The fighting force numbered some 4,000 men. After the fleet’s arrival, the British moved quickly to assert their authority and demand compensation for the seized opium, abolition of the restrictive Canton trade system, and the right to occupy one or more islands off the coast. Admiral Elliot avoided confronting the Chinese forces Lin had assembled at Canton. Instead, he imposed his own naval blockade there and proceeded to move north along the coastline with a portion of his forces, accompanied by Charles Elliot, England’s chief diplomat on the scene.

One objective of this push north was to find responsible officials at a major port who would agree to deliver the British government’s ultimatum to the emperor in Peking (Beijing). A second, related objective was to pressure the Qing court into agreeing to negotiations by threatening to cut off north China from the resource-rich and economically critical south.

By early July after blockading Amoy (Xiamen), where local officials refused to allow a landing party the fleet was approaching the Yangtze River delta, some 700 miles north of Canton. On July 4, officers from the
warship *Wellesley*, along with the an interpreter, met with local officials from strategically located Chusan (Zhoushan) Island in a vain attempt to persuade them to surrender peacefully.

After occupying Chusan, the fleet blockaded Ningpo (Ningbo), a major port close by. The force then headed north toward Tientsin (Tianjin) and the Pei-ho (Hai He), the strategic waterway leading to Peking. While the expedition was advancing toward Tientsin, the British also engaged in a brief show of force in the south, known as the Battle of the Barrier. Commissioner Lin had mobilized forces that threatened to drive the British from Macao. In a preemptive assault that began and ended in a single day (August 19), British warships silenced the Chinese battery at the barrier; fired on the ineffective war junks anchored offshore; landed a brigade of some 380 men; destroyed the Chinese military stores; and then withdrew.

Near the end of August, the fleet carrying the two Elliots reached the approach to Peking and succeeded in conveying the British demands to local officials at Tientsin. Finally awakened to the real nature of the foreign threat, the emperor responded with fury and Lin became transformed from hero to scapegoat. On August 21, the emperor chastised him harshly. Lin warned the emperor that negotiating with the foreign barbarians would never work: “the more they get the more they demand, and if we do not overcome them by force of arms there will be no end to our troubles.” Qishan, the successor of Lin, took a softer line, hoping to persuade the foreigners to withdraw simply by threatening to cut off their trading privileges and then making some concessions. He persuaded the two Elliots to return to Canton by intimating that the Chinese were prepared to engage in serious negotiations there.

The promised negotiations began in Canton in late December, with Charles Elliot as chief negotiator on the British side. Qishan offered only a smaller indemnity than requested, and even this was done without the Qing court’s knowledge. By January 1841, the British had become aware that Qishan was not prepared to make substantial concessions. The fleet had been reinforced during this lull, and the next great show of British force was unleashed at a familiar place of battle: Chuanbi. The famous “Second Battle of Chuanbi” took place on January 7, lasted but an hour, and ended with both forts captured, an estimated 500 or more Chinese killed, and perhaps half that number wounded. British casualties were 38 wounded.

On January 20, confronted by the British show of force at Canton, Qishan acknowledged his helplessness and indicated that, among other things, China was willing to cede Hong Kong, pay an indemnity of six million dollars, engage in official relations on an equal footing, and reopen Canton to trade. When this so-called Convention of Chuanbi was submitted for approval, the Daoguang emperor again flew into a rage. Qishan was imprisoned and sentenced to death and in May 1842, after his sentence was commuted, he was banished to a remote area near the Amur River far in the north.

As it transpired, Charles Elliot, Qishan’s counterpart in the agreement, also received a stinging reprimand from his government. On April 21, Palmerston castigated him for having settled for the “lowest” possible terms, and stripped him of his appointment. He was succeeded by Sir Henry Pottinger.

**Phase II of Hostilities: February 1841–June 1841:** Before the news of his dismissal and replacement arrived, Captain Elliot, initiated a series of attacks that directly threatened Canton. In the last week of February and first week of March-in a succession of quick battles sometimes known as the Battle of the Bogue, Battle of the First Bar, and Battle of Whampoa-British warships gained control over the Pearl River and placed themselves in position to besiege Canton.

Control over Whampoa enabled the British to bring up a large force for an attack on Canton, which they proceeded to carry out the following May. On May 21, at Elliot’s urging, British subjects still in Canton left the city following which Chinese soldiers and mobs plundered and gutted the “factories” where they conducted business. By May 24, the British force had taken the forts protecting the city and commenced bombarding Canton itself. Local officials together with wealthy hong merchants responded quickly by offering Elliot a “ransom” of six million dollars to desist-leading to a truce agreed to on May 27.

The truce at Canton set the stage for one of the most celebrated moments in later Chinese recollections of the war. On May 29, as Chinese troops began to withdraw from the city and British forces prepared to do likewise, local gentry in surrounding villages mobilized militia to attack the invaders. They had only primitive arms like hoes, spears, and a few matchlock guns, but were furious at the foreigners’ destruction of local tombs; rape of local
women; and looting of food, clothing, and valuables. In short time, the gentry gathered a civilian force that peaked at around 10,000 men from some 100 villages.

On May 30, in the midst of a torrential rainstorm near the village of Sanyuanli, this militia encountered and surrounded a detachment of Indian sepoys led by English officers. The downpour left the foreigners mired in paddy-field mud, and caused their flintlock muskets to misfire. One of the sepoys was killed and 15 wounded before British reinforcements arrived. Fearing an attack by the main British army, senior officials associated with the Manchu court’s regular military forces quickly dispersed the militia and negotiated another truce.

*Phase III of Hostilities: August 1841-March 1842:* Sir Henry Pottinger-Elliot’s successor as diplomatic and chief superintendent of trade arrived in Macao in August with instructions from London to do just that. In the later part of August, the fleet headed north with 14 warships including four steamers quickly occupying, once again, Amoy; Tinghai, the capital of Chusan; and Ningpo. Meanwhile, to the south, British merchants and officials embarked on a construction boom aimed at turning Hong Kong from a barren island with hardly a house upon it into the great commercial hub it was soon to become.

*Phase IV of Hostilities: March 1842-August 1842:* The winter lull in major military activities essentially ended in March 1842, when British troops suppressed two Chinese offensives in and around Ningpo. On March 10, a bold attempt of thousands of Chinese fighters to take on the foreigners within Ningpo itself ended, as so often, in one-sided carnage when the long column of Chinese, trapped in a narrow street, was mowed down by British muskets and a howitzer spraying grapeshot. On March 15, five days after this slaughter, the Chinese suffered a comparably harsh defeat at Segoan, in the countryside near Ningpo. Two months after this, beginning in mid-May, the British expedition resumed its push north, greatly replenished by reinforcements from India. The first noteworthy battle in this final advance came on May 18, 1842, with a British victory at Chapu that provided heroes and horrors in equal measure.

One month after Chapu, the British expedition attacked Woosong on the mouth of the Hwangpu River that flows through Shanghai on June 16, and Shanghai itself three days later. Part of the advance on Shanghai was done on land, with British forces picking up coolie labor along the way. With the fall of Chinkiang, the way to Nanking now lay open. By early August, the British forces were within firing range of the celebrated walls of the great city, and Qing officials finally realized the foreigners were in position to cut off all vital commerce between south China and the north. With this the first opium war ended.

1.1.6.3. The first unequal treaty: Treaty of Nanking

The First Opium War dragged on till 1842 till China was forced to submit through the Treaty of Nanking. Under the Treaty of Nanking, signed on August 29, 1842, China agreed to open the five ports requested (Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai) to trade and residence of British merchants, pay an indemnity of 20 million silver dollars, abolish the Cohong monopoly that hitherto had controlled trade in and through Canton, and a uniform and moderate tariff on exports and imports, which came to be known as the five per cent ad volorem. Additionally, the British were granted the right to occupy Hong Kong in perpetuity; this was their sole outright territorial acquisition.

Being not satisfied with the commercial advantages secured by the Treaty of Nanking, the British also imposed an additional treaty on the Chinese government known as the Treaty of Bogue. By this treaty the British obtained from the Chinese the extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal cases. As per this provision any British national who commits a criminal offence in China would be tried according to the laws of England and not according to the laws of China. England was also granted by China the most favoured nation treatment. According to this provision any concession given by China to a third power was to be extended to England as well.

During the 19th century the treaty ports became the largest commercial centers in China, with Shanghai and Hong Kong leading the way. The first Opium War was widely regarded in England as a great triumph, both for the nation and for Western notions of commercial and technological progress more generally. A good sense of this is conveyed in the gold medal the government struck commemorating “The Triumph of the British Arms, 1842.” In 1844, the United States and France rode on England’s triumph to negotiate their own treaties with the Qing government, effectively internationalizing and consolidating the basis of what became known as the
“unequal treaty” system. These treaties, together with England’s, began the inexorable process of pressuring China to allow foreigners, including missionaries, traders, doctors, and travelers, to move into the interior.

Three treaty provisions in particular constituted the core of this inequitable system: “extraterritoriality” (exemption of the foreigners from Chinese law); “most favored nation” privileges (guaranteeing each nation the same rights other foreigners might be able to extract in the future); and the legal basis for imposing what turned out to be a generally low “fixed tariff” on China (which prevented China from protecting native industries that might become threatened by foreign imports). There were, of course, no commemorative medals or official celebrations on the Chinese side. On the contrary, in the words the Opium War and Treaty of Nanking “introduced a century of humiliation for the Chinese people.”

The war and the 1842 treaty that ended it also, as it turned out, left unresolved the fundamental issue that had triggered hostilities in the first place. Apart from stipulating that of the huge indemnity China agreed to pay, one part (six million silver dollars) was compensation for the opium Commissioner Lin had destroyed, the opium trade itself went unmentioned. It did not go away. In 1856, fourteen years after the Treaty of Nanking, China and England (together with France) embarked on a second Opium War.

1.1.6.4. The Second Opium War (1856-60):

The Second Opium War was in many ways an inevitable sequel to the first. The Chinese were not eager to implement the terms of a treaty that they saw as unfair. The British merchants were unhappy as they could not get better profits from the trade with China. Smuggling continued, and this only increased Chinese resentment of the foreigners.

Historians debate whether Britain and France manufactured an excuse for the Second Opium War and whether the rationale used to go to war was justified. However, the events leading into the second war began with the Arrow Incident. The Arrow incident of 1856 was the spark that ignited the Second Opium War. The Arrow was a ship owned by a Chinese resident of Hong Kong that was registered with the British. In October, 1856, Chinese officers searching for a notorious pirate boarded the ship at Canton without the permission of the British authorities. During this operation one of the Chinese officials hauled down the British flag, which was considered as an offence by the British. During this search the Ch’ing officials also arrested the Chinese crew who are seem to be engaged in smuggling activities. British officials in Canton demanded that the sailors be released but the Ch’ing officials refused this demand. This minor incident was used by the British as an excuse to renew hostilities against China that led to the Second Opium War.

In 1857 the British forces seized an undefended fort near Canton and then attacked Canton from the Pearl River. Surprisingly, the British forces were assisted by American warships, including the Levant, in the shelling of Canton from the river. However, the Chinese resistance was sufficiently strong to force the Western navies to retreat from Humen.

The British expeditionary force was joined by a French task force against the Chinese. The French used the murder of one of their missionaries in February 1856 as a pretext to make common cause with the British against the Chinese. After some delay, the joint force took Canton in December 1857, and then moved north to threaten the capital city of Peking. By June 1858, the European powers forced the Chinese government to sign the Treaty of Tientsin. The most important provisions of the treaty included the right granted by China to the foreigners to establish permanent diplomatic residence at Peking and opening of additional ports to foreign trade.

1.1.6.5. Treaty of Tientsin

The first salvo of the Second Opium War ended in June 1858 with France, Russia and America joining Britain in the Treaty of Tientsin which opened more Chinese ports to trade and provided that:

- Britain, France, Russia, and the United States would have the right to establish diplomatic legations in the closed city of Peking.
- Ten more Chinese ports would be opened for foreign trade 3. The right of all foreign vessels including commercial ships to navigate freely on the Yangtze River.
- The right of foreigners to travel throughout China.
- China was to pay an indemnity to Britain and France of 2m taels of silver each.
China was to pay compensation to British merchants in 2m taels of silver for destruction of their property.

**Treaty of Aigun:** Then on May 28 1858, a separate Treaty of Aigun was signed with Russia. This revised the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 and moved the Chinese-Russian border to the Amur River enabling Russia to found the coastal city of Vladivostok in 1860. In 1859 the Chinese refused to allow the establishment of embassies in Peking as promised and so a naval force under Admiral Sir James Hope shelled the Taku Forts (Dagu paotai) guarding the Peiho River 60 kilometers southeast of Tientsin. The fleet was mauled and had to withdraw under the cover of fire from an American naval squadron commanded by Commodore Josiah Tattnall.

**Convention of Peking:** When the British and French returned to ratify the treaty the following summer, angry Chinese forces opened fire, killing more than 400 British men and sinking four of their ships. A much larger Anglo-French force returned a year later. In August 1860 the Anglo-French force landed at Pei Tang-Ho with 200 British and 200 French troops and took the Taku Forts. By early October 1860 they reached Peking. Emperor Xianfeng fled to the Summer Palace in Chengde and the British-French troops set both the Summer Palace and the Old Summer Palace ablaze after extensive looting. After Emperor Xianfeng fled Peking the June 1858 Treaty of Tientsin was finally ratified by Prince Gong on 24th October 1860 under the Convention of Peking. This brought the Second Opium War to an end. This convention included the right of foreign diplomatic representation in China’s capital, removal of restrictions on the foreigners to travel within China and permission to the Christian missionaries to carry on their activities and even to own property. Finally, the opium trade which was the chief reason of the whole dispute was legalized. The Convention of Peking established:

- China's recognition of the validity of the Treaty of Tientsin
- Opening Tientsin as a trade port
- The area of Kowloon south of Boundary Street and Stonecutters Island was ceded to Britain
- Freedom of religion in China
- British ships were allowed to carry indentured Chinese to the Americas
- Indemnity to Britain and France was increased to 8 million taels of silver
- The Opium Trade was legalised

The United States and Russia gained the same privileges in separate treaties. In June 1898 the Second Convention of Beijing granted Britain a 99 year lease for the New Territories to the north of Boundary Street on the Kowloon Peninsula. Beginning on 1 July 1898 it ended on 1 July 1997.

### 1.1.6.6. Consequences of Opium War

The Opium Wars had far reaching consequences on the history of China. The wars led to the imposition of unequal treaties on China by the West. By these treaties the European Powers acquired the extraterritorial rights and most favoured nation treatment. These factors led to the loss of China’s sovereignty and weakened her political institutions. The events that followed the Opium Wars greatly contributed to the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, the country’s last imperial dynasty in the early years of the twentieth century. Although some historians have argued that the Opium Wars constituted a painful but much needed shock to shake China out of her time-bound traditions, the Chinese look back on these wars as a cruel and greedy exercise of the West in exploitative imperialism.

### 1.1.7. Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864

One of the greatest Chinese peasant rebellions, the Taiping (Great Peace) Rebellion was directed primarily against the feudal rule of the Manchu dynasty and secondarily against foreign capitalism, which had been making steady inroads into the economy, society, and politics of China ever since the country’s defeat in the first Opium War and the signing of the Treaty of Nanking.

#### 1.1.7.1. Causes of Taiping Rebellion

**Crises of the Manchu Rule (1644–1911):** Manchu rule was the rule of a conquering dynasty named the Qing that had overthrown the indigenous Ming dynasty. They were considered foreigners by the mainland Chinese. Manchu rule was torn by crises, mismanagement, and corruption in the late eighteenth century, at both the central and provincial levels. Government encouragement of the sale of official positions created a vicious
cycle of corruption. Taxes were arbitrarily enhanced by local officials and landlords, who also acted as tax collectors. Political decline led to economic failure. The great majority of the peasants had no protection against exploitation by officials and various feudal elements. As in all feudal societies, land was concentrated in the hands of a handful of gentry officials and the peasants were subjected to all forms of oppression and exploitation. Factors such as these caused peasant rebellions in the earlier periods of the history of China. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, social crisis assumed a new dimension by the unexpected population explosion. In fact, China’s population increased from 180 million in 1751 to 430 million in 1851 without any corresponding expansion of the area of arable land. In the absence of any industry to absorb the surplus population and territory to which they could migrate, land was further fragmented. This not only disrupted the balance of the rural economic sector but also crippled the peasantry by lowering their standard of living.

Advent of Western Imperialism: The scenario was aggravated by the entry of western capitalism. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the import of goods from abroad, especially opium, had risen steeply compared to exports. Thus the balance of trade went against China. The import hike was met by the export of large quantities of silver from China to other countries. Before the beginning of the nineteenth century, tael (1 ounce of silver) was equal to 1,000 copper coins; in 1835, the rate of exchange was 1 ounce to 2,000 coins. The great majority of the population usually used copper coins to pay for goods including agricultural products. But the problem was that peasants had to pay their taxes not in copper but in silver. Therefore, for the peasants, taxes were doubled simply by the alteration in the rate of exchange. Moreover, a series of natural disasters from 1826 to 1850 drove the peasants below subsistence level and they were no longer in a position to pay taxes.

The political and social crises were accelerated by the First Opium War (1840–2) and the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the first in a series unequal treaties that, along with subsequent developments, transformed China from a feudal country into a semi-feudal and semi-colonial one. The Manchu state became totally discredited, politically weak and subservient to foreign powers. Before the Opium War, foreign trade was limited to the port city of Canton. A great number of porters were regularly employed in transporting goods between Canton and the Yangzi provinces. After the war, the British intruders demanded that other ports such as Amoy, Shanghai, Ningpo, and Foochow also be opened to trade. Decline in the importance of the Cantonese monopoly threw hundreds of thousands of boatmen and porters in central and southern China out of work. These unemployed masses swelled the ranks of the Taiping and furnished many of their leaders. The influx of cheap foreign textiles ruined millions of weavers and other handicraftsmen through direct competition in the market. This was known as deindustrialization, a phenomenon noticeable also in contemporary colonial India. Indigenous merchants and moneylenders, who used to finance artisans, now invested in foreign goods.

Proto-nationalist feelings gave these longstanding and diverse socioeconomic grievances a common vocabulary of protest. Followers of the Ming dynasty, overthrown by the Manchus, had prepared a literary battle against the foreign rulers at the end of the seventeenth century that profoundly inspired the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion and other risings. Supporters of the Ming dynasty formed a secret society called the Heaven and Earth Society, whose slogan was “Overthrow the Ch’ing and restore the Ming.”

Leadership of Hong Xiuquan: The beginning of the Taiping Rebellion almost coincided with the revolutionary outbreaks that shook Europe in 1848. Starting off in Tzu-chin shan in the province of Kwangsi, near the Vietnam border, it cut across China like a sword, approaching Peking in the north, Shanghai in the east, and the Tibetan mountains in the west. The rebels made Nanking their capital and set up the revolutionary state of the oppressed people known as the Taiping Tien-kuo or the Heavenly Kingdom of the Great Peace. Hong Xiuquan, the supreme leader of the rebellion, was a poverty-stricken schoolteacher who had been ill treated by the corrupt Confucian scholar gentry that served the Manchus. He was born in the province of Kwangtung (capital Canton), which gave birth to many a Chinese revolutionary including Sun Yat-sen.

Witnessing the persecution of his own people by the landlords, Hong was deeply influenced by the heroic battles of the Cantonese peasant detachments against the British invaders during the Opium War. At the same time, he came into contact with the Christianity preached, but rarely practiced, by the missionaries. This rebellion brought within its fold a number of people from different walks of life. In fact, Hong’s earliest colleagues such as
Yang (charcoal burner), Feng (village schoolteacher), Hsiao (poor peasant and woodcutter), Wei (trader), and Shih (rich peasant) reflected the class basis of the movement.

There were also representatives of small sections of relatively well-to-do scholar gentry who were opposed to the Manchus for national, not social, reasons. Their followers consisted of the Hakka, Yao, and Miao tribes, several hundred charcoal-burners, a large number of miners, and former pirates who had been driven from the seashores by foreign warships. Moreover, there were a few traders and well-to-do peasants as well as deserters from the government troops and porters from Canton. The peasantry constituted the main fighting force of the movement.

1.1.7.2. Course of the rebellion: Dynamics and Defeat

As the revolutionary situation was conducive to their growth, the Taiping rebels quickly grew in strength. In the summer of 1852, they left their original base in Kwangsi and marched northwards toward Hunan, where they were joined by a huge body of rebels from other movements. From Hunan they proceeded through Hupei and then occupied Nanking, the southern capital of the Ming dynasty in the spring of 1853. Nanking became the seat of rebel power and Hong Xiuquan set up his court there. An army was dispatched northwards with the aim of capturing Peking. However, because of inadequate military preparations and the inability of the southern soldiers to adjust to the northern food habits and cold winter climate, the thrust to the north came to nothing. The rebels could not keep their revolutionary fervor intact for long for a number of reasons. In 1856, the rebels fell out among themselves in the city of Nanking itself, and the treachery of a commander named Wei Chang-hui resulted in a confrontation in which some of the most important leaders lost their lives. This brought the revolutionary offensive to an end and its continuance in the following years turned out to be purely defensive. Along with this, other internal contradictions developed within the rebel order.

The Taipings began by conducting mobile warfare, all the way from the mountains of Kwangsi to the rebel capital of Nanking. Undoubtedly this was a spontaneous people’s war against the feudal order. However, after establishing a government and a state in Nanking, the leaders soon became a privileged class. In order to make the governmental machinery work, they had to make increasing demands on the peasantry. This marked the transition point for the peasantry, who were transformed from active agents participating in the decision to create a new political formation to passive subjects of a government. They had to pay taxes, suffer requisitions, and supply unpaid labor: the system they had sought to change. This was why the peasantry became increasingly disaffected in the last years of the Heavenly Kingdom. The rebel state was thus in the process of being weakened by these internal contradictions.

1.1.7.3. Causes of failure of rebellion

The defeat of the Taipings can be attributed not only to internal factors, but also to external ones. The foreign powers played a major role in this. At the beginning, the rebellion received much praise in the western press and even in government circles. The fact that the rebels were Christian and stood against Manchu corruption and backwardness was much acclaimed. That is why the western powers maintained neutrality in the initial years of the revolt. They wanted to utilize the revolt to further their own gains by exploiting the internal contradictions within China. Some foreign leaders sought to transform the rebel leaders into their stooges, who would help them capture political power and gain control over China. Others wanted to see China exhausted by internal turmoil and cease to exist. However, the Taipings were never prepared to allow foreigners to use them as they wished. Through their revolutionary activities and their program of action, they made it clear that the civil war in China was the internal affair of the Chinese people and that any offer from foreigners to mediate between the rebels and the Manchu state was unacceptable to them. At the same time, by imposing a ban on the opium trade in areas controlled by the Taiping rebels, they made their anti-western position perfectly clear.

1.1.7.4. Foreign Intervention

The Opium War and the treaties signed thereafter paved the way for the control of China’s internal affairs by the foreign powers. Britain’s declaration of war on China was followed by that of France, culminating in the Second Opium War in 1857-58 which also ended in China’s defeat and the signing of another unequal and humiliating treaty, known as the Treaty of Tientsin (1858).
By this treaty, the Manchus had to concede a tremendous war indemnity, the legalization of both opium and missionary activities, and the perpetuation of foreign control of customs and tariffs. The toiling people of China were transferred to different colonies to serve in Malay, US, and New Caledonian plantations and mines as nothing better than slaves. This marked the beginning of the infamous “coolie trade” whereby Chinese workers were forced to work in abysmal, unhygienic conditions. Britain and France were to provide military help to the Manchu government to fight the Taiping rebels. Opium was legalized by the treaty and the Taipings, who had banned opium, were regarded as “international law-breakers” in their own motherland. The attitude of the foreign governments and the press toward the rebels soon changed. They were no longer regarded as religious brethren but as “anarchists” and “blasphemers.” The Manchu government, regarded previously as reactionary, was now hailed as the guardian of trade and legality and a force for stability. In fact, by 1861-12, British and French troops started participating in the armed conflicts on the side of the Manchus in Shanghai.

Many progressive people in the western world raised their voices against unwarranted western interference in the internal affairs of China. A number of foreigners fought directly for the Taipings. Augustus Lindlay, a British citizen, not only took up arms on the side of the Taipings but also wrote a moving eyewitness account of the rising. Moreover, several former officials of the French army and at least one Italian named Major Moreno played an active part in it. The last phase of the battle was the bloodiest of all. The combined attacks of the Manchu and foreign troops finally put an end to this greatest peasant revolt in the history of modern China. In the summer of 1864, the capital Nanking fell to the Manchus.

1.1.7.5. Revolutionary Measures

The military successes of the Taiping were based on the overwhelming support of the people. It was truly a people’s war that unleashed the initiative and creativity of the masses. The social and political program they adopted reflected the aspirations of the masses. In fact, many of the principles of the Taiping Rebellion served as an inspiration and model for Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang (National People’s Party) he founded, as well as for the May 4 movement of 1919 and the communists. Franke writes that the Taiping took the idea of equality from Christianity. This idea combined with many ancient ideas and did much to strengthen their revolutionary social program.

- **Common property:** Under the Taipings, unlike in previous regimes, there were no private possessions. They established a common treasury and granary from which provision was made for individual weddings, births, funerals, and so on.

- **Land reform program:** The makers of the new order proclaimed an egalitarian Agrarian Law according to which all the land under Heaven was to be collectively cultivated by all the people under Heaven. All land was divided into nine categories according to its quality and was allocated for the use of the population. The peasants retained for themselves only that part of the produce that was needed for their subsistence. Taxes were reduced to a level that was lower than that demanded by the Manchu state. In a manifesto of November 2, 1860, Hong Xiuquan announced a reduction of taxes in the southern counties of Kiangsu.

It is true that the revolutionaries were thoroughly anti-feudal and anti-Manchu and regarded all property, including landed property, as the “property of the Satan.” At the same time, as peasant rebels they tended to reproduce structures similar to what had existed before, relying on gentry and bureaucrats for administration. As a result, in many cases landlord-bureaucrats failed to carry out demands for the reduction of sharecroppers’ rent and were able to impose practically the whole burden of taxation on the shoulders of the peasantry.

- **Position of women:** In traditional Chinese society, the position of women was subordinate in every respect to that of men. Women did not have any right over property; they were subjected to political, religious, clan-based, and patriarchal exploitation. The Taipings marked a qualitative departure from the past as they sought to create a new society based on gender equality. Their unhesitant declaration to this effect was itself a revolutionary political statement. In a feudal society where women had no rights whatsoever, they forbade prostitution and the purchase and sale of women in marriage. In the rebel order, women could sit for state examinations and occupy the same civil or military positions as men. One unique fact is the presence of women
soldiers in special women’s contingents in the Taiping army. Monogamy was made obligatory. Rape was punishable by death.

- **Temperance**: Like tobacco and alcohol, opium was also strictly prohibited and this was enforced in practice.

- **Attack on images**: The Taipings were monotheistic and their activities showed signs of their intolerance toward other religious sects. They were influenced by Christianity and destroyed the images, statues, and temples of Buddhism, Taoism, and particularly Confucianism, which served as the ideological basis of the feudal system in China. By directing their attacks against images, the Taipings gave their critics and opponents a powerful weapon to use against them.

- **Treatment of foreigners**: The Taiping Rebellion took place in the context of western capitalist penetration when foreign trade and the opium business had already extended their tentacles. The Taipings recognized none of the privileges the foreign powers extracted from the Manchus through unequal treaties. On the other hand, they were prepared to establish commercial relations with them on the basis of equality. As a result of the Christian influence, they regarded all nations as having equal rights; they did not deride foreigners as “barbarians,” nor did they regard the Chinese as people chosen by the Lord on High. They were hostile to Catholics, but fairly friendly to Protestants.

- **Calendar reform**: The traditional lunar Chinese calendar was replaced by a completely new calendar with a seven-day week.

- **Literary reform**: The Taipings also introduced important changes in the written language of the people. The Chinese language does not have an alphabet: it is ideographic. Moreover, there was a wide variety in the dialects used by people living in each province. Despite such differences, the written language was the same everywhere and it was this unity that could hold the Chinese nation together, regardless of disunity in other fields. The problem was that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese did not know the written language and so were not in a position to write. The Taipings relaxed the heavily conventional written style, which was quite different from the spoken language, by approximating it more closely to colloquial speech. In this they were the forerunners of the great literary revolution that took place later on.

- **Other reforms**: Besides these reforms, the Taipings envisaged other modern infrastructural reforms, such as the construction of a network of railways, a postal service, hospitals, and banks. They accepted the Ten Commandments and the divinity of Christ. In their opinion, Hong Xiuquan was the second brother of Christ. They believed in baptism, and the Old and New Testaments were integral parts of their religious canons. It can therefore be argued that the Taipings created a complete politico-religious system which combined spiritual salvation and obedience to the will of God with the political and military defense of the rebel state.

### 1.1.7.6. Nature and Significance

Although the Taipings did attempt to establish an egalitarian utopian society, their reforms were actually such as to pave the way to capitalism. But peasant rebellions without the creation of new productive forces through the participation of an urban bourgeoisie could not achieve capitalist development. In effect, the peasantry was used by the landlords and the nobility as a lever to bring about dynastic changes. The Taiping Rebellion took place at a time when Chinese society had been undergoing a process of transition from a feudal society to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial one. The process of transition started roughly from the time of the Opium Wars when Britain and other foreign powers had already began making active encroachments on Chinese soil. Epstein (1956) holds that this rebellion was simultaneously the last of China’s old-style peasant wars and the first great democratic fight of its people in the modern period. The elements of proto-nationalism in the Taiping movement linked it with the peasant revolts of earlier days. The rebels accused the Manchu dynasty of wanting to drain the country of its wealth. It is important to refer in this connection to an interesting feature: they allowed their hair to grow on the front part of the head - a longstanding practice that was prohibited by the Manchu rulers. It was this nationalistic element that explains the participation of a large number of educated and rich people whose anti-Manchu patriotism gave them some sympathy for the rebel cause.
A number of scholars, both Chinese and western, have written on the nature and significance of the Taiping Rebellion. Mao Zedong (1939) pointed out that peasant risings and wars constituted a unique feature of Chinese history. According to him, class struggles between peasants and feudal forces constituted the dynamic element in the progress of China amidst the changing fortunes of ruling dynasties. He argued that in the absence of “correct leadership” by the proletariat and the Communist Party, peasant wars of the past were unable to liberate the peasantry from the feudal yoke. While speaking of the Taiping Rebellion, Mao said that it was one of the eight major events that occurred in the formative period of China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Mao’s observations inspired the historians of modern China to engage in 11 years of debate from 1950 to 1961. In 1952, the Chinese Historical Society published eight volumes of source materials on Taiping from Shanghai. During that period, Chinese journals published 400 research articles. However, as Tan Chung (1985) argues, this important intellectual achievement has hardly been noticed outside China. J. P. Harrison, who followed this debate with interest, was critical of the communist historians’ attempts to put the peasant movements of the past on a new pedestal. Tan Chung argued that in earlier times the gentry had suppressed information about the importance of peasant rebellions in Chinese history, an importance that was recovered only after the aforementioned debates. These debates helped Chinese scholars view their past as a continuous process of social evolution with peasant movements acting as locomotives, having an anti-feudal dynamic. A different view was that the peasants attacked the regime, not feudalism as a class system. Hou Wailu described the Taiping revolt as the highest form of peasant war and a very good beginning for modern revolution. Another writer, Wu Shimo, asserted that Taiping stood for political equality, economic equality, sexual equality, and equality among nations.

Karl Marx and The Times (August 30, 1853) hailed the event in identical language. Marx called it a formidable revolution and The Times described it as the greatest revolution the world had ever seen. On the other hand, Barrington Moore (1993) and Kung-chuan Hsiao (1979) maintain that it was a rebellion, not a revolution, as it did not alter the basic structure of society. Vincent Shih holds that the Taipings had genuine revolutionary possibilities in borrowing Christian and western ideas. But these possibilities were nullified because the Taipings were only able to perceive Christian ideas through the glass of traditional concepts. It is ridiculous to argue that all revolutionary possibilities should be identified solely with western ideas. While opposing Vincent Shih, Tan Chung argues that the Taiping ideology drew heavily on native cultural aspirations such as folklore, but the trace of continuity does not necessarily dilute its revolutionary character. D. S. Zagoria has made an ecological analysis and argues for the inevitability of the movement. He maintains that a peasant rebellion of the Taiping type was the inevitable outcome of “Monsoon Asia.” China, one of the wettest countries in the world, is well known as a “rice economy,” highlighted by intensive utilization of farmland, a dense population, hunger for land, elimination of smallholdings, and proletarianization of the peasants, thereby creating the conditions for rural unrest, revolts, and anti-feudal wars. Although old democratic revolutions consisting of the Taiping, Boxer, and the 1911 nationalist revolution failed to free China from the tentacles of feudal and imperialist forces, its successor, the new democratic revolution, from the May 4 movement onwards-when the working class entered the political stage-could bring about the liberation of the country within a short span of 30 years. The Taiping Rebellion was an agrarian revolution, which formed part of the democratic revolution.

1.1.8. Chinese Response to the West

The influence of the West on different spheres of Chinese life led to gradual and guarded response on the part of the Chinese to the Western influence. Progress was made in the field of education, reforms were introduced in military and innovations were adopted in industry and business. Besides, enlightened social reformers such as Kang Yu Wei impressed upon the Manchu government to introduce reforms in all spheres of Chinese life including society, education, economy, military, and administration. The Manchu government itself undertook certain reform measures in an attempt to perpetuate its rule. These reforms along with the knowledge of Western political system gradually convinced the Chinese the need to change their own political structure by putting an end to the decaying Manchu dynasty and driving out the foreign imperial powers which led to the emergence of nationalism in China.
**Progress in Education:** The foremost Chinese response to the Western influence was evident in the field of education. Efforts of the missionaries and China's contact with the Western Powers through diplomatic missions gradually led to the reforms in the Chinese educational system. This marked the beginning of a dramatic break from traditional Chinese educational system. The missionaries learnt mastered local Chinese languages, translated foreign books into Chinese and brought out dictionaries. To promote the study of foreign languages, a language school was established at Peking in 1866. Gradually, schools came to be established in various cities of China to impart learning in various subjects such as foreign languages, astronomy, mathematics, shipbuilding and other subjects.

Tseng Kuo Fan and Li Hung Chang, two of the most enlightened government officials who had taken a leading part in the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion encouraged education on Western model. They made efforts to educate young Chinese in Western countries, especially in the United States, England and France. They were instrumental in sending students' education missions to USA and Europe. The first students' mission from China comprising 120 students was sent to the United States between 1872 and 1881. The second mission comprising 30 students was sent to England and France for technical training.

**Military Reforms on Western Model:** By introducing far reaching military reforms, the Chinese responded favourably to the Western impact. The military weakness of China was exposed during the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion. Failure to maintain a strong central army prompted the Manchu government to promote regional armies. To put down the Taiping rebels, a new type of military organization became necessary. The government troops had become corrupt and undisciplined. In 1852 the Manchu government assigned to Tseng Kuo Fan and Li Hung Chang the task of organising local militias against the Taiping rebels. These two military leaders organised their militias with the help of Western military advisors. They purchased arms and ammunitions from the West. Some foreigners also entered the Chinese military service to suppress the Taipings. With the support of the British and French governments and the assistance of their foreign colleagues, Tseng and Li were able to slowly and gradually suppress the Taipings.

The suppression of the Taiping Rebellion by the local militias with the help of foreign military officers and support of the Western Powers showed that the Manchu government narrowly escaped destruction from domestic enemies. It became evident that lack of a trained, disciplined and equipped central army would spell doom to the Manchu dynasty. Realising a need for drastic military reforms, in 1865, Tseng Kuo Fan and Li Hung Chang petitioned the Manchu government to set up defense establishments. Between 1865 and 1888 a number of military establishments were set up. Naval and Military Academies on Western model were also established at Tientsin. Elaborate plans were floated for the control, equipment and training of armies, including the necessary military industries. However, in spite of all efforts, the military reforms in China could not save the Manchu dynasty.

**Introduction of Modern Industries:** The Western impact made itself felt on the economic life of China. The process of industrialisation was gradual and slow. The first modern shipyard was constructed in Shanghai in 1865. In 1871, Li Hung Chang established the ‘China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company’ at Shanghai. The Tientsin Machine Factory was remodelled to produce modern weapons. Western technology was introduced for the first time at Kaiping coal mines in 1878 to extract coal. The first railway line was constructed between Shanghai and Wuchang in 1876. But the superstitious people opposed the railroad. Another attempt to introduce railways in China was made in 1881 at the initiative of Li Hung Chang. Its success marked the beginning of modern transport system in China. In 1882 a telegraph line was opened between Tientsin and Shanghai. A dockyard was built at Port Arthur and a plan was prepared to build steel ships. By 1906, a Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce were established at Peking. Codes of commercial and company law were issued. These factors led to a considerable growth of Chinese industries. The industries included cotton textile mills, electric plants, flour mills, match and tobacco factories, steel mills and silk manufacturing. Modern banking system was also introduced in China to finance industrial enterprises.

**The Manchu Reform Programme:** The Manchu government for nearly half a century (1860-1908) was dominated by the Dowager Empress, Tsu Hsi. She was opposed to reforms in order to maintain her control over the government. Internal and external compulsions forced the Manchu government, led by Tsu Hsi to think in
terms of introducing some reforms at the turn of the twentieth century. This was not because the Manchus were genuinely interested in the Western influenced reforms, but as a desperate attempt to save the tottering dynasty.

Following the Boxer Protocol, Tsu Hsi issued reform edicts that aimed at reforming the society, such as removing ban on intermarriage between the Chinese and the Manchus and advising the people to abandon the practice of ‘foot-binding’ of girls. Reforms were also introduced in the field of education. Chinese young men were encouraged to go abroad at government expense to acquire modern education. A Ministry of Education was set up in 1903. Schools were established to teach Chinese and Western subjects. A commission on judicial reform was established, and on its recommendation Chinese laws were modified. Torture and other cruel forms of punishment were abolished. In 1905, the civil service examination based on the Chinese classics was abolished.

The most important of all the reforms was an attempt to introduce constitutional government in China. Tsu Hsi sent missions to Japan and Western countries to study their constitutions. After a thorough study of the British, German and Japanese constitutional systems, China adopted Japanese system of constitution. The Provisional Constitution of 1908 vested wide ranging powers in the Emperor. Citizens were promised freedom of thought, speech and association. The constitution provided for a bi-cameral legislature with restricted powers. In 1908, Emperor Kuang Hsu died, followed shortly after by the Dowager Empress, Tsu Hsi. Aisin Gioro Pu Yi, a three years old great-nephew of Tsu Hsi, through her sister's daughter, was placed on the throne. His father became the Regent. But he was inefficient and was unable to meet the challenges of the time. The reforms promised by Tsu Hsi came too late and too little, and they could not save the Manchu dynasty from the impending disaster and inglorious end following the Revolution of 1911.

1.1.9. Conclusion

There had been regular trade contact between China and the West since ancient times. Since the Portuguese opened the sea route to the East, China came under increasing influence of the West through trade and cultural contacts. Though initially, the Chinese government was reluctant to open up additional ports for the European trade, the Opium Wars changed the military equation between China and the West and gradually China became the victim of Western imperialism. European countries and Japan tried to bring the major part of China under their influence. The cutting of the Chinese melon prompted the United States to declare the so called ‘Open Door Policy’. Though China resisted the Western influence in the beginning gradually she could not avoid the winds of change blowing from the West. This diplomatic relations with the West, work of the Christian Missionaries in the field of education and other factors gradually led the spread of Western influence in China. China responded to some extent to the Extent to the Western Influence by introducing certain reforms in military and industry. In the subsequent period the Taiping rebellion took place and was primarily directed against the feudal rule of the Manchu dynasty and secondarily against foreign capitalism. The social and political program adopted during Taiping rebellion reflected the aspirations of the masses. The influence of the West on different spheres of Chinese life led to gradual and guarded response on the part of the Chinese to the Western influence. Progress was made in the field of education, reforms were introduced in military and innovations were adopted in industry and business.

1.1.13. Summary

- The early contact between the West and China can be traced to the early period of Christianity through the silk trade carried on between China and the Roman Empire.
- It was during the seventh century that Christianity was introduced in China. The Nestorian missionaries of the Persian Church reached China in about 635 C.E.
- The Mongol Empire established by Chenghis Khan extended from the western borders of Russia to the Pacific Ocean under his successors, facilitated the opening of trade routes between China and Europe which had been closed for more than four centuries.
- A Franciscan missionary, John de Plano Carpini was welcomed by Kublai Khan in 1246. Louis IX of France sent two political embassies in 1249 and 1252.
- Two Venetian merchants, Nicolo and Maffeo Polo reached the court of Kublai Khan in 1264. Later, in 1275, the Polo brothers along with Nicolo’s son, Marco Polo visited China.
As the land routes to the Far East through Central Asia became unsafe due to the Turkish domination of the region, the Europeans began to explore the possibility of an alternative route through the seas to the East.

Portuguese sailors Raphael Peresterela was the first Portuguese to reach the southern coast of China in 1516. Later, in 1557, the Portuguese established themselves at Macao, a small peninsula in Southern China.

The Portuguese monopoly of trade with China was broken when the Spaniards reached China in 1575, followed by the Dutch in 1604, English in 1637 and the Americans in 1784.

Russia was the first foreign country to conclude an agreement with China in 1689.

The Chinese were of the strong conviction that their country had the highest and in a sense the only true civilization in the world.

In the eighteenth century the English East India Company enjoyed the monopoly of the Eastern trade.

The Opium Wars of 1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860 marked a new stage in China’s relations with the West. China’s military defeats in these wars forced its rulers to sign treaties opening many ports to foreign trade.

The Opium Wars led to the imposition of unequal treaties on China by the West. These led to the loss of China’s sovereignty and weakened her political institutions.

One of the greatest Chinese peasant rebellions, the Taiping Rebellion was directed primarily against the feudal rule of the Manchu dynasty and secondarily against foreign capitalism.

The Taiping rebellion was truly a people’s war that unleashed the initiative and creativity of the masses. The social and political program they adopted reflected the aspirations of the masses.

The influence of the West on different spheres of Chinese life led to gradual and guarded response on the part of the Chinese to the Western influence. Progress was made in the field of education, reforms were introduced in military and innovations were adopted in industry and business.

1.14. Exercise

1. Trace the history of contact between Chinese and European.
2. Examine the causes and consequences of the Opium Wars.
3. Examine the causes, course and significance of Taiping rebellion.
4. Which industries were introduced in China during the second half of the 19th Century?
5. Discuss the Western influence on China. How did she respond to this influence?

1.15. Further Reading


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Unit-1
Chapter-2
FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR
Treaty of Shimonoseki; Hundred Days Reform, Boxer Rebellion

Structure

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1.2.0. **Objective**

In this lesson, students investigate the historical incidents took place in the history of China in the 19\(^{th}\) century. After studying this lesson you will be able to:

- understand the causes, consequences and significance of First Sino-Japanese War;
- discuss the factors, course and nature of boxer rebellion in China;
- investigate the hundred day reform carried out in China long before the establishment of peoples republic of China and
- Identify the various other historical events happened in the late 19\(^{th}\) century Chinese history;

1.2.1. **Introduction**

Till the middle of the 19\(^{th}\) Century, China looked down upon Japan as a tributary state. This position was completely reversed in the second half of the century. While China was crushed and humiliated by the Western powers from inside and paralysed by internal rebellion, Japan showed surprising vigour and strength. Within a very short time, Japan accommodated herself to the changed time, learnt from her Western contacts and grew to be a formidable power.

The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) was fought between China under Qing Dynasty and Japan under the famous Meiji rule. The primary cause was control over Korea. After more than six months of unbroken successes by the Japanese land and naval forces, as well as the loss of the Chinese port of Weihai, the Qing leadership sued for peace in February 1895. The war clearly demonstrated the failure of the Qing dynasty's attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats to its sovereignty, especially compared with Japan's successful post-Meiji restoration. For the first time, regional dominance in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; the prestige of the Qing Dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow. The humiliating loss of Korea as a vassal state sparked an unprecedented public outcry. Within China, the defeat was a catalyst for a series of political upheavals led by Sun Yat-Sen and Kang Youwei, culminating in the 1911 Revolution. The war is commonly known in China as the War of Jiawu. In Japan, it is called the Japan-Qing War and in Korea, where much of the war took place, it is called the Qing-Japan War.

1.2.1.1. **Causes of Sino-Japanese War**

After two centuries, the Japanese policy of seclusion under the shoguns of the Edo period came to an end when the country was forced open to trade by United States intervention in 1854. The years following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the fall of the Shogunate had seen Japan transform itself from a feudal society into a modern industrial state. The Japanese had sent delegations and students around the world to learn and assimilate western arts and sciences, with the intention of making Japan an equal to the Western powers. Korea continued to try to exclude foreigners, refusing embassies from foreign countries and firing on ships near its shores. At the start of the war, Japan had the benefit of three decades of reform, leaving Korea backward and vulnerable.

**Conflict over Korea:** As a newly risen power, Japan turned its attention toward its neighbor Korea. In the interest of its security, Japan wanted to block any other power from annexing or dominating Korea, or at least to ensure Korea's effective independence, resolving to end the centuries-old Chinese suzerainty. Japan realized the potential economic benefits of Korea’s coal and iron ore deposits for Japan's growing industrial base, and of Korea's agricultural exports to feed the growing Japanese population. On February 27, 1876, after several confrontations between Korean isolationists and Japanese, Japan imposed the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876, forcing Korea open to Japanese trade. Similar treaties were signed between Korea and other nations.

Korea had traditionally been a tributary state of China's Qing Dynasty, which exerted large influence over the conservative Korean officials gathered around the royal family of the Joseon Dynasty. Opinion in Korea itself was split: conservatives wanted to retain the traditional relationship under China, while reformists wanted to approach Japan and western nations. After two Opium Wars against the British in 1839 and 1856, and the Sino-French War, China was unable to resist the encroachment of western powers. Japan saw the opportunity to take China's place in strategically vital Korea.

In 1882, the Korean peninsula experienced a severe drought which led to food shortages, causing much hardship and discord among the population. Korea was on the verge of bankruptcy, even falling months behind on
military pay, causing deep resentment among the soldiers. On July 23, a military mutiny and riot broke out in Seoul in which troops, assisted by the population, sacked the rice granaries. The next morning the crowd attacked the royal palace and barracks, then the Japanese legation. In response, Japan sent four warships and a battalion of troops to Seoul to safeguard Japanese interests and demand reparations. The Chinese then deployed 4,500 troops to counter the Japanese. Tensions subsided, however, with the Treaty of Chemulpo, signed on the evening of August 30, 1882.

**Gapsin Coup:** In 1884 a group of pro-Japanese reformers briefly overthrew the pro-Chinese conservative Korean government in a bloody coup d'état. However, the pro-Chinese faction, with assistance from Chinese troops under General Yuan Shikai, succeeded in regaining control in an equally bloody counter-coup. These coups resulted not only in the deaths of a number of reformers, but also in the burning of the Japanese embassy and the deaths of several embassy guards and citizens. This caused a crisis between Japan and China, which was eventually settled by the Sino-Japanese Convention of Tientsin of 1885 in which the two sides agreed to: (a) pull their expeditionary forces out of Korea simultaneously; (b) not send military trainers to the Korean military; and (c) give warning to the other side should one decide to send troops to Korea. Chinese and Japanese troops then left, and diplomatic relations were restored between Japan and Korea. The Japanese, however, were frustrated by repeated Chinese attempts to undermine their influence in Korea.

**Nagasaki Incident:** The Nagasaki Incident was a riot in Nagasaki caused by Qing Dynasty Beiyang Fleet soldiers in the port city in 1886. Several Japanese policemen confronting the rioters were killed. After the incident, the Qing refused apologies, confident in the superiority of their navy. Japan's setback during the Gapsin Coup, in which 400 Japanese soldiers had been driven off by 2000 Qing soldiers, was still recent and fresh. The Qing Government claimed that the Japanese had attacked the Chinese, and had injured many Qing soldiers who were bringing presents to Nagasaki, but had been left to the mob by Japanese authorities.

**Kim Ok-gyun affair:** On March 28, 1894, a pro-Japanese Korean revolutionary, Kim Ok-gyun, was assassinated in Shanghai. Kim had fled to Japan after his involvement in the 1884 coup and the Japanese had turned down Korean demands that he be extradited. Ultimately, he was lured to Shanghai, where he was killed by a fellow Korean, Hong Jong-u, at a Japanese inn in the international settlement. His body was then taken aboard a Chinese warship and sent back to Korea, where it was quartered and displayed as a warning to other rebels. The Japanese government took this as an outrageous affront.

**Tonghak Rebellion:** Tension was high by June 1894, but war was not yet inevitable. A rebellion in Korea caused the Korean king to request Chinese troops on June 4 to aid in suppressing the Tonghak Rebellion. The rebellion proved not to be as formidable as initially thought, and the Chinese troops were not required, but the Chinese government sent General Yuan Shikai as its plenipotentiary at the head of 2,800 troops. According to the Japanese, the Chinese government violated the Convention of Tientsin by not informing the Japanese government of its decision to send troops, though the Chinese claimed that Japan had approved this. The Japanese countered by sending their own 8,000-man expeditionary force to Korea. The first 400 troops arrived on June 9 en route to Seoul, and 3000 landed at Inchon on June 12.

However, Japanese officials denied any intention to intervene. As a result, the key Chinese official Li Hongzhang "was lured into believing that Japan would not wage war, whereas Tokyo was fully prepared to act." Japan requested that China and Japan co-operate to reform the Korean government, which China refused. Korea requested that Japan withdraw its troops, which Japan refused. In early June 1894, the Japanese force of 8,000 seized the Korean king, occupied the Royal Palace in Seoul, and by June 25 replaced the existing government with members of the pro-Japanese faction. Though Chinese troops were already leaving Korea, finding themselves unneeded there, the new pro-Japanese Korean government granted Japan the right to expel the Chinese troops forcibly, while Japan shipped more troops to Korea. China rejected the new government as illegitimate, and war loomed.

**1.2.1.2. Course of the War**

**Early stages of the war:** On 1 June 1894, the Tonghak Rebel Army moves toward Seoul. The Korean government requests help from the Chinese government to suppress the revolt. On 6 June 1894, about 2,465
Chinese soldiers are transported to Korea to suppress the Revolt. Japan asserts that it was not notified and thus China has violated the Convention of Tientsin, which requires that China and Japan must notify each other before intervening in Korea. China asserts that Japan was notified and approved of Chinese intervention. In response to Chinese military act on 8th June 1894, around 4,000 Japanese soldiers and 500 marines land at Jemulpo (Incheon).

Meanwhile on 11th June 1894, the Tonghak Rebellion came to an end. On this the Japanese government telegraphs the commander of the Japanese forces in Korea, Otori Keisuke, to remain in Korea for as long as possible despite the end of the rebellion. Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu meets with Wang Fengzao, Chinese ambassador to Japan, to discuss the future status of Korea. Wang states that the Chinese government intends to pull out of Korea after the rebellion has been suppressed and expects Japan to do the same. However, China retains a resident to look after Chinese primacy in Korea. Additional Japanese troops arrive in Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi tells Matsukata Masayoshi that since the Qing appear to be making military preparations, there is probably "no policy but to go to war." Mutsu tells Otori to press the Korean government on the Japanese demands. Ōtori presents a set of reform proposals to Korean King Gojong, which his government rejects and in return insists on troop withdrawals. Failure of mediation between China and Japan arranged by the British ambassador to China. On 23 July 1894, the Japanese troops enter Seoul, seize the Korean king and establish a new pro-Japanese government, which terminates all Sino-Korean treaties and grants the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Chinese Beiyang Army from Korea. This led to the first battle of the war Battle of Pungdo / Hoto-oki kaisen

**Opening moves:** By July 1894 Chinese forces in Korea numbered 3000-3500 and were outnumbered by Japan. They could only be supplied by sea through the Bay of Asan. The Japanese objective was first to blockade the Chinese at Asan located south of Seoul and then encircle them with their land forces.

**Sinking of the Kow-shing:** The Kow-shing was a 2,134-ton British merchant vessel chartered by the Qing government to ferry troops to Korea, and was on her way to reinforce Asan with 1,200 troops plus supplies and equipment. A German artillery officer, Major von Hanneken, advisor to the Chinese, was also aboard. The ship was due to arrive on 25 July. The cruiser Naniwa, under Captain Togo Heihachiro, intercepted the Kow-shing and captured its escort. The Japanese then ordered the Kow-shing to follow Naniwa and directed that Europeans be transferred to Naniwa. However the 1,200 Chinese on board, desperate to return to Taku, threatened to kill the English captain, Galsworthy, and his crew. After four hours of negotiations, Captain Togo gave the order to fire upon the vessel. A torpedo missed, but a subsequent broadside hit the Kow-shing, which started to sink. In the confusion, some of the Europeans escaped overboard, only to be fired upon by the Chinese. Japanese ships did not assist in rescue, and an estimated 900 Chinese died in the sinking.

**Conflict in Korea:** Commissioned by the new pro-Japanese Korean government to forcibly expel Chinese forces, Major-General Oshima Yoshimasa led mixed Japanese brigades numbering about 4,000 on a rapid forced march from Seoul south toward Asan Bay to face 3,500 Chinese troops garrisoned at Seonghwan Station east of Asan and Kongju. On 28 July 1894, the two forces met just outside Asan in an engagement that lasted till the next morning. The Chinese gradually lost ground to the superior Japanese numbers, and finally broke and fled towards Pyongyang. Chinese casualties amounted to 500 killed and wounded, compared to 82 Japanese casualties.

On 1 August, war was officially declared between China and Japan. By 4 August, the remaining Chinese forces in Korea retreated to the northern city of Pyongyang, where they were met by troops sent from China. The 13,000-15,000 defenders made defensive repairs to the city, hoping to check the Japanese advance. On 15 September, the Imperial Japanese Army converged on the city of Pyongyang from several directions. The Japanese assaulted the city and eventually defeated the Chinese by an attack from the rear; the defenders surrendered. Taking advantage of heavy rainfall overnight, the remaining Chinese troops escaped Pyongyang and headed northeast toward the coastal city of Uiju. Casualties were 2,000 killed and around 4,000 wounded for the Chinese, while the Japanese lost 102 men killed, 433 wounded, 33 missing. In the early morning of 16 September, the entire Japanese army entered Pyongyang.

**Defeat of the Beiyang fleet:** On September 17, 1894, Japanese warships encountered the larger Chinese Beiyang Fleet off the mouth of the Yalu River. The Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed eight out of the ten Chinese
warships, assuring Japan's command of the Yellow Sea. The Chinese were able to land 4,500 troops near the Yalu River. The Battle of the Yalu River was the largest naval engagement of the war and was a major propaganda victory for Japan.

**Invasion of Manchuria:** With the defeat at Pyongyang, the Chinese abandoned northern Korea and instead took up defensive positions in fortifications along their side of the Yalu River near Jiuliancheng. After receiving reinforcements by 10 October, the Japanese quickly pushed north toward Manchuria. On the night of 24 October 1894, the Japanese successfully crossed the Yalu River, undetected, by erecting a pontoon bridge. The following afternoon of 25 October at 5:00 pm, they assaulted the outpost of Hushan, east of Jiuliancheng. With the capture of Jiuliancheng, General Yamagata's 1st Army Corps occupied the nearby city of Dandong, while to the north, elements of the retreating Beiyang Army set fire to the city of Fengcheng. The Japanese had established a firm foothold on Chinese territory with the loss of only four killed and 140 wounded.

The Japanese 1st Army Corps then split into two groups with General Nozu Michitsura's 5th Provincial Division advancing toward the city of Mukden (now Shenyang, China) and Lieutenant General Katsura Taro's 3rd Provincial Division pursuing fleeing Chinese forces west along toward the Liaodong Peninsula. By December the 3rd Provincial Division had captured the towns of Ta-tung-kau, Ta-ku-shan, Xiuyan, Tomu-cheng, Hai-cheng and Kang-wa-seh. The Japanese 2nd Army Corps under Oyama Iwao landed on the south coast of Liaodong Peninsula on 24 October and quickly moved to capture Kin-chowand Talienwan on 6-7 November. The Japanese laid siege to the strategic port of Lushunkou.

**Fall of Lushunkou:** By 21 November 1894, the Japanese had taken the city of Lushunkou (Port Arthur). Furious over Chinese massacre, torture and mutilation of captured wounded Japanese soldiers, the Japanese army massacred thousands of the city's civilian Chinese inhabitants in an event that came to be called the Port Arthur Massacre. By 10 December 1894, Kaipeng (modern-day Gaixian) fell to the Japanese.

**Fall of Weihaiwei:** The Chinese fleet subsequently retreated behind the Weihaiwei fortifications. However, they were then surprised by Japanese ground forces, who outflanked the harbor's defenses in coordination with the navy. The battle of Weihaiwei would be a 23-day siege with the major land and naval components taking place between 20 January and 12 February 1895. After Weihaiwei's fall on 12 February 1895, and an easing of harsh winter conditions, Japanese troops pressed further into southern Manchuria and northern China. By March 1895 the Japanese had fortified posts that commanded the sea approaches to Beijing. This would be the last major battle to be fought; numerous skirmishes would follow. The Battle of Yinkou was fought outside the port town of Yingkou, Manchuria, on 5 March 1895.

**Occupation of the Pescadores Islands:** On 23 March 1895, Japanese forces attacked the Pescadores Islands, off the west coast of Taiwan. In a brief and almost bloodless campaign the Japanese defeated the islands' Qing garrison and occupied the main town of Makung. This operation effectively prevented Chinese forces in Taiwan from being reinforced, and allowed the Japanese to press their demand for the cession of Taiwan in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895. This incident put an end to the conflict between China and Japan.

### 1.2.1.3. The Treaty of Shimonoseki

The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed at the Shunpanro hall in Japan on April 17, 1895, between the Empire of Japan and the Qing Empire, ending the First Sino-Japanese War. The peace conference took place from March 20 to April 17, 1895. This treaty followed and superseded the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty of 1871.

**Signatories and diplomats:** The treaty was drafted with John W. Foster, former American Secretary of State, advising the Qing Empire. It was signed by Count Ito Hirobumi and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu for the Emperor of Japan and Li Hongzhang and Li Jingfang on behalf of the Emperor of China. Before the treaty was signed, Li Hongzhang was attacked by a right-wing Japanese extremist on March 24. He was fired at and wounded on his way back to his lodgings at Injoji temple. The public outcry aroused by the assassination attempt caused the Japanese to temper their demands and agree to a temporary armistice. The conference was temporarily adjourned and resumed on April 10.
**Treaty terms:** Following are the terms of treaty of Shimonoseki

**Article 1:** China recognizes definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, that are in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.

**Articles 2 & 3:** China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty of the Penghu group, Taiwan and the eastern portion of the bay of Liaodong Peninsula together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property.

**Article 4:** China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels

**Article 5:** China opens Shashihi, Chungking, Soochow and Hangchow to Japan. Moreover, China is to grant Japan most-favored-nation treatment.

The treaty ended the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 as a clear victory for Japan. In this treaty, China recognized the independence of Korea and renounced any claims to that country. It also ceded the Liaodong Peninsula (then known to the Western press as Liaotung, now southern part of modern Liaoning province), and the islands of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (also known as the Pescadores) to Japan. China also paid Japan a war indemnity of 200 million Kuping taels, payable over seven years, and the signing of a commercial treaty similar to ones previously signed by China with various western powers in the aftermath of the First and Second Opium Wars. This commercial treaty confirmed the opening of various ports and rivers to Japanese trade. As a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), China recognized the "full and complete independence and autonomy" of Joseon.

**Value of the indemnity:** Qing China's indemnity to Japan of 200 million silver kuping taels, or about 240,000,000 troy ounces (7,500 t). After the Triple intervention, they paid another 30 million taels for a total of over 276,000,000 troy ounces (8,600 t) silver, worth billions in today's dollars.

**The Treaty of Shimonoseki and Taiwan:** During the summit between Japanese and Qing representatives in March and April 1895, Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito and Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu were serious about reducing the power of Qing Dynasty on not only Korean Peninsula but also Taiwan islands. Moreover, Mutsu had already noticed its importance in order to expand Japanese military power towards South China and Southeast Asia. It was also time of imperialism so that Japan wished to follow what the West was doing. Imperial Japan was seeking for enough colonies and resources in Korean Peninsula and Mainland China to compete with Western powers at that time, and this was the only way to prove how fast Imperial Japan since Meiji Restoration in 1867 had run after the West and how serious it was about amending unequal treaties among Western powers.

At the peace conference between Imperial Japan and Qing Dynasty, Li Hongzhang and Li Jingfang, the ambassadors at the negotiation desk of Qing Dynasty, originally did not plan to cede Taiwan because they also realised Taiwan’s great location for trading with the West. Therefore, even though the Qing had lost wars against Britain and France in the 19th century, the Qing Emperor was serious to keep Taiwan under its rule, which began in 1683.

On 20 March 1895, at Sunpanro in Shimonoseki in Japan, one month long peace conference had started. At the first half of the conference, Ito and Li talked mainly about a cease-fire agreement, and during the second half of the conference, the contents of the peace treaty were discussed. Ito and Mutsu claimed that yielding the full sovereignty of Taiwan was an absolute condition and requested Li to hand over full sovereignty of Penghu Islands and the eastern portion of the bay of Liaodong Peninsula. Li Hongzhang refused on the grounds that Taiwan had never been a battlefield during the first Sino-Japanese War between 1894 and 1895. By the final stage of the conference, while Li Hongzhang agreed to the transfer of full sovereignty of the Penghu islands and the eastern portion of the bay of Liaodong Peninsula to Imperial Japan, he still refused to hand over Taiwan. Li stated with regards to Taiwan that, ‘Taiwan is already a province, and therefore not to be given away.’

However, Imperial Japan was too strong for the Qing Dynasty to cope with, and eventually Li gave Taiwan up. On 17 April 1895, the peace treaty between Imperial Japan and the Qing Dynasty had been signed. This had a huge impact on Taiwan, the turning over of the island to Imperial Japan marking the end of 200 years of Qing rule despite an attempt to avoid annexation by Qing loyalists.
1.2.1.4. Aftermath of the War

The conditions imposed by Japan on China led to the Triple Intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, western powers all active in China, with established enclaves and ports, just six days after its signing. They demanded that Japan withdraw its claim on the Liaodong peninsula, concerned that Lushun, then called Port Arthur by Westerners, would fall under Japanese control.

Under threat of war from three Western political powers, in November 1895, Japan a weaker emerging nation not yet perceived as even a regional power receded control of the territory and withdrew its claim on the Liaotung peninsula in return for an increased war indemnity from China of 30 million Taels. Within months after Japan receded the Liaodong peninsula, Russia started construction on the peninsula and a railway to Harbin from Port Arthur, despite a protesting China. Eventually, Russia agreed to offer a diplomatic solution to the Chinese Empire, and agreed to a token lease of the region to save face, instead of annexing Manchuria outright, its de facto effect. Within two years, Germany, France, and Great Britain had similarly taken advantage of the economic and political opportunities in the weak Chinese Empire, each taking control of significant local regions. Japan also took note of how the international community allowed the great powers to treat weaker nation states, and continued its remarkable measures to bootstrap itself into a modern industrial state and military power, with great success as it would demonstrate in the Russo-Japanese War less than a decade later.

In Taiwan, pro-Qing officials and elements of the local gentry declared a Republic of Formosa in 1895, but failed to win international recognition. In China, the Treaty was considered a national humiliation by the bureaucracy and greatly weakened support for the Qing dynasty. The previous decades of the Self-Strengthening Movement were considered to be a failure, and support grew for more radical changes in China's political and social systems which led to Hundred Days' Reform and the abolition of the bureaucratic examinations followed by the fall of the Qing dynasty itself in 1911.

The Triple Intervention was a crucial historic turning point in Japanese foreign affairs. From this point on, the nationalist, expansionist, and militant elements began to join ranks and steer Japan from a foreign policy based mainly on economic hegemony toward outright imperialism.

1.2.2. The Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion of 1898-1900 is one of the best known aspects of Chinese history. The Boxers were not in fact ‘boxers’; they were a semi-religious peasant group. The name came from the ritual gymnastic-like movements that were part of their preparation for battle. Boxers came to believe that these rituals made them invulnerable to bullet or sword. The Boxer uprising was not actually a rebellion. The term ‘rebellion’ implies that they wanted to overthrow the Qing (Ch’ing) or Manchu government of China. The Boxers, in fact, wanted to support the Qing, but were opposed to foreign influence in all forms and wanted to drive the foreigners, their works and their Christian religion out of China. The Boxer Rebellion was almost entirely limited to northern China. The event that gained worldwide attention during the Boxer uprising was the siege of the western legations, when the Boxers surrounded the diplomatic residences of the Western powers in Beijing (formerly Peking). Eight foreign nations combined to lift the siege. Although the Boxers failed to drive out the foreigners, the uprising remains ‘an important episode in the emergence of mass nationalism in China’.

1.2.2.1. The origins, aims and membership of the Boxer Society

China has a long history of peasant rebellion and tradition of secret societies. The Boxers are part of both. Their background is obscure. An early historical reference to the Boxers can be found dating back to 1808. They were at that time linked to one of the larger secret societies, the ‘White Lotus’. The Boxers also appear to have had links to the ‘Big Sword Society’, an anti-Christian group that had rituals similar to those of the Boxers. There are different translations of the Boxer name, including ‘Fists of Righteous Harmony’, ‘Righteous and Harmonious Fists’ or ‘Boxers United in Righteousness’.

1.2.2.2. The main characteristics of the Boxers

The Boxers were mostly peasants from Shandong and Zhili in northern China. The Boxer homeland was ‘a poor agricultural region, densely populated, but particularly prone to both natural and human disasters’. Almost all the Boxers were adolescents, with local leadership provided by Chinese monks, peddlers and soothsayers,
many from the class who had led local peasant uprisings in the past. There were female Boxers known as Lanterns. The Boxers were either illiterate or semi-literate. They appeared to get some of their ideas from travelling operas and sensational stories. Their outlook was, nevertheless, ‘part and parcel of the Chinese ethos’. They were fiercely anti-Christian and anti-foreign; whether or not they had been at one time anti-Qing is open to debate. They were told that their Boxer rituals made them invulnerable. After 1898 Ci Xi provided them with Imperial support in their attacks on Christians and foreigners.

1.2.2.3. Theories about the Boxers

There is a range of opinions among historians about the origins and aims of the Boxer movement. The two main points of view relate to whether the Boxers originally were formed to oppose the Qing dynasty or to support it. The most widely held view is that the Boxers began as an anti-Qing movement; in other words, they were opposed to the existing government of China. This was linked to their early association with the White Lotus society. By the 1890s they had changed from opposing the Qing to supporting them. The Boxers did, however, retain their opposition to the foreigners.

The alternative view is that the Boxers were recruited by the Qing as a militia to help oppose the foreigners. The events in Shandong in 1899 when the local governor recruited some of the Boxers seem to support this view. Since opinion among historians is divided, we need to consider both the alternatives. The difficulty in deciding between these two quite different points of view arises because of the sources available to historians. Many of the sources we have about the Boxers come from Chinese officials, some hostile to the movement, others sympathetic to it. Other information comes from the European missionaries, who were among the Boxers’ prime targets.

1.2.2.4. The emergence of the Boxers

A range of factors contributed to the emergence of the Boxers:

*Foreign exploitation and humiliation of China:* By 1898 foreign countries had sliced off bits of China and there appeared to be a real risk that China might be broken up and shared out as colonies among the foreign powers.

*Anti-Christian feeling in China:* The Western missionaries and their Chinese converts challenged all the old traditions. These challenges were not simply a matter of religious belief. China had a long tradition of tolerating and adapting foreign beliefs, but the Christians defied many of the local social and political conventions, therefore, challenging the very fabric of Chinese society. For example, missionary doctors threatened local practitioners and the foreigners insisted on building their churches in such a way as to challenge traditional spiritual beliefs.

*Foreign encroachment caused economic difficulties:* Imported foreign cotton was cheaper than the Chinese product. Local handicrafts also suffered. Both these factors led to growing unemployment. ‘By the end of the 19th century, the country was beset by bankruptcy of village industries, decline of domestic commerce, rising unemployment, and a general hardship of livelihood’. The foreigners were blamed for many of China’s ills.

*Natural calamities:* The Yellow River dominated the vast plain that is the macro-region of north China. It had shifted its course in 1852 and flooded regularly from 1882. A major flood in 1898 affected more than a million people. This was followed by a severe drought in 1900. The Boxers blamed the foreigners, saying that Western technology and the construction of Christian churches had angered the traditional spirits.

*The role and motivation of the Empress Ci Xi in encouraging the Boxers:* The Boxer uprising was a peasant movement, but the entire affair would have been different had it not been for the Dowager Empress Ci Xi. She had taken power from her nephew in a palace coup in 1898 as part of a reaction against the reforms that were attempted during the famous 100 Days of Reform. It is fair to say we will never know Ci Xi. Her rise to power was based upon plots, lies, half-truths, bluff, murder, sexual favours and sexual blackmail. She supported the Boxers as they attempted to kill all the foreigners in Beijing, but the Western armies arrived and defeated the Boxers. Nevertheless, Ci Xi, in later years, had no trouble convincing some of the women she would have happily seen butchered that she was a kind and tender person.

As the Boxers began their attacks, the Western powers were slow to realise that the Dowager Empress intended to support the Boxer raids. Ci Xi hoped to use the Boxers to either drive out the foreigners or at least
loosen their grip on China. Her decision was influenced by a number of hard-line, anti-foreign conservatives at court, notably Prince Tuan (T'uan). With hindsight, support for the Boxers was the greatest single political miscalculation of Ci Xi's life. Nevertheless, it proved to be a typically devious tactic and even though the Boxers failed, she survived. If the Boxers had failed badly from the outset, she could have turned on them instantly and denounced them as local bandits; yet when the Boxers had some early success, causing the foreigners to complain, she replied that they were outlaws and she was trying to control them. If the Boxers succeeded she would take the credit; if the Boxers failed they would take the blame. Even though the Dowager Empress was manipulative in the extreme, Ci Xi also genuinely responded to the feelings of the people.

1.2.2.5. The nature, extent and impact of the rebellion

From May of 1900 Boxer raids increased. As a response, 2100 foreign troops under the British admiral, Seymour, moved towards Beijing from Tianjin by rail to help defend the diplomatic legations. They came under attack by Boxers and only got half way; they had to fight their way back to Tianjin. Between June 13 and 14 the Boxers attacked Christians and foreigners in Beijing and Tianjin. The Qing government told the foreigners that their diplomats in Beijing were well-defended by Imperial troops and there was no need to send troops. On 20 June Clemens von Ketteler, the German minister in Beijing, was killed by Boxers. The following day the Dowager Empress declared war on all the foreign powers. The Imperial court authorised the Boxer attack on the foreign diplomats in Beijing, suggesting four possible motives for this action. The court wanted to: vent anger against the foreigners, stir up patriotic feeling among the Chinese people, remove the foreign military presence from the Qing capital and finally perhaps eliminate foreigners as possible witnesses to Imperial involvement.

The siege of the diplomatic legations in Beijing lasted from 29 June until 14 August, when Indian troops, part of the British Army, broke through to relieve them. There were 475 civilians inside the diplomatic compound, with 450 troops from all nations and 3000 Chinese Christians. There were also 150 racing ponies. The ponies were important because they provided the defenders with a supply of fresh meat. During the course of the siege sixty-six foreigners were killed and 150 wounded. As with all of China’s other clashes with the West, the Boxer uprising was crushed by superior foreign weaponry and technology. The Boxers, despite all their rituals, were not invulnerable to bullets. By the time the uprising was brought under control, however, 250 missionaries across China had been killed.

When the foreign troops arrived in Beijing, Ci Xi was smuggled to safety. After the peace terms were arranged she returned to the capital. Qing officials promoted the myth that the uprising had been a rebellion, with the hope of limiting the penalty the Western powers might impose. The Qing propaganda was only partly successful. The terms of the settlement, known as the Boxer Protocol, were that; ten high Qing officials were executed and 100 others were punished. The area of the legation in Beijing was enlarged and more troops brought in to defend it. An indemnity or fine of $333 million was to be paid by China over forty years.

It could have been worse. The Boxer uprising was limited to northern China. Chinese officials in other parts of the country had managed to ignore Ci Xi’s call for war. As a result, a peace treaty was made that kept foreign troops out of key regions in central and southern China.

1.2.2.6. The consequences of the Rebellion

The Boxer uprising has been described as a catastrophe, based on the fact that despite the loss of life the Boxers appeared to change very little. The uprising seemed to be a desperate and fanatical response by peasants to forces beyond their comprehension or control. It resulted in the Chinese people facing an even greater tax burden, as the Imperial government raised the money to pay the massive indemnities imposed by the foreign powers. In the short term it was a catastrophe; however, in the longer term the Boxer Rebellion triggered some major historical changes. The Boxers did have a victory of sorts. Their action prevented the foreign powers from going through with the partition of China; without the Boxers, China may well have been carved up in 1900.

The Boxer uprising was also a clear reflection of an emerging nationalist movement, which transformed China in the twentieth century. The decisions made by Ci Xi and her court during the uprising indicated that the Qing dynasty was incapable of ruling China. The Boxer Rebellion accelerated demands for reform and revolution. The overthrow of the Qing in 1911 can be traced back to the uprising of 1898-1900.
1.2.3. The Hundred Days Reform, 1898

The Hundred Days' Reform was a failed 104-day national cultural, political and educational reform movement from 11 June to 21 September 1898 in late Qing dynasty China. It was undertaken by the young Guangxu Emperor and his reform-minded supporters. The movement proved to be short-lived, ending in a coup d'état ("The Coup of 1898") by powerful conservative opponents led by Empress Dowager Ci xi.

1.2.3.1. Causes and Background

The advocacy of institutional reform by progressive officials: During the Self-Strengthening period (1862-1894), China developed Western techniques and military technologies. Yet several more progressive officials like Feng Kuei-fen-o already argued that for real self-strengthening, China should develop basic Western institutions that gave rise to those techniques and military technologies. Such an advocacy formed an underlying cause for the 1898 reform.

The reform-minded scholars' recognition of the inadequacy of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860-1894): Ever since 1885, when Qing China was defeated by France in Indo-China, more and more scholar-officials knew the Self-Strengthening Movement was inadequate to save China. Institutional reform was really necessary. Although officials like Chang Chih-tung (a governor-general) and Weng T'ung-ho (an imperial teacher) were Confucian conservatives, they nevertheless advocated a limited administrative reorganization based on Western methods to supplement the traditional, basic Chinese political structure. Weng himself had advocated war against Japan in 1894. But with China's defeat, he realized that changes more fundamental than those of the Self-Strengthening period were necessary.

The introduction of Western ideas of reform by foreign missionaries and Treaty Port: Besides preaching their religion, foreign missionaries, especially the British and American Protestants, introduced Western knowledge and culture to China. They established schools, gave public lectures, opened libraries, and published newspapers and magazines. In particular, missionary schools educated many of the late Qing's reform-minded intellectuals. By 1889, some 16,000 Chinese had studied in such schools. Through discussions, foreign missionaries convinced quite a number of Chinese scholars and officials of the need for reform. Indeed, K'ang Yu-wei, the most important reformer in the 1898 Reform, admitted that many of his ideas on reform came from missionaries.

Through the treaty ports also Western ideas of reform were introduced in China as western social and political ideas were most easily learnt by the Chinese who lived in treaty ports and cities. In treaty ports, a new Chinese intellectual class began to appear. In the International Settlement of Shanghai, for example, where foreigners enjoyed self rule free from the Qing government's control, these Chinese intellectuals had the opportunity of observing Western institutions firsthand and the freedom to learn foreign things. They convinced other Chinese scholars outside the treaty ports of the need for institutional reform. Owing to the increased penetration of European goods and ideas' South China was more progressive than the north. It was hardly an accident that K'ang Yu-wei's native place was in Kwangtung.

The rise of a generation of politically conscious and more progressive minded young scholars: Translations of Western books on a variety of subjects were abundant in late 19th-century China. They were read by many young Chinese scholars, who therefore became increasingly reform-minded. The improved communications between different places helped in the growth and spread of national consciousness among Chinese scholars. To a certain extent, educational reforms before 1894 made it possible for Chinese students to receive a Western-style education. Traditionally speaking, the scholar class in China had the responsibility of saving the country in time of crisis. With the repeated national humiliations that China suffered after 1840, the young scholars became especially sensitive to national problems and were ready to defend their country. By the late 1880s, this generation of progressively minded young scholars had already become a considerable political force.

The effects of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895): China's quick defeat in the Sino-Japanese War further convinced many Chinese scholar-officials that more fundamental reform was both urgent and necessary. The humiliating treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 aroused much public anger in China. Some 600 young students
from all over China signed a 'Ten Thousand Words Memorial' that rejected the Shimonoseki agreement and advocated institutional reform. The leader was K'ang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei). Despite the official and traditional prohibition against any political grouping, young scholars began to form associations known as hsueh-hui (study societies) to save the country. After 1895, many patriotic societies of this kind appeared. Their local branches spread over the provinces. These societies had four aims; to urge the Qing government to reform its institutions, to carry out reform activities in the provinces, to popularize Western ideas by translating more Western and Japanese books and publishing newspapers to advocate such ideas and to fight against Christianity by changing Confucianism into a state religion.

Social programs were to be worked out to compete with the social welfare measures of Christianity in China. Many of these societies had the support of influential officials like Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung. The younger and idealistic scholars like K'ang Yu-wei, however, were dissatisfied with the limited and moderate reforms carried out by Yuan and Chang in the provinces. These idealistic scholars favoured broader and deeper institutional changes initiated from Peking.

**The effects of the Scramble for Concessions (1895-1899):** Foreign imperialism was intensified in the Scramble for Concessions. It further showed the necessity and urgency of institutional reform. By 1898, Germany had seized Kiaochow from China, and other powers were fighting for their own spheres of influence. K'ang Yu-wei repeatedly wrote memorials to the Qing court to advocate institutional reform. Many such reform proposals were circulated in Peking among the young scholars.

**The political struggle within the Qing court:** Meanwhile, a political struggle took place between the Kwang-hsu (Guangxu) Emperor and his aunt, the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi (Cixi), within the Qing court. Although Kwang-hsu was the Emperor, real power was held by Tz'u-hsi. A 'northern' group of conservatives like Hsü Tung supported the Empress, while a 'southern' group led by Weng Tung-ho supported the Emperor. Although both agreed on the need for reform, the two groups struggled for the leadership. The Northern Party attempted to bring Chang Chih-tung to Peking to lead the movement. This led the Southern Party to call in many reform-minded young scholars, including K'ang Yu-wei, to support itself. There were the following reasons; firstly, since K'ang Yu-wei advocated political centralization, reforms undertaken by him would strengthen the Emperor's power and weaken the Empress Dowager's influence. Second, young scholars would not readily challenge the leadership of the more senior officials in the Southern Party. Third, Weng Tung-ho was himself attracted by K'ang Youwei's progressive reform proposals and finally members of the Southern Party like Weng Tung-ho knew little about Western ideas and institutions.

Consequently, Weng Tung-ho introduced K'ang to the Emperor Kwang-hsu. The Emperor began reading Feng Kuei-fen's ideas of institutional reform and Western translations as early as the late 1880s. The Emperor was deeply impressed by K'ang's reform ideas and was more and more determined to put into effect institutional changes. Dissatisfied with the Empress Dowager's continued domination over the Qing court, Kwang-hsu intended to make use of a reform movement led by himself to regain power, though on the other hand he really wanted to save China. On June 11, 1898, he issued the first reform decree, telling the people to learn foreign knowledge. The Hundred Day Reform had begun.

### 1.2.3.2. Motives, Contents and Results of Reform

**Motives of Reform:** The Emperor and the young reformers like K'ang Yu-wei believed that institutional reform and more fundamental changes would strengthen China's defense against Western imperialism. Institutional reform was of two kinds such as a new educational structure would replace the old, traditional one, so that the people would become modern citizens of a modern nation like Meiji Japan and secondly the political system would be re-organized to achieve a greater degree of efficiency. K'ang Yu-wei, however, expected more changes. He intended to establish a constitutional and parliamentary government for China. All other reform measures, to K'ang, were secondary to political modernization. Another motive of the old scholar-officials like Weng Tung-ho, the reform movement was also part of the struggle for power within the Qing court. Although most of the young scholar-reformers advocated reform out of patriotic reasons, it could not be denied that the reform movement was an opportunity for these young men to advance to positions of power in the government.
Contents of Reforms: From June to September 1898, K'ang Yu-wei and his young followers prepared many edicts and decrees for the Emperor to sign. Some 200 or so reform decrees were issued in quick succession. A broad program for 'reform of institutions' was attempted. The reform measures included the following:

**Educational Reforms**

a) Abolition of the 'Eight-legged essay' in the Civil Service Examinations. (The Eight legged essay required the students to have a good memory and frequent practice. Creativity and knowledge of current social and political problems were not necessary.) Introduction of a new syllabus based on current political and economic problems.

b) Abolition of swordsmanship and marksmanship in the military examinations. Introduction of a new syllabus based on knowledge of modern military tactics.

c) Opening of a special examination on political economy.

d) Establishment of an Imperial University in Peking. Founding of a medical school under it.

e) Establishment of primary and secondary schools in the provinces for the study of both Chinese and Western subjects. Change of traditional private schools into modern government schools. Change of Buddhist temples into public schools.

**Government administration**

a) Abolition of sinecure posts (jobs with a salary but involving no work) and unnecessary offices, including the governorships of a few provinces.

b) Appointment of progressive-minded officials in government.

c) Introduction of stricter disciplines for civil servants. Measures to check corruption.

d) Improvement in administrative efficiency by removing delays and by developing a new, simplified administrative procedure. Creation of 12 new Ministries to replace the old 6 Boards (traditionally responsible for top government administration in Peking).

e) Encouragement of reform suggestions from private citizens.

**Military reform**

a) Reorganization and modernization of the army.

b) Founding of militia forces (part-time soldiers for local self-defense).

**Economic reform**

a) Promotion of railway construction.

b) Promotion of agricultural, industrial and commercial developments. Founding of banks.

c) Encouragement of inventions.

d) Preparation of a government budget.

**Others**

a) Visits to foreign countries by high officials.

b) Improvement and simplification of law codes.

**Results of Reforms**

The reform movement only lasted for 103 days. Most of the reform decrees were not carried out. Only in the province of Hunan, where there was a governor sympathetic to the reform, was a serious attempt made to put into effect the Emperor's decrees. In the rest of the empire, reform measures met with either passive non-cooperation or outright resistance. Some officials were willing but had not the ability to carry out the reform. Many officials did not even understand the reform measures. At first, the Empress Dowager and other high officials like Chang Chih-tung and Weng Tung-ho were not opposed to the idea of reform. But as conservatives, they disliked the radical changes proposed by K'ang and the Emperor. Opposition to the reform grew. Many top conservative officials, eunuchs and Manchu begged the Empress Dowager to take over power and rule herself so as to stop the reform movement.

The young reformers feared that the Empress Dowager would sooner or later interfere and depose the Emperor. They therefore planned to carry out a palace revolt by capturing the Empress. They asked Yuan Shih-k'ai to support them with troops. However, Yuan betrayed the Emperor and the reformers by telling the Empress Dowager everything about the intended revolt.
The Empress Dowager immediately imprisoned the Emperor, took over the government, and gave orders to arrest the reformers, six of whom were captured and killed. K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Liang Qichao) were, however, warned in time to escape abroad. Most of the reform measures were cancelled such as the Eight-legged essay and the abolished governorships were restored, study societies (hsueh-hui) were prohibited. The government press was closed. The people were forbidden to make suggestions to the government. However, the Peking Imperial University and some of the provincial schools that had been established were allowed to remain. Some unnecessary offices were really abolished. The Empress Dowager opposed only the radical methods and nature of reform by men like K'ang Yu-wei, not the idea of reform itself.

1.2.3.3. Reasons for the failure of the hundred day reforms

The Boxer rebellion became a failure because of the following reasons.

Reform on paper: Many of the reform measures were not put into practice.

Opposition to the reform: The reforms attacked both Chinese tradition and the self-interests of many people. The conservatives felt that the political tradition of the dynasty had been violated by the reforms. They felt that K'ang and his followers intended to destroy Chinese culture. The Empress Dowager and her followers believed that the reform was just an excuse used by the Emperor and K'ang Yu-wei to struggle for political power. The abolition of the Eight-legged essay, together with changes in the educational system, ruined the future of students who had been preparing for the traditional government examinations. The abolition of sinecure posts and governorships ruined the future of many officials. The appointment of young, new and progressive minded scholars to the government endangered the political career of many existing officials. When promotion was not based on seniority but on real ability; the old and inefficient officials felt that their career prospect would be endangered. Even Li Hung-chang lost some important power because of the administrative changes.

Many Manchus believed that the new reform measures were especially directed against them, because quite a number of conservative Manchu officials had been dismissed from the Central government; all the young reformers were Chinese; K'ang Yu-wei came from South China, where there was a strong anti-Manchu tradition. Besides, the Manchus were jealous of the Chinese reformers, who were trusted by the Emperor. Changes in the military forces threatened the privileges and livelihood of the Manchu banner men and the Chinese Green Standard Army (traditional Qing armies). The attack on corruption was unwelcome by those officials who got rich by this unlawful practice. Palace eunuchs who were favoured by Tz'u-hsi feared that administrative reforms would reveal their practice of corruption. The change of Buddhist temples into public schools angered the Buddhist monks and priests.

The lack of effective political power: Without strong political power, no reform could be effectively carried out.

The Empress Dowager's powerful influence at the Qing court: Although the Empress nominally retired in 1889, she was still in firm control of the Qing court. Her followers controlled top government departments and the imperial armies. Her eunuchs watched every move of the Emperor.

Regional decentralization: Ever since the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), the dynasty's political power had been decentralized. Peking's control over the provinces was getting weak and was on the decline. As a result, the Central government's reform decrees did not receive much attention in the provinces.

Weaknesses of the Study Societies: The Study Societies formed between 1895 and 1898 depended heavily upon official support for their existence. When these societies became too radical, such official support was withdrawn and they quickly fell apart. The young reformers at the Qing court had therefore lost a social power base for support in 1898. They had to depend on Yuan Shih-k'ai's military strength to act against the Empress Dowager. As it happened, Yuan betrayed them.

The inexperience of the reformers: Both K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had no previous experience in administration. Their knowledge of Western institutions was, moreover, limited. In carrying out reforms, they were not tactful enough. In three months' time, they aimed at doing away with all of China's problems at one blow. It was an attempt at achieving too much in too short a period of time. Both the Emperor and the reformers offered
poor leadership for the reform movement. They failed to obtain support and cooperation from the conservative officials.

**Lack of popular support from the common people:** Reformers like K’ang Yu-wei came from the scholar class. They had little contact with and enjoyed no support of the common people.

**K’ang Yu-wei’s radical ideas:** To Confucian conservatives, K’ang was a traitor to Confucianism. Many moderate reformers like Chang Chih-tung were frightened off by K’ang’s radical explanations of the Chinese Classics and radical reform programs.

To conclude, many of the reform measures were not actually practiced. But one could doubt whether they would succeed even if they were really put into practice. The Hundred Day Reform was a sharp break with the gradual changes of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The reform movement lacked effective power and experienced leadership. It invited all kinds of opposition.

### 1.2.3.4. Effects of the Hundred Days Reform

**Re-establishment of conservative power:** The failure of the progressive reform attempt in 1898 led to a reestablishment of conservative influence. The Empress Dowager came back with full power to the Qing court and re-appointed die-hard conservative Manchus to top official positions. The introduction of an anti-Chinese policy began, which furthered the growth of anti-Manchu feelings among the Chinese. This indirectly led to the 1911 Revolution.

**Growth of an anti-foreign attitude at the Qing court:** In 1898, as the Empress Dowager tried to arrest the reformers, K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao were helped to escape from China by the British and the Japanese respectively. In addition, foreign ministers in Peking prevented the Empress from dethroning Kuang-hsu and choosing a new Emperor immediately after 1898. Consequently, anti-foreign feelings were strong at the Qing court. This factor partly led to the Boxer Uprising in 1900-01.

**Disappointment with reform as a way to save China:** The failure of the Hundred Day Reform seemed to prove that reform from the top was useless. More and more Chinese came to believe that in order to save China, the Manchu dynasty (which opposed change) must be overthrown, and revolution from the bottom must be carried out. This contributed to the growth of Sun Yat-sen’s (Sun Yixian) revolutionary movement.

**Way for continued reform efforts:** Although the Empress Dowager was opposed to the Hundred Day Reform, the reform measures that were introduced had an unforgettable impression on her. After the Boxer Uprising of 1900-01, the Empress announced an official reform movement on her own. Reform measures similar to the 1898 ones were carried out between 1901 and 1911. In short, the Hundred Day Reform quickened the Empress Dowager’s decision in favour of institutional reform. Some of the 1898 reforms were allowed to continue. They paved the way for the Late Qing Reform (1901-1911). The movement for constitutional government continued. After the 1898 failure, K’ang Yu-wei formed an important political group in Japan to advocate constitutional rule. Liang, on the other hand, began to become an influential political writer. Although the idea of constitutional rule was not actually put into practice in 1898, it was at least introduced to China. This made it easier for the adoption of constitutional government in the Late Qing Reform (1901-1911). The advocacy of constitutional government brought with it ideas of people’s rights which indirectly helped the revolutionary movement.

**Beginning of mass political movements in China:** The establishment of Study Societies from 1895 to 1898 marked the beginning of Modern China’s mass political movements. Whereas scholars in the past had been traditionally unwilling to form political associations and had kept themselves from being involved in political matters, they voluntarily joined societies of a political nature after 1895. The scholar class was increasingly active in politics, a trend that continued from 1901 onwards. This made it easier for the creation of local political assemblies in the constitutional program of the Late Qing Reform (1901-1911).

**Birth of modern Chinese nationalism:** The enthusiastic organization of nation-saving groups like the Study Societies represented the beginning of Chinese nationalism among the young Confucian scholars. Nationalistic consciousness among them grew. In addition, high Qing officials began to use a new, nationalistic
policy in foreign matters. They were conscious of China's national rights in dealing with foreign powers. Concessions made to foreign powers were held to the minimum.

1.2.4. Conclusion

The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) was fought between China under Qing Dynasty and Japan under the famous Meiji rule for the control of Korea. The Japanese defeated the Chinese. The war clearly demonstrated the failure of the Qing dynasty's attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats to its sovereignty. For the first time, regional dominance in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; the prestige of the Qing Dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow. The humiliating loss of Korea as a vassal state sparked an unprecedented public outcry. Within China, the defeat was a catalyst for a series of political upheavals led by Sun Yat-Sen and Kang Youwei, culminating in the 1911 Revolution. Another major political upheaval took place in the late 19th century China was Boxer Rebellion of 1898-1900. The Boxers were not in fact 'boxers'; they were a semi-religious peasant group. The Boxers, in fact, wanted to support the Qing, but were opposed to foreign influence in all forms and wanted to drive the foreigners, their works and their Christian religion out of China. The Boxer gained worldwide attention during the siege of the western legations, when they surrounded the diplomatic residences of the Western powers in Beijing. Eight foreign nations combined to lift the siege. Although the Boxers failed to drive out the foreigners, the uprising remains ‘an important episode in the emergence of mass nationalism in China’. Another important incidents in the then China was the Hundred Days' Reform, a failed 104-day national cultural, political and educational reform movement from 11 June to 21 September 1898 in late Qing dynasty China. It was undertaken by the young Guangxu Emperor and his reform-minded supporters. The movement proved to be short-lived, ending in a coup d'état by powerful conservative opponents led by Empress Dowager Ci xi.

1.2.5. Summary

- The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) was fought between China under Qing Dynasty and Japan under the famous Meiji rule to control over Korea.
- The war clearly demonstrated the failure of the Qing dynasty's attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats to its sovereignty, especially compared with Japan’s successful post-Meiji restoration. For the first time, regional dominance in East Asia shifted from China to Japan.
- The prestige of the Qing Dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow.
- The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895, between the Empire of Japan and the Qing Empire, ending the First Sino-Japanese War.
- The Boxer Rebellion of 1898-1900 is one of the best known aspects of Chinese history. The Boxers were not in fact ‘boxers’; they were a semi-religious peasant group. The name came from the ritual gymnastic-like movements that were part of their preparation for battle.
- The Boxers were mostly peasants from Shandong and Zhili in northern China. The Boxer homeland was ‘a poor agricultural region, densely populated, but particularly prone to both natural and human disasters’.
- The Boxer uprising was also a clear reflection of an emerging nationalist movement, which transformed China in the twentieth century.
- The Hundred Days' Reform was a failed 104-day national cultural, political and educational reform movement from 11 June to 21 September 1898 in late Qing dynasty China.

1.2.6. Exercise

1. What key events led to the siege of the foreign legations in Beijing?
2. What were the four main factors that led to the emergence of the Boxers?
3. Discuss the clauses and significance of treaty of Shimonoseki.
4. What are the causes responsible for outbreak of first Sino-Japanese War?
5. What is Hundred Day Reforms? How and what are the reforms it brought in China? Discuss.

1.2.7. Further Reading

• Teng S. & Fairbank J.K., China’s Response to the West, Atheneum, New York, 1968

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Unit-1
Chapter-3
NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN CHINA
Proclamation of the Republic; Career and Achievements of Sun Yat Sen

Structure
1.3.0. Objective
1.3.1. Introduction
1.3.2. Rise of Chinese Nationalism
1.3.3. Background of Chinese Nationalism:
1.3.4. Causes of the Revolution of 1911
1.3.5. Course of the Revolution of 1911
1.3.6. Consequences of the Revolution of 1911
1.3.7. Career and Achievements of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen
   1.3.7.1. Early Life of Sun Yat-sen:
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   1.3.7.4. Travels in Foreign Countries:
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1.3.8. Conclusion
1.3.9. Summary
1.3.10. Exercise
1.3.11. Further Reading
1.3.0. Objectives

In this lesson, students investigate nationalist movement in China. After completing this chapter, you will be able:

- to understand the social origin of the Revolution of 1911 by tracing the growth of nationalism in China.
- to evaluate the transformation of Dr Sun Yat-sen into a reformer and revolutionary.
- to review the causes, course and consequences of the Revolution of 1911 in China.
- to know about the proclamation of republic.
- to assess the growth of the Kuomintang Party and the Nationalist Government under Dr Sun Yat-sen.

1.3.1. Introduction:

At the turn of the twentieth century China was ripe for revolution. The weakness of the Manchu dynasty, foreign imperialism and economic exploitation, influence of Western liberal ideas, increasing population and pressure on cultivable land which was in short supply, impoverishment of the peasants due to high taxation and natural calamities became the underlying causes of the Revolution of 1911. However, it is important to note that the real basis of the Chinese revolutionary movement was rooted in the Confucian teaching. According to Confucianism the Chinese emperor ruled under the ‘mandate of heaven’. In return for his autocratic power the emperor was expected to maintain peace and order and promote prosperity of the people. Under these circumstances it was believed that the emperor has lost the ‘mandate of heaven’ and the people have the right to rebel against him and replace him by another ruler. The conservative society in China was in turmoil due to the impact of the Western imperialism. While the educated and Western influenced section of the Chinese society desired social and other reforms, the conservative section of the society was opposed to radical reforms. However, nationalist sentiments among the young and enlightened sections of the Chinese society gradually began to assert itself which ultimately resulted in the Revolution of 1911 under the dynamic leadership of Dr Sun Yat-Sen. The Revolution of 1911 brought an end to the Manchu dynasty and ushered in an era of republic in China.

1.3.2. Rise of Chinese Nationalism:

The impact of the Western imperialism on the Chinese society was quite different from other parts of Asia. Hence, the rise and nature of nationalism in China and other Asian countries also differed. In Asian countries such as India, Indo-China and Indonesia, the British, the French and the Dutch respectively established their economic and political power.

These European powers had a predominant control over these countries though other European powers had pockets of their influence. These imperial powers gradually replaced the central political authority in these countries. Thus, nationalism in these countries was an outcome of the circumstances created by the imperial powers and national movement was aimed at liberating the country from foreign domination.

However, the Chinese society had to face the twin problem of a weak and outdated monarchy and exploitative imperial powers. The Chinese society considered that the Manchu monarchy was responsible for the internal evils of China and for its failure to resist the military and commercial power of the imperial powers. On the other hand the economic exploitation of the country by the imperial powers through trade, leasehold, and spheres of influence added to the poverty and misery of the Chinese people. Added to this was the national humiliation imposed by the foreign powers through the unequal treaties. The missionary activities and spread of Christianity was viewed by the conservative section of the Chinese society as a challenge to their ancient culture and beliefs. Hence, the rise of Chinese nationalism can be traced to these above factors. The aim of the Chinese national movement was not only to liberate the country from the exploitative foreigners but also to overthrow the weak and inefficient Manchu dynasty and establish a republic.

The methodology of the Chinese nationalism took different forms. These included establishment of secret societies, rebellions directed against both the Manchus and the foreigners, attempts by some scholarly leaders to introduce reforms, and measures to reorganise the army, industry and economy on the model of the Western Powers. The Revolution of 1911 brought an end to the Manchu dynasty and led to the establishment of a republic in China. Following these events attempts were made to bring about national unification by suppressing the
warlords and feudal barons. The second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed the origin and growth of Chinese nationalism.

1.3.3. **Background of Chinese Nationalism:**

**Secret Societies:** The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a number of secret societies in different parts of China. These secret societies propagated anti foreign and anti-Manchu feelings among different sections of the Chinese society. Some of the secret societies were strongly nationalistic. With a view to foment rebellions, these societies recruited unemployed and disaffected youths and provided them military training. The White Lotus Society, a secret society influenced by Buddhism incited a serious rebellion in Central China.

In 1822, a secret society bandit, Small Pax Chu, raised the banner of revolt. In 1830’s members of the secret societies known as the Triads and Yae created trouble in Hunan. The Heaven and Earth Society was the other secret society that was active in China.

**The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864):** The first major anti-Manchu movement was the Taiping Rebellion in the mid nineteenth century. It began in the hills of South China under the leadership of Hung Hsiu Chuan, a religious visionary claiming to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ. The Taiping Rebellion succeeded in establishing a separate rival government, the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping Tien-Kuo), which ruled much of southern China for more than a decade. The Taipings won the support of the local people with a mixture of messianic Christianity and attacks on the non-Chinese Manchu dynasty.

Hung Hsiu Chuan directed his message particularly to his fellow Hakka, who spoke a separate dialect and maintained distinct customs from other Chinese. Hung offered the Hakka salvation through morality and religious organization. To enforce moral purity, he imposed prohibition against alcohol, opium, gambling, promiscuity, banditry, and violence. His Christianity corresponded with the image of the wrathful Old Testament God, who rewarded the virtuous and obedient with heaven while the wicked were punished with hell. Hung’s supporters founded a religious movement around his vision called the Bai Shangdi Hui (God Worshipers’ Society) for worship and mutual protection. By 1853 Hung and his followers had moved north to establish their headquarters at Nanking. For more than a decade they expanded their influence along the Yangtze River and sought to overthrow the Manchu dynasty in Peking. With the help of the local militias led by scholar generals such as Tseng Kuo Fan and Li Hung Chang and with foreign assistance, the Manchus eventually suppressed the Taiping Rebellion in 1864.

In spite of the early end of the Taiping Rebellion, its stunning success for a decade illustrated the unpopularity of the Manchu regime, the weakness of imperial institutions, and the urgent need for a new social vision to overcome the problems of the age. The rebellion seriously weakened the authority of the central government. The ethnic antagonism rekindled by the Taiping Uprising merged with the forces of modern nationalism to bring an end to China’s imperial regime less than fifty years after the rebellion ended.

**Boxer Uprising (1900):** Following the Taiping Rebellion attempts were made to introduce reforms in various fields. Tseng Kuo Fan and Li Hung Chang, who were chiefly responsible for the suppression of the Taipings, took a lead in suggesting reforms. However, they could not make much progress due to the resistance from the conservative section of the Chinese society led by the Dowager Empress. Similarly, the ‘Hundred Days Reforms’ were also abandoned. The promoter of the reforms, Emperor Kuang Hsu was imprisoned and the brain behind the reforms, Kang Yu Wei went into exile. Within a short period following the end of the Hundred Days Reforms another crisis shook China in the form of the notorious Boxer Uprising. This uprising manifested the reaction of the conservative section of the Chinese society to the adverse effects of Western imperialism.

The Boxer Uprising was directed first against foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians, and then against the Western diplomats themselves. The Boxers originally had anti-Manchu feelings. However, the Dowager Empress and the royal court made a common cause with the Boxers against the foreigners and missionaries. With a certain degree of support from the Manchu court the boxers became openly pro-dynastic and made an alliance with anti-foreign officials. In June 1900, the Boxers launched an uprising by attacking missionaries and foreigners in general. Shantung, Chihli, Shansi and Manchuria were the chief provinces affected.
by the Boxer Uprising. The Boxers manifested their anti-foreign sentiments by uprooting the railroads and telegraphs, burning churches and massacring missionaries and Chinese converts to Christianity. Emboldened by the success of the Boxers the Manchu government declared war on the foreigners on 21 June 1901. Being encouraged by the government the Boxers attacked the foreign legations at Peking. A joint force of the major Western Powers and Japan marched into Peking, defeated the Boxers and the government army, and extracted a massive indemnity from the Chinese government through a settlement known as the Boxer Protocol (1901).

The Boxer Uprising was a manifestation of anti-foreign influence in China. The Chinese considered the foreigners responsible for the sufferings of the Chinese society. They aimed at destroying the foreigners along with their machines and inventions, their 'strange and intolerant religion' and their air of superiority. The Boxer Uprising profoundly influenced China's political future. The strong hatred of the Boxers against the foreigners put a check on their attempt at the dismemberment of China. It hastened the conservative Manchu reform programme under the Dowager Empress with a view to strengthen and preserve the dynasty. Although the dynasty survived till 1911, its fate was sealed by the Boxer Rebellion. As such the Boxer Rebellion can be considered as a catalyst in the march of China towards the goal of nationhood.

1.3.4. Causes of the Revolution of 1911

Decline of the Manchu Dynasty: The Manchu dynasty that had been ruling China from 1644 was facing decay and decline since the close of the eighteenth century. Succession of a number of weak and inefficient rulers including minors led to the degeneration of the monarchy. In the late nineteenth century there was lack of capable Manchu leadership. The royal court and palace were filled by women, eunuchs and cliques of inefficient and corrupt officials and courtiers. Under these circumstances, the Manchu emperors could not provide the desirable leadership to the country. The affairs of the state fell into neglect. Inertia, inefficiency and corruption marked the administrative system. The civil service sank into corruption and indolence. Absence of central control extended misadministration and corruption in the provinces. The common people in the provinces became victims of bribery, extortion, miscarriage of justice and man-made famines.

As politics was so corrupt and demoralized, political power could no longer be centralized in Peking. Political decentralization as such had been growing serious since the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). At that time, the Manchu court permitted the creation of regional armies for suppressing rebellions. These regional armies were locally based, financed by local money, and trained to obey local provincial officials like Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang. Peking's control over them was ineffective. This factor partly explained why the provinces declared independence in 1911. The weakness of the Manchu dynasty was revealed by its failure to prevent the Western penetration in China through the treaty-port system and other privileges independent of the Chinese control. The Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion exposed the military weakness of the Manchu government and accelerated the decline of the dynasty.

Economic and Social Causes: Long years of peace in the early and mid Manchu period had contributed to a rapid rise in China’s population. Over population exerted an increasing pressure on cultivable land which was limited in amount and was concentrated in powerful landlords. The people were forbidden by law to move to Manchuria and other places outside China to find alternative land or means of livelihood. Moreover, lack of industrialization result in mass unemployment. As a result, more people only meant greater social poverty and inequality. As society was poor, the taxes that the Manchu government could collect were limited in amount. Corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy affected the peasants the most. The tax collectors exploited the illiterate peasantry by collecting two to three times the assessed taxes. This miserable condition alienated the mass of the peasantry from the Manchu government.

Economic depressions were caused due to recurring natural calamities such as floods and famines. Absentee landlordism and ruin of domestic industries added to the impoverishment of the peasants and craftsmen. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century cheap foreign manufactured goods began to penetrate deeper into China, which nearly wiped out rural industries. Without any alternative occupation, the rural population had to depend entirely on age old agrarian economy to sustain itself. The Chinese treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy. China had to spend large amount of money on modernization. Heavy war reparation that China had to
pay to Japan following her defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and much heavier Boxer indemnity not only depleted the Chinese exchequer, but also heavily drained the resources of the country. This prompted the government to further burden the people with additional taxes that increased discontent and disaffection against the Manchus.

Failure of the Reform Programmes: The major reform programme, known as the 'Hundred Days Reforms', inaugurated by Emperor Kuang Hsu under the guidance of Kang Yu-wei in 1898, saw an early and inglorious end due to conservative opposition. The conservative reaction to the reforms led by the Dowager Empress, Tsu Hsi confirmed the widespread suspicion among the educated Chinese that the ruling dynasty was not interested in reforms and regeneration of China. The radical elements in southern part of China and the Chinese exiles abroad became convinced that for the reforms and revitalization of China, the alien Manchu dynasty has to be overthrown.

Consequences of the Manchu Reforms: In a few years, the Dowager Empress, Tsu Hsi, by force of circumstances realized that the survival of the dynasty depended on a certain degree of reforms. Thus, she moved rather cautiously towards the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. In order to bring about this transformation Tsu Hsi undertook essential and far-reaching administrative, judicial, and fiscal reforms. Proposals were put forward to create a modern army, to support industrial development and to abolish the traditional civil service examinations and to promote a new educational system. But these efforts were too little and came too late and these reforms only served to boomerang on the fortunes of the dynasty. The Manchu reforms were seen as a further evidence of the weakness of the dynasty. The government was forced to grant concessions due to the pressure of public opinion. These reforms eventually undermined the established order. Institutions of higher education that once had turned out Confucian scholar-officials now began to graduate revolutionaries. In the newly raised army and military schools, patriotic young officers driven by nationalism began to espouse revolution.

Development of the Chinese industry on modern lines gave rise to a new class, that of merchants as well as scholar-officials. Their needs and values differed from those of the old ruling class. Representatives of this emerging class could make their presence felt in the newly created provincial assemblies, which became natural centers of political agitation. One of the aims of the Manchu reform programmes was to strengthen the authority of the central government over the provinces. The common people and provincial bureaucrats resented this limitation on the traditional rights and privileges of the local bodies.

Spread of Western Education: Western education in China, though limited gradually began to influence the Chinese youth with Western ideas. Through missionary efforts and via treaty-ports, modern ideas such as democracy and republicanism were introduced to and popularized among Chinese intellectuals. These progressive young people were greatly influenced by examples of great European revolutions such as the French Revolution of 1789 and national unifications such as the Italian and German Unification of 1871. To find better prospects prompted a large number of Chinese to immigrate to foreign countries. These overseas Chinese came in contact with new Western ideas. They were influenced by liberal ideas such as liberty, equality and fraternity, republicanism and democracy. Many Chinese went into exile or were sent as trainees to neighbouring Japan. Chinese revolutionaries who were in self-exile in Japan secretly tried to undermine their loyalty to the Manchu dynasty. Foreign education gradually promoted the growth of patriotic and anti-Manchu revolutionary feelings among the Chinese educated class. By providing modern education to its prospective official class, the Manchu dynasty signed its own death warrant.

Death of Emperor Kuang Hsu and Tsu Hsi: On 14 November, 1908, Kuang Hsu, the emperor of China, who had been kept virtually as a state prisoner by the Dowager Empress following the end of the 'Hundred Days reforms' died at Peking. On the next day, 15 November, the Dowager herself was suddenly taken ill and died within few hours. The myth of Manchu dynasty was kept alive by proclaiming a great-nephew of the Dowager, through her sister's daughter, Aisin Gioro Pu Yi, a child of three years, as the next emperor. The child emperor succeeded under the reign title of Hsuan Tung, meaning ‘extended rule’. The new Regent, Prince Chun, father of the child Emperor, was the younger brother of the late emperor Kuang Hsu. He was a weak and incompetent man. However, he had resented the virtual deposition and confinement of his brother and attributed his fall to the
treachery of Yuan Shi-kai, a prominent general, who commanded the most modern formations of the Chinese army. The Regent's first act was to dismiss Yuan. He was strongly influenced by the extreme Manchu party at the court, who distrusted all Chinese ministers and officials. He sought to counter the effects of the constitutional reform programme by appointing his relatives as the chief ministers. Under these circumstances the people as a whole, or rather the educated classes did not put much faith in Manchu promises of reform.

**Role of Dr. Sun Yat-sen:** The movement for a revolution and republic had begun fifteen years before the events in 1911. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a Western educated convert to Methodist Christianity became the chief architect of the Revolution of 1911. After failing to impress the then all-powerful viceroy, Li Hung Chang, in a plan for reform, had started to conspire against the dynasty and made an unsuccessful attempt to capture political power in the city of Canton in 1895. Dr. Sun was forced to flee China. Dr. Sun Yat-sen moved between Hong Kong, Malaya, Japan, and America. He spent his time and used his influence for raising funds and winning recruits for a revolution. Most of the financial support for the revolutionaries came from the overseas Chinese, especially from successful businessmen. They were generous in their contributions to a revolutionary movement, which they regarded as essentially a nationalist and modernizing movement.

In 1905, Dr. Sun organized a secret revolutionary society at Tokyo called the Tung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance). Its chief aim was to propagate revolutionary ideas among the numerous Chinese students who had come to Japan to gain modern education. Between 1906 and 1911, the followers of Dr. Sun Yatsen failed in ten armed uprisings against the Manchu dynasty. None of these efforts attracted sufficient number of participants. However, the revolutionaries did not give up their hope of future success. Following the failure of the tenth major uprising at Canton on 27 April 1910, Dr. Sun Yat-sen left Japan and travelled first in Southeast Asia to rally support among the overseas Chinese. Later, he proceeded to the United States to win support to his revolutionary activities and raise additional funds from the Chinese residents.

**Immediate Cause-Railway Nationalization:** The final crisis that brought about the Revolution of 1911 was a dispute over the control of China's railway. Many Chinese regarded foreign control of the railway network as one of the major threats to Chinese independence. The Chinese acquired the right to build some key lines returned by the foreigners to the Chinese ownership. Members of the local gentry had put up substantial amount of capital for railroad construction. Meanwhile, the provincial assemblies constituted as per the Manchu reform programme, became the watchdogs of provincial rights as against those of the central government. Early in 1911, the private railway construction rights in Central, South and Southwestern China were taken away by the central government through a decree for the nationalization of the railways. The chief reason for this move was to mortgage these railway lines to foreign banks against a loan of six million pounds taken from a consortium of American, British, French and German bankers.

The agitation began as a 'Movement for the Protection of the Railroad'. The nationalization of the provincial railroads decreed in May 1911 touched a sensitive nerve in Sichuan and several central provinces. It was this move that set off the explosion resulting in the Revolution of 1911. Nationalization meant the intrusion of Western capital in a business matter that should have been purely Chinese and provincial. People belonging to different classes in Sichuan were united by a nationalist movement that was anti-Western in intent, anti-Manchu in fact, opposed to absolutism, and already revolutionary. As the news of the disturbances spread all over central and southern China, secret revolutionary societies, including Dr. Sun Yat-sen's considering the situation appropriate redoubled their efforts at a major insurrection.

**Hankow Incident and Wuchang Mutiny:** On October 10, 1911, an explosion occurred in a house in the Russian concession in the Yangtze treaty port of Hankow. The police investigation found that this house was an arsenal and headquarters of the revolutionaries. The police captured several of the ringleaders and seized a number of papers including a list of members of the Tung Meng Hui, the secret revolutionary society of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Thus, the revolutionaries decided to stage an uprising immediately rather than wait to be arrested. When the officers of the Wuchang garrison learned what had happened at Hankow, went at night to the bedroom of their commander, General Li Yuan Hung, a loyal monarchist. The officers roused him at pistol point and gave him the
choice of leading a revolution or death. Li chose revolution. On the morning of 12 October, 1911, the dragon flag of the Manchu dynasty was hauled down in Wuchang. This was the beginning of the Revolution of 1911 in China.

1.3.5. Course of the Revolution of 1911

Spread of the Revolution: Throughout Southern China the garrisons revolted and set up independent administration. In most cities the change was peaceful. In some provinces the imperial governors supported the revolution. Less than two months later all the provinces of Central and Southern China, along with the Northwest, had proclaimed their independence. In Western China, where some of the provincial capitals had Manchu resident garrisons, the revolution took violent turn. In Sian, capital of Shensi, the Manchus were systematically massacred by a secret anti-Manchu society called the Society of the Elder Brethren, which was powerful in Western China. However, the Northern provinces remained loyal to the Manchus. The revolutionary army captured the city of Nanking on 2 December 1911. The revolutionaries proclaimed the establishment of a republic with Nanking as the capital.

Return of Dr Sun Yat-sen from USA: Dr. Sun Yat-sen was in Denver, Colorado (USA) when the revolution broke out in China. He came to know about the event through a newspaper. Dr. Sun Yat-sen decided to return to China to take up the leadership of the revolution. During his return journey, Dr. Sun Yat-sen stopped at London to try to arrange for a loan, but failed. He made another stop at Paris. He finally arrived in Shanghai on 24 December 1911, just to become Provisional President of the Republic of China and took office on 1 January 1912, at Nanking.

Recall of Yuan Shi-kai: The imperial court, in desperation, turned to Yuan Shi-kai. He was the builder of the strongest army that China then possessed. He was considered by the Manchus as the best man to command this army, in spite of his unceremonious ouster from the command four years earlier. Yuan extracted very broad powers from the Manchu court before accepting the command. Being an opportunist, Yuan made a deal with the revolutionaries. Under an agreement with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Yuan supported the transformation of China into a republic and in return demanded the Presidency for himself.

The End of the Manchu Dynasty: The abdication of the Manchu dynasty was effected without resistance. The court was powerless, and was even without money. As soon as he began his secret negotiations, Yuan had seized the imperial treasury and deprived the court of this last resource. He assured the regent that there was no hope in further resistance and the dynasty must abdicate. However, he promised that he would arrange satisfactory and generous terms.

The terms for 'favourable treatment' were included in a treaty signed between the revolutionary republicans and the dynasty. These terms provided that the emperor would legally abdicate this would transfer the government to the republic. In return the emperor could retain his title and his court would have their ranks. Further, the dethroned emperor could retain the imperial palace along with the summer palace and all his private property. He would receive an annual pension of $4,000,000. The abdication took the form of an imperial edict issued on 12 February 1912. Thus, the Revolution of 1911 led to the end of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of the first Republic in China.

Betrayal of the Republic: On 13 February 1912, Dr. Sun Yat-sen resigned as the provisional President of the republic, and on 15 February, Yuan Shi-kai was elected in his place. The president and the executive of the republic remained in Peking. However, the revolutionary council was still in Nanking. It was preoccupied with plans for the election of a parliament and constitutional assembly, which would inaugurate democratic government. Sung Chiao-jen, one of the ablest followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen organized an open parliamentary party named Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist People's Party replacing the revolutionary and secret society the Tung Meng Hui. Yuan Shi-kai, who began to fear that the election would not suit his plans, formed a 'Republican Party'.

In the election that held in February 1913, the Kuomintang won a clear majority. Sung Chiao-jen seemed to be the Prime Minister. This would have drastically reduced Yuan's powers as the President. On 20 March 1913, Sung Chiao-jen was assassinated on Shanghai railway station, probably at Yuan's instigation. The Kuomintang
sympathizers in several central and southern provinces rebelled against Yuan in July, but were easily suppressed. At the end of the year Yuan outlawed the Kuomintang.

In January 1914, he dissolved the parliament. This put an end to parliamentary government in China. Yuan replaced the Parliament by a political council with handpicked members. The political council proposed a new constitution on 1 May 1914, which gave the President all the powers, which the late Empress Dowager had proposed to reserve for the emperor in the constitution she had promised in 1908.

Yuan Shi-kai was moving carefully not only towards establishing dictatorial power, but assuming the imperial title. At the end of 1914 he made a sacrifice to heaven at the Altar of Heaven in Peking, an imperial rite that only an emperor could perform. In the early months of 1915, Yuan assembled a convention. When the convention met in August 1915, it voted for the restoration of the monarchy and invited Yuan Shi-kai to ascend the throne of a new dynasty. The new dynasty was to be proclaimed on New Year's Day 1916. Meanwhile, the First World War was in progress. Taking advantage of the pre-occupation of the Allied powers in Europe, Japan presented the Twenty-one Demands to Yuan Shi-kai. These demands contained proposals not only for Japanese influence over considerable areas of China, but also for the inclusion of Japanese advisers in several important branches of the Chinese government including the police.

Opposition to Yuan's proposed dynastic ambition was gathering momentum. The educated class, the military commanders and provincial governors had their own reasons to resist Yan's claim to imperial title. Disaffection and rebellion spread in various provinces. The troops that were sent against the rebels refused to fight. Under these circumstances Yuan decided to postpone the enthronement until order could be restored. But things were going out of control for Yuan. Provincial governors and military generals deserted him. In a joint telegram they all demanded the abrogation of the new dynasty and monarchy. On 22 March 1916, Yuan Shi-kai gave up the throne, abolished the monarchy, and resumed the Presidency. In spite of this, discontent against Yuan Shi-kai continued. He became ill with worry and disillusionment and died on 6 June 1916. Yuan's career had been a story of betrayals. He had betrayed the emperor, Kuang Hsu. He had betrayed the Manchu dynasty. Finally, he had betrayed Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the republic. His failure and death plunged China into further confusion, civil war, and new developments. However, it marked the end of the first phase of the Chinese Revolution, the failure of democratic republicanism and also an attempt to restore the monarchy.

Revival of the Republic: Immediately after the death of Yuan Shi-kai, the Constitution of 1912 was revived and the republic was restored with Li Yuan Hung, as the new president and Tuan Chi Jui as the prime minister. Tuan Chi Jui dominated the government as the prime minister. He drove out the president with the help of a royalist general following a disagreement between the two on China's entry into the First World War. For a very brief period there was a Manchu revival. The boy emperor, Pu Yi was put back on the throne. However, Tuan threw out the royalists and the restoration soon came to an end. Following four years of turmoil, instability, factionalism, warlordism and foreign interference, especially by Japan, Dr. Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton from his exile from Shanghai.

In 1921 he was re-elected President of the Southern Republic. Another clash between the military groups drove out Sun Yat-sen again from Canton to Shanghai. Repeated failures did not dishearten Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He devoted his time for the reorganization of the Kuomintang (Nationalist People's Party). Analyzing the problems faced by the republic, he began to re-orient his course of action. In order to consolidate the republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen laid down his future course of action - alliance with the Soviet Union, cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party, and promotion of the interests of the workers and the peasants. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's dream of unifying China under the republic could not be realized due to his death on 12 March 1925. This task was achieved by his successor Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government.

1.3.5. Consequences of the Revolution of 1911

The Revolution of 1911 in China can be considered as one of the significant landmarks in the history of China. It produced far reaching consequences in the political, economic and social spheres in China. It marked the end of an era of conservatism and ushered in an age of liberalism and modernism. The consequences or results of the Revolution of 1911 can be summarized as the following:
End of the Manchu Dynasty: Politically speaking, the Revolution of 1911 was a decisive break with the past. For over two thousand years, China had been ruled by the monarchical form of government by successive dynasties, the last being the Manchu dynasty. The revolution of 1911 not only put an end to the Manchu dynasty but to monarchical system of government itself in China. Whereas in the past, the dynasty could claim absolute obedience from its subject people, the Chinese people after 1911 began to learn that sovereignty belonged finally to them and to no one else.

Establishment of Republic: The end of the dynastic monarchy led to the establishment of a republic in China. Republicanism was not a popular political practice at that time in other parts of the world. For example, except for China, there was no republic in Asia in 1911. Even in Europe, there were only two republican governments, one in France and the other in Switzerland. In this way it could be said that the Revolution of 1911 put China ahead of other Asian countries in respect of political advancement.

Diminishing Influence of Confucianism: The political break with the past had far reaching effects on the Chinese society. Negatively, the importance of Confucianism in Chinese society was greatly decreased. The monarchy and political structure had been an inseparable part of Confucianism. The abolition of the monarchy in 1911 manifested that the age old Confucianism was becoming irrelevant with changing times as a political belief. Later, during the May Fourth Revolution in 1919, even Confucianism as a way of life and a body of social thought was under attack. In this way, the 1911 political revolution made way for the 1919 intellectual revolution.

Spread of Westernization and Modernization: Positively, the creation of a Western-style republic speeded up and extended Westernization and modernization in all areas of Chinese social life and culture. The Chinese people were therefore psychologically better prepared to accept new and modern things.

Lack of Social Revolution: In spite of the political revolution, it may be said that socially speaking, the Revolution of 1911 was a failure. First of all the Revolution did not bring about much change in the composition of the Chinese ruling classes. It is true that the emperor and his officials were gone, but the conservative gentry-landlords had not been overthrown. They were still ruling in the countryside. In addition, military officials of the Manchus like Yuan Shih-k'ai remained influential. Revolutionaries and intellectuals, who helped in running the Republic, were powerless in the presence of these conservative forces. Secondly, the Revolution of 1911 was limited to several cities only. It did not affect much of the rural population in China as it came to an end within a short period with the abdication of the last of the Manchu rulers. Thus, the Revolution of 1911 only revolutionized the political system. The social order remained what it had been. Consequently, while the cities were modernized, the villages continued to remain as backward and conservative as ever.

Increased Provincial Decentralization: Once the dynasty had been overthrown, the traditional link between the provinces and Peking was cut. The new Republic was weak and could not establish centralized political power over all China. Consequently, the local-provincial scholar-gentry got itself immersed in local and provincial rather than national affairs. The growth of national consciousness was therefore slowed down. Seen from this angle, the Revolution of 1911 worsened the problem of political decentralization which had started during the later part of the Manchu dynasty.

From anti-Manchuism to anti-Imperialism: Before 1911, Chinese intellectuals could blame the Manchus for all the national and social problems that China suffered. However, following the Revolution of 1911, the Manchus no longer ruled China. Hence, the foreign imperialism became the target of the Chinese nationalists after 1911. As a result, modern Chinese nationalism gradually transformed from anti-Manchuism to anti-imperialism after 1911.

Increased Foreign Influence in China: As the new Chinese Republic was weak and divided, foreign control over China went on increasing after 1911. For example, the foreign diplomats in Peking had taken over the complete direction of China's maritime customs.

Loss of Outer Mongolia and Tibet: The weakness of the republican government in China and the internal conflict between different political factions led to the breakup of China. Territories that traditionally belonged to China such as Outer Mongolia and Tibet declared independence from China after 1911.
Conclusion: A number of factors contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911 in China. The degenerating political, economic and social conditions in China coupled with the failure of the reform programmes brought about a lot of discontent among the Chinese nationalists who were influenced by the Western ideas of nationalism, republicanism and democracy. These nationalist forces were canalized by Dr Sun Yat-sen through his secret societies which finally led to the Revolution of 1911. Within a short period the revolution spread to different provinces of China, especially in Southern and Central regions of the country. Though true Manchu government tried to save the dynasty by recalling one of its trusted generals, Yuan Shi-kat, However, the ambitious general struck a deal with the Dr Sun Yat-sen and forced the last of the Manchu candidates to abdicate in 1912. The developments led to the end of the Manchu dynasty in China and the beginning of the republican form of government.

1.3.6. Career and Achievements of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen

As we noticed in the above paragraphs how Dr. Sun Yat-Sen under his able leadership successfully led a revolution and alter the political history of China. At the turn of 19th century nationalism as a binding force among different sections of the Chinese society still found missing. Under these circumstances it was the turn of the newly emerging middle class to make a fresh attempt to give a new orientation to Chinese nationalism. The leader of the new Chinese nationalism was Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. The following paragraphs will discuss the life and career of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

1.3.6.1. Early Life of Sun Yat-sen:

Sun Yat-sen was born in a village near Canton in 1866. His family belonged to the peasant class. At early school age, he had a traditional Chinese classical education. At the age of thirteen, Sun Yat-sen was sent to Honolulu in Hawaii to join his elder brother who had started a successful business overseas. At Honolulu, Sun Yat-sen received a foreign, modern education and became a Christian. Later, he returned to his village. However, the practice of Christianity alienated Sun Yatsen from his family and community and once again he was forced to leave his native land. He went to Hong Kong where he studied medicine at a British mission hospital and became a doctor in 1892. For a brief period he practiced medicine at Macao where he came into contact with friends who were members of anti-Manchu secret societies. Such connections with secret societies proved to be important for his later revolutionary career.

1.3.6.2. Making of a Revolutionary:

During these formative years, Sun Yat-sen was exposed to two contrasting worlds - a Western World of powerful national states and a degenerated China steeped in Confucian theory, governed by an outdated dynasty and economically exploited by the imperial powers. Years of observations, both in Hawaii or Hong Kong and in his home village, made Sun Yat-sen realize the backwardness of China and the progress of the West and his dissatisfaction with the corrupt Manchu rule grew.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen strongly believed that in order to regenerate China the Manchu dynasty should be overthrown and the imperial powers must evacuate. As he had received a Western education and was a Christian and a doctor, Sun Yat-sen had difficulty in making himself acceptable and popular among the traditional scholar-gentry and reformers like K’ang Yu-wei. However, as he was familiar with Western countries and Western culture, he had an advantage of having the quality of political leadership that traditional Confucian scholars lacked contacts with the West. Because Dr. Sun Yat-sen came from a peasant family and had lived among overseas Chinese, he was in a better position to develop connections with the lower classes of Chinese society in revolutionary efforts. In this respect, he was unlike the Confucian scholars, most of whom kept themselves apart from the common people. South China and Kwangtung in particular, had a stronger anti-Manchu tradition than North China. Born in such an environment, Sun Yat-sen was himself deeply revolutionary in character.

It is important to note that during the initial period Dr. Sun Yat-sen was not yet an outright revolutionary. He still thought of using the old method to save China, namely, reform. Thus, he made attempts to meet reformist figures of the time, such as K’ang Yu-wei in 1893 and Li Hung-chang in 1894. Dr. Sun Yat-sen put forward a number of proposals for reforms. Following his failure to attract Li’s attention, he became a full-time revolutionary working for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty.
1.3.6.3. The Hsing-chung Hui (Revive China Society):

Finding no response from the government for his reform proposals Dr. Sun Yat-sen decided to set up a revolutionary organization that would become 'modernist, nationalist and anti-monarchical, instead of merely patriotic and anti-dynastic'. In 1894-95, Dr. Sun Yat-sen founded the Society for the Revival of China (Hsing-chung Hui) in Hawaii and Hong Kong. It consisted mainly of overseas Chinese and Christians and was under the leadership of a small group of missionary-educated young people like Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself. Initially there were about 150 members. They took an oath to "expel the Manchus, restore the Chinese rule, and establish a republic.” Branches of the Revive China Society were organized in different parts of Central China. Members of the society tried to teach the people improved methods of production of necessities of life through better education. It was planned that the overseas Chinese members would organize revolts in places like Hong Kong, and secret-society members would be hired to do the fighting on the Chinese mainland. Taking the advantage of the disturbances created by China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) Dr. Sun Yat-sen made an attempt to organize the first revolt in Canton in 1895 in order to take over its government. As the attempt ended in failure, Dr. Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan where he made a number of friends and received aid for his secret society.

1.3.6.4. Travels in Foreign Countries:

After 1895, Dr. Sun Yat-sen travelled in foreign countries with a view to win sympathy from Western countries and seeking more support from the overseas Chinese communities. Dr. Sun Yat-sen believed that active foreign assistance or friendly foreign neutrality was necessary for a successful revolution in China. He therefore tried to convince the foreigners that their interest in trade and missionary activities could be better protected by a new republic than by the corrupt Manchu dynasty. He promised that a republic set up by the revolutionaries would bring advantages for foreigners. However, in spite of his best efforts Dr. Sun Yat-sen could not muster enough support for his revolutionary endeavour from the foreign countries.

From 1896 to 1898, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was in Europe. In 1896, he went London to pursue his studies and improve his knowledge of the West. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen stayed in London, he was kidnapped by some Manchu officials in the Chinese legation. However, with the help of an English friend, he was finally rescued. Later, Sun Yat-sen published his story of kidnapping in London and overnight he became the most famous Chinese revolutionary. The effect of the incident was to strengthen Dr. Sun Yat-sen's sense of confidence and mission, making his determination to overthrow the Manchu dynasty greater than ever.

1.3.6.5. The Tung-meng Hui (The Revolutionary Alliance):

Following his return in 1900, Dr. Sun Yat-sen carried on his propaganda in China, Indochina, Malaya, Philippines and Japan. During the Boxer Rebellion, he made an appeal to Li Hung Chang to give up the cause of the Manchus and support a democratic republic. After 1900, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political aim was the achievement of republicanism and nationalism through armed revolution.

As the Manchu reform programme was in progress in China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Hsing-chung Hui as the Tung-meng Hui (The Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905. From 1905-6, there were about 1,000 people who joined the Revolutionary Alliance. Out of these 90% were overseas Chinese from Japan. Most of the members were students and intellectuals, and nearly all provinces of China were represented in the organization. The new Society preached republican ideology. The primary and most important objective of the society was overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, establishment of a republic and a parliamentary system of government. Other aims were included in a six-point program such as overthrow of the Manchus, establishment of a republic, maintenance of world peace, nationalization of land, cooperation with Japan, and world support for the revolutionary movement.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's theory of China's first modern political revolution is found in the Manifesto of Tung-meng Hui proclaimed at Tokyo in 1905. Min Pao, (The People), the official organ of the Tung-meng Hui, was also founded in Tokyo. Its aim was to defend republican ideology and the revolutionary road against the partisans of constitutional monarchy.
1.3.6.6. The Three Principles of the People:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen gradually developed the Three Principles of the People (San Min Chu-i). These principles were aimed at making China a nation state with democratic government and creating conditions suitable for people's livelihood. The Three Principles of the People were the following:

**Principle of Nationalism (Min-tsu chu-i):** Initially, nationalism was understood as an attempt to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. However, following the end of the Manchu dynasty in 1912, Dr. Sun Yat-sen realized that merely ousting the Manchus would not make China a nation state. He visualised a strong political unity of all the Chinese people in place of the cultural unity which was the heritage of China. According to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the people remained a 'sheet of loose sand', lacking solidarity. He aimed at binding this 'sheet of loose sand' by the cement of nationalism. Thus, Dr. Sun Yat-sen revised the principle of nationalism to include the idea of a unity of Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and various lesser groups. Basically, this nationalism was neither anti-Manchus nor anti-foreignism. Eventually, nationalism stood for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Dr. Sun Yat-sen wanted to divisive forces, both internal and external through a united national front.

**Principle of Democracy (Min-chuan chu-i):** Minchuan, literally means people's power or democracy. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had upheld the idea of democracy in 1905 while attacking the supporters of a constitutional monarchy. Later, by 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen elaborated the Principle of Democracy. His ideas on democracy were derived from four chief sources: (a) Western republicanism (b) The Swiss principles of initiative, referendum, elections and recall. (c) Soviet democratic centralism, and (d) Chinese ideas of examination and control. Dr. Sun Yat-sen believed that popular control would be established over the government through electoral process. Political power was to be exercised through five branches - executive, legislative, judicial, examination and censorship. The first three are familiar concepts in the West, whereas the last two, examination and censor were based on old Confucian practices.

Dr Sun Yat-sen viewed the progress towards democracy in three distinct stages. Military action, power and control would characterize the first stage. In the second stage, people would be under political control in which they would be trained in the use of their powers. Democratic process would start from local level and gradually move towards national democracy. In the final stage, with the training of the people to exercise their powers on a national scale, constitutional and democratic government would be established.

**Principle of People's Livelihood (Min-sheng chu-i):** This principle included a number of social and economic theories which had influenced Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Often Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers used this principle as an equivalent for socialism. In order to promote China's industrial development, Dr. Sun Yat-sen emphasized recovery of tariff autonomy and imposition of protective tariffs. He also stressed on the need for technological improvement of agriculture. The Revolution of 1911 was the greatest manifestation of the emergence of Chinese nationalism. The latent forces of nationalism nurtured by secret societies and inspired by the Dr. Sun Yat-sen's philosophy of let loose the forces of revolution that swept away the Manchu dynasty.

1.3.7. Conclusion

As the conservative Manchu dynasty dominated by the Dowager Empress Tsu Hsi was reluctant to introduce social and political reforms, the moderate Chinese nationalists tried to find other ways to fulfill their nationalist aspirations. There were a number of secret societies that were operating in China whose aim was to rid China of the Western imperialism and the decadent Manchu dynasty. The Taiping Rebellion during the mid nineteenth century and the Boxers Uprising at the turn of the twentieth century were two major attempts that tried to achieve these objectives. However, the Manchu government with the help of the Western powers suppressed these rebellions. Under these circumstances, Dr Sun Yat-Sen emerged on the Chinese political stage and tried to give a new turn to Chinese nationalism. As his attempts towards reforming the Chinese government and society did not bear fruit, he organized secret societies recruit Chinese revolutionaries and tried to win the support of the Chinese living abroad. He traveled widely to garner support for his revolutionary movement in China. His vision for China was summed up in three Principles of the People - Principle of Nationalism, Principle of Democracy, and Principle or People's Livelihood. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen not only successfully led the National Revolution of 1911 but also by his courage he overthrown the Chinese Empire and established the Republic Government in China.
1.3.8. **Summary**

- The weakness of the Manchu dynasty, foreign imperialism and economic exploitation, influence of Western liberal ideas, increasing population and pressure on cultivable land which was in short supply, impoverishment of the peasants due to high taxation and natural calamities became the underlying causes of the Revolution of 1911.
- Dr Sun Yat-Sen was the dynamic leadership of the Revolution of 1911, which brought an end to the Manchu dynasty and ushered in an era of republic in China.
- Sun Yat-sen was born in a village near Canton in 1866 in a peasant family. At early school age, he had a traditional Chinese classical education. Later, he received higher education at Hawaii. He studied health science and became a doctor.
- He was familiar with Western countries and Western culture, hence, he had an advantage of having the quality of political leadership that traditional Confucian scholars lacked contacts with the West.
- In 1896, he went London to pursue his studies and improve his knowledge of the West. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen stayed in London, he was kidnapped by some Manchu officials in the Chinese legation. After which he became in overnight the most famous Chinese revolutionary.
- Dr. Sun Yat-sen's theory of China's first modern political revolution is found in the Manifesto of Tung-meng Hui proclaimed at Tokyo in 1905.
- Dr. Sun Yat-sen gradually developed the Three Principles of the People (San Min Chu-i). These principles were aimed at making China a nation state with democratic government and creating conditions suitable for people's livelihood.
- His vision for China was summed up in three Principles of the People—Principle of Nationalism, Principle of Democracy, and Principle or People's Livelihood.
- Dr. Sun Yat-Sen not only successfully led the National Revolution of 1911 but also by his courage he overthrown the Chinese Empire and established the Republic Government in China.

1.3.9. **Exercise**

1. What was the immediate consequence of the Revolution of 1911 in China.
2. Enumerate the causes, course and results of the Revolution of 1911.
3. Trace the origin of Chinese nationalism
4. Trace briefly the early life and career of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
5. Point out the areas that were affected by the Revolution of 1911 in China.

1.3.10. **Further Reading**


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Unit-2  
Chapter-1  
CHINA AND FIRST WORLD WAR AND AFTER  
Achievements and Failures of Kuomintang Government under Chiang Kai Shek,  
Manchurian Crisis, 1931

Structure

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2.1.0. Objective
In this chapter we intended providing you an insight into the historical development took place in the eve of first world war in China. By the end of this chapter the learners would be able to:

- to know the condition and response of China on the eve of First World War amidst imperialist nations.
- to trace in brief the life and career of Chiang Kai Shek till he takes charge of the Nationalist Government in China.
- to evaluate the achievements and failure of domestic and foreign policy and programme of the Nationalist Government under the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek.
- to study the causes, course and consequences of Manchurian crisis.

2.1.1. Introduction
The Great War first burst forth in Europe, but its effects were felt at once on the opposite side of the globe. These effects were both immediate and far-reaching. Momentous as were the results of the first year of the war in Europe, they were equally significant in Asia, and the making of the new map of the Orient was one of the most important features of the first stage of the great conflict. Upon the outbreak of the first world war China thought it wise to follow a neutral policy. Germany’s difficulties in Europe encouraged China to re-occupy the German occupied province of Shantung. Being alarmed at this move of China, Japan sent her troops to Kiaochow and Shantung. Doubtless, the First World War had changed the balance of power in China. Taking advantage of the elimination of Germany from China and the engagement of Britain, France, America and Russia in the European War, Japan as an ally of the allied powers made attempts to extend her empire in China. It was during this time that in China was under the course of National Revolution. The Republic of China was established in 1912, but by the end of the 1920s the Kuomintang split with the Communists led by Mao Tse Tung. After the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang became the leader of the Kuomintang army and seized control of the government. This chapter will discuss the political development occurred during the inter war period of Chinese history.

2.1.2. China and First World War
On August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia and France; just two weeks later Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany, demanding its complete withdrawal from its possessions in the Pacific. On August 23rd, Japan declared war; within three months, Tsingtao, the Oriental stronghold, of the Germans, with the co-operation of a small British force, was captured, and the Japanese were installed in Germany's place in the province of Shantung. Two months later, Japan presented a series of demands on China, divided into five groups, the acceptance of which would have placed China definitely in the position of a vassal state. After less than four months of negotiations, on May 8, 1915, China accepted four groups of these demands, leaving the fifth open for future discussion. Thus, in the first nine months of the first year of the Great War, Germany's political and military power were eliminated in the Orient; Japan had taken over its possessions in China; and China had been forced to concede to Japan extensive territorial rights, economic privileges, and military concessions of great strategic importance. Thus the ante-bellum situation in the Far East was entirely altered, and new problems of international policy and relations were created. The spark struck at Sarajevo had, indeed, kindled a world-wide flame; Europe and Asia, the Occident and the Orient, alike were to feel its transforming force.

2.1.2.1. Expansion of Japan
As mentioned above Japan after occupying the province of Shantung, Japan placed before China the Twenty One demands. For the fulfillment of these demands China was served with an ultimatum of forty-eight hours. These twenty One Demands consisted of five different kinds of proposal, Viz, the first relating to the province of Shantung, the second concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, the third concerning iron and coal, the fourth relating to the rivers and ports of China, and the fifth relating to appointment of a Japanese adviser at the Chinese court.

2.1.2.2. Recognition of Demands by Chinese President
Yuan-shi-kai, the then President of China, on his own responsibility promised to fulfill the demands for two reasons, although in doing so there was the possibility of undermining the sovereignty of China. Firstly, he
was inspired with the hope of securing Japan’s help in the execution of his imperialistic plan, and secondly, he
perceived that war with Japan was inevitable in the case of China refusal to accept those demands. So Yuan agreed
to transfer the German occupied province of Shantung to Japan; he accepted Japanese military position in
Manchuria; accorded much facilities to Japan concerning coal and iron and also promised not to allow any other
foreign country excepting Japan to establish any kind of authority in the Chinese port. But the Chinese Parliament
did not ratify the demand of Japan. However, after occupying Shantung, Japan occupied South-Manchuria and
some parts of Inner Mongolia.

2.1.2.3. China Joined First World War.

Under the pressure of the allies, China entered the war against Germany in 1917. The chief motives of the
Allies in forcing China to participate in the war was to drive out Germany completely from China. On the other
hand, the objectives of China in entering the war were to recover her lost territories with the help of the Allies as
well as to secure from them military and economic aids. The Chinese was efforts were extremely limited. They
were only interested in resisting Japan. In the First World War Japan enormously helped the Allies. In return for
her help, Japan was promised the province of Shantung by the Allies after the end of the war. The allied pledged to
Japan was kept secret from the Chinese government. Moreover, by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the USA along
with the Allied powers had recognized Japan’s Special interests in China. Thus for expediency the Allies did not
hesitate to satisfy Japan at the cost of China’s interests. Meanwhile, Japan began her economic penetration in the
Chinese empire. In 19117-18 Japan compelled China to accept Nishihara Loans and on the pretext of joining the
Allies against Soviet Russia, she occupied Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

2.1.2.4. Gains of China in Joining World War

China participation in the war was not wholly fruitless. She reaped some advantage. Firstly, China got
back her own territories occupied by Germany. Secondly, China was able to cancel the dues payable to Germany
as reparation of the Boxer Rebellion and China was granted a five years moratorium for paying her reparation to
the Allies. Thirdly, due to the participation of the Chinese youths in the war, they were imbued with the spirit of
democracy, communism and nationalism. The cries for freedom and nationalism hence forth became wide spread
throughout China. Fourthly, Soviet Russia voluntarily gave up her rights and privileges in China. Although the
Allies instigated China to break off her diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, Soviet Russia was the first
country to break the system of foreign domination of China as well as to pave the way of treating China on an equal
footing with the other nations of world.

2.1.2.5. Disadvantages of China in War

In spite of some gains China, on the other hand, suffered loss and was put to disadvantages on account of
joining the war. Japan gradually established herself firmly in China. Economic condition of China deteriorated and
she was compelled to accept aids from Japan. Japan gave generous loans to China in return for the latter’s
provincial revenues, mineral resources and many other rights and concessions. As a result Japan’s influence was
well established in China.

2.1.2.6. China at the Paris Peace Conference

It has already been stated that China joined the Allies against Germany in the First World War in the hope
of recovering her lost territories from the foreign powers by abolishing the unequal treaties and the extra territorial
rights of the foreigners. As a reward of joining the Allies, China was allowed representation in the Paris Peace
Conference. The chief aim of China in the attending this conference was to regains her sovereignty.

Disappointment of China: The Chinese representative at the conference raised the demands for the return
of the province of Shantung and for the reconsideration of the unequal treaties. Upon Wilson’s opposition to
Japan’s position in Shantung, Japan threatened to quit the conference. As a result Wilson had to retrace his steps.
Recognizing Japan’s right over Shantung, the Allies declared all demands of China as irrelevant. Hence, the
Chinese representatives had to return empty handed, disappointed and disillusioned.

Reaction in China: The terms of the treaty of Versailles gave rise to a strong popular movement in China
which she had never witnessed before. The students assumed the leadership of this movement. They staged strong
demonstrations against the foreigner in China, particularly the Japanese. For a week a terrible disorder continued in the capital and the cries for boycotting the Japanese goods spread all over the country.

2.1.2.7. China at the Washington conference

Although the Paris peace conference failed to satisfy the hopes and aspirations of China, her international prestige got recognition in the conference. The USA was not at all satisfied with the treaty of Versailles. Moreover, she was becoming very much worried at the expansion of Japan in China, Siberia and the Pacific region. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 indirectly favoured Japan’s expansion in the Far East. So, in order to resist Japan’s further expansion by abrogating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the USA convened a conference at Washington in 1921. The representatives of Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Netherland, Belgium, The USA and Portugal attended the conference. The conference had to settle the question of disarmament, the Pacific problems and the problems of China. The war lords of North-China were also given the right of representations in the conference while representation was not accorded to the Nationalist government at Canton neither Soviet Russia was invited. After deliberations and discussions a number of treaties were signed. Of these, two were concerned with the naval power and the rest in regard to the pacific and the Far Eastern questions.

Recognition to the Chinese Demand: Due to the pressure of America and the repeated request of Chinese representatives, the demands of China were at last recognized and a treaty was signed whereby Japan gave back the province of Shantung to China in return for heavy compensation. In 1922 Japan Japan left Shantung. Thus the Chinese diplomacy at last achieved success and the expansionist policy of Japan got a setback for the first time. The Chinese representatives also demanded the restoration of the sovereignty of China by abolishing Special right and the extra-territorial rights of the foreigner in China.

The Nine-power treaty and China: So far as China was concerned a Nine-power Treaty was concluded in the Washington Conference, whereby the signatories; Recognized sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of China, Agreed to help China in her attempt to organize an efficient government. Recognized equal commercial rights of all nations in China and Agreed to refrain from extorting special rights and privilages from China.

At the Washington Conference the western countries were more eager to preserve their commercial and economic interests than to protect the sovereignty of China. Though the western powers recognized the tariff-autonomy of China in principle yet no effective measure was laid down in this respect. Still the Washington Conference marked the defeat of the expansionist policy of the western powers as well as of Japan for the first time. Although the demand for the recognition of the sovereignty of China was not fully satisfied and Japanese supremacy in Manchuria and Eastern-Mongolia remained unaffected the international prestige of China got recognition. Of course, the contribution of the USA in this respect was remarkable. Due to America’s efforts the Anglo-Japanese Alliances was finally terminated, The Washington Conference advertised the Chinese demands to the nations of the world, it increased sympathy for her abroad and finally put the Europeans nations to retreat for the first time.

2.1.3. Kuomintang Government under Chiang Kai Shek

The Revolution of 1911 brought an end to the Manchu dynasty and ushered in an era of republic in China. However, the dream of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the nationalists to establish a truly democratic republic was shattered. The period between 1912 and 1927 was marked by an attempt by Yuan Shi-kai to establish his dictatorship and monarchy, First World War and Japan’s intimidation through the Twenty-one Demands, warlordism, factionalism in the government, attempt of the foreign powers to keep China divided and weak, re-emergence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the president of the Southern Republic, his death and rise of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek, on his part had to consolidate his position in the Kuomintang party, eliminate Communist influence within and outside the party, bring about the unification of China either with the cooperation of the warlords or suppressing them, provide a working government, resist the Japanese invasion and finally fight a civil war against the Communists. At the end losing out to the Communists he was forced to flee China and settle in Taiwan.
2.1.3.1. Chiang Kai Shek

Chiang Kai-shek was one of the most important political leaders in 20th century Chinese history, sandwiched between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse Tung. Early in the twentieth century Chiang Kai-shek fought for Dr. Sun Yat-sen's United Revolutionary League and the Kuomintang party to overthrow China's imperial dynasty. The Republic of China was established in 1912, but by the end of the 1920s the Kuomintang split with the Communists led by Mao Tse Tung. After the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang became the leader of the Kuomintang army and seized control of the government.

Birth and Early Life: Chiang Kai-shek was born on 31 October 1887, in a family of salt merchants in Chekiang Province, in eastern China. At the time of Chiang’s youth, China was suffering from a series of defeats by foreign powers that had left the country in debt, politically destabilized, and vulnerable to foreign intervention. A desire to rescue his country from its precarious position led Chiang to pursue a career in the military. Following schooling in Ningbo and a brief trip to Japan in 1906, Chiang enrolled in a government military academy in Baoding. From 1908 until 1910 he attended military school in Tokyo.

Chiang and Revolution of 1911: While in Japan, Chiang became involved in the revolutionary movement to overthrow China’s ruling Manchu dynasty, which he and others blamed for the country’s condition. In 1908 Chiang joined the T’ung Meng Hui, founded by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. When revolution broke out in China in 1911, Chiang left Japan to serve under revolutionary forces in Shanghai. The revolutionaries succeeded in overthrowing the imperial government and establishing a republican government in Nanking in eastern China. In 1912, Chiang and other revolutionaries formed a new political party, the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. In 1917 Dr. Sun Yat-Sen set up a revolutionary government in the southern Chinese city of Canton to compete with the warlords. In 1918 he summoned Chiang as he valued his military expertise. In the next few years, Chiang moved back and forth between Canton and Shanghai, but his activities were unclear. It appears that he engaged in stock market speculation in Shanghai, perhaps to raise funds for Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, and became connected with business and underworld leaders.

Chiang’s Rise to Political Power: In 1923 Dr. Sun Yat-Sen appointed Chiang as the military chief of staff of his government. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s new alliance with the Communist leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) opened the door to substantial economic and military aid for the Kuomintang government. Dr. Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang to Moscow, where he spent several months studying Soviet military and political organization. Soviet aid enabled Dr. Sun Yat-Sen to establish a Kuomintang military academy at Whampoa near Canton in 1924. Chiang became director of the academy and personally trained nearly 2,000 cadets in three years. These officers, sometimes called the Whampoa Clique, became the core of a new nationalist army and served as Chiang Kai-shek’s political base.

2.1.3.2. Achievements of Kuomintang Government

Measures Towards the Unification of the Country: Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925 created a power vacuum within the Kuomintang. Chiang was looked upon as one of the chief political heirs of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He became the commander-in-chief of the Nationalist army. Chiang’s key break came in July 1926 when he launched the Northern Expedition, a military campaign to defeat the warlords controlling northern China and unify the country under the Kuomintang. The Nationalist army under Chiang moved gradually and gained striking victories against the warlords. By the end of 1925, Chiang brought Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces under the control of the Kuomintang executive. In 1926, Chiang advanced northwards through Hunan to the Yangtse valley and occupied all the important cities in the valley. The advancing Nationalist army received strong local support. The practical unification of the country by military campaign took two years to complete. The campaign was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, the Nationalist army captured Hankow within a few months. In the second phase, the Nationalist army under Chiang captured Peking, the ancient capital, of China in June 1928.

Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to unify the country made him popular among the Chinese people.

Breakup of the Kuomintang: Meanwhile, a growing split had developed between Left and Right factions within the Kuomintang. In January 1927, allied with the Chinese Communists and with Moscow’s representative, Michael Borodin, KMT leftists moved the civilian government from Canton to Hankow in Central China. The
move revealed the ideological power struggle between the two factions. After conquering Shanghai and Nanking in March, Chiang decided to break with the Hankow group. On 12 April 1927, Chiang launched a swift and brutal attack on thousands of suspected Communists in the area he controlled. The Soviet agents were sent back. Chiang then established his own Nationalist government in Nanking, supported by many conservatives. The financial magnates of Shanghai supported Chiang in his struggle for supremacy. Due to continuing political and military rivalries, Chiang took many months to consolidate his power. In August 1927, he resigned his command of the Nanking government, but continued to exercise his control from the background. In the following month he travelled to Japan. Chiang had previously been married at least twice and had one son from his first marriage. On 1 December, 1927, while in Japan, he married Soong Mei-ling, the third daughter of a prominent Christian leader in Shanghai. Mei-ling’s older sister, Soong Ching-ling, was the widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Thus, through the marriage Chiang tied himself to the legacy of the revered founder of the Kuomintang. In the decades that followed, Madame Chiang, as she was known, would serve as a liaison to Western powers, particularly the United States. Chiang Kai-shek returned from semi-retirement due to Communist uprising in Canton during November-December 1927. The need of Chiang’s military leadership was felt by all sections of the Kuomintang. By January 1928 Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the supreme leader of the Kuomintang (Generalissimo).

**Capture of Peking:** The second phase of the unification of the country through military campaign was launched by Chiang Kaishek after the break with the Communists. The Nationalist army under the command of Chiang captured Peking in June 1928. Chang Tso-lin, the leader of the Peking regime, fled to Mukden where he was killed by a mysterious bomb explosion. Following his death, his son Chang Hsueh-liang, still in control of the three eastern provinces, accepted the Kuomintang flag. He was persuaded to join the party and rule there as deputy of the Nationalist government. Thus, theoretically at least, China was united under the military rule of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government. Nanking became the capital of the Nationalist government. Twelve Western Powers including the United States, France and England gave recognition to the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek. The Nationalist government claimed to have realised the ‘principle of nationalism’, one of the first principles of Dr. Sun Yatsen’s “Three People’s Principles”. The Nationalist government set its goal to the achievement of the other two principles -principle of democracy and people’s livelihood, in due course of time.

**Constitution of the Kuomintang:** To carry out Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s programme, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee was convened in August 1928. It adopted a provisional constitution called the Organic Law. The Organic Law established a close link between the government and the party, both functioning under the principle of ‘Democratic Centralism’. The highest organ of the state was the State Council whose Chairman was also the Head of State. Under the State Council functioned five Yuans or departments of government - the legislative, executive, judicial, examination and control Yuans. Chiang Kai-shek became Chairman of the State Council. The State Council together with the Party’s Central Executive Committee constituted Central Political Council. This ensured the control of the Kuomintang on the administration. The Organic Law remained in force as the basis of government till the adoption of another provisional Constitution in May 1931 by the National People’s Convention.

**Conflict Between the Nationalists and Communists:** Chiang’s greatest domestic rivals, the Chinese Communists, were outside of his party. The Communists regrouped in a remote area of central Kiangsi Province in the early 1930s and created a Soviet style government. Though the Nationalist government was able to destroy the urban political strength of the Communists without much difficulty, the Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung won the support of impoverished and oppressed peasants of southern and central China. The Communists also increased their influence among the workers by forming unions, which attempted to raise wages and improve their working conditions. Chiang became obsessed with destroying the Communists. With the aid of German military advisers, he launched numerous campaigns to defeat the Communists. During the fifth campaign, in 1934, Chiang surrounded the Communists and launched an all-out ‘annihilation drive’. Starved out by the blockade, the Communists broke out and began their famous Long March. The Communists eventually established a new base at Yenan in the far northwest.
The United Front against Japan: Following the Manchurian Crisis of 1931, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a defensive policy towards the Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Meanwhile, he was making an all-out effort to crush the Communists within China. The Chinese Communists had already declared war on Japan in 1932. They made an appeal to Chiang to put an end to the civil war in order to maintain a united front against the Japanese. But Chiang disregarded their appeal as well as the pressure of Chinese patriots for a joint defense of the country. Even one of Chiang’s allied commanders, Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been expelled from Manchuria after the Mukden Incident, came to doubt the wisdom of Chiang’s approach. Following these developments, in 1936 Chang held Chiang prisoner in Sian. For a time, Chiang’s life was in danger. However, early in 1937, a compromise was reached with the Communists about a united national front against the Japanese. By the compromise, the Communists agreed to bring its autonomous regime and army under the control of the National government. The Nationalist government agreed to lead a determined resistance against the Japanese aggression and establish a democratic system. It also promised social and economic reforms. This settlement ended the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists for the time being.

2.1.3.3. Administration of the Nationalist Government

The administration of the Nationalist government during the period 1930-1937 is remembered for the growth of capitalism, Financial, legal and educational reforms, and improvement of transport and communication.

Promotion of Capitalism: Chiang Kai-shek’s strong apathy towards Communism and his conservative roots enabled him to promote capitalism in China. In his struggle against the Communists he had the support of wealthy Chinese families, business community, landlords and the bourgeoisie. By marriage he was linked to one of the wealthiest Soong families of China. Being converted to Christianity, Chiang had the support of the Christian missionaries. In foreign policy he followed a pro-Western approach. These factors helped in the growth of capitalism in China.

Reforms in Financial Sector: The Nationalist government took advantage of its improved relations with the West and invited foreign banks to operate in China. T.V. Soong, the brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek was appointed as the Minister of Finance. Under his guidance the Nationalist government introduced a number of fiscal and economic reforms that greatly helped in the growth of capitalism in China. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, on behalf of the League of Nations, helped to improve China’s financial system. In 1936, a new currency, Yuan was introduced to replace the old Tael (Liang). The paper currency known as Fa-pi was also accepted as a legal tender. Nickel and copper coins under decimal system were also minted to supplement the paper currency.

Reforms in Banking Sector: Along with financial reforms, Chiang’s Nationalist Government introduced significant reforms in the Banking sector as well. The Central Bank with a capital of 100 million Chinese dollars (Yuans) was recognised as the Central Bank of China. Its chief function was to maintain currency stability. The Bank of China with a capital of 40 million Yuans was assigned the function of controlling the foreign exchange. The Bank of Communication with a capital of 20 million Yuans was to provide assistance to the development of domestic industries. The Farmers’ Bank of China was assigned the task of farm credit and land mortgage. The tariff agreements with the treaty-powers enabled China to regain her tariff autonomy, which led to an increase in revenue. The presentation of regular annual budget manifested Nationalist government’s control over financial matters.

Legal Reforms: The need to remove ‘unequal treaties’ led to reforms in legal system and judicial procedure. An attempt towards legal reforms had already undertaken during the regimes of Yuan Shi-kai and Warlords of Peking. However, the Nationalist government, in an attempt to induce the Western Powers to give up their privileged position in China, earnestly took up the reform of the legal system. Between 1929 and 1935, the Legislative Yuan passed a number of laws relating to commerce, industry, mining, forests etc.

Reforms in the Field of Education: In order to promote constitutional government and eventual democracy in China, the Nationalist government attempted to introduce massive educational reforms. An ambitious programme of providing at least six years of schooling for all children was introduced. However, due to lack of funds and trained teachers, the results of this programme were not quite encouraging. In the field of higher education, the success of the Nationalist government was quite impressive. Several public universities, colleges
and professional schools were consolidated into thirteen national universities, five technical colleges, and nine provincial universities. The Nationalist government provided subsidies in order to encourage private enterprise in higher education.

**Industrial Progress:** The Nationalist government made considerable efforts to promote industrialization in China. In spite of the loss of Manchuria and the Japanese attack on Shanghai, the Nationalist government aimed at developing medium and large scale industries in the middle and lower Yangtse region as they were under her direct control. Both Chinese and Chinese industrialists concentrated their industrial enterprises in coastal regions, thereby neglecting the interior regions of China. There was considerable progress in light industries such as textiles, matches, flour production, cement, and chemical manufacturing.

**Agrarian Reforms:** Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Principle of Livelihood of People’ prompted the Nationalist government to pay considerable attention to the problems related to the peasants and farmers. The Nationalist government enacted a Land Law in 1930. Its aim was to eradicate some of the worst defects in tenancy and attempted to reduce rents. The law also contained provisions to protect the peasants from eviction from their land if they did not pay rents for two successive years or their failure to cultivate the land for a year without a valid reason. However, this law was not strictly implemented and the conditions of the poor peasants continued to worsen. In spite of its failure to solve the problems of the peasantry, the Nationalist government tried to improve the agriculture technically. Agricultural research institutions were set up. Agricultural departments were opened in colleges and universities. Studies were made in improving the production of food grains, cotton and silk. The peasants were instructed in the use of better seeds and chemical fertilizers. The Nationalist government also undertook the construction of dykes in areas susceptible to frequent floods and irrigation projects in drought afflicted regions. However, these benefits could not reach to a vast majority of peasants whose conditions gradually deteriorated.

**Improvement in Transport and Communication:** The Nationalist government undertook projects to improve the transport and communication system. To administer the existing railway lines as well as to expand the railway system, a Ministry of Railway was established in 1928. The Nationalist government expanded the railway system to central and southern China. With foreign help railway lines, such as the Peking-Canton were built. Modern types of motorable roads linking up even distance provinces were built. To supervise and control this ambitious project a National Road Planning Commission was constituted. In 1930, the China National Aviation Corporation was set up with the help of Chinese and American capital. In the field of communication, the Nationalist government made considerable progress in postal, telegraph and telephone services.

### 2.1.3.4. Failure of the Nationalist Government

The defeat and ouster of the Nationalist government by the Communists in 1949 manifested its inherent failure not only in military tactics and strategy but also in administrative field.

**Failure to Solve the Rural Problems:** The programme of the Nationalist government was one of social and economic reform and not revolution. Its reform programme as seen above was typical of a bourgeoisie capitalist state. As such, it failed to meet the need for livelihood of a large number of impoverished people. Though experiments in rural reconstruction under the supervision of semi-independent provincial governments were allowed, the Nationalist government was not serious about their success. Land Laws, aimed at protecting peasants were hardly implemented. The propertied classes including the rural landlords, who were the support base of the Nationalist government, desired no such changes in the system of land tenure or agricultural credits, which would have affected their interests. Thus, the rural masses identified the Nationalist government with urban businessmen and rural gentry. As such they became receptive to the propaganda of the Communists.

**Lack of Economic Development:** The Nationalist government’s record in stimulating economic development in China during its regime was quite dismal. The rise of the Kuomintang took place during a period when light and medium industries, communication systems, and export-import oriented firms, which had begun during the First World War, were gradually expanding. The hopes of quickening and broadening the process of economic modernization during the rule of the Nationalist government were not fulfilled. The government did show its earnestness in economic progress through tariff autonomy, fiscal, legal and educational reforms, industrial
expansion and improvement in transport and communication. However, these reforms were not enough to break away from the traditional system and to establish a truly modern economy.

The need of the time was far-reaching institutional reforms affecting the very foundation of Chinese life and livelihood. Nationalist government’s policies were repressive of economic growth. Heavy expenditure to maintain the nationalist army did stimulate increased economic activity. But they diverted available resources and labour from projects which in long run could have been more productive of goods and services. As a result during the years 1932-1936 the gross national product did not keep pace with increases in population. This was reflected in the increased popular unrest.

**Lack of Ideological Direction:** Chiang Kai-shek, being a military man tended to view political, social and economic issues with the eyes of a general. He attempted military solution of the country’s social and economic problems. He aimed at the unification of the country through military force. However, he never bothered seriously to think what would hold China after his armies had accomplished their task. His emphasis on military made the Kuomintang ideologically bankrupt. Chiang could never make it a dynamic organization driven by ideological steam. His military approach made people to think that “he ruled China with his armies, not with ideas”. Other than the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, to which a lip service was given, the Nationalist government had little to offer in competition with the Communists. All that Chiang could do in the field of ideology was to launch the so-called New Life Movement in 1935 to provide an ideological basis for unity. Confucianism was revived and applied to China’s modern problems. The Nationalist leaders were under the illusion that class-antagonism did not exist in China and wrongly believed that it was a perception of the Marxists. Thus, the Nationalist government gave priority to political control and neglected internal reforms. This manifested the ideological bankruptcy of the Nationalist government, which proved to be the main cause of its failure.

**Challenge by the Communist Party:** The rise of the Communist party, especially under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung proved to be the greatest challenge to the Nationalist government. Following their ouster from the Kuomintang Party in 1927, the Communists created problems for the Nationalist government by plotting an urban based revolution. Meanwhile another group of Communists under Mao Tse-tung began to organize the rural peasantry in the mountainous regions of Kiangsi and Hunan provinces. Chiang Kai-shek’s determination to suppress the Communists led to a series of unsuccessful military campaigns against them resulting in loss of men, material and money. Chiang’s apathy towards the Communists even prompted him to compromise with the Japanese when they invaded Manchuria in 1931. Internal pressure and readiness of the Communists to fight the Japanese under the banner of the Nationalist government brought about a united front against the latter. However, with the final defeat and surrender of the Japanese at the end of the Second World War (1945) led to a bitter civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists, which finally led to the victory of the former and exile of the latter to the island of Taiwan.

### 2.1.3.5. Foreign Policy Under Chiang Kai-shek

The Nanking Incident of 1927 had alienated the foreign owners and thus, they were unwilling to enter into relations with Nationalist government of China. The Nanking Incident, not to be confused with the Nanking Massacre, occurred during the first phase of the Northern Expedition starting on 21 March 1927 and continued till 23 March 1927. As the Nationalist Kuomintang troops neared and entered the city, which had many foreign residents, they targeted and looted foreign properties, doing much damage and killing and injuring many foreigners. Western and Japanese warships on the river responded by shelling Chinese forces in an effort to stop the looting of the city. Chiang Kai-shek and his ‘moderate’ wing of the Kuomintang blamed the outrages on Communist elements in the army, an explanation which the Japanese and many westerners were very ready to accept, although there is no good evidence to support this. Foreign outrage against the Nanking Incident of 1927 was strong. However, the Americans and Japanese in particular wanted to avoid action against Chiang that would weaken his hand against the Communists, whom they feared far more. In order to contain the damage done by the Nanking Incident of 1927, Chiang undertook the responsibility of making reparations for the damages which resulted from the incident and succeeded in securing official recognition of his Nationalist government from foreign powers.
Snapping Relations with Soviet Russia: In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek broke off relations with the Russian Communists. His subsequent anti-Communist attitude and measures, coupled with the responsibility which he undertook for the Nanking Incident won the goodwill of the Western Powers. This enabled him to free China from many of the restrictions which foreign Powers had previously imposed on her sovereignty.

Revision of the Treaties with the West: The Nationalist government while engaged in the task of unification and reconstruction also attempted at the revision of the ‘unequal treaties’ imposed upon China by the Western Powers. It meant recovery of tariff autonomy, abolition of extra-territorial rights enjoyed by foreign nationals in China, abolition of foreign residential area called Concessions and Settlements in China’s port cities, removal of foreign troops and police from the legation quarters and railway zones, acquisition of Manchurian railways held by the Soviet Union and Japan, abolition of remaining leaseholds, and restoration of China’s ‘traditional frontiers’. In this direction the warlord governments in Peking under pressure of public opinion and empty treasury had already taken the initiative. The achievement of the Nationalist government in the field of treaty-revision was quite substantial. Two developments enabled the Nationalist government to press upon the revision of the unequal treaties. In the first place the First World War had disrupted the unity of the treaty powers. Being defeated in the war, Germany was too weak to re-assert her former privileged position under the unequal treaties. The Soviet Union had voluntarily given up the former Tsarist rights to prove her anti-imperialist credentials. The weaker and smaller treaty powers such as Belgium and Holland, could be forced to give up their special rights. Secondly, the powerful countries, England, France and the United States were gradually becoming appreciative of the Nationalist government for its anti-Communist drive. The liberal government of Japan was also pursuing a conciliatory policy in respect of what was known as China proper, that is, eighteen provinces south of the Great Wall. Earlier in December 1926, England had urged the Treaty Powers to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards the Chinese Nationalist government and to accept tariff autonomy whenever the new Chinese tariff law would come into operation. The British initiative enabled China eventually to achieve tariff autonomy. China’s new tariff law came into effect on 1 January 1929. Japan also followed the lead of the Western Powers when after prolonged negotiations a Sino-Japanese Tariff Treaty was signed on 6 May, 1930. Thus, China won the long struggle to secure complete freedom to impose her own custom duties. By this tariff autonomy, China secured additional revenue. Besides, this gave an opportunity to China to protect her industries from foreign competition.

China’s efforts to abrogate the extra-territorial provisions of the treaties met with only partial success. By 1930, nine countries agreed to give up their extra-territorial rights in China. However, England, France and the United States, while accepting abrogation of extra-territoriality in principle, insisted on gradual abolition of the system. With the hope of enlisting the support of Western Powers against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek postponed the complete abrogation of extra-territorial rights for more than a decade. During the Second World War, England, France and the United States, being in alliance with China, voluntarily gave up extra-territorial rights for their nationals by a joint declaration in 1943. Thus, by 1931, China had recovered tariff autonomy and most of the leased territories, foreign concessions and settlements and had also resumed jurisdiction over most of the foreign nationals in China.

The Manchurian Crisis: The most serious challenge Chiang faced was not his domestic enemies but the threat of Japanese imperialism. On 18 September 1931, a bomb explosion damaged the railway line just outside Mukden. Probably this was stage-managed by the Japanese army itself. Immediately after this incident seized Manchuria, a region comprising China’s three northeastern provinces and containing 30 million people. The Nationalist government was unable to resist Japan’s military strength, and Chiang’s reputation as a nationalist leader suffered a serious blow. As Japanese pressure continued in the following years, Chiang was reluctant to challenge his enemy directly. Chiang referred the matter to the League of Nations. The Japanese ignored the League resolution asking the Japanese to withdraw their troops to their original garrison bases in Manchuria. Chiang adopted a slogan, “first internal pacification, and then external resistance”; in other words, first eliminate the Chinese Communists, then focus on Japan.

In China there was a loud outcry against the Nationalist government. As the government was weak, the people tried to make up for it by strikes in Japanese-owned business concerns and boycott of Japanese goods. In
1932, Pu Yi, the dethroned Chinese monarch who was living in the Japanese concession at Tientsin, was declared Chief Executive of the Republic of Manchukuo and two years later he was crowned Emperor of that State. Manchukuo lasted till the end of the Second World War. The Lytton Commission under the League of Nations recommended autonomy for Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty. However, the Western Powers never thought of using force to enforce this recommendation as they felt that a strong Japanese military presence in Manchuria might act as a bulwark against the Soviet Russia. (A detailed account of this issue has been dealt separately in last part of this chapter).

**The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945):** In July 1937 a serious clash between Chinese and Japanese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking precipitated a full-scale, though undeclared, war between the two countries. Chiang Kai-shek adhered to the terms of the compromise and offered strong resistance to the invading Japanese forces. The Chinese were hampered by their lack of industrial bases and well-trained army officers and enlisted men. The Japanese quickly captured the major cities in northern China, including the capital of the Nationalist government, Nanking. In 1938 the Japanese also seized Hankow in Central China and Canton in the south. Chiang Kai-shek led his armies westward into the interior and established the new wartime capital at Chanking, in Sichuan province. The Japanese were able to cripple the Chinese economy and isolate Chiang’s forces by capturing the entire coastal strip of China and cutting off communications with the interior. The Chinese, however, continued to resist the Japanese. From July 1937 until December 1941, China fought the Japanese alone. However, when Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, the Second World War spread to the Pacific. China became one of the Allied Powers. Even as Chiang’s position within China weakened, his diplomatic stature grew. He was recognized as one of the “Big Four” Allied leaders along with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin. Chiang travelled to Cairo, Egypt, in November 1943 for a summit with Roosevelt and Churchill.

**The Civil War (1945-1949):** Although China and Chiang apparently achieved great status, in reality the Nationalist government was crumbling, and it was plagued by corruption and inflation. The Japanese continued to inflict devastating blows on China as late as 1944. On the other hand the Chinese Communists took advantage of wartime condition to spread their guerrilla organizations throughout the north. When the war ended in August 1945, the Communists had consolidated their control over a vast area of rural China. Although the United States attempted to negotiate a settlement between the Communists and the Nationalist government civil war proved inevitable. At first Chiang’s forces appeared to have the upper hand, but in late 1948 and early 1949 they suffered a series of crippling defeats. In the summer of 1949 the Nationalist resistance collapsed, and in October Communist leader Mao Tse tung proclaimed a new People’s Republic of China. Chiang Kaishek, along with the remaining Nationalist forces, retreated to the island of Taiwan. There he established a government in exile that he claimed to be the legitimate government of China.

### 2.1.3.4. An Assessment of the Nationalist Government

In spite of these failures, the Nationalist government’s achievements in domestic and foreign fields should be assessed in the background of its struggle for survival against both the Japanese and the domestic enemies, especially the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek’s role and his contribution to modern China had been a subject of controversies. His supporters had showered him with unqualified praises and admirers and his detractors had been strong in their condemnation.

### 2.1.3.5. Conclusion

It is important to note that Chiang Kai-shek took up the leadership of the Kuomintang Party in a very critical and difficult period of Chinese history. He became a symbol of national unity and brought a major part of the country under one administration. He defeated the warlords and united the nationalist forces under the banner of the Kuomintang. For a time being though not voluntarily, Chiang became a rallying point to the nationalists and Communists in a united front against the Japanese aggression. His military leadership was acknowledged not only by the Chinese Communists but also the Soviet Union, who pressurized the former to make common cause with the Nationalists against the Japanese. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership China regained her sovereignty by securing customs autonomy and revising the “unequal treaties”. In spite of all odds, he initiated the economic modernization of the country. However, its benefits did not reach to the urban and rural impoverished masses. He
failed to comprehend the role of workers and peasants in the revolution and hated Communists. In spite of all his defects and shortcomings, Chiang Kai-shek has been described by John Gunther as “the strongest man China has produced in generation”.

2.1.4. Manchurian Crisis

The Mukden Incident, also known as the Manchurian Incident, was a staged event engineered by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion of the northeastern part of China, known as Manchuria, in 1931. On September 18, 1931, a small quantity of dynamite was detonated by Lt. Kawamoto Suemori close to a railway line owned by Japan's South Manchuria Railway near Mukden now Shenyang. Although the explosion was so weak that it failed to destroy the track and a train passed over it minutes later, the Imperial Japanese Army, accusing Chinese dissidents of the act, responded with a full invasion that led to the occupation of Manchuria, in which Japan established its puppet state of Manchukuo six months later. The ruse was soon exposed to the international community, leading Japan to diplomatic isolation and its March 1933 withdrawal from the League of Nations. The bombing act is known as the "Liutiaohu Incident" and the entire episode of events is known in Japan as the "Manchurian Incident" and in China as the "September 18 Incident".

2.1.4.1. Background

Japan had hoped to establish her paramountcy in China taking advantage of the western powers preoccupation with the First World War. At the end of the war she was given an equal status with the Western Powers by being made a permanent member of the League Council and acquired a mandate from the League of Nations over the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. But owing to the influence of the United States, Japan had to return the German possessions to China and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 embodying the Twenty One Demands was abrogated. America was suspicious of Japanese intentions in the Pacific and wanted to check it, before it grew into dangerous proportions. At Washington conference Japan was isolated diplomatically as the conference restored to China the German possessions and abrogated all the rights and concessions which affected the sovereignty of China.

Thus, on account of the developments since the end of the First World War, Japan came to the conclusion that only by her own inherent strength, she could maintain her position in the Pacific. She took steps to become a major industrial power, to develop her air and naval forces, to increase her food production and to step up her trade. Japan realized that for industrial production coal and iron were indispensable and they were found in Manchuria, where since the days of the Russo-Japanese War, she had claimed a special position. To Manchuria, therefore, she turned her attention in 1930 because Manchuria was rich in soya beans, wheat, iron and coal.

Japanese economic presence and political interest in Manchuria had been growing ever since the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the war had granted Japan the lease of the South Manchuria Railway branch of the China Far East Railway. The Japanese government, however, claimed that this control included all the rights and privileges that China granted to Russia in the 1896 Li-Lobanov Treaty, as enlarged by the Kwantung Lease Agreement of 1898. This included absolute and exclusive administration within the South Manchuria Railway Zone. Japanese railway guards were stationed within the zone to provide security for the trains and tracks; however, these were regular Japanese soldiers, and they frequently carried out maneuvers outside the railway areas. There were many reports of raids on local Chinese villages by bored Japanese soldiers, and all complaints from the Chinese government were ignored.

In Manchuria Soviet Russia had secured the right to operate the Chinese Eastern Railway along with China. This was not liked by Chang Hsueh Liang, the ruler of Manchuria and the friend of the Kuomintang Government at Nanking. Russia thereupon invaded Manchuria from the West in 1929 and defeated the force of Chang Hsueh Liang. Chang and the Nanking Government agreed to the Soviet participation in the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This was the first Manchurian crisis, precipitated by Russia.

The first crisis of 1929 created for Russia special interest in a land which Japan had been claiming as her sphere since the days of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japan wanted to establish her special position by force of arms, as Manchuria’s ruler Chang Hsueh Liang, the Young Marshal supported the Nanking Kuomintang Government. Japan claimed that she had saved Manchuria from Russian occupation in 1905 and that after the
Russo-Japanese War she had invested heavily her capital for the development of the province. In 1928 under the Nanking Government’s influence, the Young Marshal attempted to make the south Manchuria Railway a commercial enterprise and deprive Japan of her administrative control because the activities of the Japanese Railway Guards and the Japanese consular police were irritating to the Chinese Nationalists. Another source of friction between the Japanese and the Chinese was the presence of nearly 80,000 Koreans, who after 1910 were Japanese subjects. While China objected to the acquisition of land by the Koreans, Japan refused to recognize the Koreans as Chinese citizens. Another cause of friction was in regard to the railway construction in Manchuria. The Japanese who were controlling the South Manchuria Railway terminating in the great port of Dairen had previously allowed the construction of only those Chinese lines as would be feeders to the South Manchuria Railway. But after 1924 lines paralleling and competing with South Manchuria Railway were constructed by the Chinese and the new lines divided traffic from the Japanese controlled roads.

The great wave of world economic depression struck Japan in 1930 and many banks and business houses collapsed. The prices of all articles fell disastrously, but most serious was the fall in the price of silk. In her desperation, Japan welcomed an aggressive foreign policy, just as the people of Germany did under rather similar circumstances. September 1931 was a time well chosen for her attack on Manchuria. The great depression and the Hoover Moratorium turned the USA to solve the economic crisis. England went off the Gold standard, Japan thought that Britain and the USA were not likely to interface.

2.1.4.2. Course of the Crisis

The militarists of Japan decided to invade Manchuria and occupy it. An explosion in the South Manchuria Railway provided the necessary occasion. Colonel Seishiro Itagaki, Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishiwara, Colonel Kenji Doihara, and Major Takayoshi Tanaka had laid complete plans for the incident by May 31, 1931. The plan was executed when 1st Lieutenant Suemori Komoto of the Independent Garrison Unit of the 29th Infantry Regiment, which guarded the South Manchuria Railway, placed explosives near the tracks, but far enough away to do no real damage. On September 18, the explosives were detonated. However, the explosion was minor and only a 1.5-meter section on one side of the rail was damaged. In fact, a train from Changchun passed by the site on this damaged track without difficulty and arrived at Shenyang.

On the morning of the September 19, two artillery pieces installed at the Mukden officers’ club opened fire on the Chinese garrison nearby, in response to the alleged Chinese attack on the railway. Zhang Xueliang’s small air force was destroyed, and his soldiers fled their destroyed Beidaying barracks, as five hundred Japanese troops attacked the Chinese garrison of around seven thousand. The Chinese troops were no match for the experienced Japanese troops. By the evening, the fighting was over, and the Japanese had occupied Mukden at the cost of five hundred Chinese lives and two hundred Japanese lives.

At Dalian in the Kwantung Leased Territory, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army General Shigeru Honjo was at first appalled that the invasion plan was enacted without his permission, but he was eventually convinced by Ishiwara to give his approval after the fact. Honjo moved the Kwantung Army headquarters to Mukden and ordered General Senjuro Hayashi of the Chosen Army of Japan in Korea to send in reinforcements. On 19 September, Mukden was declared secure.

Having recently lost a major military conflict against the USSR, Zhang Xueliang, falsely claiming to be under implicit instructions from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government to adhere to a non-resistance policy, had already urged his men not to put up a fight and to store away any weapons in case the Japanese invaded. Therefore, the Japanese soldiers proceeded to occupy and garrison the major cities of Changchun and Antung and their surrounding areas with minimal difficulty. However, in November, Muslim General Ma Zhanshan, the acting governor of Heilongjiang, began resistance with his provincial army, followed in January by Generals Ting Chao and Li Du with their local Jilin provincial forces. Despite this resistance, within five months of the Mukden Incident, the Imperial Japanese Army had overrun all major towns and cities in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. In September 1931 the Japanese occupied Mukden, the capital of Manchuria and soon overran the whole territory. The Mukden Incident took place without the knowledge of the Japanese Cabinet. It was the work of hot headed Army Officers.
2.1.4.3. The Chinese Response to the Invasion of Manchuria

The policy of the Chinese Government at the time of the Mukden Incident was one of non resistance towards Japanese troops in this area. This was primarily because they wanted to concentrate their efforts on defeating Communism in China and securing a strong and stable government. As a consequence the small Japanese force of some 11,000 men were able to take control of much of Manchuria very easily, despite the presence of a quarter of a million Chinese troops in the area.

In order to try and retain control of Manchuria the Chinese appealed to the League of Nations. In October the League of Nations passed a resolution saying that Japanese troops should withdraw and established a commission which would investigate the claims of both sides. The Japanese rejected the League of Nations resolution and insisted on direct negotiations with the Chinese Government. These negotiations failed and the Japanese proceeded, now against some resistance, to take control of the remainder of Manchuria. They then proceeded to launch an attack on the Chinese city of Shanghai which was outside of the area of Japanese economic control.

2.1.4.4. The League of Nations response to the Manchurian Crisis

China appealed to the League of Nations. Japan cleverly started a movement for the independence of Manchuria. It must be noted that originally Manchuria was not a part of China; it was outside the Great Wall. When the Manchus became the rulers of China, Manchuria became part of the Chinese Empire. The Japanese intention was that when the Manchu Dynasty ceased to exist, China had no claim over Manchuria. Japan further pointed out that after the Chinese revolution of 1911, the Viceroy of Manchuria was independent of the Peking Government. It was further pointed out that Emperor Pu-Yi only abdicated the throne of China at the time of the revolution of 1911, but retained the title of the Manchu Emperor. So in February 1932 Manchuria was proclaimed by Japan as an independent state under the name of Manchukuo and Pu-yi was made Emperor. The establishment of the Japanese puppet State of Manchukuo was an effort to set up a continental power in Asia as a counterbalance to the maritime power which the Western nations had exercised over China for nearly a century.

The initial response of the League of Nations was to follow its pre-arranged process for arbitration. They listened to the complaints of the Chinese and the Japanese position and then the Council, minus the representatives of China and Japan, discussed the issue before coming up with a Resolution. In this case the resolution called for Japanese withdrawal from Manchuria whilst a Commission investigated the issue. The Japanese ignored the wishes of the League of Nations and continued to expand whilst negotiations and diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis continued. When the commission produced its report on Manchuria in October 1932 it stated that Japan should leave Manchuria. A Special Assembly of the League of Nations was then held to vote on the issue in February 1933. When the vote reiterated that Japan should leave Manchuria, the Japanese delegation simply walked out of the League of Nations, never to return.

Though Japan argued in favour of an independent Manchuria, world public opinion would not accept the Japanese position because since 17\textsuperscript{th} century there had been continuous migration of the Chinese people into Manchuria and in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Manchuria was much Chinese as any other part of China.

The League of Nations to whom China appealed against Japanese occupation of Manchuria appointed the Lytton Commission to enquire into the matter. The Lytton Commission declared in favour of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. On the basis of the Lytton Report the League of Nations asked Japan to withdraw from Manchuria and advised China to make Manchuria autonomous under her sovereignty. The League also directed all its members not to recognize Manchukuo. Japan refused to abide by the decision of the League and withdraw from the international organization.

Japan called the conquest of Manchuria as the ‘Manchurian Incident’. Chinese reaction to it was at first limited to a boycott of Japanese goods, but early in 1932 fighting broke out in Shanghai between Chinese troops and Japanese marines. Part of Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese gun boats. Thereupon Chiang sued for peace. It is interesting to note that all the incidents had taken place without the breaking of diplomatic relations or any declaration of war.
Japan was not content with the establishment of a puppet regime in Manchukuo. Japanese military leaders favoured the creation of an autonomous North China, under the tutelage of Manchukuo. An autonomous buffer state was set up in North China South of the Great Wall, from which Chinese forces were excluded.

2.1.4.5. **Japanese policies in Manchukuo**

In 1932 Japan created an independent state of Manchukuo, which according to her was the outcome of a freedom movement in China. The world, however, knew the reality and the League of Nations advised all the member state not to recognize the new born state. for quite some time this new state was not recognized by any power except Japan. Subsequently, however, some states, due to compelling circumstances, gave *de facto* recognition to this state.

Manchuria was highly important for the economy of Japan. Hence, Japan took several steps to ensure that her control was tight over the State. Some of the steps taken were as follows:

- Japan concluded a treaty with the Emperor of New born State by which the treaty of 1919 signed with the Subedar leasing out Southern Manchurian Railway for a period of 99 years, was ratified and re-affirmed.
- It was agreed by the New Government that Japan will continue to have enjoy special rights over the new State. The new State agreed that the responsibility of Japan to protect its integrity and sovereignty.
- Japan increase the strength of her already existing army in the area.
- Japan encouraged her capitalist to spend more and more money in the new State. So much money was spent in industries in the area that the new State became predominantly an industrial instead of agricultural from 132 to 1938 Japanese investment rose from 43 million yens to 97 million yens.
- Japan took steps to settled her citizen in the new state. new settlement for Japanese were set up. Japan had an estimate of settling about 10,00,000 Japanese citizen in Manchukuo. Japan also carried out active propaganda to minimize the presence of Chinese nationals in Manchukuo.

2.1.5. **Conclusion**

The First World War although burst forth in Europe, but its effects were felt across the globe. Initially China follow a neutral policy during the war, but Germany’s difficulties in Europe encouraged China to re-occupy the German occupied province of Shantung. The First World War had changed the balance of power in China, at this juncture taking advantage of the elimination of Germany from China and the engagement of Britain, France, America and Russia in the European War, Japan as an ally of the allied powers made attempts to extend her empire in China and placed before China the famous twenty one demand. It was during this time China was still under the course of National Revolution, the newly established Republic of China was struggling, by the end of the war the Kuomintang split with the Communists led by Mao Tse Tung. In 1925 Dr. Sun Yat-sen died, and he was succeeded by Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang introduced various reform in China, in some area he was successful although failed to achieve in some other sphere. In the meanwhile the rising Japanese influence and subsequent crisis such as Mukden incident aggravated the situation. In the home front Chiang also chassed the Communist propaganda leaded by Mao-Tse Tung. The period between 1945 to 1949 is marked with the Chinese civil war between the Kuomintang party and Communist, finally 1949 the communist drove Chiang out of China.

2.1.6. **Summary**

- *The Great War first burst forth in Europe, but its immediate and far-reaching effects were felt at the Far Eastern world.*
- *Taking advantage of the elimination of Germany from China and the engagement of Britain, France, America and Russia in the European War, Japan as an ally of the allied powers made attempts to extend her empire in China.*
- *The Republic of China was established in 1912, but by the end of the 1920s the Kuomintang split with the Communists led by Mao Tse Tung.*
- *Japan after occupying the province of Shantung, Japan placed before China the Twenty One demands.*
- *China entered the war against Germany in 1917. China participation in the war was not wholly fruitless as she was able to get back her own territories occupied by Germany. Chinese youths were imbied with the spirit of democracy, communism and nationalism due to war.*

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Japan gradually established herself firmly in China. Economic condition of China deteriorated and she was compelled to accept aids from Japan.

China was allowed representation in the Paris Peace Conference. But, achieved nothing from the conference. The terms of the treaty of Versailles gave rise to a strong popular movement in China which she had never witnessed before. The students assumed the leadership of this movement.

In retaliation to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 to resist Japan’s further expansion, the USA convened a conference at Washington in 1921, where the demands of China were at last recognized and a treaty was signed whereby Japan gave back the province of Shantung to China in return for heavy compensation.

Chiang Kai-shek was one of the most important political leaders in 20th century Chinese history, sandwiched between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse Tung. Chaing Kai Shek succeeded to the power after death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

The administration of the Nationalist government during the period 1930-1937 is remembered as period of the growth in China.

Chiang Kai-shek took up the leadership of the Kuomintang Party in a very critical and difficult period of Chinese history. He became a symbol of national unity and brought a major part of the country under one administration.

The Mukden Incident, also known as the Manchurian Incident, was a staged event engineered by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion of the northeastern part of China, known as Manchuria, in 1931.

The period between 1945 to 1949 is marked with the Chinese civil war between the Kuomintang party and Communist, finally 1949 the communist drove Chiang out of China.

2.1.7. Exercise
1. Trace the career of Chiang Kai-shek as the military and political leader in China.
2. Analyze the administrative reforms introduced by the Nationalist Government in China.
3. What were the factors that led to the failure of the Nationalist Government in China?
4. Review the foreign policy of the Nationalist Government in China.
5. Write a note on the Manchurian Crisis of 1931.

2.1.8. Further Reading
- Gupte, R. S., The History of Modern. China, Sterling, New Delhi, 1972
Unit-2
Chapter-2

BIRTH AND GROWTH OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA
Cooperation and Conflict between the Communists and Kuomintang, 1921-1945, Sino-Japanese War, 1937; Civil War, 1945-49 and establishment of People’s Republic China.

Structure
2.2.0. Objective
2.2.1. Origin of Communism in China
   2.2.1.1. Circumstances that Led to the Growth of Communism in China:
2.2.2. Mao Tse Tung and Communist Party of China
2.2.3. Civil War, 1945-49
2.2.4. Birth of People’s Republic of China
2.2.5. Triumph of Communists
   2.2.5.1. Causes of the Triumph of the Communists:
2.2.6. Second Sino-Japanese War 1937
   2.2.6.1. The Causes of the War
   2.2.6.2. Course of the War
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2.2.7. Conclusion
2.2.8. Summary
2.2.9. Exercise
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2.2.0. Objectives

In this lesson, students investigate the birth and growth of Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tse Tung. After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

- to trace the growth of Communism in China.
- to understand the circumstances that led to the rise of Mao Tse-tung.
- to trace the circumstances that led to the Long March under taken by the Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and understand the difficulties faced by them.
- to study the various developments in China that ultimately led to the birth of the People’s Republic in China.
- to understand the causes, course and significance of Second Sino-Japanese War.

2.2.1. Origin of Communism in China

Transformation from monarchy, to democratic republic and finally to one party Communist regime during the first half of the twentieth century is a remarkable phase in the history of China. Within a few years after the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Communist Party was established. Initially, the Chinese Communist Party had an uneasy partnership with the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek’s strong dislike of the Communists and his campaigns aimed at their annihilation put the Communists on the defensive. However, the Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung built a strong base among the impoverished rural populace. The civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists ended in the success of the latter and led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Under the Communist rule, China emerged as a strong economic and military power in Asia.

2.2.1.1. Circumstances that Led to the Growth of Communism in China:

Influence of the Comintern:
In order to promote similar Communist revolutions in other countries, the Communist Party of USSR established the Comintern (Communist International). It was to be a worldwide organization of revolutionary parties, with its headquarter in Soviet Russia. Communist ideas found followers in many countries including China. The Communist ideology claimed the ability to solve virtually all of humanity’s problems. Besides, the Comintern’s hostility to the capitalist powers strongly appealed to people in countries like China, which had long been victims of European imperialism.

The May Fourth Movement:
The so-called "May Fourth Movement" or "new culture" movement that began in China around 1916 greatly influenced in the foundation of the Communist Party in China. The May Fourth Movement set in motion in China following the failure of the 1911 Revolution to establish a republican government, and continued through the 1920s. Its importance equals if not surpasses the more commonly known political revolutions of the century. The May Fourth Movement was an agitation initiated by the intellectuals primarily the academicians. Its strength came from the students and the professors. In the narrower sense, the May Fourth Movement refers to a student demonstration staged in Peking on 4 May 1919. The aim of the demonstration was to protest against the decision of the Paris Peace Conference that transferred Germany's rights in Shantung province to Japan. In a broader sense, the May Fourth Movement was a initiated the cultural renewal and social revolution.

The May Fourth Movement included not only political protest but also literary and scientific developments considerably influenced by Western ideas. The May Fourth Movement strengthened Chinese nationalism and promoted the concept of democracy, which gained in popularity among the intellectuals. The May Fourth Movement promoted a faith in nationalism, progress, democracy, and science. The rejection of Chinese ideals and the adoption of European values were linked. Thus, the May Fourth Movement can be considered as a symbol of broad Cultural Revolution and expression of nationalism. The May Fourth Movement brought to the forefront anti-foreignism, national unity and recovery of lost rights.

Marxist Study Group: The initial impact of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia on China had been quite negligible. Petrograd and Moscow were too far away. In spite of this Communist influence was felt in China. Chinese translations of some of the important writings of Marx and Lenin were gradually introduced in China. In 1818, a Marxist Study Group in Peking was established. A number of students including the young Mao
Tse-tung joined this study group. Originally the study group viewed Marxism more from the academic interest rather than a practical ideology. However, under the influence of the events of 4 May 1919, and on becoming acquainted with more of the Marxist-Leninist texts, especially Lenin's theory of imperialism, both Li Ta Chao and Cen Tu Hsiu became staunch Marxists by 1920.

**Birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP):** Small groups of Marxists were in existence in different cities of China. The first emissary of the Comintern, Voitinsky arrived in China from the Soviet Union in early 1920. He met both Li Ta Chao and Chen Tu Hsiu, and held meetings of Marxist groups during the year. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formally established when twelve delegates representing fifty members held the First Congress in Shanghai on 1 July, 1921. The CCP remained a small party comprising of less than a thousand members for several years after it was founded. Most of its member were educated people. Inspired by the Marxist ideas, these young intellectuals soon attempted to organize the proletariat, the industrial workers, as the main basis of the revolution. Chinese workers, like those in many other countries, suffered from long hours of work, low wages, and miserable working conditions. The rapidly spreading discontent among the industrial workers made it easy for the CCP members to organize them. However, it is important to note that the Chinese proletariat was still very small. This was chiefly due to the slow progress of industrialization in China. Thus, the CCP could not muster enough workers to win battles against the employers.

The lack of an urban proletariat prevented the CCP from following an extreme 'leftist' programme of establishing socialism in China. Lenin was of the opinion that due to lack of an urban proletariat in most of the colonial and backward countries of the world, the local Communist parties should make a temporary alliance with bourgeoisie-democratic movements. This would enable them to advance their own influence and base of mass support, while retaining organizational independence. Meanwhile the industrial labour force would grow. The CCP at its Second Congress in July 1922 adopted Lenin's proposals. The CCP decided to work for a two-party alliance with Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang. The Comintern was of the opinion that the Kuomintang had a better mass base and Sun Yat-sen was a better revolutionary leader.

**Kuomintang-Comintern-CCP Alliance:** Dr. Sun Yat-sen initially rejected the Comintern proposal for a two-party alliance. However, he invited individual Communists to join the Kuomintang, and in some cases to take top positions in it. The CCP was to retain its external independence. By this arrangement, the Comintern aimed at making the Kuomintang a means for furthering Russian interests in China. It also believed that the CCP would eventually be able to take control of the Kuomintang. Sun Yat-sen, on his part, was disillusioned with the treatment meted out to China by the Western Powers, including non-recognition of his government by them. He was also in need of material aid from Russia in the form of arms and money in order to build a strong army with which he could unify China. Besides, he anticipated that he could keep the Communists as inferior partners within the Kuomintang.

**Reorganization of the Kuomintang:** Dr Sun Yat-sen agreed to have the Kuomintang reorganized on the Bolshevik model following his meeting with the Comintern representative, Adolfe Joffe during 1923. Michael Borodin and other Russian advisers arrived at Canton in October 1923, to organize both the Kuomintang party and the Nationalist army. The alliance between the Kuomintang, Comintern and the CCP seemed to offer considerable benefits to all the parties involved. The Russians hoped that large portions of China would come under the control of the CCP, over which they had a great deal of power through the Comintern, or at least of Kuomintang with which they were allied. The small CCP gained prestige by affiliating with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and cooperation from his organization. On the other hand, Dr. Sun Yat-sen gained new recruits from among the Communists, arms and funding from the Comintern, and invaluable services from the Russian advisers to teach the Kuomintang how to run a political party and an army. The instructors of the Whampoa Military Academy included Comintern advisers as well as Communist and non-Communist members of the Kuomintang. They trained military officers of a considerably higher quality than most of those found in the warlord armies of the north.

**Chiang Kai-shek’s Distrust of the Communists:** Following the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in March 1925, two men, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, had emerged as possible successors to his leadership. Chiang was soon made commander-in-chief of the Nationalist army and president of the Whampoa Military Academy in
Canton. Though he began to distrust both the Russian and the Chinese Communists, he realized that Russian help was essential in order to bring about the unity of the country through military campaigns. Even then, Chiang took advantage of the temporary absence of Borodin in Peking during March 1926 to arrest many Communists in Canton and to put several Russian advisers under house arrest. In spite of this action the Comintern insisted that the CCP should maintain its ties with the Kuomintang.

Borodin agreed to restrict the activities of the Communists in the Kuomintang and to support Chiang’s northern expedition. On his side, Chiang promised to follow restraint against the Communists. With the help of arms supplies and military advisers sent by Soviet Russia, the Northern Expedition began in July 1926. The troops were aided considerably in their task by the activities of the Communists, including Mao Tse-tung, who organised the peasants along the route of the Kuomintang army.

2.2.2. Mao Tse Tung and Communist Party of China

*Early Life and Career:* Mao Tse-Tung, who became the supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party led the long struggle that made China a Communist nation in 1949. Following the success of the Communist Revolution that ousted the Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung became the ruler of the Chinese republic and one of the world’s most powerful leaders. Mao Tse-tung was born on 26th December 1893, in the village of Shao-shan, Hunan Province in a peasant family. From the age of eight he attended his native village's primary school, where he acquired a basic knowledge of the Confucian Classics. At 13 he was forced to leave and begin working full time on his family's farm. Rebelling against paternal authority, Mao Tse-tung left his family to study at a higher primary school in a neighbouring county and then at a secondary school in the provincial capital, Ch'ang-sha. There he came in contact with new ideas from the West, as formulated by such political and cultural reformers as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Nationalist revolutionary Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He witnessed the revolution of 1911 and took part in it as revolutionary army in Hunan and spent six months as a soldier.

With the establishment of the new Chinese Republic in 1912, Mao Tse-tung’s military service came to an end. Mao eventually was graduated from the First Provincial Normal School in Ch'ang-sha in 1918. From the normal school in Ch'ang-sha, MaoTse-tung went to the Peking University, China's leading intellectual centre. The half year that he spent in Peking working as a librarian's assistant was of great importance in shaping his future career. In the Peking University Mao Tse-tung came under the influence of Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the principal figures in the foundation of the Chinese Socialist Party. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung found himself at the Peking University precisely during the months leading up to the May Fourth Movement of 1919, which was to a considerable extent the fountainhead of all of the changes that were to take place in China in the following half century. In September 1920 Mao Tse-tung became principal of the Lin Ch'angsha primary school. In October he organized a branch of the Socialist Youth League in Ch'ang-sha.

*Entry in to CCP:* In July 1921 he attended the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), together with representatives from the other Socialist groups in China and two delegates from the Moscow-based Comintern (Communist International). Mao Tse-tung participated in the Congress acting as the recording secretary. He was appointed as the party's general secretary for Hunan Province, where on his return he begins to organize labour unions and strikes. In 1923, when the CCP entered into an alliance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's KMT, Mao Tse-tung was one of the first Communists to join the KMT and to work within it.

At the CCP's Third National Congress held at Guangzhou in June 1923 Mao Tse-tung was elected to the party Central Committee. In the winter of 1924-25, Mao returned to his native village of Shaoshan for a rest. After witnessing demonstrations by peasants stirred into political consciousness by the shooting of several dozen Chinese by foreign police in Shanghai in May and June 1925, Mao Tse-tung suddenly became aware of the revolutionary potential inherent in the peasantry. Following the example of other Socialists working within the Kuomintang who had already begun to organize the peasants, Mao Tse-tung sought to channel the spontaneous protests of the Hunanese peasants into a network of peasant associations.

*Struggle with Kuomintang:* Following the death of Dr Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek, who had assumed the leadership of the KMT launched a campaign against the northern warlords and succeeded in bringing
under Kuomintang control nearly half of China within nine months. However, the alliance with the CCP soon began to crumble. The split between the KMT and CCP came in July 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek turned violently on the CCP, executing many of its leaders and up to 3,500 party sympathizers. Under these circumstances the Soviets shifted their allegiance to the communists, who initiated a series of unsuccessful insurrection attempts.

**Realizing power of Peasant:** Mao Tse-tung, noticed that the largest element of the population in China was the peasantry. During the period of Kuomintang-Communist United Front (1924-1927) Mao Tse-tung organized the peasant movement in Hunan. He planned a rural revolution and destruction of feudalism, which had held the peasantry captive in China’s countryside. The vast majority of China’s peasants were illiterate and poor. They were overburdened with taxes and debt-ridden. Under Mao Tse-tung’s leadership the Communists organized peasant societies in Kiangsi, Fukien and Hunan provinces. He won over the peasants to the communist cause by offering them agrarian reforms, reduction of taxes and rent, establishment of peasant councils and setting up schools. Under his guidance the peasants were organized into guerilla groups to wage relentless war against the city-based power of the Kuomintang government. A Chinese Red Army was in the process of creation under the command of Chu Teh, a close associate of Mao Tse-tung, during these years.

**The Autumn Harvest Uprising:** The Communists planned simultaneous urban uprising and peasant revolts in the countryside. Mao Tse-tung had been deputed to Hunan by the Central Committee to prepare for the uprising. He incited the so called Autumn Harvest Uprising in September 1927. Autumn was chosen as the season for the uprising chiefly due to the fact that taxes were collected during the autumn harvest and that the peasants were most likely to support any rebellion that would benefit them. Mao Tse-tung’s programme included the confiscation of the land from big and middle landlords, and its redistribution it to the poor peasants. He also aimed to organize a revolutionary army, and to set up soviets. However, the Autumn Harvest Uprising launched on 9 September 1927, ended in a failure due to lack of local support, and military defeats suffered by the Communists at the hands of the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Tsetung with his supporters numbering around 1,000 was forced to flee for refuge to the mountainous region of Chingknaoshan. Because of the failure of the uprising, and for his premature advocacy of organizing Soviets before they were officially authorized, Mao Tsetung was removed from his position as a member of the CCP Central Committee in November 1927.

**Right and Left wing Factions in the Kuomintang:** The members of the Kuomintang gradually came to be divided into two factions depending on their ideological leanings and other factors. Wang Ching-wei headed the left wing of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek led the right wing. The rivalry and conflict between these two factions of the Kuomintang were due to a number of reasons. These included personal rivalry between the two leaders, differing views on the alliance with the Communists, and Wang’s fear of Chiang’s military machine. In January 1927, Wang Ching wei moved the Kuomintang National Government to Wuhan. Chiang preferred Nanking as the capital of the Nationalist government. In March the Wuhan government placed restrictions on the military and political authority of Chiang.

**Suppression of the Communists in Shanghai:** Moving out of Nanking, Chiang entered Shanghai, where the workers, organized by the Communists under the leadership of Chou En-lai, had taken over the control of the Chinese section of the city. Realizing the futility of any prolonged unity between the Kuomintang and the CCP, Chiang decided to suppress the Communists and proceeded to Shanghai with his troops. In this task, bankers, businessmen and landlords supported Chiang. On 12 April 1927, Chiang launched a massacre of the CCP members along with a number of suspected Communists. Chou En-lai managed to escape with his life.

**Purge of the Communists from the Kuomintang:** On the other hand, friendship between the CCP and the left wing of the Kuomintang did not last long. Wang Ching-wei’s suspicion that the Communists were planning to capture the Kuomintang was confirmed when a Comintern representative, M.N. Roy, showed him a telegram from Stalin which urged the CCP to take control of the Kuomintang. In mid-July the Wuhan government purged the Communists from the Kuomintang, and sent Comintern advisers, including Borodin, back to Moscow. Stalin was keen to see a strong, unified China run by a government friendly to Russia. However, his aspiration remained unfulfilled, as the Communists were unable to get organizational control of the Kuomintang. Besides, Stalin,
thousands of miles away in Moscow, was poorly informed about events in China. Moreover, Stalin underestimated the ability of Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists. Unable to face the determined repression of the Nationalists in urban areas, the Communists moved to the countryside for safety. Gradually, over the years they evolved a strategy independent of the Comintern.

A number of factors contributed to the growth of Communism in China. The May Fourth Movement of 1919 in a real sense broadened the Chinese nationalism and stimulated intellectual activities leading to the organization of Marxist study groups. These factors, along with the propaganda activity of the Comintern led to the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dr Sun Yat-sen's positive attitude towards the Chinese Communist helped the CCP to strike deeper roots in China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung who believed in mobilizing the peasantry who, he believed had tremendous potential for proletarian revolution in China. Under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, the Communists organized peasant societies in Kiangsi, Fukien and Hunan. The first attempt of Mao Tse-tung in organizing the peasant revolt known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising did not succeed. But Mao Tse-tung never gave up hope and continued his work in establishing peasant Soviets in China. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government took up arms to suppress the communists.

2.2.3. Civil War, 1945-49

Following the Japanese surrender once again the mutual jealousy and rivalry between CCP and KMT raised their heads and China was once again plunged into civil war, in which Mao scored a brilliant victory over KMT forces. Finally the KMT forces were driven out of China and were forced to take refuge in Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed in October 1949.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which had a shaky alliance with the Nationalist Party headed by Chiang Kai-shek came to an end in April 1927, when the Nationalist Army let loose a reign of terror in which thousands of the Communists perished. Few of the Communist leaders including Chou En-lai fled to the west to the Kiangsi Province. The remoteness of Kiangsi was so great in the 1930s that the government had almost no control over this area. With lack of roads as in most parts of China in those years, it could be traversed only by mountain footpaths by people carrying bundles on their backs, horse-and-mule caravans. With its remoteness inaccessibility, Kiangsi provided a suitable base for the Communists to resist the Nationalist government and peasant rebellions. By its geographical location the Kiangsi Province was steeped in illiteracy, disease, poverty, and ignorance. It was here that Mao Tse-tung set up his new Soviet Communist zone.

**Organization of the Red Army:** In April 1928, Chu Teh, the chief architect of the Chinese Red Army, joined Mao Tse-tung. The Red Army comprised a force of about 10,000 men. Together they set up local Soviets and implemented radical land policy of liquidating landlords and redistributing land of the whole area to the landless peasants. In spite of their success in Chingkangshan, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh were forced to leave the region in January 1929 due to the attacks from the Nationalist Army and economic blockade. Moving to south Kiangsi, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh set up a new base, which was to become the future Chinese Soviet Republic. All the elements of the Maoist strategy became apparent in the Kiangsi Soviet. This included the use of rural base areas (Soviets) from which he could conduct land reform and guerrilla warfare by means of a Red Army led by a disciplined Communist party.

**Differences Between Mao Tse-tung and the CCP:** However, Mao Tse-tung’s strategy ran contrary to the directives of the Sixth Congress of the CCP and the Sixth Congress of the Comintern held in Moscow in 1928. The Sixth Congress recognized that the agrarian revolution was the main content of the Chinese revolution. However, it emphasised that organizing the proletarian bases in the cities was the first priority of the CCP. It was considered essential to link the rural Soviets to the struggle of the urban workers, and to establish party control over the peasants. Thus, the Sixth Congress stressed the need for proletarian control over the revolution, while Mao Tse-tung emphasised the importance of the peasants in any revolutionary movement. The Congress also called for preparations for armed uprisings in the future. As against this programme Mao Tse-tung was in favour of gradual expansion and consolidation of the peasant bases in rural areas.

**The ‘Bandit Encirclement Campaigns’**: In addition to the intra-party conflict, Mao Tse-tung was also faced with the formidable task of facing the ‘Bandit Encirclement Campaigns’ initiated by Chiang Kai-shek at the
end of 1930. Alarmed by the Red Army strikes against the cities in the summer of 1930, Chiang Kai-shek was determined to wipe out the Communists once and for all. However, the Red Armies using guerilla warfare frustrated the first two of his ‘Encirclement Campaigns’. At this juncture Chiang’s attention was diverted to Manchuria due to the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 engineered by the Japanese who occupied the entire province. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to call off the campaign against the Communists of the Kiangsi Soviet to deal with the problem created by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

For seven years the Communists prospered despite everything Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Army could do in The First, Second, Third and Fourth ‘annihilation’ campaign against the ‘Red Bandits’ as he referred to them. During these four campaigns the Communists had used the guerilla tactics of hit-and-run. They maneuvered the Nationalists deep into their territory and attacked them with deadly ambushes. The Communist captured huge quantities of guns and ammunition and from the thousands of Nationalist prisoners, they replenished losses in their ranks.

**German Assistance to the Nationalists:** In the autumn of 1933, the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek launched a huge and determined Fifth Campaign against the Communists who were then based in the Kiangsi and Fukien provinces in south-east China. During the Fifth Campaign Hitler, the dictator of Germany and an enemy of the Communists had dispatched one of his best Generals, Hans von Seeckt to China as an adviser to the Nationalist forces in their attempt in suppressing the Communists. He advised Chiang Kai-shek not to launch a full frontal attack on Kiangsi. He advised Chiang Kai-shek that with 500,000 Nationalist troops the Communist base at Juichin in Kiangsi could be surrounded with a view to strangle the Communists. The Nationalists had a policy of making a slow advance building trenches and blockhouses in order to provide protection to the Nationalist forces. Seeckt wanted a war of attrition but with minimal contact with the Communists as he wanted to starve them out rather than engage in battles with them. Seeckt was a skilled soldier and his strategy worked very well. His ‘slow-but-sure’ process lead to the area controlled by the Communists shrinking quite rapidly. Within 12 months, the Communists had lost 50% of the territory they had controlled in 1933 and 60,000 Communist soldiers of the Red Army were killed. Under these circumstances the Nationalists had the clear ability to fully destroy the Communists. Von Seeckt moved the Nationalist troops forward very slowly and then built concrete reinforced blockhouses and pillboxes. This allowed the Nationalists to control every path and road. The noose was being drawn around the Red Army slowly but surely. The Red Army was forced to confront the Nationalists in costly head to head battles. For Chiang Kai-shek the end to the Red Bandits was near at hand and he took great comfort in this.

**Temporary Setback to Mao Tse-tung:** It was then that the Communists changed tactics. Against the advice of Mao Tse-tung, the Communists used full-scale attacks against the Nationalist forces on the advice of the Russian agents lead by Otto Braun. It was Braun who advised full-frontal attacks against the Nationalist forces and convinced the Communist hierarchy that Mao Tse-tung was wrong in his strategies. He also branded Mao Tse-tung as being politically wrong because peasants in Kiangsi were being killed by the Nationalists and the Red Army did nothing to assist them. In order to minimize his influence Mao Tse-tung was even expelled from the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee. However, the strategy of Braun proved to be very costly for the Communists. They lost men and equipment and as Kiangsi was surrounded by blockhouses held by the Nationalists, they could get no supplies through from the other Communist base at Hunan. Realizing the hopeless situation in which the Communist were placed, Mao Tse-tung tried to win back the support from the Communist cadre by pushing for a breakout by the Red Army followed up by an attack on the Nationalist forces in their rear. This was rejected in favour of Braun’s idea for a full-scale retreat from Kiangsi with a push for a Communist base in Hunan where the Chinese Communist’s Party Second Army was based. The retreat, which was to be called the Long March, thus started in October 1934.

**Beginning of the Long March:** The Red Army started to Long March carrying whatever it could. 87,000 soldiers started the retreat carrying such items as typewriters, furniture, printing presses etc. They also took with them 33,000 guns and nearly 2 million ammunition cartridges. It took the Red Army 40 days to get through the blockhouses surrounding Kiangsi. However, as soon as they got through the blockhouses they were attacked at
Xiang by the Nationalist forces. In the Battle of Xiang, the Red Army lost as many as 45,000 men, that is, over 50 per cent of their fighting force. It was believed that the poor strategy adopted by Braun was responsible for the disastrous defeat and loss of the Red Army. Braun ordered the Red Army to march in a straight line. The Nationalists were able to predict where the Red Army would be at any given point. Also the fleeing communists took with them equipment that was bound to hamper their retreat. The printing presses, typewriters and other articles were not of military value in survival terms and hindered speed of movement. After the Battle of Xiang, Braun was blamed for these failings, but the damage had been done. In January 1935, control of the Red Army was handed over to Mao Tse-tung and Braun was suspended.

**Strategies Adopted by Mao Tse-tung:** Mao Tse-tung with the support of Chu Teh adopted new tactics. Mao Tse-tung wanted the Red Army to move in a completely unpredictable way. He sent his men in several directions trying to confuse Chiang Kai-shek who had between 500,000 and 750,000 men on the chessboard to prevent Mao Tse-tung from escaping north across the Yangtze River. As the Red Army moved away from Xiang, it used twisting movement patterns that made predicting its direction very difficult. Mao Tse-tung also split up the Red Army into smaller units. In theory this made them more open to attack, but in practice, they were more difficult to find in the open spaces on China.

**Difficulties During the Long March:** Mao also had a new target, Shensi province towards the north of China. The journey was physically demanding as it crossed a very difficult environment. The Red Army had to cross the Snowy Mountains, some of the highest mountains in the world. The 14,000 and 15,000-foot height would kill many men who would just die for lack of oxygen. Halting at the top proved to be fatal. It was terrible not to rest, but rest meant death. The best was to sit down and slide. So that ice would take into bottom. Some were lost, catapulted off cliffs, other suffered broken bones, but many survived. To most of the Red Army, the Snowies were the worst experience of the Long March. While crossing the Chinese Grassland which was an area of deep marshes the Red Army lost hundreds of lives. The Red Army did not only have to contend with the Nationalist Army but the Warlords who were in control of the land in northern China. Even the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek had failed to break their power. They did not welcome the arrival of the Red Army into an area they effectively ruled.

**Establishment of the Soviets:** In spite of the difficulties faced during the Long March, the Communists implemented their network of Village Soviets as they had done in Chingkangshan and Kiangsi. They took land from the landlords and distributed it among the landless peasants. The peasants in the Village Soviets were also provided arms to defend themselves and their property. Mao Tse-tung succeeded in earning the friendship and goodwill of the tribal people on the way who proved to be of a great help as guides to the red Army while crossing the mountain ranges.

**End of the Long March:** By October 1935, what was left of the original 87,000 Red Army soldiers reached their destination at Yenan in Shensi province which marked the end of the Long March after enduring the hardships and death for more than a year. Less than 10,000 men had survived the Long March. These survivors had marched over 9000 kilometers. The march had taken 368 days. The Long March is considered one of the great physical feats of the Twentieth Century. After arriving in the northwestern province of Shensi, the Communists, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung reorganized and regrouped their scattered forces. When those who survived the Long March reached Yenan, they combined with the communist troops there to form a fighting strength of 80,000 which still made it a formidable fighting force against the Nationalists. Gradually they extended their control over the neighbouring provinces. Under the Communist influence the peasants became increasingly radical in their attitude and approach. The economic reforms which won support of the peasants for the Communists were-redistribution of land, abolition of tax extortion and elimination of privileged groups.

**Significance of the Long March:** While costly, the Long March gave the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the isolation it needed, allowing its army to recuperate and rebuild in the north of China. It also was vital in helping the CCP to gain a positive reputation among the peasants due to the determination and dedication of the surviving participants of the Long March. Emphasising the importance of the Long March, Mao Tse-tung wrote in 1935: "The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes
while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation." In addition, policies ordered by Mao for all soldiers to follow, the Eight Points of Attention, instructed the army to avoid harm to or disrespect for the peasants, in spite of the desperate need for food and supplies. This policy won support for the Communists among the rural peasants. From the Long March the rank and file of the Chinese Communist Party emerged with enormous energy and courage. The Communist Red Army had become tough and well trained in guerilla tactics that it could face any challenge not only from the Nationalist Army but also the Japanese forces. Mao Tse-tung described the Red Army as the ‘army of heroes’. The Long March was an epic feat of great importance in the history of China. It was a unique human adventure as nearly 100,000 persons undertook a march for 368 days covering a distance of 6,000 miles. The marchers had to pass through inhospitable regions, encounter unfriendly tribes and bear the brunt of the pursuing Nationalist army. Giving a vivid picture of the Long March, Edgar Snow in his famous book ‘Red Star Over China’ writes, “Altogether they crossed eighteen mountain ranges, five of them perennially snow-capped, and they crossed twenty four rivers. They passed through twelve provinces, each larger than most European countries; they broke through enveloping armies of ten different provincial warlords; they eluded, outmaneuvered or defeated Kuomintang troops numbering more than 3,00,000. They entered and crossed six different aboriginal districts, and penetrated areas through which no Chinese army had gone for many years.”

2.2.4. **Birth of People’s Republic of China**

Following the Long March, the Communists under the supreme leadership of Mao Tse-tung had to consolidate their position in north-western China so as to meet the final challenge of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek. The chief aim of the Communists was the organization of the peasants, building of a strong Red Army and capture of political power through a sustained revolution that would lead to the establishment of the People’s Republic in China under the Communist control. However, the Communists had to wait for nearly 15 years before the final goal was achieved in 1949. During these 15 years China had to face the invasion of the Japanese and the Communists were forced by circumstances to forge a second front in order to fight against the Japanese which continued even after the outbreak of Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 which eventually merged with the Second World War that began in 1939. Following the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Communists and the nationalists fought a bitter Civil War that ultimately led to the victory of the Communists and the birth of People’s Republic in China in 1949.

**The Second United Front:** In August 1935, Mao Tse-tung had initiated new proposals for a united front with the Nationalists against the Japanese aggression. This would provide a respite for the Communists from further Nationalist military campaigns. Even the Comintern was in favour of the proposal. Public opinion in China demanded that Chiang Kai-shek should give up the civil war against the Communists and resist the Japanese. However, Chiang rejected the proposal of the Communists for a united front against the Japanese. He agreed only after the so-called ‘Sian incident’ in which Chiang was practically held a hostage by his own troops from Manchuria under the command of Chang Hsiu Liang. They were in favour of resisting the Japanese rather than pursuing the Communists. Chiang was released following the intervention of Chou En-lai as a mediator. Under the agreement reached between the Communists and the Kuomintang, the former accepted Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the state and pledged to place their reorganized armies under his command. They also agreed to slow down the pace of socialisation of land and industry in the areas under their control.

**The Second Sino-Japanese War:** On 7 July 1937, the Japanese attacked China falsifying an attack at the Marco Polo Bridge. Japanese troops and warships poured into China, attempting to occupy the five Western provinces and create another state like Manchukuo. They occupied the major cities of China including Peking, Shanghai, Wuhan and Canton by October. In December 1937 they took Nanking, the Nationalist capital. Crowded with refugees, the Nationalists abandoned Nanking to its fate at the hands of the Japanese. Over a period of six weeks, hundreds of thousands of Chinese were killed, women were raped, and the city sacked in what became known as the “Rape of Nanking.” As the Japanese advanced deeper inside China and occupied a vast part of the
country, the Communist and the Nationalist guerilla groups remained behind the thinly held Japanese areas. Chiang Kai-shek and his followers relocated to Chunking in the Sichuan province. By 1939, as war started in Europe, China had been fighting a forgotten war for eight years. There were more than 2,000,000 Chinese casualties, widespread disease and famine. The Japanese declared China conquered, but the reality was that neither side could gain an upper hand. Chiang Kai-shek distrusted the Communists, and sent his army against them as often as he attacked the Japanese.

The Communists were better experienced and organised to continue guerilla activities. Thus, they were more successful against the Japanese. The Communists set up a number of local governments in border regions, which they controlled during the late thirties and early forties. The Second Sino-Japanese War was merged with the Second World War when the United States declared war on Japan in December 1941 following the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii on 7 December 1941.

The United Front provided the Communists with the much-needed breathing space for extension of their control and for strengthening the fighting capacity of the Red Army. Both the Communists and the Nationalists had entered into a compromise with their bitter memories of mutual hostility. Neither of them was prepared to make any sacrifice of their principles. By 1941 the United Front ceased to exist, and charges and counter charges began to be leveled against each other. In spite of an understanding that the Red Army should be placed under the authority of Chiang Kai-shek, the Communists retained control over their military formations throughout the war against Japan. The Red Army received intensive political indoctrination and continued to grow under the leadership of Chu Teh. By the end of the Second World War, the communist armed forces had increased from 80,000 in 1937 to about three million in regular troops, guerilla forces and militia. Thus, at the time of the Japanese defeat and collapse, the CCP was ready to fill the vacuum with a large well-doctrinated army, efficient party machine and by popular slogans of ‘‘land redistribution and agrarian reform’’.

End of the Second World War: With the surrender of Japan in August 1945, Chiang Kai-shek, assured of good relations with Russia and strong support of the United States confidently looked forward to reform and reconstruct China. He was unaware of the deteriorating economic situation, widespread corruption and incompetence of his government. He relied on his apparent superior military power. He was strongly opposed to any proposal of entering into a coalition with the Communists to form a government in the post-war China. The United States tried to exert diplomatic pressure on Chiang to organise a coalition government with the Communists as a means of building national unity and reconstruction of the war-ravaged economy. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek demanded the disbandment of Communist troops and their return to their original north-west region as a price for concession.

Struggle Between the Nationalists and the Communists: The Communists, aware of their strength and support in the country, refused to oblige Chiang Kai-shek. The result was a race between the Nationalists and the Communists to take over from the Japanese the control of cities, strategic areas and railroads all over the occupied parts of China. The United States airlifted the Nationalist troops to Shanghai and Nanking ahead of the Communists. Before the end of the year clashes had taken place between the rival troops in as many as eleven provinces. There was keen competition in Manchuria. The Communists entered important cities in North China and rural areas of Manchuria. They threatened civil war if Chiang attempted to send troops against them. The occupation of Manchuria and capture of Manchukuoan troops gave the Communists an upper hand in the civil war which broke out the following year leading eventually to the fall of the Nationalists.

Shuttle Diplomacy of the US: Meanwhile, the United States was engaged in promoting a coalition government in China in order to prevent civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists and to ensure unity and integrity of the country. Throughout 1945, the American Ambassador, Patrick Hurley, was engaged in a shuttle diplomacy between Chungking and Yenan trying to sort out the differences between the two parties on the question of forming a national government. Mao Tse-tung was also in favour of a ‘democratic coalition government’. However, Chiang Kai-shek was opposed to any such proposal.

The Marshall Mission: General George Marshall followed Patrick Hurley to China in December 1945, as President Truman’s personal representative. He was instructed to prevent a civil war and achieve the ‘unification
of China by peaceful democratic methods’. President Truman wanted a strong China, allied with the United States, to form a linchpin of post-war US policy for Asia. The Marshall Mission aimed at ending the one-party rule in China, which was considered to be the main objection of the Communists. By early 1946 Marshall was able to set up a People’s Consultative Council comprising of Communist, Kuomintang and other representatives as a prelude to ending the one-party rule of the Kuomintang. The People’s Consultative Council lasted only for three weeks and the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists broke out all over North China and in Manchuria. A cease-fire arranged by George Marshall broke down. Marshall left China in disgust due to the stubborn attitude of Chiang Kai-shek and China plunged into a full-scale civil war.

**Success of the Communists:** Following the outbreak of a full-scale civil war, in the initial stages the Nationalist forces gained an upper hand. But from mid-1947 advantage shifted to the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek gradually lost his initiative, particularly in Manchuria and North-east China. Faced with grave inflation, military setback and loss of sympathy of the United States, the Nationalists lost the confidence and support of the poverty stricken people. The Communists were quite successful against the Nationalist forces as they adopted guerilla tactics. The Communists succeeded in putting the Nationalist on the defensive by disrupting communications, cutting off supplies and massacring the scattered Nationalist troops or forcing them to surrender. Defection, treachery of generals and deteriorating morale of the Nationalist forces completed the tale of defeat and disaster. Nanking and Shanghai fell to the Communists without a fight. On 21 January 1949, Chiang Kai-shek officially resigned as president of the Republic of China and vice president Li Tsung Jen nominally took Chiang’s place. However, Chiang kept real power in his own hands. As his military position on the mainland of China became hopeless, he withdrew as many of his troops as possible to the island of Taiwan. On 1 March 1950, Chiang Kai-shek once again took the title of President of the Republic of China.

**Birth of the People’s Republic of China:** The Red Army, renamed as the People’s Liberation Army during the civil war, crossed the Yangtze River in April 1949, and reached Canton on the southern coast in October. At this point the civil war seemed to be effectively over. On 1 October 1949, in the old imperial capital of Peking, the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

### 2.2.5. Triumph of Communists

The triumph of the Communists against the Nationalist forces commanded by one of the best experienced generals, Chiang Kai-shek manifests the determination, sense of sacrifice and able leadership of Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders. It was no mean feet that the decimated Communist Red Army during the Long March, was revived by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh with additional troops and weapons that could resist the Japanese and eventually overwhelm the Nationalist forces in the Civil War following the end of the Second World War and emerge triumphant.

#### 2.2.5.1. Causes of the Triumph of the Communists:

It was apparent that the Nationalist government in spite of its greater resources and better equipped army failed to defeat the Communist forces which were less in number and ill-equipped. However, the causes of the triumph of the Communists can be analyzed without much difficulty.

**The Effect of the Second Sino-Japanese War:** The most important factor that led to the triumph of the Communists was the eight years of the Sino-Japanese War that completely exhausted the Nationalist government militarily and financially. Had there been no Sino-Japanese War, the situation in China would have been very different. Many of the disastrous consequences of that war continued to trouble the Nationalists during their struggle with the Communists. The sustained war against the Japanese, the external enemy and against the Communists, the internal enemy led to the progressive weakening of the power of the Nationalist party lead by Chiang Kai-shek. It had to bear the main brunt of the Japanese invasion and the strain of long period of resistance to the enemy. This weakened and impoverished the Nationalist government. The depletion of its effective military power led to a consequent increase in the relative strength of the Communist armies.
Wrong Strategy of the Nationalists: Chiang Kai-shek sent a large body of his troops to Manchuria where over four and a half lakh of them were either captured by the Japanese or killed. His decision to pursue the Communists and capture their headquarters at Yenan proved to be detrimental to the interest of the Nationalists as a large number of troops had to be deployed to suppress the Communists. The war against the Japanese was also not properly executed causing demoralization and destruction of the Nationalist forces. These factors greatly contributed to the weakness of the Nationalist forces and the Communists succeeded in taking advantage of this situation.

Corruption Among the Nationalists: The Nationalist party, as a governing party and as an agency for national reconstruction, was discredited by the corruption and inefficiency of its officers. The top ranking officials used their position to fill their own pockets by diverting supplies intended for public use into the channels for private trade for their own profit. During the Second World War, the US Army General Joseph Stilwell was given the task of commanding Allied forces in China. Stilwell was highly critical of Chiang Kai-shek's widespread corruption, obsession with the Communists, and lack of emphasis on training. Being annoyed with Stilwell’s observation, Chiang Kai-shek urged the US President F.D.Roosevelt to replace him with the British General, Lord Louis Mountbatten in 1943. Under these circumstances the demand of the Nationalist Government for new sacrifices on the Chinese people for war efforts against the Communists failed to inspire confidence of the Chinese people. Moreover, the Nationalists distrusted the masses and depended on the support of the landlords, propertied classes and bureaucrats. Thus, it lost touch with the common people and failed to win their sympathy.

Economic Crisis and Inflation: The economic crisis in China coupled with galloping inflation proved disastrous to the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. According to an estimate, between 1945 and 1948 prices of essential commodities rose by 30 percent per month. Inflation, financial mismanagement coupled with corruption among the rank and file of the Nationalist Government and army destroyed livelihood of millions of Chinese people and completely discredited the Nationalist government.

Loss of Peoples’ Confidence in the Nationalist Government: Besides corruption among the officials of the Nationalist Government and uncontrolled inflation and economic crisis, the conduct of the Nationalist officials who returned to the Japanese occupied territories following the defeat of the latter in the Second World war, damaged the prestige of the Nationalist Government. They returned as conquerors and treated the people with contempt as if they had been disloyal citizens or traitors. The Nationalists were more interested in taking over the enemy properties that trying to solve the immediate problems of the peasants and other common people. The Nationalist officials manifested their greed and practiced corruption by appropriating the relief materials meant for the peasants and other suffering population in the former Japanese occupied territories, who had been waiting for eight years for the return of the Nationalist Government. These factors resulted in the loss of confidence in the Nationalist Government among the Chinese people.

Neglect of Economic and Social Reforms: One of the important causes for the success of the Communists was the acts of omission on the part of the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek. The Nationalist Government neglected to introduce the much needed economic and social reforms especially rural China advantage of which was taken by the Communists. There is no doubt that the Nationalist Government had to face a number of internal and external problems of great magnitude. It had to bring about national unification and meet the challenge of the Communists. On the other hand it had to deal with the aggression of Japan. However, by neglecting economic and social reforms, the Nationalist Government failed to solve the basic problems of the masses of the people whose support was essential for the continuation of the government.

Appeal of the Communists to the Masses: On the other hand, the Communists appealed to the peasantry and the common people by carrying on vigorous propaganda among them. They won their hearts by their austere simplicity and their insistence on clean and honest government that would work for the upliftment of the masses. In those areas controlled by them, the Communists used their power to ameliorate the condition of the peasants rather than for personal advantage. Their troops were orderly and disciplined and neither plundered civilians nor outraged women. Such conduct of the Communists was so contrary to the experience of the Chinese people as
compared with the Nationalist government that it induced general belief among them that the Communists were sincerely concerned for the welfare of the Chinese people. Thus, the success of the Communists was due as much to the weakness of the Nationalist party as to their growing strength and popularity. Dissensions among the Nationalist party leaders weakened it further. Chiang Kai-shek chief relied on the military and hence, he did not care for the masses. Besides, the support from Soviet Russia in terms of finance and military aid strengthened Communists after 1945.

Thus, besides the determined leadership of Mao Tse-tung and his comrades and the sacrificing spirit of the Communists, the failure of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek to consolidate its position in China indirectly helped the Communist to capture political power by defeating the Nationalist forces in the Civil War. The Second Sino-Japanese War which eventually merged with the Second World War though caused loss of human life, destruction of property and occupation of a large part of China by the Japanese, it created the circumstances that eventually enabled the Communists to defeat the Nationalists and emerge victorious. The defeat and withdrawal of Japan from China created a power vacuum that was gradually filled by the Communists during the Civil War against the Nationalists.

As the Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek was determined to annihilate the Communists and surrounded their hide outs in the Kiangs and Hukien Provinces, the Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung undertook the epic Long March. During this Long March, the communists suffered heavy losses but not their spirit, in spite or relentless pursuit from the Nationalist forces and hostile terrain, the surviving Communists reached Yenan in the North-west of China from where they reorganized themselves. During the Manchurian Crisis (1931) and Second Sino-Japanese war (1937) which merged with the Second World War (1939) the Communists and the Nationalists fought against the Japanese. However following the end of the Second World War in 1946 the differences between the Communists and the nationalists came to the forefront which ultimately led to the Civil War between the two resulting the final victory of the Communists. The Communists captured political power in China from the Nationalists and proclaimed the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

2.2.6. Second Sino-Japanese War 1937

The second Sino-Japanese War was the culmination of events initiated by the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) in which China, under the Qing dynasty, was defeated by Japan and forced, in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, to cede Taiwan and recognize Korean independence. Japanese imperialism and its domination of China led Sun Yat-sen, founder and first president of the Republic of China, in 1912, to begin efforts to unify the country. Chiang Kai-shek continued those efforts through his leadership of the Kuomintang government, with the ultimate goal of ridding China of Japanese influence.

Following Japan’s conquest of Manchuria in 1931, politics carried both China and Japan ever closer to a broader conflict. The Chinese nationalism, often unorganized incoherent, even leaderless had become vehement against foreign encroachment. In Japan also the militarists, flushed with success influenced the politicians to find solutions of their problem by armed force. The result was the renewal of Sino-Japanese hostilities on a grand scale and the final merge of this conflict with the world conflagration when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour in 1941. Actually it was an undeclared war called lightly by Japanese as ‘Affair’ or ‘Incident’.

2.2.6.1. The Causes of the War

The following factors leads to the outbreak of the so called undeclared war between China and Japan in 1937. First, the weakness and the internal strife of China induced Japan to make further encroachment in Chinese soil. Secondly, the attitude of Chiang Kai-Shek was also favourable to the Japanese. He considered Japanese aggression was a wound on the skin while the communist menace was a disease in the heart. So he signed the Truce of Tongku with the Japanese. This was an indirect recognition of Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Thirdly, Japan was also emboldened by her successful aggression up on Manchuria. The Japanese militarist party, flushed with this success, induced the politicians to commit further aggression upon China. The lack of powerful international sanction also encouraged them. Fourth cause was Japanese link with the Axis Powers of Europe infused an aggressive mentality. Moreover as the signatory of the Anti-Comintern Pact, she was bound to flight
against ythe spread of communism. Sixth factors was the growing anti-Japanese sentiment also worried the Japanese government. Red Army’s propaganda and its guerilla activities irritated them. Finally, the formation of National United Front against Japan alarmed her and decided to destroy it before it became too powerful. Then, some of the provocative activities on the part of China were also responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. A Japanese druggist was killed in Kuantung province. A consular police man was killed at Hankow. Bombs were discovered in a Japanese consulate. Japanese sailors were shot dead at Shanghai by a Chinese in the international settlement. Finally, the young Japanese officers of Kuangtung Army manufactured as incident at Lu-Kou-Chiao (Marcopolo Bridge) about ten mile west of Peking on July 1937 precipitating a clash with the Chinese garrison. Invoking the Boxer Protocol on 1001, which permitted foreign signatories to station troops between Peking and the Sea, the Japanese garrison in North China in early July 1937 held a field exercise outside Peking, near the Marco polo Bridge. On the pretext that a soldier was missing, the Japanese demanded to enter the nearby city to conduct a search. When refused by local Chinese garrison the Japanese army bombarded the city, thus precipitating an undeclared war between the two countries.

2.2.6.2. Course of the War

The war’s beginning can be traced to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, when the Imperial Japanese Army assaulted that vital access bridge to Beijing. The Chinese government, deciding that was the final straw on the camel’s back of Japanese aggression, commenced full mobilization of its army. The Japanese attacked again and, after the brutal three-month long Battle of Shanghai, were victorious. The Japanese then captured the capital, Nanking, which fell on December 13, and initiated the worst massacre of the war, killing, according to some accounts, more than 300,000 civilians. The Japanese attacks culminated in the capture of Wuhan in October 1938, but the Chinese Kuomintang government initiated a defensive strategy that U.S. general Joseph Stillwell called “winning by outlast.” The succeeding years were characterized by Chinese successes in frustrating Japanese advances but regaining little occupied territory and, in addition to other atrocities, the indiscriminate bombing of civilians by the Japanese air force. That status quo continued until the United States was drawn into the war at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Following paragraphs discuss the detailed course of the war.

In the beginning the Japanese were able to occupy all the strategic points outside Peking. The United China faced the challenge boldly. All the political parties including the communists rallied under the banner of Chiang who declared “let there be no distinction between North and South, age or youth, but let all implicitly and with iron discipline follow the guidance of the government”. But the modernized Japanese army proved more than a match for the Chinese. The Japanese were poised to attacked Peking, which was evacuated by the Chinese in order to preserve the priceless historical relies and art treasures of the city.

In August Japan opened a second Front in Shanghai the financial centre of China to destroy China’s economic capacity of war.

When the Chinese heroically defended Shanghai, Japan outflanked the defenses and advanced to the gates of Nanking, the capital, which fell in December. The fall of Nanking was followed by indiscriminate massacre of ten thousands civilians accompanied by atrocities. This was the notorious ‘Rape of Nanking’.

In North the Chinese were driven South of Yellow river. From Nanking a Japanese force moved North ward and Tientsin was captured.

The next major battle was fought at Wuhan which was also taken in December 1938. It was followed by the fall of Canton in October 1939. The next stage of war was basically one of the attrition, where the Japanese occupied most of cities and lines of communication in the Eastern half of China, while the Chinese pursued a scorched-earth policy followed by strategic withdrawal and guerilla warfare.

In spite of this success, the Japanese could not win the war. Tokyo finally resigned itself to a stalemate.; it adopted the policy of living off the conquered land with the help of Puppet Government. In 1937 a Mongolian Autonomous Government was created. With the help of a traitor Wang Chinag-Wei they founded the Reformed Government of Chinese at Nanking.
Finally, in order to establish Japanese political and economical hegemony the Japanese Premier Konoe proclaimed a New Order in East Asia. It was a kind of Japanese ‘Monroe Doctrine’ aiming at the domination of Asiatic countries.

2.2.6.3. Significance of the war

The eight years of the Sino-Japanese War led to the triumph of the Communists and it completely exhausted the Nationalist government militarily and financially. Had there been no Sino-Japanese War, the situation in China would have been very different. Many of the disastrous consequences of that war continued to trouble the Nationalists during their struggle with the Communists. The sustained war against the Japanese, the external enemy and against the Communists, the internal enemy led to the progressive weakening of the power of the Nationalist party lead by Chiang Kai-shek. It had to bear the main brunt of the Japanese invasion and the strain of long period of resistance to the enemy. This weakened and impoverished the Nationalist government. The depletion of its effective military power led to a consequent increase in the relative strength of the Communist armies.

2.2.7. Conclusion

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded in 1921 believes in the doctrines of Marxism and Leninism for achieving socialism and communism in China as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung and his successors. The Chinese Communist Party has been able to capture the support and imagination of the masses. With the passage of time its strength and influence have steadily increased. It successfully led, the people of the country in a series of revolutionary wars and finally in the Civil War (1945-49) it succeeded in overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and capitalism and Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek to establish the People’s Republic of China in October, 1949. Following the victory over the Nationalists in the civil war, the Communists proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. In the beginning the People’s Republic had the facade of a coalition government under the leadership of the Communist Party. Till the adoption of a regular Constitution in September 1954, China was governed by the so-called Organic Laws. In September 1954, a constitution was adopted by which the Communist government was formalized. The new constitution not only provided legitimacy to the Communist regime, but also became a legal basis for the socialist transformation of the national economy.

2.2.8. Summary

- Transformation from monarchy, to democratic republic and finally to one party Communist regime during the first half of the twentieth century is a remarkable phase in the history of China.
- Within a few years after the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Communist Party was established.
- Initially, the Chinese Communist Party had an uneasy partnership with the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek’s strong dislike of the Communists and his campaigns aimed at their annihilation put the Communists on the defensive.
- However, the Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung built a strong base among the impoverished rural populace.
- The civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists ended in the success of the latter and led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Under the Communist rule, China emerged as a strong economic and military power in Asia.
- Mao Tse-Tung, who became the supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party led the long struggle that made China a Communist nation in 1949. Mao Tse-tung was born on 26th December 1893, in the village of Shao-shan, Hunan Province in a peasant family.
- In April 1928, Chu Teh, under the guidance of Mao established the Chinese Red Army, joined Mao Tse-tung.
- The Red Army started to Long March carrying whatever it could. 87,000 soldiers started the retreat carrying such items as typewriters, furniture, printing presses etc. While costly, the Long March gave the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the isolation it needed, allowing its army to recuperate and rebuild in the north of China.
Following the Long March, the Communists under the supreme leadership of Mao Tse-tung had to consolidate their position in north-western China so as to meet the final challenge of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek.

Following the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Communists and the nationalists fought a bitter Civil War that ultimately led to the victory of the Communists and the birth of People’s Republic in China in 1949.

The weakness and the internal strife of China induced Japan to make further encroachment in Chinese soil which led the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) successfully led, the people of the country in a series of revolutionary wars and finally in the Civil War (1945-49) it succeeded in overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and capitalism and Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek to establish the People’s Republic of China in October, 1949.

2.2.9. Exercise
1. Trace the growth of Communism in China.
2. Discuss the factors that led to the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party.
3. Give an account of the rise of Mao Tse-tung in China.
4. Trace the circumstances that led to the Long March and the problems faced by the Communists during the Long March.

2.2.10. Further Reading
- Gupte, R. S., *The History of Modern China*, Sterling, New Delhi, 1972

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CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1966-68;
Foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China.

Structure

2.3.0. Objective
2.3.1. The Cultural Revolution:
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  2.3.1.2. Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution:
  2.3.1.3. Justification of the Cultural Revolution:
  2.3.1.4. Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”:
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  2.3.1.10. Campaign to Purify Class Ranks”:
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  2.3.1.12. Defection and Death of Lin Piao:
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2.3.3. Conclusion
2.3.4. Summary
2.3.5. Exercise
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2.3.0. Objectives
In this lesson, students investigate various facets of China after establishment of Peoples Republic of China in 1949. After studying this lesson you will be able to:
- to learn the reconstruction programme carried out by the Chinese Communist Party in the field of agriculture and industry.
- to analyze the leadership crisis in the People’s Republic of China leading to the Cultural Revolution and to understand its impact on China.
- to investigate China’s foreign policy towards different nations of world.
- to trace the Sino-US relations and understand their significance.
- to draw China’s relation with the USSR and analyze the reasons why the cordial relations between the two Communist countries deteriorated.
- to study China’s relation with India which were friendly during the first two decades but turned sour following the China’s aggression on India in 1962.

2.3.1. The Cultural Revolution:
The ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ (1966-76) was launched by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Tse-tung to stem what he perceived as the country’s drift away from socialism and toward the ‘restoration of capitalism’ under Liu Shao-chi. The campaign, which was euphorically described at its inception by its progenitors as “a great revolution that touches people to their very souls” and which inspired radical students from Paris to Berkeley, is now regarded as having been a terrible catastrophe for the Chinese nation.

2.3.1.1. The Origins of the Cultural Revolution:
The origins of the Cultural Revolution can be traced to the mid 1950s when Mao Tse-tung first became seriously concerned about the path that China's socialist transition had taken in the years since the CCP had come to power in 1949. His anxieties about the bureaucratization of the party, ideological degeneration in society as a whole, and the glaring socio-economic inequalities that had emerged as China modernized escalated through the early 1960s and propelled him on a crusade to eradicate the ‘revisionism’ that he believed was contaminating the party and the nation.

Mao concluded that the source of China's political retrogression lay in the false and self-serving view of many of his party colleagues that class struggle ceased under socialism. On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung concluded, the struggle between proletarian and bourgeois ideologies took on new, forms even after the landlord and capitalist classes had been eliminated. The principal targets of Mao's anger were, on the one hand, party and government official who he felt had become a ‘new class’ divorced from the masses and, on the other, intellectuals who, in his view, were the repository of bourgeois and even feudal values.

Mao Tse-tung's decision to undertake the Cultural Revolution was strongly influenced by his analysis that the Soviet Union had already abandoned socialism for capitalism. The Cultural Revolution was also a power struggle in which Mao Tse-tung fought to recapture from his political rivals some of the authority and prestige that he had lost as a result of earlier policy failures. Furthermore, Mao Tse-tung saw the Cultural Revolution as an opportunity to forge a ‘generation of revolutionary successors’ by preparing China's youth to inherit the mantle of those who had originally brought the CCP to power.

There was also a policy dimension to the Cultural Revolution: once those who were thought to be leading China down the ‘capitalist road’ had been dislodged from power at all levels of society, a wide range of truly socialist institutions and processes (“sprouts of communism”) were to be put in place to give life to the vision of the Cultural Revolution. For example, elitism in education was to be replaced by schools with revamped, politicized curricula, mass based administration, and advancement criteria that stressed good class background, political activism and ideological correctness.

2.3.1.2. Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution:
In the long career of Mao Tse-tung there has been no episode less easy to comprehend or more controversial than the Cultural Revolution. When it began in 1966, the Cultural Revolution was subject of many interpretations. It was seen as a power struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, the president of the
Peoples Republic of China. It was also viewed as a revolt of the young against the privileges of the senior members of the Party. Many believe that it was an upsurge of nationalism, which had characterized China in the years following the fall of the Manchu dynasty. It was also believed that the interval of unity that the Communist victory had imposed in 1949 was breaking down, and a new warlord era was predicted.

2.3.1.3. **Justification of the Cultural Revolution:**

Mao Tse-tung himself justified the Cultural Revolution. According to him the revolution must have various stages. The first stage was political, by which the ‘bourgeoisie’ state is overthrown and the Communist Party, champion of the masses, comes to power. Next comes the economic revolution by which the capitalist economy and the ‘feudal’ land system are first modified, and finally replaced by new socialist forms of economy and land tenure. This was accomplished in the years following the military victory, and culminated in the Commune system and virtually the complete nationalization of industry and commerce. According to Mao, there remained a further stage. The government had been changed and the economy transformed, but the Chinese themselves, their thoughts, their tastes, their outlook on life and their personal hopes and ambitions, remained largely unchanged. Thus, the last step was a cultural revolution, by which these characteristics were to be remodeled leading to genuine socialists.

2.3.1.4. ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’:

The conflict between Mao Tse-tung and his opponents came to a head in 1966. The Deputy Mayor of Peking, Wu Han, was an academic, who had joined the Communist movement along with many other intellectuals during the 1950s. In 1961, Wu Han wrote a play called Hai Rui Dismissed from Office. The play was the story of a wise and virtuous official of the Ming dynasty, devoted to the welfare of the people, who was dismissed from office by an egotistical emperor. This play was viewed as a veiled criticism of the Great Leap Forward and Mao’s dismissal of Defense Minister Peng Te Huai, who had criticized the programme and argued for more moderate policies.

2.3.1.5. **Beginning of the Cultural Revolution:**

Wu Han’s allusive style was strongly attacked in the Shanghai publication, Wen Hui Pao, which was under the direct supervision of Chiang Ching, Mao’s wife. In February 1966 Chiang Ching proclaimed Wu Han’s play a “reactionary poisonous weed,” and called for attacks on other cultural works that criticized Mao’s policies. In April 1966, the army’s mouthpiece, Jeifangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), published a rousing call for a ‘cultural revolution’. In May 1966, Nieh Yuan Tsu, the Communist Party secretary of the philosophy department at China’s prestigious Peking University, fired another opening shot of the Cultural Revolution when she displayed a poster warning that the bourgeoisie, or elite controlled the university. The poster called for an all-out attack against elitist forces. By Mao’s order, the poster was read over national radio on 1 June 1966.

Mao Tse-tung also authorized editorials in the Communist Party newspaper to denounce the bourgeoisie elements in society. By doing this, he formally proclaimed the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, though few at the time understood that it would lead to ten years of chaos and violence. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution extended officially from August 1966 to April 1969.

2.3.1.6. **The Red Guards:**

In response to Mao’s call, high school students in Peking began forming groups called the Red Guards. Mao Tse-tung approved the formation of these groups. Following the support from Mao Tse-tung, high school and university students around the country formed other bands of Red Guards. The eleven million youthful Red Guards spearheaded a revolution that destroyed not only people, but also countless works of art, temples and other items of China’s cultural inheritance. These students began to criticize teachers, school administrators, and government leaders. Mao himself received millions of Red Guards in a mass review at Peking’s Tiananmen Square on 18 August 1966. Schools were ordered closed and students from all over the country travelled to Peking for an opportunity to meet Mao Tse-tung, who was worshipped by many as a ‘godlike’ hero. Schools and universities remained closed from 1966 to 1969. Mao appealed to the students to “smash the four olds”: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits.
2.3.1.7. **Attack on Intellectuals:**

Chaos and lawlessness spread throughout China as the Red Guards destroyed temples, artwork, books, and anything associated with traditional or foreign cultures. They raided the homes of professors and other intellectuals, confiscated or destroying Western-style clothing, books and paintings, and anything that offended them. Radical leaders and Red Guards also persecuted artists, writers, and those with foreign connections. Victims were subjected to public criticism, humiliation, and physical abuse. Intellectuals such as the writer Lao She and the historian Wu Han were among the thousands of victims who committed suicide or died from Red Guard abuse. Many others were imprisoned or forced to do menial labour. The police and military were under orders not to interfere.

2.3.1.8. **Action Against the Moderate Government Officials:**

On 5 August 1966, the direction of the movement began to change. Mao Tse-tung himself issued a statement titled ‘Bombard the Headquarters’. Through this statement he pointed out that there were people in the CCP at all levels up to the very top who were following reactionary ‘bourgeoisie’ policies. This led to an attack on moderate Government officials by the radicals. Liu Shao-chi, who was then China’s President and Mao’s chosen successor, was the most prominent moderate. For his pragmatic policies, Liu was accused of being “China’s number one capitalist roader” and a traitor to Chairman Mao. He died in prison in 1969. Those associated with Liu’s policies, such as Teng Hsiao Ping, were removed from their government positions and imprisoned or exiled. Military leader Lin Piao, a supporter of Mao’s Cultural Revolution policies, was named Mao’s successor in 1969.

2.3.1.9. **Restoration of Order by the People’s Liberation Army:**

Under the weight of the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party structure gradually collapsed, leading to anarchy and lawlessness. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained the sole disciplined structure in the country. In 1967, to put an end to the anarchy and mob violence let loose by the Red Guard and to prevent the situation going out of control due to the fighting between rival Red Guard groups, the People’s Liberation Army was called in to restore order. From 1967 to 1969 thousands died in violent clashes between Red Guard factions, and between the Red Guards and the military. In an attempt to control the chaos, Mao and his supporters placed most government organizations under the control of the People’s Liberation Army.

2.3.1.10. **“Campaign to Purify Class Ranks”:**

Mao Tse-tung launched the new phase of the Cultural Revolution known as the ‘Campaign to Purify Class Ranks’. Beginning from 1969 urban government officials and intellectuals were sent to the countryside to do hard labour and to study Mao’s works. Many urban youths from the age 16 to age 19 were sent to the countryside where they were instructed to learn from the peasants. Family members were often split up and forced to live in harsh conditions thousands of miles from one another. Many youths remained in the countryside for years, as they could not get permission to return to their native cities and towns.

2.3.1.11. **“Barefoot Doctors”:**

Throughout the early 1970s Mao continued his goal of reducing the economic gap between the city and the countryside. The children of urban elite lived and worked among rural peasants. The children of peasants, workers, and soldiers attended the reopened schools where they studied the works of Mao and the accomplishments of the peasants. Thousands of students received rudimentary medical training and went to the countryside as so-called ‘barefoot doctors’. They provided basic health care to peasants who otherwise had no access to medical facilities. Urban culture was replaced by new revolutionary ballet, opera, and literature, much of it produced under the patronage of Chiang Ching. The new work expressed the struggles of the peasants and glorified Chairman Mao.

2.3.1.12. **Defection and Death of Lin Piao:**

As public order was restored and the Party machinery was revived, Mao felt less need for the army and its commander. He began to cut down the authority of Lin Piao. Uncertain as to how far this would go, and not willing to give up the supreme power, Lin Piao apparently began to plot against Mao. In the power struggle that followed, Lin Piao lost by September 1971. He and some of his followers apparently tried to flee to Soviet Russia.
by an airplane. However, they were killed when their plane crashed in Outer Mongolia. The cause of the crash is still uncertain.

2.3.1.13. **Rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao Ping:**

Mao Tse-tung had suspended a large number of officials from important positions on a purely temporary basis during the Cultural Revolution. The defection of Lin Piao increased Mao’s need to broaden his base of support by bringing non-Maoists back into the party and the government. During the early 1970s, even people who had been charged with most serious crimes during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated and restored to position in the party and government. The most important of them was Teng Hsiao Ping, who was rehabilitated in 1973. By 1975, as both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai became too ill to handle any great amount of business, Teng was given control of the day-to-day operations of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.

2.3.1.14. **End of the ‘Gang of Four’:**

While most of the radical excesses of the Cultural Revolution had diminished by the mid-1970s, some of its rhetoric and policies continued even after Mao’s death in 1976. Chiang Ching, the widow of Mao Tse-tung and the rest of the ‘Gang of Four’ were arrested that year. With their arrest the Cultural Revolution officially came to an end. In 1981 the members of ‘Gang of Four’ were convicted for their crimes. The Communist Party leadership under Teng Hsiao Ping officially condemned the Cultural Revolution.

2.3.1.15. **Consequences of the Cultural Revolution:**

**Slowdown of the Chinese Economy:** The Cultural Revolution had far-reaching consequences on all aspects of the Chinese society. The years of chaos from 1966 to 1969 resulted in the slowdown and partial collapse of the Chinese economy. As the rural markets were forbidden, the peasants were forced to sell all produce to the state. The possibility of economic cooperation with the West was eliminated due to China’s emphasis on self-reliance and the fear of foreigners and foreign influence ‘corrupting’ the Chinese culture. This caused economic isolation and stagnation. In contrast, during the same period the economies of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea made great progress.

**Setback to Education:** Education suffered serious setback. An entire generation of young people had their education disrupted. A large number of high school and college students joined the Red Guards and ‘made revolution’ for Chairman Mao. College entrance exams, suspended in 1966, were not restarted until 1977. During the Cultural Revolution many valuable books and art collections were destroyed and many scholars of China’s leading schools and colleges died from abuse and attacks by the Red Guards.

**Loss of Prestige of the CCP:** The Chinese Communist Party lost much of its prestige as a result of the Cultural Revolution. People at all levels of society were disillusioned by the high-level power struggles and instability of the party policy. But the CCP managed to remain in control. Teng Hsiao Ping’s economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s attempted to wipe out the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Even Mao Tse-tung, once glorified as ‘The Great Helmsman’ and the ‘Red Sun’, was officially criticized for his ‘leftist mistakes’ in the Cultural Revolution. However, he was still praised for his leadership in both the war against Japan and the civil war against the Kuomintang. Today, while privately vilified by many Chinese, Mao is at the same time still genuinely admired as a powerful national leader.

The People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung undertook measures to reconstruct agricultural and industrial system in China. As far as agriculture was concerned, the Communist regime took drastic steps if[Confiscating me land Iron and redistributing it among the landless peasants. By establishing mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives the Communist regime ultimately succeeded in organizing the vast ms of the Chinese peasants into communes. For the industrial reconstruction, the Communist government adopted the Soviet model and gradually succeeded in establishing government control over industries. The government also introduced Five Year Plans to bring about rapid growth of agriculture and industry. Emphasis was laid on heavy industry.

During the so called ‘The Great Leap Forward’ program, Mao Tse-tung aimed at maximum exploitation of resources and man power to supersede some of the industrially advanced European counties. However, this programme resulted in a lot of misery to the Chinese peasants and working class, as they were over worked and
underpaid. Following the start of ‘The Great Leap Forward’ programme, there emerged leadership crisis among the hardliners led by Mao Tse-tung and moderates led by Liu Shao-chi who were in favour of reforms in economic field, this leadership crisis led to the Cultural Revolution initiated by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters who were keen in maintaining the purity of Communist ideology. The so called ‘revisionists’ were purged and severely suppressed. The Cultural Revolution led to a lot of bloodshed and chaos before order was established by the People's Liberation Army.

2.3.2. China’s foreign policy
Since ancient times China had been following a policy of isolationism. The Chinese had been following a unique culture of their own being surrounded by mountains, seas and rivers. The Chinese had been proud of their own culture and considered it superior to other cultures of the world including that of Europe. For centuries the Chinese lived an isolated and self-reliant life. The contact with the West did have a profound influence on the world view of China.

2.3.2.1. Historical Legacy:
China's long and rich history as the world's oldest continuous civilization has affected Chinese foreign relations in various ways. For centuries the Chinese empire enjoyed basically unchallenged greatness and self-sufficiency. China saw itself as the cultural center of the universe, a view reflected in the concept of the Middle Kingdom. For the most part, it viewed non-Chinese people’s as uncivilized barbarians. Although China was occasionally overrun and ruled by these ‘barbarians,’ as during the Yuan (1279-1368) and Manchu (1644-1911) dynasties, the non-Chinese usually retained enough Chinese institutions to maintain a continuity of tradition.

2.3.2.2. Belief in Sino Centrism:
Because the Chinese emperor was considered the ruler of all mankind by virtue of his innate superiority, relations with other states or entities were tributary, rather than state-to-state relations between equals. Traditionally, there was no equivalent of a foreign ministry; foreign relations included such activities as tributary missions to the emperor made by countries seeking trade with China and Chinese military expeditions against neighboring barbarians to keep them outside China's borders. The first Europeans who sought trade with China, beginning in the sixteenth century, were received as tributary missions and had to conform to the formalities and rituals of the tribute system at the Chinese court. China's view of itself as the undisputed center of civilization—a phenomenon called ‘Sino centrism’, remained basically unchanged until the nineteenth century, when the Manchu dynasty began to deteriorate under Western pressure.

2.3.2.3. Policy of ‘Leaning to One Side’:
A traditional concept related to China's view of itself as the Middle Kingdom that continues to have relevance is the idea of ‘using barbarians to control barbarians.’ In modern times, this practice has taken the form of using relations with one foreign power as a counterweight to relations with another. Two examples are China's policy of ‘leaning to one side’ in the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s for support against the United States and Beijing's rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s to counteract the Soviet threat China perceived at the time. China's strong desire for sovereignty and independence of action, however, seems to have made Chinese alliances or quasi-alliances short-lived.

2.3.2.4. Tendency Towards Isolationism:
Another effect of China's historical legacy is its tendency toward isolationism and ambivalence about opening up to the outside world. In imperial times, China's foreign relations varied from dynasty to dynasty, from cosmopolitan periods like the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) to isolationist periods such as the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), when few foreigners were allowed in the country. Overall, the Sino centric worldview and China's history of centuries of self-sufficiency favoured isolation, which contributed to China's difficulty when confronted by expansionist Western powers in the nineteenth century. The debate over self-reliance and possible corruption by foreign influences or opening up to the outside world in order to modernize more quickly has continued for over a century and was still an issue in the late 1980s.
2.3.2.5. **Change in Chinese World View:**

During her imperial period, China did not acknowledge any other nation as her equal. Until the establishment of the Communist government in 1949, China did not link her destiny with any other country. With the growth of her economy and power, the Chinese leaders have begun looking at the world in the manner of the bygone Celestial Empire exercising influence in her part of the world. The Chinese have once again developed the feeling that once again China is the Middle Kingdom with a row of peripheral countries gladly acknowledging her superiority and feeding at the fount of Chinese civilization. She expects that her neighbours should submit to her transforming influence. Chinese invasion of China in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 can be viewed as examples of this line of thinking. In order to understand the foreign policy of China, it is necessary to understand her ‘world view’. The Chinese, like the Marxists, generally believe in world history. They believe that the many desperate events that characterize the day-to-day reality of world affairs are manifestations of a fundamental historical process which links the entire world into an interconnected whole. They believe that this process can be rationally analyzed, and long range trends in power relationships can be inferred from it. Moreover, they believe that neither harmony nor balance but struggle is the basic condition of mankind. In that struggle there always is a revolutionary ‘left’, a reactionary ‘right’, and a ‘center’ which is between the two. The Chinese see themselves as part of the revolutionary ‘left’. The Chinese foreign policy changed as the circumstances relating to her security, nationalism and national economic needs changed. Thus, Chinese world view changed as her foreign policy changed.

2.3.2.6. **Distancing Between Two Power-Blocks:**

The Chinese did not want to be the part of any of the two ideologically distinct power blocks that had developed since the end of the Second World War. From 1949 to 1956 China did believe that she and Russia belonged to the socialist block and was opposed to the capitalist block of the West headed by the United States. However, the break up between the two communist states that had begun since 1956 ultimately separated them in 1966, forcing China to adopt the policy of self-reliance. Since 1970s China once again broke its isolationist stance and improved her relations with the United States. In spite of her new equations, China believed in her own strength and did not want to belong to any of the two power blocks, but instead wanted to create her own block.

2.3.2.7. **Changing Needs-Change of Friends:**

Chinese foreign relations and world view were directly related to her changing needs. During the initial period of its existence, the Chinese Communist government depended on Soviet Russia for the development of her industries. China sent young people to Russia to be trained as technicians to run the new industries. However, with the break up with Russia and improved relations with the United States, the Chinese government had been sending her young people to the United States for training in modern technology. China has completely reversed her policy with regard to Japan, once her worst enemy in Asia. She had developed better relations and had signed a pact of friendship as he needed Japanese technology to refine her crude oil. The Chinese foreign policy has undergone a revolution since 1966, more so after she became a member of the UNO in 1972. Her former close ally Russia had become her bitterest enemy, and the United States, formerly her bitterest enemy, has become a friend. This clearly indicates the changing approach of China’s world view and change in her foreign policy direction.

2.3.2.8. **China’s relations with USA**

China’s relations with USA can be traced to the late nineteenth century. In order to prevent the division of China into exclusive spheres of influence by the major powers, the United States proposed the ‘Open Door Policy’ in China. The Open Door Policy was challenged when Russia encroached upon Manchuria in the late 1890s which eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). However, the biggest setback to the Open Door Policy came in 1931, when Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria, setting up the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Americans, along with other countries, strongly condemned the action but did little at the time to stop it.

The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 saw aid flow into the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek from the United States under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. A series of Neutrality Acts had been passed in the United States with the support of isolationists that forbade American aid to countries at war. However, since the Second Sino-Japanese War was undeclared, Roosevelt denied that a state of war existed in China and proceeded to send aid to Chiang. China formally declared war on Japan in 1941 following the Japanese
Attack on Pearl Harbour, which brought the Americans into World War II. Massive amounts of aid were given by the Roosevelt administration to Chiang Kai-shek's beleaguered government. However, a perception grew that Chiang's government was unable or incapable to effectively resist the Japanese, or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung. The Nationalists and the Communists had been in conflict for years.

After World War II ended in 1945, the obvious hostility between the Nationalists and the Communists exploded into open civil war. General Douglas Macarthur directed the military forces under Chiang Kai-shek to go to the island of Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, thus beginning the military occupation of Taiwan. American general George C. Marshall tried to broker a truce between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1946, but the attempt ended in a failure. The Nationalist cause was lost and in 1949 the Communists emerged victorious and drove the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland into Taiwan and other islands. Mao Tse-tung established the People's Republic of China on the mainland, while the Nationalist government still remains on Taiwan and other islands.

**Non-recognition of the People's Republic of China by the US:** For 30 years after its founding, the United States did not formally recognize the People's Republic of China. Instead, it maintained diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government of China also known as the Republic of China (Taiwan), and recognized it as the sole legitimate government of all China. As the People's Liberation Army moved south to complete the communist conquest of mainland China in 1949, the American embassy followed the Republic of China government headed by Chiang Kai-shek to Taipei later that year. U.S. consular officials remained in mainland China. However, the Nationalist Government was hostile to this official American presence, and all U.S. personnel were withdrawn from the mainland in early 1950.

**Sino-US Relations During the Korean War:** The hope of normalizing relations between the US and People’s republic of China ended when the US and Nationalist government forces fought directly against each other in the Korean War starting on 1st November 1950. In response to the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea, the United Nations Security Council was convened and passed the UNSC Resolution 82 condemning the North Korean aggression unanimously. The resolution was adopted mainly because the Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had been boycotting proceedings since January, in protest that the Republic of China (Taiwan) and not the People's Republic of China held a permanent seat on the council. Once the American-led UN forces counter-attacked and pushed the invading North Korean Army back past the North/South border at the 38th parallel and further into the north and began to approach the Yalu River on the Sino-Korea border, the People’s Republic of China undertook a massive intervention into the conflict on the side of the Communists. Two years of continued and often locally bitter fighting ended in an overall stalemate that ensued while negotiations dragged on, until a cease-fire was agreed to on the 27 July 1953. The war officially had not ended, and the Korean issue had an important role in Sino- American relations ever since. The entry of the Chinese in the Korean War caused a shift in US policy toward Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government from marginal support to full blown defense of Taiwan from any aggression by the People’s Republic of China.

**Sino-US Relations During the Vietnam War:** The People's Republic of China's involvement in the Vietnam War began in 1949, when the Communists took over the country. The Communist Party of China provided material and technical support to the Vietnamese Communists. In the summer of 1962, Mao Tse tung agreed to supply Hanoi with 90,000 rifles and guns free of charge. China also sent anti-aircraft units and engineering battalions to North Vietnam to repair the damage caused by American bombing, rebuild roads and railroads, and to perform other engineering work. This freed North Vietnamese army units for fight in the South. Between 1965 and 1970, over 320,000 Chinese soldiers fought the Americans along side the North Vietnamese Army.

**China Becomes a Nuclear Power:** The United States continued to work to prevent the People’s Republic of China from taking Nationalist China's (Taiwan) seat in the United Nations and encouraged its allies not to deal with the People’s Republic of China. The United States placed an embargo on trading with the People’s Republic of China, and encouraged allies to follow it. The People’s Republic of China developed nuclear weapons in 1964
and, as later declassified documents revealed, President Johnson considered preemptive attacks to halt its nuclear programme. Ultimately he decided the measure was too risky and it was abandoned. Despite this official non-recognition of the People’s Republic of China, beginning in 1954 and continuing until 1970, the United States and the People's Republic of China held 136 meetings at the ambassadorial level, first in Geneva and later in Warsaw.

**Rapprochement Between China and the US:** Both the People’s Republic of China and the US had issued feelers to try to improve relations between the two major powers. This became an especially important concern for the People's Republic of China after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. The People’s Republic of China was diplomatically isolated and the leadership came to believe that improved relations with the United States would be a useful counterbalance to the Soviet threat. Chou En-lai, the Premier and foreign minister of China, was at the forefront of this effort.

In the United States, some were of the opinion that excluding Communist China from the world stage would be harmful for the interest of the US. Some Americans hoped that improved relations with the People’s Republic of China could help them in Southeast Asia to deal with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and that if the People’s Republic of China would align with the US it would mean a major redistribution of global power against the Soviet Union. It was also postulated that mainland China's market of over a billion consumers could be a boon to American business. One of the American political figures most interested in the People’s Republic of China was Mike Mansfield, the Democratic Senate Majority Leader. He was contacted by the People’s Republic of China and they proposed a meeting. Mansfield passed the note to the State Department and President Richard Nixon.

**President Nixon’s Interest in Asia:** President Richard Nixon had long been interested in Asia. His National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger believed approaching the People’s Republic of China would be valuable. Nixon also weighed the domestic political concerns. He hoped that improved relations with China could help him greatly in the 1972 American presidential election. He also worried immensely that one of the Democrats would preempt him and go to the People’s Republic of China before he had the opportunity. Meanwhile, communications were ongoing between the People’s Republic of China and American leadership through the intermediaries of Pakistan and Romania.

**The Ping-Pong Diplomacy:** In 1969, the United States, thus, initiated measures to relax trade restrictions and other impediments to bilateral contact. China responded favourably to these overtures of the US. However, the rapprochement process was stalled by US actions in Indochina until on 6 April, 1971 the young American ping pong player, Glenn Cowan, who had missed his U.S. team bus was waved by a Chinese table tennis player onto the bus of the Chinese team at the 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan. Cowan spoke with the Chinese players in a friendly fashion, and the Chinese player, Zhuang Zedong, a three-time World Men's Singles Champion, presented him with a silk-screen portrait of the famous Huangshan Mountains. While this had been a purely spontaneous gesture of friendship between two athletes, China chose to treat it as an officially sanctioned outreach.

The friendly contact between Zhuang Zedong and Glenn Cowan, as well as the photograph of the two players in Dacankao, had an impact on Mao Tse-tung's decision making. He had earlier decided not to invite the US team along with teams of other Western countries that had been invited to play in China. Later known as the ‘Ping Pong Diplomacy’, China responded by inviting the American ping pong team to tour mainland China. The Americans agreed and on April 10, 1971 the athletes became the first Americans to officially visit China since the establishment of the Communist regime in China in 1949.

**Kissinger's Secret Visit to China:** In July 1971 Henry Kissinger, while on a trip to Pakistan, feigned illness and did not appear in public for a day. He was actually on a top-secret mission to Beijing to open relations with the government of the People’s Republic of China. On 15 July, 1971, President Richard Nixon revealed the mission to the world and that he had been invited to visit China and that he had accepted the invitation.

**Reaction to the Possible Visit of Nixon to China:** The announcement of a possible visit of Nixon to China caused immediate shock around the world. In the United States, some of the most hard-line anti-communists spoke against the decision. However, public opinion in the United States supported the move and Nixon’s popularity increased which was evident from the jump in the popularity polls. Within China there was also opposition from
left-wing elements to the possible visit of Nixon to China. Lin Biao, the head of the military was the leading Communist leader who expressed reservation at the developing rapprochement between China and the United States. Lin Biao, however, died in a mysterious plane crash over Mongolia while trying to defect to the Soviet Union, silencing most internal dissent over the move. Internationally, the reactions varied. The Soviets were immensely concerned that two major enemies seemed to have resolved their differences, and the new world alignment contributed significantly to the policy of détente.

America's European allies and Canada were pleased by the initiative, especially since many of them had already recognized the People’s Republic of China. In Asia, the reaction was far more mixed. Japan was extremely annoyed that it had not been told of the announcement until fifteen minutes before it had been made, and feared that the Americans were abandoning them in favour of China. A short time later, Japan also recognized the People’s Republic of China and would commit to substantial trade with the continental power. South Korea and South Vietnam were both concerned that peace between the United States and China could mean an end to support for them against their Communist enemies. Throughout the period of rapprochement both these states had to be regularly assured that they would not be abandoned.

**Nixon's Visit to China:** From 21 February to 28 February, 1972, President Richard Nixon travelled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. At the conclusion of his trip, the United States and China issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their respective foreign policy views. In the Communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic relations. The United States acknowledged the position of the People’s Republic of China that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The statement enabled the United States and China to temporarily set aside the "crucial question (Taiwan) obstructing the normalization of relations" and to open trade and other contacts.

**Consequences of the Rapprochement:** The rapprochement with the United States benefited China immensely and greatly increased its security during the rest of the Cold War. It has been argued that the United States, on the other hand, saw fewer benefits than it had hoped for. China continued to heavily support North Vietnam in the Vietnam War and also backed the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. However, eventually, China's suspicion of Vietnam's motives would lead to a break in Sino-Vietnamese cooperation and, upon the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese War. Both China and the United States would back combatants in Africa against Soviet and Cuban supported movements. The economic benefits of normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon's China policy is regarded by many as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy, have argued that it provided very little benefit to the United States.

**Formal Diplomatic Relations:** In May 1973, an effort to establish formal diplomatic relations between China and the United States was made. In this direction the US and China established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart Chinese office in Washington, DC. In the years between 1973 and 1978, such distinguished Americans as David K. E. Bruce, George H. W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, and Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the USLO with the personal rank of Ambassador.

In an effort to strengthen the relations between the United States and China, the US President, Gerald Ford visited China in 1975 and reaffirmed the interest of the United States in normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter again reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai Communiqué. The United States and the People's Republic of China announced on 15 December 1978 that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on 1 January, 1979.

**Recognition of ‘One China’:** In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations dated 1 January, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The US reiterated the Shanghai Communiqué's acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Beijing also acknowledged that the American people would continue to carry on commercial, cultural, and other unofficial contacts with the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act made the necessary changes in US domestic law to permit such unofficial relations with Taiwan to flourish.
Visit of Deng Xiaoping to the US: Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington, DC initiated a series of important high-level exchanges, which continued until the spring of 1989. This resulted in many bilateral agreements - especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural interchange as well as trade relations. Since early 1979, the United States and China have initiated hundreds of joint research projects and cooperative programmes under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, the largest bilateral programme. On March 1, 1979 the United States and China formally established embassies in Beijing and Washington, DC. In 1979 outstanding private claims were resolved and a bilateral trade agreement was concluded. The US Vice President Walter Mondale reciprocated Vice Premier Deng's visit by paying a return visit to China in August 1979. This visit led to agreements in September 1980 on maritime affairs, civil aviation links, and textile matters, as well as a bilateral consular convention.

As a consequence of high-level and working-level contacts initiated in 1980, US dialogue with the China broadened to cover a wide range of issues, including global and regional strategic problems, political-military questions, including arms control, UN and other multilateral organization affairs, and international narcotics matters.

The Taiwan Issue: The expanding relationship that followed normalization of relations between the US and China was threatened in 1981 by the objections raised by China to the level of US arms sales to Taiwan. The US Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981 in an effort to resolve Chinese questions about America's unofficial relations with Taiwan. Eight months of negotiations produced the US-China joint communiqué of 17, August 1982. In this third communiqué, the US stated its intention to gradually reduce the level of arms sales to Taiwan, and China described as a fundamental policy their effort to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. Meanwhile, Vice President George Bush visited China in May 1982.


Cultural Exchanges: In the period before the June 3rd and 4th, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, a large and growing number of cultural exchange activities undertaken at all levels gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each other's cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. Numerous mainland Chinese professional and official delegations visited the United States each month. Many of these exchanges continued after the suppression of the Tiananmen protests.

US Reaction to Tiananmen Massacre: Following the suppression of demonstrators in June 1989 that led to the Tiananmen Massacre, the US and other governments adopted a number of measures to express their condemnation of China’s violation of human rights. The US government suspended highlevel official exchanges with China. The United States also imposed a number of economic sanctions and stopped weapons exports to China. In the summer of 1990, at the G7 summit meeting at Houston, Western nations called for renewed political and economic reforms in mainland China, particularly in the field of human rights.

Cooling of Sino-US Relations: Tiananmen Incident disrupted the Sino-US trade relationship, and US investors' interest in mainland China dropped dramatically. The US government also responded to the political repression by suspending certain trade and investment programmes. Some sanctions were legislated where as others were executive actions. On 2 September, 1992, US President George Bush announced a decision to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan for ‘defensive’ purposes, a move in violation of previous promises made by the US government to China. In addition, he sent Trade Representative Carla Hills to visit Taiwan, further subverting Sino-US relations. On 5 October, 1992, US President George Bush signed the 1992 US-Hong Kong Policy Act over China’s strong opposition. The main contents established the authority of the US government to treat Hong Kong as a non-sovereign entity distinct from China for purposes of American domestic law. China lodged a stern protest, expressing strong dissatisfaction.
Conclusion: China's foreign policy was basically based on her world view. Historically China believed in the superiority of her history and culture and considered the rest of the world as 'barbarian'. China, for many centuries believed in isolationism. However, the world view of China underwent a change following the end of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of the republic in 1912 and later the establishment of the People's Republic of China under the Communist regime. For Ready two Canines, Crania tried to distance between two power blocks, though she depended on the Soviet Union initially for industrial progress and moral support; in 1970s the relationship between China and the United States began to improve. The United States recognized the People's Republic of China and improved its relations during Nixon's presidency. Nixon became the first President of the United States to pay a state visit to China. Even the Chinese government dignitaries reciprocated with their visits to the United States. The high level exchanges between the two countries led to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries.

2.3.2.9. China's relation with USSR

After assuming political control over China following the civil war in 1949, the Chinese Communists sought diplomatic recognition. USSR was the first country to grant diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. Within seven months, the entire Communist bloc including Yugoslavia and other countries such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Israel, the Netherlands, Switzerland, England, and six Asian countries, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan recognized the People's Republic of China. China also claimed membership of the United Nations, and the right to the permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship: Close relations with Russia marked the early years of Chinese foreign policy. Russia was one of the earliest countries to recognize the Communist regime in China. Immediately after the establishment of the new Chinese government in Beijing in October 1949, Mao Tse-tung undertook his first visit outside the Chinese territory, to Moscow in December 1949, to negotiate aid and trade agreements. Both China and Russia abrogated their old treaties and entered into a thirty year Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. Its terms were outwardly directed against a renewal of Japanese aggression. However, taking into account the international politics, this treaty was actually designed to align Communist China with the Soviet Union against the United States. Both the signatories agreed, “To develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between China and the Soviet Union, to render all possible economic assistance and to carry out necessary economic cooperation.”

Russia Sends Advisers and Technicians to China: Following the Treaty of Friendship, the Soviet Union sent a large number of advisers and technicians into China to help her in economic development along Soviet lines. USSR also provided direct military and economic assistance to the People's Republic of China. On the other hand, the Russian-built railway across Manchuria from Siberia to the ports of Darien and Port Arthur were to be jointly managed by China and USSR. Russia was also to have port facilities under her control in Darien, and the right to use Port Arthur for naval activities. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in a telegram to Malenkov and Molotov after the death of Stalin, acknowledged “the fraternal aid rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese people.”

Weakening of Relations Between China and USSR: The alliance between China and the Soviet Union, apparently so strong in 1950, was cracking by 1960. The important reasons for the split were increasing Chinese self-confidence, which made China less willing to accept a subordinate role in the Communist bloc, increasing Chinese demands on its ally, and doctrinal shifts in both China and USSR, which weakened ideological unity between the two.

China's Reaction to De-Stalinization: The first source of public disagreement between China and USSR was de-Stalinization in Russia. When Stalin died in 1953, it was not clear who would succeed him. However, all of his potential successors were of the opinion that the Stalinist system needed some degree of reform. By 1956 Nikita Khrushchev, who was in favour of substantial reform of the Soviet system emerged as the new leader in Moscow. He decided that undoing Stalin's works required destroying Stalin's 'godlike' image. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of USSR, in February 1956, Khrushchev delivered a speech denouncing Stalin. At one stroke Khrushchev destroyed the image of the man who had ruled the Communist world for a quarter of a
century. Thus, Chinese, especially Mao Tse-tung deeply resented the Soviet Union’s change of policy in respect of Stalin. It was not that they loved the late dictator, but because they had not been previously informed or consulted about so great a transformation of the policy.

**Disagreement Between China and USSR Towards Eastern Europe:** Besides criticizing Stalin as an individual, Khrushchev was dismantling some of Stalin’s policies. Soviet Union began to relax its hold over other Communist countries, especially in Eastern Europe. However, when the Hungarians took advantage of this relaxation and revolted against the Soviet Union in November 1956, the Soviet Red Army entered Hungary to restore it to the Soviet bloc. To the Chinese this seemed evidence of Soviet incompetence. USSR, on the other hand, resented Chinese presumption in trying to tell the Soviet Union how to run the Eastern Europe.

**Disapproval of the Policy of Peaceful Co-existence:** The bitterest controversy between China and USSR was over Khrushchev’s policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Khrushchev felt that it was time to improve relations with the Western democracies to increase trade, and reduce the threat of war. As against the Marxist-Leninist theory of the inevitability of war, Khrushchev argued that the further expansion of Communism in the world would be achieved by peaceful political means, rather than by war. China disagreed with Khrushchev’s doctrinal shift. Chinese Communists were of the opinion that violent means alone could offer a reasonable hope for success to the Communists especially in South-east Asian countries like South Vietnam. The debate between the Soviet Union and China on the subject of how Communist Parties in general should act in the world as a whole, consumed much of their energy and time. The result was that the Russians came to the conclusion that the Chinese were dangerously insane, while the Chinese accused the Russians as cowards who were abandoning the traditional Communist theory of revolution and becoming ‘revisionists’. China disapproved Russia’s attempt at forging a separate peace between the Soviet Union and the United States, which left the United States free to continue its hostility towards China.

**Stress on Vigorous Policy Towards the West:** The Soviet Union tested an Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in August 1957 and launched the world’s first space satellite in October the same year. The Chinese saw these technological successes as a manifestation of Soviet superiority over the United States. In October 1957, Mao Tse-tung attended a meeting of the world’s Communist parties held in Moscow following the celebrations of the Fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He took the opportunity to re-stress his belief that ‘the East wind prevails over the West wind’, and pressed for a more forceful foreign policy, especially against the West. However, the Soviet leaders were unwilling to concede to his arguments.

**Russia's Silence During the ‘Offshore Island’ Crisis:** Soviet Union’s reluctance to support China’s foreign policy objectives was clearly demonstrated during the ‘offshore island’ crisis. In August 1958, China decided to take the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the control of the Nationalist government based in Taiwan. A massive bombardment from the nearby mainland was opened and continued for many days. The United States came to the rescue of the Nationalist government by threatening intervention to protect Taiwan and the offshore islands. China was forced to retreat. Khrushchev maintained silence on the issue of the offshore islands during the crisis. This manifested a complete lack of coordination between the Sino-Soviet foreign policy.

**Differing Views on the ‘Great Leap Forward’:** The rift between China and USSR widened in 1958 by China’s Great Leap Forward. China boasted the success of the communes as the ‘buds of communism’ and claimed that China would achieve communism before its economically more advanced rival, the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Khrushchev criticized Chinese communes as ‘old fashioned, ‘which would not work’.

**Tibetan Crisis and Russian Neutrality:** There was anti-Chinese revolt in Tibet in March 1959. The revolt was ruthlessly suppressed by China and the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India. India denounced the Chinese action. However, Khrushchev studiously remained neutral during the Tibetan crisis and in the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1959, which annoyed China further.

**Chinese Disapproval of Khrushchev's Visit to the US:** In September 1959, unmindful of Chinese criticism, Khrushchev went to the United States to confer with President Eisenhower at Camp David to protect Russian interests. Khrushchev flew from the United States directly to Peking to convince the Chinese leadership regarding the advantages of the idea of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and to suggest that the Chinese should adopt the de
facto recognition of ‘two Chinas’ as a solution to the Taiwan problem, and to urge them not to ‘test by force the stability of the capitalist system’. However, China strongly criticized Khrushchev's visit to the United States and Mao Tse-tung, who believed that all power grew out of the barrel of the gun, gave Khrushchev cold reception.

Withdrawal of Soviet Experts From China: From this time onwards, the gap between the Soviet Union and China widened further. In 1960 the Chinese launched bitter attack on Soviet policies. Following the strained relations between the two Khrushchev ordered the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China and cancelled all economic aid. Each accused the other of ideological deviation from the true Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Their views regarding war and peace, disarmament, non-alignment and neutrality were diametrically opposed to each other.

China’s Disapproval of Khrushchev’s Congratulatory Message to JFK: When John F. Kennedy was elected the President of the United States, Khrushchev sent him congratulatory messages in February 1961. The Chinese, who continued to oppose the policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’, disapproved this gesture of the Soviet leader and his attempt to establish détente with Kennedy. The Soviet Union attacked Albania, a staunch ally of China, as dogmatist and broke off diplomatic relations with it. On the other hand China dubbed Yugoslavia as revisionist.

Russian Neutrality in the Sino-Indian War (1962): The rift between China and the Soviet Union deepened in 1962 with the Sino-Indian border war, in which the Soviet Union remained neutral, and then supplied fighter aircrafts to India. The Chinese considered the diplomatic support given by the Soviet Union to India as a ‘treachery’.

China's Reaction to Cuban Missile Crisis (1962): When the Cuban missile crisis took place almost simultaneously with the Sino-Indian border conflict, China at first announced its support for the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba. However, when Khrushchev backed down due to the US pressure on 27 October, Chinese leaders denounced the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba as ‘adventurism’, and the decision to take them out as ‘capitulationism’.

The question of Sino-Soviet Border: The question of Sino-Soviet border also became a major flash point in 1962. The Chinese accused Russia of incorporating into the Soviet Union more than 60,000 Chinese living in Sinkiang, and refused to let them return home. By raising the border question, the Chinese also referred to the ‘unequal treaties’ imposed on China by Tsarist Russia on China.

China's Criticism of the NTBT: The Chinese criticized the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow by England, the United States, and the Soviet Union in July 1963. The Chinese leaders saw the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a Soviet-West plot to keep China and others out of the nuclear club. Mao saw this as a clear indication that Khrushchev had chosen the West over China. Still there were attempts at reconciliation between the two Communist countries. Boundary negotiations took place in Peking in 1964. But the negotiations were deadlocked due to disagreement between the two.

Testing of the First Nuclear Device by China: Khrushchev was ousted from power on 15 October 1964. On the following day the Chinese announced that they had tested their first nuclear device. This demonstrated the rapid advance of Chinese technology to the level of the most developed industrial countries, without the aid from any one of them, including Russia.

Differences over the Vietnam War: Increasing tension over the Vietnam War, and whether China and the Soviet Union should engage in ‘united action’, soon became the focus of Sino-Soviet relations. China decided to prohibit Soviet aid by air to Vietnam passing over Chinese territory. Mao Tse-tung strongly rejected Soviet proposals for united action. The Chinese and Albanians did not attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union in March 1966, as they dubbed it as ‘revisionist’. 

China's Criticism of Russian Invasion of Czechoslovakia: China criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. Chou En-lai accused the Soviet Union of trying to create puppets with the help of guns and compared the Soviet ‘act of aggression’ with Hitler’s past invasion of Czechoslovakia and with the United States aggression against Vietnam. The Brezhnev doctrine, asserting the right of the Soviet Union to
take military action against any member of the socialist community was denounced by China as an ‘outright doctrine of hegemony’.

**Clash Between Chinese and Russian Troops:** On 2 March 1969, fighting broke out over Damansky Island in the Ussuri River. From 1960 there had been numerous smaller incidents, but this was the first serious clash between Soviet and Chinese forces, resulting in heavy Soviet casualties. The conflict escalated along the Manchurian and Sinkiang frontiers. On 11 September 1969, Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, stopped in Peking for talks with Chou En-lai. These airport conversations resulted in an agreement for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. An agreement to hold talks on border questions was finally reached on 7 October, and the talks were held in Peking on 20 October. However, since 1969 there has been no resolution of the border question. The treaty of friendship between China and Russia was allowed to lapse with no new agreement to take its place.

**Rapprochement With the United States:** The bilateral Sino-Soviet relationship has not markedly changed in the period from 1969 to 1982. However, there has been significant change in the international environment. The worldview of Chinese leaders underwent a change. In 1970s China succeeded in breaking through her isolation. By the early 1970s most Western nations had recognized her. In 1971, China was finally admitted to the United Nations on her own terms, which meant the exclusion of Taiwan. The great victory of Chinese diplomacy was the rapprochement with the United States in 1972. Mao Tse-tung met with President Nixon and then with President Ford, and significant steps were taken towards Sino-American normalization of relations.

**Russian Attempt to Improve Relations with China:** In January 1976 Chou En-lai died, followed by Mao Tse-tung, who died On 9 September, 1976. In October the ‘Gang of Four’ was arrested and China embarked upon a new political course. Soviet Union ceased its anti-Chinese propaganda in September 1976. Soviet Union also declared readiness to hold talks with China on the settlement of border question. However, China continued her anti-Soviet propaganda. A message of congratulations sent by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to Hua Guofeng on his appointment as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party was rejected. Thus, Sino-Soviet relations continued to remain static. Tension between two Southeast Asian client states, Cambodia and Vietnam, further damaged relations between China and USSR. In 1979 China invaded Vietnam to defend Cambodia from the Vietnamese incursion of 1978. The Soviet Union condemned the invasion and increased arms shipments to Vietnam. Competing goals in Southeast Asia remained a key issue for nearly a decade.

**China’s Reaction to the Soviet Invasion on Afghanistan:** A new set of bilateral negotiations began in 1979, but the Chinese ended talks shortly after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979. Thereafter, China added withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan to its conditions for renewing the two nations' 1950 friendship treaty. Talks on the Sino-Soviet border situation finally resumed in late 1982, but relations remained static until Gorbachev began making conciliatory gestures in 1986 and 1987. In 1988 two major obstacles were removed when the Soviet Union committed itself to removing troops from Afghanistan, and Vietnam did likewise for Cambodia. The Sino-Soviet summit meeting of June 1989 was the first since the Khrushchev regime.

**Improvement in Relations Between China and Russia.** In the early 1990s, relations got a boost from China's interest in renewed weapons imports from Russia and other forms of military cooperation. In 1992 an exchange of visits by high defense officials established defense ties and included the signing of a major arms technology agreement with a reported value of US$1.8 billion. In 1993 another series of defense exchange visits yielded a five-year defense cooperation agreement between the two countries. A strategic partnership, signed in early 1996, significantly strengthened ties.

**Normalization of Relations:** In December 1992, Yeltsin went to China and signed a nonaggression declaration that theoretically ended what each called the other's search for regional hegemony in Asia. Another treaty included Russian aid in building a nuclear power plant, the first such provision since Sino-Soviet relations cooled in the late 1950s. Chinese party chairman Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in September 1994 and concluded a protocol that resolved some border disputes and generally strengthened bilateral ties. During Yeltsin's visit to China in April 1996, both sides described their relationship as evolving into a ‘strategic partnership’, which included substantially increased arms sales. At the April meeting, new agreements made progress toward
delineating and demilitarizing the two countries' 3,645 kilometers of common border. Although border security and illegal Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East were controversial issues for Russian regional officials, Yeltsin demanded regional compliance with the agreements. Russia had respected China's claim that Taiwan is part of its territory, although Russia's trade with Taiwan increased to nearly US$3 billion in 1995 and Russia planned to open trade offices on the island in 1996.

In 1994-96 China emerged as a major market for Russian arms, having bought several dozen Su-27 fighter aircraft and several Kilo class attack submarines. Russia also had a positive trade balance in the sale of raw materials, metals, and machinery to China. A series of high-level state visits occurred in 1994 and 1995. Both countries pursued closer ties, in each case partly to counterbalance their cooling relations with the United States. In March 1996, Russia announced that it would grant China a loan of US$2 billion to supply Russian nuclear reactors for power generation in northeast China, and further cooperation was proposed in uranium mining and processing, fusion research, and nuclear arms dismantlement.

2.3.2.10. China's relation with India

Cultural contacts between India and China go back to ancient times. Over two thousand years ago Buddhist bikshus crossed the snow clad peaks of the Himalayas to preach the gospel of peace to Tibet, China and Japan. Following Buddhist missionary activities many Chinese were converted to Buddhism. Thereafter, a number of Chinese travelers and pilgrims visited India. The most famous among them were Fa-hien, Hieun Tsang and I-tsing. Some of the Chinese pilgrims stayed in India for many years and have left detailed accounts of social, economic and political conditions of this country. These accounts spread over hundreds of years indicate that both China and India had good relations.

Mutual Support During the National Movement: During the nineteenth century, China, like India became a victim of foreign imperialism. The Indians hailed the rise of nationalism in China culminating in the Revolution of 1911 leading to the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. The emergence of Chinese nationalism served as an inspiration to the Indian nationalists. With the establishment of the Kuomintang India felt more and more drawn to China. Dr. Sun Yat-sen supported Gandhiji’s non-cooperation movement during 1920s. Chiang Kai-shek and his wife paid several visits to India. Indian National Congress gave moral support to China in its determined fight against Japan from 1931 to 1945. Jawaharlal Nehru visited China in 1939 and expressed a sincere desire to have relationship with China. The Chinese gave Ravindranath Tagore a warm welcome when he visited their country in 1942. But with the end of the Second World War, China was engulfed in a civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists leading to the victory of the latter led by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: Following their success in the Civil War, the Communist leaders set up the Peoples’ Republic of China in October 1949. India was one of the first countries to grant de facto recognition to the new Chinese government in December 1949. India re-established diplomatic relations with China by re-appointing Sardar K.M. Pannikar as India’s ambassador to China.

Chinese Action in Tibet and Indian Response: India’s friendship with China came under strain when the latter invaded Eastern Tibet in October 1950. The Chinese authorities ordered the People’s Liberation Army to ‘liberate three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression' and complete the unification of China. The Tibetans sought Indian help. The Government of India protested against the Chinese action in Tibet. On the other hand China asserted that Tibetan issue was her domestic affair. Later India denied any attempt at interference on her part in the domestic affairs of China. However, India pointed out that the Tibetan problem should be settled by peaceful methods and that Tibet’s legitimate claim for autonomy should be respected, as Tibet was a weak and peaceful country.

On 23 May 1951, China entered into an agreement with Tibet by which regional autonomy was granted to the Tibetans and China took control of the defense and foreign relations. Tibet, which had been a buffer state between India and China, could no longer play the role. Though India disapproved the way China had settled her affairs with Tibet, she had no other alternative but to adjust her relations with Tibet.

The Panchasheel: A desire to maintain good relations prompted India to demonstrate her sincerity towards China. India strongly advocated China’s membership to the United Nations. During the Korean War
(1950-52) India condemned the West for branding China as an aggressor. In order to strengthen her relations with China, India even surrendered her special rights over Tibet. On 29 April, 1954, China and India entered into a Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and Tibet. The terms of the agreement were criticized in and outside the Indian Parliament. However, Nehru justified the agreement with China on Tibet.

By the Agreement of 1954, which was to be valid for eight years, Tibet was recognized as ‘the Tibetan region of China’. The Agreement specified markets and pilgrim routes and laid down regulations for trade and other relations between Tibet and India. India permitted China to establish trade agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. On the other hand China permitted India to establish similar agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

Trade, pilgrimage and travel between the two countries were also regulated. India also transferred to China some rest houses and postal, telegraphic and telephonic services with their equipment owned by the Government of India in Tibet. The most important part of the Agreement of 1954 between India and China was its preamble. The preamble explained the principles and considerations that governed mutual relations between the two countries. These five principles of peaceful co-existence came to be known as the Panchasheel. These principles are: (1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. (2) Mutual non-aggression. (3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. (4) Equality and mutual benefit. (5) Peaceful coexistence.

Jawaharlal Nehru was of the opinion that China and India should live in mutual peace and understanding. The agreement ensured to a large extent peace in certain areas of Asia. Nehru believed that the area of peace could spread to the rest of Asia and to the rest of the World.

**Chou En-lai’s Visit to India:** In June 1954, the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai visited India. According to the Nehru-Chou En-lai Statement issued on June 28, 1954, the two Prime Ministers discussed many matters of common concern to India and China. The chief issues discussed by them included the prospect of peace in the South-east Asia and the developments that had taken place in the Geneva Conference with regard to Indo-China. Both Nehru and Chou En-lai re-affirmed the five principles laid down in the Indo-China agreement on Tibet.

**Nehru’s Return-Visit to China:** Believing sincerely that China would be faithful to the commitments made with India, Jawaharlal Nehru returned the compliment by paying a fortnight’s visit to China in October 1954. Nehru and his advisers were aware of the fact that his visit to China might be misunderstood and that there was a danger of the gulf between the United States and India widening. But Nehru risked all this because he earnestly believed that he could contribute to world peace if he could keep China out of war.

**China and India At The Bandung Conference (1955):** The friendship thus, apparently cemented between India and China bore fruit at Bandung where the leaders of the Afro-Asian countries met in 1955 with President Sukarno as their host. This was the first conference of this kind. Though Nehru introduced Premier Chou En-lai to the Afro-Asian leaders, it was the latter who stole the show and projected the claim of China as the leader of the East.

**Dispute Over the McMahon Line:** During his visit to China in October 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru had raised with the Chinese leaders the question of some maps published in China which had shown an incorrect boundary alignment between the two countries and incorporated about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in China. However, Chou En-lai, in reply, sought to treat these Chinese maps as merely a reproduction of old Kuomintang maps and pointed out that the Communist Government had no time to revise them.

**The ‘Cartographic Aggression’:** The first official repudiation by the Chinese government of the traditional boundary between India and China (McMahon Line) came on 23 January 1959. Nehru had drawn the attention of Chou En-lai in a letter of 14 December 1958, about the wrong representation of the Sino-Indian boundary in an official Chinese journal. In his reply to Nehru, Chou En-lai contended that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally marked. He pointed out that there were certain differences between the two sides over the issue and that the government of China had not raised the issue in 1954 because ‘conditions were not then ripe for settlement’. Arguing further, the Chinese Premier stressed that the Chinese government had never recognized the McMahon Line. As for the Chinese maps, Chou En-lai claimed that the boundaries drawn on them
were consistent with those on earlier maps. Thus, going back on all their assurances and violating the Agreement of 1954, the Chinese laid a claim to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory. This ‘cartographic aggression’ by China resulted in considerable stresses and strains in the Sino-Indian relations.

**The Tibetan Revolt:** The Dalai Lama came to India in 1956 to participate in the 2500th anniversary of Buddha’s nirvana. After the end of the celebrations the Dalai Lama was reluctant to return to Lhasa for the fear of the Chinese. However, Nehru persuaded him to return to his homeland. Chou En-lai, who was also at that time in Delhi promised the Dalai Lama that the Tibetan grievances would be redressed. But unfortunately Chou En-lai did not keep his promise and in early March 1959 the Tibetans rose in an open revolt against the Chinese authority. The warlike Khampa tribesmen of Eastern Tibet started the revolt. The uprising was ruthlessly crushed by the Chinese troops, and the Chinese government terminated Tibetan autonomy. The Dalai Lama fled to India in April 1959 and was granted ‘political asylum’ by the Indian Government. The Dalai Lama established a ‘government-in-exile’. The Tibetan revolt and its aftermath deteriorated Sino-Indian relations further.

**Sino-Indian Border Dispute:** The Tibetan crisis precipitated the Sino-Indian border dispute. While chasing rebel tribesmen, Chinese troops clashed with Indian border guards. The Indian government demanded that the Chinese should withdraw from the disputed areas. The Chinese in turn offered to negotiate the issue on the basis of the status quo. As early as 1957, Indian authorities had discovered that the Chinese had for several years been operating a highway cutting across territory that was marked part of India on Indian maps. There were two areas of significant size in dispute. At the eastern end of the Sino-Indian border was an area of over 35,000 square miles, loosely administered by India, called the North-Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA). At the western end of the border was an area of about 14,000 square miles, consisting mostly of the deserts of the Aksai Chin Plateau, but stretching south and west into some thinly settled regions under Indian influence.

After appropriating a large barren chunk of Indian territory, the Chinese proposed to construct a road connecting Tibet with Southwestern China. This was unacceptable to Nehru, who was being pressured to settle the issue with China through war. The Chinese, in order to show their ‘good faith’, concluded border treaties with Burma (January 1960), Nepal (March 1960), Pakistan (December 1962), Outer Mongolia (December 1962) and Afghanistan (November 1963).

**The Sino-Indian War (October, 1962):** India regarded any compromised settlement of the border dispute with China as an offence against the national pride. The Indian army began pushing forward. The Indian leaders hinted that they might eventually evict the Chinese from the whole of the disputed area by force. In August Nehru reported to the Parliament that part of the 12,000 square miles of Ladakh overrun by the Chinese had already been recovered and that the Indian army had been instructed to ‘expel the Chinese from NEFA’. The Sino-Indian War broke out in October 1962, when Chinese and Indian troops confronted one another at close range on the western end of the border. On the northern edge of the NEFA the Indian government ordered its troops to attack Chinese positions that even according to Indian maps lay in Chinese territory. Chinese reprisal was swift. Charging the Indians with aggression, the Chinese launched a counter-offensive, which pushed back the Indian troops to the southern part of NEFA. In a few weeks of the campaign, the Chinese expelled the Indian army from the whole of the disputed area. However, the Chinese were careful not to advance beyond the area, which China had claimed.

**Unilateral Ceasefire by China:** The Chinese unilaterally ceased fighting on 21 November 1962, and withdrew behind the McMahon Line. This might have been a move to convince the world opinion that the sole purpose was to maintain her legitimate border and that she had no intention to wage an all-out war with India. China handed back to India NEFA, and all prisoners of war and weapons taken in the campaign. India acquired somewhat more than two-thirds of the disputed area following a roughly imposed compromise between the two countries. Thereafter, the Sino-Indian relations remained extremely hostile for about twenty years.

**Impact of the Sino-Indian War:** The Sino-Indian War seriously harmed China’s international image. China was already known to be attacking the doctrine of ‘peaceful co-existence’ in its dispute with the Soviet Union, while India had a good reputation as the largest and most prestigious of the countries maintaining neutrality in the Cold War. Most of the international community accepted the Indian claim that the war had been unprovoked Chinese aggression. The Sino-Indian War further deteriorated the Sino-Soviet relations due to Russian neutrality.
during the war fought between a Communist and a non-Communist power. Sino-Indian relations were further strained by China’s support of Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, which established the independent state of Bangladesh.

**Process of Normalization of Sino-Indian Relations:** The gradual improvement of relations between the two great Asian powers assumes considerable significance in contemporary international political relations. As early as 1969, India, in an attempt to end the deadlock in Sino-Indian relations, offered to hold talks with China without setting any preconditions. In spite of this the process of normalization remained slow. China did not respond immediately to Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi’s offer for resumption of a dialogue.

**Chinese Criticism of India’s Role in Bangladesh and Sikkim:** India carefully maintained low profile despite China’s harsh criticism of India’s role in the liberation of Bangladesh as well as Sikkim. Calling the merger of Sikkim with India as yet another of India’s expansionist acts after dismembering Pakistan, China declared full support to the people of Sikkim in their ‘just struggle’ for national independence. Chinese media kept up its hostile propaganda against India, accusing her of harbouring hegemonist and expansionist ambitions towards her neighbours, indulging in nuclear blackmail and aspiring to become a sub-super power in collusion with the Soviet Union. In spite of hostile criticism from China, Indian Government, showed remarkable restraint, as she was eager to normalize her relations with China. India’s policy of combining flexibility with firmness bore fruit in 1976, when diplomatic ties between the two countries were upgraded to the ambassadorial level after a gap of nearly fifteen years.

**Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Visit to China:** During the Janata Party’s government, Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in 1979, in response to the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua’s invitation. It was the first high-level meeting between the leaders of the two countries since the Sino-Indian hostilities in the sixties. However, Vajpayee was quite unhappy with the Chinese blatant reference to the 1962 attack on India and conceded that it ‘created hurdles in the path of normalization’. He reiterated that national interests would remain supreme and the question of surrendering any Indian territory to China did not arise.

**Efforts to Improve Relations with China:** After her return to power in 1980, Mrs. Indira Gandhi also continued efforts to keep up the political dialogue with China in the course of a meeting between the Chinese Premier, Hua Guofeng and Indira Gandhi in Belgrade in May 1980. Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, visited India in June 1981. The only tangible gain from the visit was the decision to hold official level talks regarding both ‘bilateral problems and bilateral exchanges’. It was agreed by both sides that an understanding between the two sides on border settlement, although central to full normalization of relations, need not be made a precondition for improvement in relations in other areas. Thus, the first official talks, in twenty years, were held in December 1981. At this meeting five sub-groups were formed to deal with matters concerning boundary, trade and economic cooperation, cultural exchange and science and technology.

In 1985, China came forward with a proposal for reciprocal opening of missions in the two countries and resumption of Indo-Tibetan border trade as meaningful steps towards an overall improvement in Sino-Indian relations. Though India did not have any objection to the proposal in principle, her response remained visibly cool in view of lack of any tangible progress on the border question, which she considers central to any normalization.

**Rajiv Gandhi’s Visit to China:** The end of 1988 saw the visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China, which brought the relations of the two countries into a new stage of development. The two sides agreed that pending the solution of the boundary questions, the two countries would maintain peace and tranquility in the areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and make efforts to improve and develop bilateral relations. The two countries also decided to establish joint working group on boundary questions, joint committees on economics and trade and science and technology. The two sides also signed the agreements of cooperation on science and technology and on civil aviation.

**Li Peng’s Visit to India:** During Premier Li Peng's visit to India in December 1991, the two countries signed the consular treaty, agreement on resuming establishment of consulate generals, Memorandum on resuming border trade and MOU on cooperation in science and technology for the peaceful use of outer space. This visit, having promoted an all-round improvement and development of the Sino-Indian relations, was followed
by successive exchanges of high-level visits. The Chinese Consulate General in Mumbai and the Indian Consulate General in Shanghai were reopened respectively at the end of 1992 and early 1993. The Indian side also abrogated the discriminative and restricted laws and regulations against the Chinese nationals in India in 1992.

**Narasimha Rao’s Visit to China:** In September 1993, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China. The two countries signed the agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the LAC in the Sino-Indian border areas, agreements of cooperation in environment, in radio and television and protocol on opening more border trade points, which have added new contexts to the friendly cooperation between the two countries. In the same year, Li Ruihuan, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) visited India. In 1994, Indian Vice President K. R. Narayanan paid a visit to China and Qian Qichen, Chinese Vice Premier cum Foreign Minister, visited India. The two countries signed agreements on avoiding double taxation, agreements of cooperation on health and medical science, on simplifying the procedure for visa application and on banking cooperation between the two countries. In 1995, Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), visited India and had extensive contacts with Indian leaders. The visit has further promoted the bilateral relations.

It was again during the NDA rule under Atal Bihari Bajapai, relation between China and India was smooth. During the last decades also the UPA government had a cordial relation with China. The formation of BRICS and emerging Indian market also enhanced the bilateral relationship between the two giant of Asia. Recently elected NDA government under Narendra Modi invited Chinese President and the later also came to India on Indian PM invitation.

**2.3.3. Conclusion**

The ‘Cultural Revolution’ was launched by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Tse-tung to stem what he perceived as the country's drift away from socialism and toward the ‘restoration of capitalism’ under Liu Shao-chi. The Cultural Revolution was also a power struggle in which Mao Tse-tung fought to recapture from his political rivals some of the authority and prestige that he had lost as a result of earlier policy failures. In response to Mao’s call, high school students in Peking began forming groups called the Red Guards. Mao appealed to the students to “smash the four olds”: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. Chaos and lawlessness spread throughout China as the Red Guards destroyed temples, artwork, books, and anything associated with traditional or foreign cultures. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1967, put an end to the anarchy and restore order. The Cultural Revolution had far-reaching consequences on all aspects of the Chinese society. The years of chaos from 1966 to 1969 resulted in the slowdown and partial collapse of the Chinese economy. Education suffered serious setback. The Chinese Communist Party lost much of its prestige as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

For centuries the Chinese empire enjoyed basically unchallenged greatness and self-sufficiency. China saw itself as the cultural center of the universe, a view reflected in the concept of the Middle Kingdom. Establishment of the Communist government in 1949, the Chinese leaders have begun looking at the world. The Chinese did not want to be the part of any of the two ideologically distinct power blocks that had developed since the end of the Second World War. From 1949 to 1956 China did believe that she and Russia belonged to the socialist block and was opposes to the capitalist block of the West headed by the United States. However, the break up between the two communist states that had begun since 1956 ultimately separated them in 1966, forcing China to adopt the policy of self-reliance. Since 1970s China once again broke its isolationist stance and improved her relations with the United States. Chinese foreign relations and world view were directly related to her changing needs. During the initial period of its existence, the Chinese Communist government depended on Soviet Russia for the development of her industries. The Chinese foreign policy has undergone a revolution since 1966, more so after she became a member of the UNO in 1972. Her former close ally Russia had become her bitterest enemy, and the United States, formerly her bitterest enemy, has become a friend. This clearly indicates the changing approach of China’s world view and change in her foreign policy direction.

**2.3.4. Summary**
The ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ (1966-76) was launched by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Tse-tung to stem what he perceived as the country’s drift away from socialism and toward the ‘restoration of capitalism’ under Liu Shao-chi.

The principal targets of Mao’s anger were, on the one hand, party and government officials who he felt had become a ‘new class’ divorced from the masses and, on the other, intellectuals who, in his view, were the repository of bourgeois and even feudal values.

The Cultural Revolution was also a power struggle in which Mao Tse-tung fought to recapture from his political rivals some of the authority and prestige that he had lost as a result of earlier policy failures.

In response to Mao’s call, high school students in Peking began forming groups called the Red Guards. Mao appealed to the students to ‘smash the four olds’: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits.

Chaos and lawlessness spread throughout China as the Red Guards destroyed temples, artwork, books, and anything associated with traditional or foreign cultures. The Communist Party structure gradually collapsed, leading to anarchy and lawlessness. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained the sole disciplined structure in the country.

In 1967, to put an end to the anarchy and mob violence, the People’s Liberation Army was called in to restore order.

The Cultural Revolution had far-reaching consequences on all aspects of the Chinese society. The years of chaos from 1966 to 1969 resulted in the slowdown and partial collapse of the Chinese economy. Education suffered serious setback. The Chinese Communist Party lost much of its prestige as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

For centuries China saw itself as the cultural center of the universe, a view reflected in the concept of the Middle Kingdom. Establishment of the Communist government in 1949, the Chinese leaders have begun looking at the world.

The Chinese did not want to be the part of any of the two ideologically distinct power blocks that had developed since the end of the Second World War.

From 1949 to 1956 China was a friend of Russia and was opposed to the capitalist block of the West headed by the United States. Both of them broke apart in 1956 and ultimately separated them in 1966, forcing China to adopt the policy of self-reliance.

Since 1970s China improved her relations with the United States. China believed in her own strength and wanted to create her own block.

China has completely reversed her policy with regard to Japan, once her worst enemy in Asia. She had developed better relations and had signed a pact of friendship as she needed Japanese technology to refine her crude oil.

The Chinese foreign policy has undergone a revolution since 1966, more so after she became a member of the UNO in 1972.

Her former close ally Russia had become her bitterest enemy, and the United States, formerly her bitterest enemy, has become a friend. This clearly indicates the changing approach of China’s world view and change in her foreign policy direction.

2.3.5. Exercise
1. Trace the causes, course and consequences of the Cultural Revolution.
2. Discuss the various stages in the relationship between China and USSR.
3. Trace the various stages in the relationship between China and India.
4. Discuss the various stages in the relationship between China and USA.
5. How did China gain from USSR during the early years of the Communist regime in China?

2.3.6. Further Reading

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Unit-3
Chapter-1
THE OPENING OF JAPAN
Perry and Harris Mission, The Restoration of the Meiji and reforms of Meiji Era, The
Constitutional Movement and the Constitution of 1889

Structure
3.1.0. Objective
3.1.1. Introduction
3.1.2. The advent of the West
3.1.3. The Perry Mission
  3.1.3.1. Factors behind America’s interest in Japan
  3.1.3.2. Aims of Perry’s Mission
  3.1.3.3. Expedition of Perry
  3.1.3.4. Arrival of Perry in Japan
  3.1.3.5. Negotiation
  3.1.3.6. Treaty of Kanagawa
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3.1.6. The Constitutional Movement and the Meiji Constitution:
  3.1.6.1. Promulgation of the Constitution amid Cheers
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  3.1.6.3. Treachery of the Tosa Faction
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3.1.11. Further Reading
3.1.0. Objectives

In this lesson, students explore the history of modernization of Japan. After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

- trace the history of opening of Japan to the western world;
- identify the influence of Parry and Harris mission into Japan and subsequent Meiji Restoration of 1868 in Japan;
- recognize the contribution of Meiji Emperor for the modernization of Japan;
- appreciate the different reforms carried out by Meiji Emperor for the growth of modern Japan;
- point out the significance of constitutional development in modern Japan at par with western democracy in late 19th century.

3.1.1. Introduction

Japan occupies a prominent and predominant place in the history of the world today. Hence, it's very essential to know the history of Japan. It is desirable to discuss the history of Japan in detail in this work. The early history of Japan cannot be separated from legend and mythology. These legends are contained in the two chronicles Kajiki and Nihongi or Nihanshoki. They reveal that the Japanese Islands were created by Heavens. The Japanese particularly attributes it to the Sun Goddess, Ametetasu and her brother Susanoo. The latter is said to have descended to Silla in Korea and sailed to Izumo in Japan. In Japan he initiated his line of kings, according to the legend.

According to historical records of Japan, their ancestors were Gods. The two Gods Izanagi and Izanami, brother and sister, were commanded by the senior Gods to create Japan. So they stood on the floating bridge of Heaven and thrust down into the ocean a jeweled spear and held it aloft in the sky. The drops of water that fell from the spear formed into the sacred Islands. Izanagi and Izanami mated and as a result Ameterasu, the Sun Goddess was born. From her grandson Ninigi sprang, in the divine and unbroken lineage, all the emperors of Dai Nippon. Hence, Japan came to be known as the land of the Rising Sun. From that day there has been the only imperial dynasty in Japan. However, the historical period of Japan may be dated from 400 A.D. Many historical events of this period have also been testifies by the Chinese annals and Korean records. Thereafter, chronology of the Japanese history becomes exact. The emperor ruled Japan with the help of the feudal warlords and the subjects revered their emperor as the lineal descendant of the gods.

For a long time the Japanese remained in seclusion. No doubt their culture was influenced by that of the Chinese. Confucianism and Buddhism spread into Japan through Korea. But the Japanese maintained their own social and political institutions in a different manner. They did not welcome the foreign elements all through their history until the advent of the westerner.

3.1.2. The advent of the West

By the middle ages Japanese administration was controlled by several powerful clan. Among them the Satsuma, Choshu and the Tokugawa clans were the most powerful. There were the Daimyos of the Feudal lords, who controlled the agricultural economy. The Samurai were the military class and they exercised sufficient force. There were also the Bakfu who formed the court of the Shogun and were practically managing the entire Japanese trade. Under these conditions the Tokugawa clan became powerful and created its Shogunate or the military dictatorship in the name of the Emperor. The Shogun was the supreme military dictator who guided the destiny of the nation. Yedo, modern Tokyo, became the seat of the Government of the Shogun and that of the Bakfu or the court of Shogun. The Mikado or the Emperor had its court nobility called Kuge at Kyoto. Thus, the Japanese society under the Tokugawa Shogunate was composed of three important classes. The Kuges or the Court Nobles, the Samurai or the military class and the Heimin or the common people. The Tokugawa clan remained supreme in the political arena of Japan from 1637 to 1854. During this period the Emperor was reduced to the position of a presiding deity. Though the imperial seal was affixed to the ordinances and laws were promulgated in the name of the Emperor, the Shogun was the de facto rulers of Japan. The Tokugawa Shoguns followed a very rigid isolation policy. However, the Tokugawa Shoguns gave Japanese people a sense of discipline and of unity which would prove to be a very valuable asset during the period of transition in Meiji Restoration (1868 to 1912).
It was however, the Dutch were the first westerner to be allowed to trade from a small inlet of Dishemia near Nagasaki. Dishemian was Japan’s window to the West. Inspite of its policy of isolation, Japan’s contact with the outside world was increasing in the beginning of the 19th century. The policy of isolation was definitely broken when Parry knocked the door of Japan.

By the nineteenth century Japan had become more isolated and insular than it was in early Tokugawa times. Dutch studies had made progress and Western books were imported, but there was little or no personal contact with outsiders. Commercial trade with the outside world had dwindled as Japan’s economy had diversified sufficiently to meet domestic needs. The Dutch had continued their trade as much from inertia as from interest; so long as it was a monopoly there was no reason to give it up, but there were also few expectations of growth or profit. Within Japan the richness of cultural developments in the great urban centers combined with the effects of censorship as it was applied to all discussion of national and international affairs to create something of a cocoon seldom penetrated from without.

From 1800 on, however, the national consciousness was periodically punctuated by the knowledge or appearance of outsiders whose effect was great. Some were substantial intrusions, others were mere pinpricks; some were from near and others from great distances, but because isolation allowed so little distinction between what was near and what was far each could seem formidable and even menacing. A maverick Hungarian nobleman who came with tales of Russian invasion plans, a Russian emissary seeking permission for trade, a shipwrecked sailor, a British frigate from the south, a chartered merchant vessel bringing back some castaways; ships more often sighted from the shore, shipwrecked whalers; a sudden letter from the king of Holland, and then more warnings from the Dutch at Nagasaki; all this came to a climax with great black ships from across the Pacific, many times the size of anything in Japanese waters, contemptuous of Japanese practice and demanding far-ranging changes. All of this was interspersed with the social and political events already discussed, to create complementary vibrations that were to doom the Tokugawa ship of state.

3.1.3. The Perry Mission

The opening of Japan to commercial and diplomatic intercourse with the west in 1853 was undertaken by America. The 250 years of continued seclusion came to an end due to this many changes took place in the history of Japan. As the power of Shogun declined, the power of the feudal lords(Daimyos) increased. Among the feudal lords, the four families were most influential i.e. Tosa, Satsuma, Choshu and Hizen. The Daimyos began to assert their power and authority. The central authority wielded by the Tokugawa Shogunate becomes so weak, at the time of Perry’s arrival that it could easily be overthrown by any combination of Daimyos. The revival of Japanese learning paved the way for rebellion. In this way the conditions were very conducive for the opening of Japan by Perry.

Besides, the intellectual awakening impelled the Japanese youth and the students to forge closer links with the West. At this juncture Dishemia was the gateway to the west. The Japanese maintained their contact through the Dutch at first. Japan was ready to learn and adopt western science and knowledge when Perry knocked the door of Japan. Japan was by no means in a state of peaceful slumber in the 250 years long period of national seclusion. The external pressures were no less responsible for the opening of Japan. Improved means of communications and transportation, desire for trade, needs of the mariners and colonial competitions led powers to find new fields and pastures.

Some western powers made half-hearted attempts to open Japan to trade. The Russians were the first to press upon Japan’s closed doors. England also tried to obtain a foot hold in Japan but failed. The increased activity of the westerners in China bound to influence the course of neighboring countries. Western ships began to appear in Japanese waters. Soon the nations of the west were demanding that the Japanese follow China to open their country to commercial and diplomatic relations. This was eventually achieved through the establishment of much the same unequal treaty system as had been imposed on China. Commodore Perry of America led the way.

3.1.3.1. Factors behind America’s interest in Japan

American interest in Japan was twofold. Until the discovery of oil in Pennsylvania in 1858 the country was illuminated by whale oil lamps; Pacific waters were busy with fleets of whalers, some of whom inevitably
ended up on the shores of Japan. At that time Americans were more eager to protect whalers than they were whales, a priority that has been reversed more recently. Accounts of the mistreatment of shipwrecked sailors and the failure to help ships in need fired public indignation. Americans had also entered the competition for the China trade. Speedy clipper ships bound for China by the Great Circle route had long moved close to Japanese shores, for Japan lay astride that course. The advent of steam navigation brought with it need for a Pacific source of coal, and hopes of a coaling station en route to China added importance to contact with Japan. Entrepreneurs began to dream of routes that would circle the globe. American victory over Mexico and the acquisition of California strengthened the American position on the Pacific coast, and the gold rush that followed brought many more Americans to the far west. Slogans of manifest destiny stirred popular imagination and led easily to Pacific adventures. For all these reasons Japan was more important to Americans than it was to English.

In 1832 President Andrew Jackson directed steps to bring America into the China trade that had been opened by Great Britain, and the 1834 Treaty of Wanghsia brought America benefits the British had won by force. At the same time relations were opened with Siam. Naval commanders at the time were instructed to open talks with Japan if it could be done without risk, but the only action that followed was the private voyage of the Morrison in 1837. Significantly, the missionary on board that vessel was from the China coast, a pattern that would be repeated in future contacts. In 1845 the United States representative in China was instructed to send a mission to Japan. Captain James Biddle arrived in Edo Bay in 1846 with two ships and the hope of opening relations, but when the Japanese explained that foreign relations could be carried out only at Nagasaki he withdrew, since he had no authorization to use force. At one point he was rudely jostled by a guard, and his failure to demand some concession in return seemed to some Japanese, to justify their refusal to bend their rules. Thus American interests in the Pacific led the U.S to make a determined bid for the opening of Japan. The following causes in brief however are consider responsible for the same:

- America’s expanding trans-Pacific trade.
- Overseas market for the development of American Textiles industry.
- The discovery of gold in California.
- The building of Trans-Isthmian rail road in 1852.
- The excess of wealth seeking outlet in overseas investment and
  - The spirit of continental expansion, etc.

Thus, influence by a numbers of motives, the American Government chose to send Commodore Mathew Galbraith Perry at the head of naval expedition to open Japan to trade.

3.1.3.2. Aims of Perry’s Mission

1. Protection for the shipwrecked sailors
2. The opening of the forts for the entry of vessels to refit and obtain coal and
3. The opening of ports for trade.

3.1.3.3. Expedition of Perry

Perry wanted to establish cordial relationship between the U.S.A and Japan. The then President of America Fillmore gave whole hearted co-operation for the same. Commodore Perry sailed from Norfolk on November 24, 1852, and reached Yokohama bay on July 3, 1853, disregarding all signals to stop on the way. It created great commotion in Japan.

The Perry expedition that followed in 1853 was more carefully prepared and forcefully managed. Its story has been told often and well. It is one replete with ironies. Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who would win fame as the man who “opened” Japan, accepted the assignment reluctantly, for he feared that it would bring him little honor; he would have preferred the Mediterranean command. Then, making the best of a bad situation, he prepared with great care, insisting on enough strength to guarantee the success of his mission, arming himself with what was known of Japan and taking counsel with others who had traveled in Japanese waters. The New York Public Library contained only a handful of books for him, drawn from the Dutch experience, and from these and from the example of Biddle he resolved to insist on his dignity.
Perry was resolved, as his official account put it, to “demand as a right, and not as a favor, those acts of courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another.” The lofty tone to be adopted was indicated by the instructions he carried, which he certainly influenced and perhaps wrote: Every nation has undoubtedly the right to determine for itself the extent to which it will hold intercourse with other nations. The same law of nations, however, which protects a nation in the exercise of this right imposes upon her certain duties which she cannot justly disregard. Among these duties none is more imperative than that which requires her to succor and relieve those persons who are cast by the perils of the ocean upon her shores. If, after having exhausted every argument and every means of persuasion, the commodore should fail to obtain from the government any relaxation of their system of exclusion, or even any assurance of humane treatment of our ship-wrecked seamen, he will then change his tone, and inform them in the most unequivocal terms that it is the determination of this government to insist, that hereafter all citizens or vessels of the United States that may be wrecked on their coasts, or driven by stress of weather in their harbors shall, so long as they are compelled to remain there, be treated with humanity; and that if any acts of cruelty should hereafter be practiced upon citizens of this country, whether by the government or by the inhabitants of Japan, they will be severely chastised.

Actually Perry did not wait until he had “exhausted every argument” before changing his tone. At the very outset of the talks he sent some white flags to the Japanese negotiator together with a harsh personal letter. Failure to meet his demands, he warned, would bring on a war that Japan would most assuredly lose, and in that case the white flags of surrender would be useful. In this bit of bravado he was probably acting beyond his instructions, and since it gives a rather different picture of his achievements than he might have wished, he quietly omitted all mention of this letter from his official and personal reports.

3.1.3.4. Arrival of Perry in Japan

Perry entered Edo Bay on July 2, 1853, with four ships mounting sixty one guns and carrying 967 men. As Chinese interpreter he had the missionary S. Wells Williams, who had been aboard the ill-fated Morrison sixteen years earlier, but while Williams was of help in translating documents the actual interpretation was carried on in Dutch. Perry had made a stop at Naha on Okinawa. He credited the fear that the Americans sensed there to tyrannical misrule, and recommended to Washington that the United States give thought to taking the Ryukyus for itself. Now and on his return he insisted on being taken around the island, demanding the porters and supplies required. But of course his mission lay to the north. The American warships were six or more times the size of any ship in Japan, and their dark hulls earned them their “black ships” name in Japanese lore.

After the inevitable orders, and then requests, that he go to Nagasaki, Perry made it known that he had been ordered to present a letter from the president of the United States to the emperor of Japan and that he would not deviate from those orders. By the time arrangements had been worked out for ceremonies at Kurihama at which he would deliver his letters, the shore was lined with thousands of troops that daimyo in central and northern Japan had been ordered to send. Perry’s ships, their decks cleared and crews ready for action, were drawn up so that their guns could sweep the beach. Interpreters quoted Perry as having warned that he could call on fifty more ships from Pacific waters, and as many more in California. Neither side trusted the other, and each side did its best to overawe the other. The Japanese had built a special pavilion for the reception, and the American landing party moved between long lines of Japanese, many of them armed with seventeenth century flintlocks. Perry himself marched between two flag-carrying black stewards, the tallest in his command, followed by his officers. Two cabin boys carried rosewood boxes with gold hinges that contained the official letters with their seals, boxes that were opened by the black stewards for presentation.

The ceremonies were formal and labored, with statements translated from English to Dutch to Japanese and in return order. Perry was eager to return to Chinese waters to replenish supplies that were running low, and announced that he would return in April or May to receive the Japanese response to the letters he had delivered. Then, to underscore his indifference to Japanese prohibitions, he had his ships move toward (but not as far as) Edo to survey the coast.

Perry returned in February, sooner than he had thought and certainly sooner than the Japanese had expected. He had learned that a Russian mission under Admiral Putiatin was in Nagasaki anxious to negotiate a
treaty, and he was determined that he would not be anticipated or held to conform to terms others had worked out. His squadron was stronger this time: each of three steamers had a sailing ship in tow. Again there were long debates about where the shore meetings would convene. The Japanese wanted them at Uraga, as far as possible from Edo, or at Kamakura, while Perry held out for Kanagawa, near present-day Yokohama. Perry had his way. Once again no element of pomp that could be managed was left out. The Americans again marched between rows of Japanese guards, Perry now in the rear, followed by six black stewards. Once begun, the talks went better; the Japanese had determined they had no hope of resisting some kind of treaty.

3.1.3.5. **Negotiation**

Actual negotiations were delegated to Hayashi, head of the Shogunal Sho-heiko academy. Negotiations went on for twenty-three days, and Hayashi played a weak hand with considerable skill. Perry maintained a heavy-handed stance. When Perry pressed for trade privileges, asserting that China was finding them extremely profitable, Hayashi chided him with confusing profit with humanity; had it not been his aim to seek help and supplies for those thrown up on Japan’s shores? Finally it was agreed that Japan would provide two harbors, Shimoda, at the entrance to Edo Bay, and Hakodate, on Hokkaido. Naha, on Okinawa, remained unspecified, but ships were already stopping there at will. At the two designated ports American ships would be able to receive supplies and coal, and shipwrecked sailors were to be helped and returned. Americans would be permitted to pay for supplies they received, something Perry saw as an opening step for trade, and a formula that permitted the Japanese to maintain they had denied trading privileges. The Americans were convinced a consul was to reside at Shimoda; the Japanese were less clear on that, but in the end the American reading prevailed. Both sides had reason to be pleased; Perry that he had achieved his minimum objectives, and the Japanese that they had so far managed to avoid the fate that China had encountered in its subjection to the unequal treaty system.

That, however, was not long in coming. Townsend Harris, who came to Shimoda as American representative, brought stories of new wars in China and warnings that Japan would do well to submit voluntarily to what it could not hope to avoid by resistance.

When Perry reached he was welcome by two officials of Shogun. Perry threatened that if Japan did not open her ports to America he would return next year with a larger force. The Japanese realised their weakness and came forward to make a compromise with America. The Shogun took the momentous step of initiating negotiations at Kanagawa in an atmosphere of cordiality, gaiety and exchange of gift.

3.1.3.6. **Treaty of Kanagawa**

The treaty was concluded on March 31, 1854 between Japan and the U.S.A. It was signed by Perry and the representatives of the Shogun on the same day. According to the treaty:

1. Two ports were opened to America. They were Shimoda and Hakodate. They were opened in addition to the port Nagasaki. They were opened to foreign vessels for the purpose of coaling, provisioning and refilling.
2. America got the right to appoint a Consul to reside at Shimoda.
3. It was agreed that protection should be offered to shipwreck sailors and
4. The most favored Nations treatment will be accorded to the Americans.

It was really a treaty of friendship yet the treaty Perry did secure was a remarkable achievement viewed in the light of more than two centuries of Japan’s seclusion.

3.1.3.7. **Other Treaties**

The other European powers followed suit. So the representatives of those owes rushed to Japan and secured treaties on almost similar lines from Japan. A British Admiral Sir James Sterling negotiated a treaty at Nagasaki on October, 1854. The Russian Admiral Piantin at Shimoda made a treaty with Japan on February 1855. In January 1856, the Dutch followed suit. The treaty concluded by the four powers included:

1. Permission to secure supplies at Shimoda, Hakodate and Nagasaki.
2. Right of Male residence at Nagasaki.
3. Permission to trade at these ports.
4. Permission to appoint consuls at Shimoda and Hakadote and a limited extra-territorial jurisdiction.
3.1.3.8. Harris
In 1858 the American Consul General Townshend Harris negotiated a commercial treaty with Japan, considerably extending the provisions of the original agreement made in 1854. They were diplomatic and consular representation and extra-territorial privileges. Hearing of this, Putiatin returned to Japan and obtained similar concessions for his country. Britain and France also got these rights.

The position of Japan after Commodore Perry expedition was similar to the position of China after the Treaty of Nanking which terminated the First Opium War. Foreign settlement were established in towns and treaty ports were opened to foreign trade.

3.1.4. Fall of Shogunate
The results of the opening of Japan to the West were disastrous for the Shogunate. They were:
1. The Shoguns became unpopular as the nobles, the Samurai and the Imperial court were all against the policy of opening to the foreigners.
2. They feared that foreign intrusion would affect the independence of the country.
3. Anti-foreign and anti-Shogun feeling were mounting in the capital and the Mikado hesitated to give his approval to the treaties.
4. The cry of reverencing the Throne and expelling the foreigner resounded throughout Japan and the Emperor signed the treaties only on the understanding that the foreigners would be expelled from the country after some years.
5. The weakness of the dual government was exposed during the period.
6. The Satsuma and Choshu leaders soon realized their helplessness before the Western arms.
7. Finally the Shogunate began to collapse leaving the way open for the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

The Shogunate came to an end after its chequered carrier of 250 years. Torn by financial difficulties, humiliated by foreigners, unable to check internal troubles, shorn off all support from Daimyos and Shamurai, shrinking courage and vision, the new Shogun resigned on November 9, 1867 bringing to an end to the 250 years old Shogun rule of the Tokugawa.

Now all the powers concentrated in the hands of the new Emperor, Mutsuhito was the leader of this revolutionary transition. He assumed the reign title of “Meiji” (enlightened ruler). He inaugurated a brilliant era which was ultimately to lunch Japan as a world power. The Meiji restoration was at once and the same time a revolution and a traditionalist restoration. Indeed, sweeping changes took place during the restoration.

3.1.5. Meiji Restoration
The start of the Meiji Era and the beginning of Japan’s road to modernization, started when the 16 year old emperor Mutsuhito selected the era name Meiji for his reign. This period commenced with the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate and led to Japan’s transformation from a feudal nation into a modern industrial state. Japan emerged from the Meiji Period with a parliamentary form of government and as a world power through military expansion abroad. The Meiji regime first began as an alliance between Satsuma and Choshu, the two domains responsible for the overthrowing of the Tokugawa Shogunate, with support from Tosa and Hizen domains as well. Satsuma and Choshu faced the daunting task of imposing and maintaining national unity. From January 1868 to June of 1869, the new Meiji government was involved in a civil war with the fragmented Tokugawa and dissident forces. The Tokugawa forces eventually were defeated and the former Shogunate capital of Edo, was renamed Tokyo and designated as the new national capital.

After coming to power, the Meiji government wanted to ensure the people that the new order would be of justice and opportunity. The emperor on April 6, 1868 issued the Charter Oath, which promised that assemblies would be established to deal with all matters through public discussion and that evil feudalistic customs of the past would be abolished. There were early attempts to implement the “assemblies and public discussions” mention in the Charter Oath, but before long the regime reverted to a more authoritarian structure. However, the boundaries between the social classes were gradually broken down, and reforms led to the establishment of human rights and religious freedom in 1873.
Japan introduced its first constitution in 1889, based on the European style. A parliament, called the Diet, was established, while the emperor was placed as the sovereign figure head. The emperor stood at the top of the army, navy, executive, and legislative powers. The ruling elder statesmen (genro) however held the actual power to run the state. Political parties at this time did not yet gain real power due to the lack of unity among the members of parliament. In order to stabilize the new government, the former feudal lords (daimyo) were required to return their land to the emperor in 1870. The return of land to the central government allowed the collection of land tax to be more extensive and allowed the people to own their own land. This led to the restructuring of the country into prefectures that is currently still in implementation to this day.

The Meiji government reformed the education system after the French and later after the German system. Among those reforms the most significant and lasting was the introduction of a compulsory education system. After about one or two decades of intensive westernization, a revival of conservative and nationalistic feelings took place: principles of Confucianism and Shinto including the worship of the emperor were increasingly emphasized and indoctrinated at the educational institutions.

For Japan, catching up militarily was a high priority in an era of European and American imperialism. This attitude was driven by the humiliating and unequal treaties Japan was forced to oblige to due to their military inferiority compared to the West. The Meiji government introduced universal conscription and a new army was modeled after the Prussian force and a navy after the British fleet. In order to transform the economy from an agrarian one to a developed industrial state, Japanese scholars went abroad to study Western science and language, while foreign experts taught in Japan. The government also invested heavily in public works such as railroad transportation and communication networks. It also directly supported the prospering industries, especially the powerful family owned businesses, called zaibatsu. The huge expenditures to industrialize led to a financial crisis in the mid 1880’s that resulted in reforms of the currency and banking system.

Japan during the Meiji period was involved in two victorious wars. Conflicts of interests in Korea between Japan and China, led to the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. Japan was to receive Taiwan and other territories from China, but was forced to return the territories by the intervention of the Western powers. About a decade later, new conflicts over Korea between Japan and Russia resulted in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Japanese army surprised the world and gained respect in their victory over a Western nation.

The Meiji rule ended with the death of the emperor on July 30, 1912, which also marked the end of the era of the genro. This era in Japanese history was a momentous epoch that saw the transformation of feudal Japan into a modern industrialized state with a parliamentary form of government and its emergence as a world power through military adventures abroad. The Meiji period brought about drastic political, economic, and social changes in Japan, which in turn became the framework and foundation of modern Japan as we know it.

3.1.5.1. Political Changes

Soon after the restoration of the emperor to power, the new government promised the people it would establish a constitutional government. In 1889, the Japanese Constitution was declared and various liberties and rights of the people, beginning with the right to political participation, were recognized. A year later in 1890, a national assembly, the bicameral Diet, was assembled and the constitutional government was formed. The former samurais of the Tokugawa period, who in the Meiji took the role as elder statesmen (genro) understood that the adoption of a Constitutional government was essential if Japan was to become a country strong and wealthy enough to rank with the Western powers. Accordingly, it devoted all its energies to achieving such a government.

The Meiji Constitution borrowed from the constitution of the European nations, specifically the German states. The 1889 Constitution was largely the work of Ito Hirobumi, a Choshu man who had studied abroad in Europe. The constitution invested the emperor with full sovereignty, he commanded the military, made peace and declared war, and dissolved the lower house of the parliament when elections were necessary. Effective power however lay with the genro, but the genro’s power was vaguely defined in the Constitution for it seemed to contradict with the emperor’s total sovereignty of the nation. The emperor himself reigned, rather that ruled.

The new system of government had its troubles at first, but the genro was determined to make these new institutions work, for national pride, foreign approval, and political stability. However, once war with China
became inevitable, political differences had to put aside and national unity became the priority. Before long, Japan was at blows with China, in what is known as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 - 1895. Japan’s army was victorious over the Chinese forces, and it seized control of Korea and the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria. In defeat China, also handed over control of Taiwan to Japan, but the Tripartite Intervention by Germany, France, and Russia forced return of the Liaodong Peninsula. The intervention by the Western powers made the Meiji government realize that their country was still unequal to the West and greater national strength was necessary. These events led to the intensification of Japanese expansion of their military, and their imperialistic drive.

### 3.1.5.2. Military Development

The military was the first area of major structural change, the first to adopt Western organizational patterns, and the first to hire foreign advisers. The army and the navy rapidly became the largest scale organizations in Japan, and their demand for resources acted as a major stimulus in the development of other systems, from the zaibatsu industries to the universal compulsory education. The government investment in private industries to aid the country’s military expansion resulted in the founding of companies such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo, which are still in existence today. There are three phases in the transition to a modern military organization. The first phase, which lasted from 1853 to 1870 was a lengthy period of experimentation with new forms and involved wide variation among a large number of organization. The second phase (1870-1878), the central government established a single, centralized organizational model for the army and the navy. Both institutions went through intensive organization building, which focused on internal structures and processes. The third and last phase (1878-1890), attention was shifted to the ways in which the military interacted with the political and social environment, with respect to ensuring the supply of needed resources and increasing the military’s autonomy and effectiveness. The 1853 lifting of the formal prohibition on the construction or purchase of large scale ships marked the beginning of two decades of military mobilization for Japan. The military mobilization was initially stimulated by fears of Western invasion. For Japan, the principle threat from the Western powers came from the sea. A Western-style navy could be created in “a vacant niche”: there was no existing organization performing that function which might resist attempts at transformation to a new model or oppose the creation of a rival organization.

There was a widespread agreement within the Meiji elite that Japan needs to become a militarily and economically powerful nation to be considered in the same rank with the Western powers. However, there was a great disagreement over how this should be accomplished. The traditionalists led by Saigo Takamori argued that the samurai should constitute the core of the new army, while the majority group felt that the samurai should be a minority. Saigo also urged an expedition against Korea and argued that this would force the internal unity sought by the government. A samurai of Satsuma, he gathered a strong army of discontent southern samurai. In 1877, acting as the leader Saigo led a revolt against the Tokyo government, which came to be known as the Satsuma Rebellion. The new national army was brought out to end the fierce rebellion, which the national army won relatively easily. The government called out more troops than were actually necessary to demonstrate to the nation the efficiency of the new system and to ensure victory. Omura Masajiro, the head of the War Department at that time believed that the government needs to assure domestic order and once that is achieved, the Western powers would be compelled to consider Japan as a power and would thus terminate the humiliating unequal treaties.

the 1880’s, both the military and the government came to the agreement that its independence meant the ability to pursue rights and privileges on the Asian continent as does the West powers. More precisely, the “independence” of Korea from China and into their control was the driving force behind the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, a fight between China and Japan for control of Korea. War served to solidify the strength of the military, as well as giving a huge boost to the zaibatsu, the government subsidized industrial family owned companies.

### 3.1.5.3. Economy

The government was primarily responsible in laying the foundations necessary for economic development. It was not just the role that the state undertook, but also the linkage between the private and public sectors that accounted for the industrial take-off. This special relationship between the state and private enterprises has remained a feature of the Japanese economy to the present day. The state-private enterprise relationship was
consolidated within a national framework during the early Meiji period and this coherence played a vital role in the economic development of Japan.

In the first fifteen years of the Meiji period, the government worked at developing both social and industrial infrastructure. The government invested heavily in public works such as railways, shipping, communication, ports, lighthouses, and etc. The Meiji leaders also invested a high percentage of national revenue in importing Western technology and expertise in setting up modern factories. There existed no private entrepreneurs who the capital or the confidence to enter the various fields of telegraph and railways. Without the direct investments by the government, the backbone of Japan’s modernization would not have developed as rapidly as it did. Japan developed in a manner which involved the characteristics of the dual economy, with distinctions between the traditional and modern sectors. The traditional sector refers to agriculture, and it dominated the economy for the first two decades of the Meiji period. Not only did it employ the largest percentage of the workforce, but it also provided the most revenue for the government, in the form of land tax. Through the implementation of the Land Reform Act of 1873, the introduction of new strains of rice, and the establishment of educational center of farming, the economy experienced a impressive rate of growth of 2% per year in the period of 1870-1900. After the Meiji Restoration the peasants were made the owners of the land that they had cultivated under the old government. Payment of land tax in currency was substituted for forced labor and for payment in the products of the land. Japan’s economic transformation in the Meiji was initially achieved through the subsidizing of the agriculture industry, and exploiting the peasant population. This was the only viable source for government revenue, for the government to tax the heavy industries and the zaibatsu at this early stage of development would have been counter-productive for the whole economy.

While the country was poor in natural resources, Japan was able to take advantage of the high demand for silk in Europe. Up to the end of the nineteenth century raw silk represented 40% of Japan’s total export revenues. Tea was another commodity that Japan exported heavily. The foreign demand for silk and tea, therefore, stimulated agricultural diversification and growth, which in turn led to higher revenues for which the government used to invest in industrial development. The revenues from exports in Japan was used for the purchase of foreign machinery. By the end of the Meiji Period, Japan was the leader among all manufactured silk exporting countries. The spin-off effects from the silk trade were particularly noticeable in the cotton industry. The initial motivation for the introduction and diffusion of Western technology in the cotton industry was to end its dependency of imports of Western textile goods. The aim of both public and private sectors was to achieve a situation whereby foreign revenue would be used to fund import of capital goods rather than on consumer goods. At the end of the first decade of the Meiji, there were less than 10,000 cotton spindles in Japan, but by the second decade that figure was up to 100,000. Thus by the end of the Meiji Era, Japan was a world leader in the textile industry. Japan was able to import foreign technology, then make adaptation and innovation to build its industry to become competitive in the world.

Initially, the Meiji government experimented with various devices, and in 1873 established a national banking system patterned largely after the United States. Japan also desperately required a strong financial system, due to the unequal treaties with the West, Japan was being drained of its currency. The banks and the national treasury were in a precarious state. In 1881, the government was led to organize a central bank, later known as the Bank of Japan. Furthermore, to assist in trade and foreign exchange, a secondary institution called the Yokohama Specie Bank was set up. Postal savings bank was also introduced in this time period. During the Meiji Period, the banking system finally took the form whose main features set the foundation for the modern Japanese banking system. In 1894, agricultural and industrial banks were formed to finance the farmers and manufacturers.

As commerce and financial institutions developed, there was an improvement in the means of transportation. There was an increase in steamships use and construction in Japan. The Meiji government gave its encouragement, and heavily subsidized ship building companies that laid the foundation for the tremendous growth of domestic and foreign shipping in Japan. On top of shipping, the state was also a pioneer in railway building. In spite of strong opposition by the conservatives in the government, a railway was built between Tokyo and a port in Yokohama in 1872. The state continued to promote railways and most of the earlier ones were
constructed either by the state or by government aided companies. Telegraph lines were built by the state and in 1886 the telegraph and postal services were united under a joint state bureau.

The government, directed by the reformers played a major part in the reorganization of banking, commerce, transportation, industry, and agriculture. There were two main reasons for this. First, the state was the only institution which had the organization, the capital, and the credit to undertake an operation on the large scale necessary to compete with the West. At the coming of Perry there were few if any large commercial industries. Secondly, an emphasis upon the state had been encouraged by the former government and it was just natural that the ministers of the Meiji should follow the precedent of the past ages.

**3.1.5.4. Education**

The vision, determination and the effective means of communication remain characteristics of Japanese society today. The vision and the determination encompassed a frightening degree of ruthlessness. To the new Meiji elite, the end justified all the means, which included the exploitation of women and children labor, the heavy taxation of the peasant population, etc. However, none of these characteristics make Meiji Japan all that different from the industrialized West. The process of modernization has inevitably involved a degree of brutality. Despite these quality of the Meiji leadership, they did at the very least, teach the people to read, write, and count. The ruling powers of other failed developing nations never seemed to have placed much importance of achieving national unity through education. Japan’s success was derived not so much from financial capital or imported technology, but from the accumulation and successful formation of its human capital by means of educating the masses.

A new system of compulsory education was introduced in 1871, and it placed emphasis on the spirit of scientific inquiry. A text commonly used was the “Illustrated Course in Physics” written by Fukuzawa Yukichi and was adopted as a primary text book by the Ministry of Education in 1872. A complete program of public schools was gradually carried out, beginning with the elementary school then leading through “middle” and “high” schools, and for some the national universities. Efforts were directed at seeking to discover and encourage (male) talent wherever it might be.

The Education Order of 1872, proclaimed that education should no longer be the monopoly of the upper class or indeed of only the male population. The Meiji reformers set as its goal universal literacy, and divide the country into higher-school districts with supporting networks of middle and lower schools. The literacy rate of the total population on the eve of the Meiji period was somewhere in the region of 40%, but by the end of the Meiji the literacy rate had doubled to about 80%. Progress, however, was marred by financial difficulties. In regards to overall government educational policies, its ambitious vision was not matched by its fiscal generosity. Throughout the Meiji Period, the government expenditure on education remained frugal in comparison with the excessive spending on the military.

In the early Meiji era, the government was not simply hampered in its educational aims by financial obstacles, but also by ideological obstacles. In other words, there was stiff opposition in the rural areas to mandatory education: the peasant population objected that it had more immediate priorities, like having enough to eat, than receiving an education. The peasants’ objection to compulsory education was also partly based on economic grievances. Along with the land tax, the peasantry perceived education as just one more financial burden which they were being force to bear. There was also in some cases an instinctive premonition that this new Western-style education was some form of witchcraft, hence schools were viewed by the peasant masses with suspicion and hostility.

Undaunted, the Meiji government persisted in its educational efforts. The Iwakura mission, composed of both a diplomatic and a fact finding expedition, was led by Tanaka Fujimaro, the chief educational officer. For 18 months from 1871 to 1873, a large part of the Meiji leadership toured Europe and America. Exposure to the West changed the thinking and priorities of many of the Meiji reformers. Upon Tanaka’s return in 1873, he acquired the services of American, David Murray who as chief adviser to the Ministry of Education was partly responsible in changing the original Meiji education system. The original Meiji model had been the highly centralized and structured French Napoleonic format. During the 1870’s a more informal and decentralized American format was implemented instead. The liberal atmosphere which pervaded the education system was a general reflection of the
anti-Confucians attitude of that period. The emphasis in school teaching was on learning and discovering all about
the West, and past principles were discarded in enthusiastic favor of individualism, egalitarianism and other
various Western concepts.

By the middle of the Meiji Period, the government had devised and implemented an educational system
which suited its needs and ambitions. A highly qualified leadership with a well disciplined and educated Japanese
people was, the ideal recipe for the creation of their new modern nation.

3.1.5.5. Social

By the beginning of the second decade of the Meiji Period, most of the daimyo and upper samurai power
and privileges had disappeared. The new ruling class, in terms of socio-economic consisted of an urban-based
upper middle class. It was primarily composed of industrial managers and bureaucrats. To the bureaucrats and
managers, the ruling class also included military officials, doctors, professors, architects, and members of liberal
professions. All of these classes, by the late Meiji period tended to be drawn completely from the universities and
colleges. Thus the new Japanese elite can be said to have been meritocratic in nature. The composition of Meiji’s
ruling class was very similar to that of Western industrial countries. However there are two marginal differences
which set Japan apart from the West. Most Western countries counted among their elite the magnates of various
churches, while there were no such phenomenon in Japan. More significant difference lies in the fact that Meiji
bureaucrats and managers tended to be completely divorced from the land, where in the West, the possession of
estates continued to confer social and political prestige.

Japan remained a overwhelmingly peasant society and economy, under the leadership of a minority elite
class. The demographic picture of Japan showed a heavy concentration of the population in small villages. There
was a urban ruling class within that population, which consisted namely of school teachers, proprietors of small
businesses, retailers, and manufacturers of traditional crafts. Another feature of the social setting of Japan during
the Meiji period was the relatively small number of urban middle class. Japanese society at this time has two main
characteristics. First, there was a substantial gap of wealth between the urban and rural areas, and secondly, the
difference between the upper and lower class. The upper class was well educated and rich, while the lower class
was poor and uneducated. The upper orders tended to be cosmopolitan in outlook, while the lower orders were
parochial. The rapid modernization did bring along with it comforts, however it brought a great deal of social
confusion as well. The failure to recognize the imperative need for social progress made all political reform no
more than cosmetic in effect. The economic gains of the first phase of the period of Meiji modernization were not
translated into social amendments in the course of the second phase.

3.1.5.6. Conclusion

The Meiji Era brought about major changes in the economic, social, and political sectors, that became the
foundation of modern Japan. First and foremost, from the political aspect, Japan adopted a Constitution and
implemented a parliamentary government. The basis for Japan’s current style of government was founded in the
Meiji period by emulating the then superior Western powers. On a side note, the emperor became a eminent and
potent figure, which everyone in country was aware of. The monarchy was an effective instrument for creating and
sustaining national unity. More importantly it created a close relationship between the central and local
government, as well as between one the central government and the common people.

Economically, the government’s support of family owned large businesses, called zaibatsu led to the
development Japanese industry and economy. Although these zaibatsu conglomerates was abolished after World
War II, a very similar conglomerate system still exists in the Japanese economy to this day. The roots of modern
Japanese banking and financial system can also be traced back to the reforms during the Meiji. Socially, Japan
made the monumental leap from feudalistic society into a modern industrial state. The samurai class lost its ruling
and privileged power and there was a breakdown of strictly divided social classes. Meiji Japan also was the roots
of the current compulsory education system, that we see in Japan today. The high literacy and level of educated
people, is the result of this education system in modern Japan. Although the current state of the Japanese military is
much less imperialistic, the Meiji’s military expansion to catch up with the West did influence Japan’s imperialistic
role in both the World Wars. The Meiji era, the foundation of modern Japan can be thought of as the first step of
the nation in its goal to achieve modernization and superpower status in a once Western dominated world.

3.1.6. **The Constitutional Movement and the Meiji Constitution:**

The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement fulfilled its historical mission in 1881. That year, the
government had been forced to make a political commitment to establish a national assembly in nine years. This
was a critical outcome for the movement, since it had been, in fact, renamed “the movement for the establishment
of a national assembly.” For its part, the Meiji government had adhered to the pledge during the entire period: it
had no intention to sabotage the pledge or to prolong its implementation. Meanwhile, advocates of the movement,
including Itagaki Taisuke, never doubted the government’s intention of keeping its promise, even though they had
to put up with periodic government suppression. This is perhaps a rare phenomenon in the long history of the
world. Mutual trust in the samurai discipline of keeping promises existed among samurais in those days regardless
of which side they were on.

It should be emphasized that during the nine years, the Meiji government had made an all-out effort to
draft the constitution and prepare for the establishment of the national assembly. In March 1882, Ito Hirobumi left
Japan for an overseas study tour to Europe. Immediately after his return in August 1883, Ito embarked on
reforming the government institutions. In 1885, he established the cabinet system by abolishing the traditional
Grand Council of State, and became the first prime minister. From 1886 to 1887, Ito focused on drafting the
constitution. Upon resigning from the prime ministership in 1888, Ito set up the Privy Council and became its first
president to participate in full in the deliberation of the draft constitution. After a series of deliberations in the
presence of Emperor Meiji, the Privy Council adopted the final draft of the Meiji constitution in January 1889. The
constitution was formally promulgated on February 21. Ito spent his entire seven years between the age of forty-
two and forty-nine (1882-89) to prepare and establish the Japanese parliamentary democracy.

During a three-month summer retreat on Natsushima Island in 1887, Ito spent his time debating with his
colleagues like a mere student, even though he was prime minister of Japan at the time. While at Yoshida Shoin’s
Shoka Sonjuku private school, Ito indulged in reading such works as Rai Sanyo’s Nihon Gaishi. The book was
considered to be a popular historical tale rather than an academic work, but it might have enriched Ito’s knowledge
and nurtured his views on history. Those seven years may have been the first and, as it turned out, the last occasion
in which Ito devoted his time and energy to study about the constitution. Actually, it was amazing that a person like
Ito, who had theretofore put his energies into administrative duties, could concentrate so intensively on academic
works. Moreover, not only did he edit what others had drafted, but he also wrote the draft constitution himself.
Ito’s excellence rested on his flexibility and versatility, a talent that reached the level of genius, as well as his
determination to modernize his country. While present Japanese would perhaps say that legal matters should be
left to the legal experts, Meiji era leaders had the sense of responsibility and the self-confidence to do whatever was
necessary, because there were no such experts to rely on at the time.

In terms of the amount of knowledge accumulated by drafting the constitution, Ito was well entitled to
have the unparalleled authority on the constitution. In fact, his book, Kempo Gikai, is still considered to be an
authoritative commentary on the Meiji Constitution. During the deliberations at the Privy Council, Ito set forth
highly logical arguments to defend the draft constitution from criticisms mainly from the conservative camp,
contributing to the completion of the final text of the modern Meiji Constitution. Unfortunately, the establishment
of the present Japanese constitution did not proceed in the same way as the Meiji Constitution. If the words and
phrases of the present Japanese constitution were a true reflection of the soul of the Japanese people, the
constitution would have been a great legacy based on the people’s long quest for liberal democracy, regardless of
the content. However, the Japanese public would never regard the current constitution in the same way as the Meiji
Constitution, which is indeed a true legacy, because of its nature of being a mere translation of the English draft
hastily written by the Occupation Forces.

3.1.6.1. **Promulgation of the Constitution amid Cheers**

The Meiji Constitution, essentially Prussian in nature, was welcomed wholeheartedly by all parties
including the opposing Jiyuto and Kaishintu, which had originally advocated an Anglo Saxon–style parliamentary
system. When the constitution was finally promulgated, all political prisoners were released by a decree of general amnesty. According to Itagaki Taisuke’s Jiyuto-shi, “the entire country was filled with a jovial and triumphant mood as if a war had been won. All the people rejoiced over the realization of their long-term dream and celebrated with each other as if they had forgotten about the strife of yesterday in one night.” Furthermore, “people who have been risking their lives for these goals until just yesterday were now in full of peace and friendly rapport.”

The sense of celebration and unity of the whole nation was also endorsed by all the major newspapers’ editorials. Some history books written after World War II recounted some public dissatisfaction over the Meiji Constitution. These include Nakae Chomin, who had allegedly smiled wryly upon reading the constitution. These allegations, however, have been a mere distortion of the past reflecting the postwar negative notion of the Meiji Constitution. They were misconstrued, in light of the actual mood held by the overwhelming majority of the people of the day, including the intellectuals. It is indeed a historical fact that the newly promulgated constitution had received a tremendous welcome from the Japanese people.

3.1.6.2. First General Election-Samurai Democracy

The first general election of the House of Representatives was held on July 1, 1890 (23rd year of Meiji), a month and a half after Mutsu took the post of Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. It was the first election ever to be held by a Japanese constitutional government, marking the genesis of Japanese democracy. All the books touching on this election unanimously acknowledged that it was an ideal election totally free of intervention or corruption. In those days, however, people regarded these votes as immoral because they believed elections were supposed to elect the best and the brightest.

The first election was carried out in an ideal form for two reasons: first, the people had great expectations and zeal for a parliamentary government; and, second, the Japanese are by nature incorruptible. A corrupt election smeared with unjust practices was simply unthinkable for the Japanese people at the time. Having rid themselves of feudalist rule, the Japanese in those days were highly spirited with the desire to improve themselves. People were so convinced of their ability to eliminate the prolonged tyranny and corruption of the than clique and the bureaucrats that they began to view themselves as the driving force to carve out the nation’s new fate. Reflecting this general mood, the first election was fought among leading individuals of local communities all over Japan to select representatives who could be entrusted with state affairs in place of the than clique bureaucrats. Since this was a common phenomenon observed in all local constituencies, the election logically led to a competition among prefectures over the quality of their representatives, resulting in the constellation of Diet members endowed with first-class education and virtue.

Thus, those ambitious persons who dared to run for election on their own will were rejected and despised as men of deplorable behavior not worthy to join the ranks of gentlemen. Meanwhile, men of character who had no desire to run for office were voted into Diet seats, sometimes against their will. Some were even elected without knowing they had been selected as candidates. Any chance for vote buying was forestalled due to the nature of campaign fundraising at the time: election campaigns were fully financed by voters, including a few wealthy volunteers, without any financial burden on the candidates. For this reason, expenses for an election campaign remained surprisingly small despite the absence of any restriction. This first election was, in my judgment, the one and only election that deserves to be called an ideal election both in name and substance.

Being the most prominent person in Wakayama prefecture, Mutsu was overwhelmingly supported. Even during his tenure at the Japanese embassy in the United States, voters in Wakayama nominated him to run as their candidate and voted him in. Unlike Wakayama 1st District which had no difficulty in finding a suitable candidate, the 2nd District was in a totally different situation. Okazaki writes: After a strenuous search, voters in the Wakayama 2nd district decided to nominate a certain Mr. Matsumoto, a former governor of Wakayama prefecture and a person of great achievements who had retired from public life, as their candidate without his consent. All the campaign expenses, starting with those for public appearances and well-wishers’ gatherings, were borne by volunteer supporters.
Acknowledging the full financial support from his voters, Mr. Matsumoto offered his annual allowances as a Diet member to be used for the benefit of his constituencies. But his supporters replied that it was only natural for them to finance his campaign because they had asked him to represent them. After a few exchanges, this issue was finally settled by both sides agreeing to donate Mr. Matsumoto’s annual allowances to a certain organization. Similar phenomena were reported everywhere in Japan.

Some historian viewed that had Japan’s politics succeeded in retaining the purity and integrity manifested in the first general election, Japan might have accomplished the world’s best and most consummate “samurai democracy.” What then changed the almost idyllic election to a more worldly one in a short period of time. Okazaki Kunisuke’s claims that this transition was triggered by the government’s intervention in the election as follows: At the time of the second election in 1882 (25th Year of Meiji), however, the government disrupted the people’s free election, oppressed anti-han clique government parties, and supported the pro-government party. This was the notorious “historical government intervention,” resulting in the beginning of electoral corruption, the derailing of constitutional politics, and the numbing of the people’s conscience.

3.1.6.3. Treachery of the Tosa Faction

During the first general election of 1890, one hundred and thirty Rikken-Jiyuto candidates and forty-one Rikken-Kaishinto candidates were elected, winning the absolute majority for the anti-han parties in the three hundred parliamentary seats. The anti-han clique government parties immediately proposed a 10 percent cut in the ¥80 million government budget. They insisted on removing all unnecessary government expenditures from the budget which had never been screened by the Diet. They argued that the people deserved the benefit from the 10 percent tax cut since they had long suffered from the heavy tax burden.

In an attempt to reach a compromise with the anti-government parties, the government offered to trim the budget by some ¥6 million, while preserving military-related expenditures. During this process, twenty-six Tosa-faction members of the Jiyuto defected from the party and supported the government proposal. This was what is known as the “treachery of the Tosa faction.” Mutsu, who had maintained close relations with members of the Tosa faction, was behind the compromise. Mutsu had joined the cabinet in 1890 as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. Being an advocate of the Anglo-Saxon–style democracy from the beginning and having closely observed parliamentary management in the United States as the Japanese minister to Washington, D.C., Mutsu had been convinced that compromise, as well as confrontation, was necessary to maintain democracy.

In those days, the advanced Caucasian countries were believed to be the only countries capable of handling parliamentary democracy. In order to discard this prejudice, Japan had to demonstrate that it could carry out parliamentary politics. The people of the Tosa faction also shared this conviction. It was again Itagaki who played a leadership role in the budgetary process. Itagaki insisted on letting the budget pass by trimming ¥6 million. When the majority of the party members sided with the extremist’s argument, its head, Itagaki, deserted the party, and led the moderate minority group for the sake of national interest and the international reputation of Japan.

3.1.6.4. Compromise in the First Imperial Diet

In the background of this episode, there was the process through which the Meiji Constitution had been drafted. In fact, during the drafting process, it was the advisors from Prussia, the master teachers concerning the constitution for Japan, who constantly insisted more conservative and undemocratic ideas than the Japanese drafters. And it was Albert Mosse, one of Gneist’s disciples, who became the legal advisor to the drafters of the Meiji Constitution. He had heated arguments with Inoue Kowashi because he opposed giving the Diet the authority to approve the budget. In the end, it was decided against the persuasions of the German advisers that under the Meiji Constitution it required the approval of the Imperial Diet to increase any government expenditure.

Japan’s rapid economic growth and its need for war preparation gave the parliament de facto absolute power on budget matters. Party politics was thus introduced in Japan earlier than anybody had expected. In fact, while the German Empire, which had been the model for Japan, never witnessed a party government representing a majority of parliament until its demise in 1919, it was realized in Japan in only eight years after the establishment of the Imperial Diet. In this sense, democracy has a deeper tradition in Japan than in Germany.
What would have happened if the budget proposal had been rejected, failing to secure the support of the Tosa faction? The government had no other option than to dissolve parliament, but there was absolutely no guarantee that the government party could win the majority no matter how many times parliament was dissolved. The government could not possibly do without the augmented budget. Perhaps a rejection of an augmented budget proposal would have precipitated the abolishment of the constitution, sending the country back to the drawing board. As a matter of fact, it was rumored that the Emperor Meiji himself had confided to his aide that the establishment of the Imperial Diet might have been premature for Japan.

Had the constitution been abolished and autocratic government restored, Japan would not have enjoyed its international reputation as it had, making the revision of the unequal treaties all the more difficult, although it still would have had the ability to fight the First Sino-Japanese War. Most of all, it is not certain if genuine democracy would have blossomed, albeit briefly, in the subsequent Taisho era, which is the very genesis of today’s democracy in Japan. The first Imperial Diet ended its term successfully, promising Start of Constitutional Government in Japan.

The establishment of parliamentary government in Japan was a highly unique phenomenon in world history. All of Europe experienced the democratic revolutions after the Napoleonic Wars, with the sole exception of Russia, the only country that France had failed to subjugate. In contrast, Japan underwent a bloodless revolution under the pressure of a nationwide campaign by the intellectuals in quest for freedom and people’s rights. If there were foreign influences at all, they remained as indirect and metaphysical comparable to those of British parliamentary politics on French enlightenment thought.

Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands were on an equal footing with Japan in terms of accomplishing revolutions without any foreign assistance. But it should be remembered that all of these Western revolutions took place in the abnormal circumstances of a war or through bloodshed-i.e., the 1581 declaration of human rights in the Netherlands was issued in the midst of its war of independence with Spain; Britain’s 1689 Bill of Rights was declared immediately following the invasion of England by William of Orange; the 1776 Declaration of Independence of the United States was, of course, the product of its war of independence; and it is needless to say that a lot of blood was shed during the French Revolution in 1789.

Japan was the only country to accomplish a peaceful parliamentary government. It is true that all Asian independent states—China, Korea, Siam, Persia, Turkey, and Egypt—in the nineteenth century had experienced something similar to the “expelling foreigners” movement toward the end of the Tokugawa shogunate, but none had witnessed as Japan had the rise of a nationwide campaign for freedom and people’s rights. International comparisons may have made Japan appear unique, but what took place in Japan was a natural course of events.

The development of a constitutional government had been an indication of the high cultural standard of the Japanese people at the time. No other country seemed to foster such strata of highly politicized intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century except, perhaps, Britain, the United States, Germany, and France. Threatened to be deprived of their livelihood due to social transformation, the mass of intellectuals in Japan turned into a huge group of discontented individuals longing for the emergence of a new social regime. And this was why the demand for the establishment of parliament became a nationwide movement and succeeded in mobilizing such a large number of talented individuals. Meiji Jiyūto’s success in developing such a wide support base had a prolonged influence in subsequent years, and had a great impact on forming various Japanese political parties: the Seiyūkai, the successor of Jiyūto; Minseito, the inheritor of Kaishinto; and Jiyū Minshuto, a conglomerate of individuals affiliated with the foregoing two parties.

3.1.7. Conclusion

For a long time the Japanese remained in seclusion. They did not welcome the foreign elements all through their history until the advent of the westerner. By the middle ages Japanese administration was controlled by several powerful clan such as the Satsuma, Choshu and the Tokugawa etc. Tokugawa clan became powerful and created its Shogunate or the military dictatorship in the name of the Emperor. Dutch were the first westerner to be allowed to trade from a small inlet of Dishemia near Nagasaki. Deshemia was Japan’s window to the West. Inspite of its policy of isolation, Japan’s contact with the outside world was increasing in the beginning of the 19th century.
The policy of isolation was broken when Parry knocked the door of Japan. With this mission the opening of Japan to commercial and diplomatic intercourse with the west in 1853 was undertaken by America. Commodore Perry sailed from Norfolk on November 24, 1852, and reached Yokohama bay on July 3, 1853, disregarding all signals to stop on the way. When Perry reached he was welcome officials of Shogun. He had a treaty negotiate with the Japanese on March 31, 1854. With this Japan was opened to the West. In 1858 the American Consul General Townsend Harris negotiated a commercial treaty with Japan, considerably extending the provisions of the original agreement made in 1854.

The Shogunate came to an end after its chequered carrier of 250 years. Torn by financial difficulties, humiliated by foreigners, unable to check internal troubles, shorn off all support from Daimyos and Shamurai, shrinking courage and vision, the new Shogun resigned on November 9, 1867 bringing to an end to the 250 years old Shogun rule of the Tokugawa. Now all the powers concentrated in the hands of the new Emperor, Mutsuhito was the leader of this revolutionary transition. He assumed the reign title of “Meiji” (enlightened ruler). He inaugurated a brilliant era which was ultimately to lunch Japan as a world power. The Meiji restoration was at once and the same time a revolution and a traditionalist restoration. Indeed, sweeping changes took place during the restoration. The Meiji rule ended with the death of the emperor on July 30, 1912, which also marked the end of the era of the genro. The Meijji period brought about drastic political, economic, and social changes in Japan, which in turn became the framework and foundation of modern Japan as we know it. After all, the development of a constitutional government had been an indication of the high cultural standard of the Japanese people at the time. No other country seemed to foster such strata of highly politicized intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century except, perhaps, Britain, the United States, Germany, and France.

3.1.8. Summary

- According to historical records of Japan their ancestors were Gods. The two Gods Izanagi and Izanami, brother and sister, were commanded by the senior Gods to create Japan.
- The historical period of Japan may be dated from 400 A.D. Many historical events of this period have also been testifies by the Chinese annals and Korean records.
- For a long time the Japanese remained in seclusion. They did not welcome the foreign elements all through their history until the advent of the westerner.
- By the middle ages Japanese administration was controlled by several powerful clan such as the Satsuma, Choshu and the Tokugawa etc. Tokugawa clan became powerful and created its Shogunate or the military dictatorship in the name of the Emperor.
- Dutch were the first westerner to be allowed to trade from a small inlet of Dishemia near Nagasaki. Deshemia was Japan’s window to the West. Inspite of its policy of isolation, Japan’s contact with the outside world was increasing in the beginning of the 19th century.
- The policy of isolation was broken when Parry knocked the door of Japan. With this mission the opening of Japan to commercial and diplomatic intercourse with the west in 1853 was undertaken by America.
- Commodore Perry sailed from Norfolk on November 24, 1852, and reached Yokohama bay on July 3, 1853, disregarding all signals to stop on the way.
- When Perry reached he was welcome officials of Shogun. He had a treaty negotiate with the Japanese on March 31, 1854. With this Japan was opened to the West.
- In 1858 the American Consul General Townsend Harris negotiated a commercial treaty with Japan, considerably extending the provisions of the original agreement made in 1854.
- Torn by financial difficulties, humiliated by foreigners, unable to check internal troubles, shorn off all support from Daimyos and Shamurai, shrinking courage and vision, the new Shogun resigned on November 9, 1867 bringing to an end to the 250 years old Shogun rule of the Tokugawa.
- In 1867, all the powers concentrated in the hands of the new Emperor, Mutsuhito was the leader of this revolutionary transition. He assumed the reign title of “Meiji” (enlightened ruler). He inaugurated a brilliant era which was ultimately to lunch Japan as a world power.
• The Meiji restoration was at once and the same time a revolution and a traditionalist restoration. Indeed, sweeping changes took place during the restoration.
• The Meiji rule ended with the death of the emperor on July 30, 1912, which also marked the end of the era of the genro.
• The Meiji period brought about drastic political, economic, and social changes in Japan, which in turn became the framework and foundation of modern Japan as we know it.

3.1.9. Exercise
1. Write a brief note on the condition of Japan before its opening to the west.
2. How the Parry mission opened Japan. Discuss?
3. Examine the significance Parry Mission to Japan.
4. Write an essay on the growth of modern Japan during Meiji Era.
5. Analyse the growth of modern democracy in Japan on the eve of Meiji Rule.

3.1.10. Further Reading
• Kishimoto, K., Politics in Modern Japan. Tokyo, Japan Echo, 1997.

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Unit-3
Chapter-2
JAPAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS
Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902), Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) and treaty of Portsmouth; Japanese
hegemony in Far East before the First World War and occupation of Korea.

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3.2.0. Objectives
In this chapter, students explore the role of emerging Japan in the world affair. After completing this chapter, you will be able:

- examine the role of Japan, the newly emerge Asian tiger in international affairs;
- analyse the causes and consequences of Anglo-Japanese alliance;
- give an account of Russo-Japanese war and the subsequent treaty of Portsmouth;
- understand the aspects of Japanese hegemony in Far East before the First World War and occupation of Korea.

3.2.1. Introduction
Despite the diplomatic declaration of the Mikado, Japan could not forget the humiliation. The intervention made it clear that Japan could no longer function independently and unaffected by external factors on the international scene. Japan is indissolubly bound with European Power Politics, Russo-Japanese war and its inevitability became evident. The triple interventions also ironed the determination of Japanese to strengthen their nation. Learning new lessons Japan changed her policies. The Japanese ambition was to have a respectable place in the comity of civilized nations but Europeans behaved better with China, a hater of modernity and western nations. Suddenly, it dawned on the Japanese mind that the west respected armed might more than a peace loving civilization. Japan awoke to the development of her military and naval power in order to become ready for the future trial of strength, particularly with Russia. The inevitability of war with Russia made Japan to review her diplomatic front. She turned to British friendship so that she could enjoy the fruits of her future victory undisturbed by outside intervention.

3.2.2. Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902),
Russia’s ambitions and expansionist policy was a threat to Japan’s security. Soon after the Triple Intervention, Vice-Foreign Minister Hayashi advocated the need for a positive foreign policy. Jiji-Shimpo, a leading newspaper, wrote a leader on the necessity and practicability of Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The power alignment in Europe, German diplomatic offensive against British, the South-African War exposed the weakness of the traditional British policy of Splendid Isolation. The Anglo-Japanese negotiation for joint defense of each other’s interest in the Far East were in progress for the last five years. Japan viewed with concern Russia’s growing menace in the Far East. Either Japan should bow down to Russia and become co-sharer in the spoils or checkmate Russia. The second course made Anglo-Japanese friendship imperative. The Japanese leaders were sharply divided. Ito, Seito and Inoue favoured Russian friendship while Kato, Yamagata and Katsura advocated British Cooperation. Germany supported Anglo-Japanese alliance thinking that Russo-Japanese Alliance would free Russia from her eastern commitments and politics. On the contrary Anglo-Japanese Alliance would constitute a powerful challenge to Russian interest and keep her engaged in the Far East.

The Japanese foreign policy aimed at the maintenance of territorial integrity of China, support to the policy of Open Door and safeguarding Japanese interests in Korea. British policy in the region was also similar. Why not the two powers jointly oppose those who were out to disturb status quo and challenge their interest? The turn of the 19th Century had created conditions for England which dictated the conclusion of friendship with Japan. The Russian menace in Persia, Afghanistan and the Far East; The Boer War, German commercial and naval ambitions and division of Europe into two armed camps made England to search friends. British Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain proposed an alliance of Japan, America and England to maintain the balance of power.

The year 1898 was an important year in Anglo-Japanese relations. Both were apprehensive of Russian designs in the Far East. England demanded from China that she would not give Yangtze valley and its surrounding area to any power. It was stated in the British Parliament that England would defend British interest in China and drive away Russia from North China with the help of Japan. On 17th March, Chamberlain and Kato held discussions and expressed anxiety over Russian activities. The Anglo-Japanese alliance became a matter of talk in the Press, parliament and the cabinet. In 1901, Russian Minister Iswosky proposed Russo-Japanese cooperation. England hurried to grasp Japanese hand of friendship lest she might lean on Russia. Japan cherished the bitter memories of 1895 and was keen to isolate Russia so that she may enjoy the fruits of future victory. Japan
concluded alliance with England to balance Franco-Russian power on the hand, and got the assurance of Germany neutrality on the other, in a bid to isolate the enemy-Russia.

The first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in London at what is now the Lansdowne Club on January 30, 1902, by Lord Lansdowne (British foreign secretary) and Hayashi Tadasu (Japanese minister in London). A diplomatic milestone that saw an end to Britain's splendid isolation, the alliance was renewed and expanded in scope twice, in 1905 and 1911, before its demise in 1921. It was officially terminated in 1923.

3.2.2.1. Motivations and reservations

The possibility of an alliance between United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Empire of Japan had been canvassed since 1895, when Britain refused to join the triple intervention of France, Germany and Russia against the Japanese occupation of the Liaotung peninsula. While this single event was an unstable basis for an alliance, the case was strengthened by the support Britain had given Japan in its drive towards modernisation and their cooperative efforts to put down the Boxer Rebellion. Newspapers of both countries voiced support for such an alliance; in the UK, Francis Brinkley of The Times and Edwin Arnold of the Telegraph were the driving force behind such support, while in Japan the pro-alliance mood of politician Okuma Shigenobu stirred the Mainichi and Yomiuri newspapers into pro-alliance advocacy. The 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation had also paved the way for equal relations and the possibility of an alliance.

In the end, the common interest truly fueling the alliance was opposition to Russian expansion. This was made clear as early as the 1890s, when the British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice identified that Great Britain and Japan working in concert was the only way to challenge Russian power in the region. Negotiations began when Russia began to move into China. Nevertheless, both countries had their reservations. The UK was cautious of abandoning its policy of "splendid isolation", wary of antagonizing Russia, and unwilling to act on the treaty if Japan were to attack the United States. There were factions in the Japanese government that still hoped for a compromise with Russia, including the highly powerful political figure Hirobumi Ito, who had served four terms as Prime Minister of Japan. It was thought that friendship within Asia would be more amenable to the USA, which was uncomfortable with the rise of Japan as a power. Furthermore, the UK was unwilling to protect Japanese interests in Korea and likewise the Japanese were unwilling to support Britain in India.

Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne began their discussions in July 1901, and disputes over Korea and India delayed them until November. At this point, Hirobumi Ito requested a delay in negotiations in order to attempt a reconciliation with Russia. He was mostly unsuccessful, and Britain expressed concerns over duplicity on Japan's part, so Hayashi hurriedly re-entered negotiations in 1902.

3.2.2.2. Terms of Agreement

The aim of the treaty, was to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East. The signatories of the treaty were interested in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations. The first article of the treaty mentioned the special British interests in China and Japanese interest in both China and Korea. Both recognized to take necessary action to safeguard their interests. In doing so, if one is involved in war with any other power, the other friend would remain neutral and try to see that the enemy did not get help from any other nation. If the warring party was helped by any other nation, the friendship would come to the aid. Both would conclude peace together. The treaty would remain in force for five years. The treaty contained six articles:

**Article 1:** The High Contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies in either country, having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, whilst Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting parties for the protection of the lives and properties of its subjects.
Article 2: Declaration of neutrality if either signatory becomes involved in war through Article 1.
Article 3: Promise of support if either signatory becomes involved in war with more than one Power.
Article 4: Signatories promise not to enter into separate agreements with other Powers to the prejudice of this alliance.
Article 5: The signatories promise to communicate frankly and fully with each other when any of the interests affected by this treaty are in jeopardy.
Article 6: Treaty to remain in force for five years and then at one years' notice, unless notice was given at the end of the fourth year.

Articles 2 and 3 were most crucial concerning war and mutual defense. The treaty laid out an acknowledgement of Japanese interests in Korea without obligating the UK to help should a Russo-Japanese conflict arise on this account. Japan was not obligated to defend British interests in India.

Although written using careful and clear language, the two sides understood the Treaty slightly differently. The UK saw it as a gentle warning to Russia, while Japan was emboldened by it. From that point on, even those of a moderate stance refused to accept a compromise over the issue of Korea. Extremists saw it as an open invitation for imperial expansion.

3.2.2.3. Result

The Anglo-Japanese Agreement occupies an important place in the history of international relations. The alliance was no less than the merger of Japanese in European politics. The treaty enhanced Japanese prestige. For the first time in history, an Asiatic power had entered into an alliance with a European power on a place of entire equality. She was admitted into the European concert. England, the mistress of the seven seas, launched Japan on international scene as a world power. The treaty marked the beginning of a new era in world politics for it was tantamount to a seal of British approval on Japan’s aspirations and efforts. Constituted, although indirectly, an endorsement of her program of expansion, which was launched in the last decade of the 19th century. Although the alliance did not prevent war with Russia, it enabled Japan to plan and prosecute the war against Russia without any tear of interference from a third power. Moreover, it was an effective guarantee that there would be no repetition of a coalition of Powers against Japan, such, as had occurred after the Sino-Japanese War. England, was delivered of her dangerous policy of isolation. She utilized the treaty to checkmate Russian bear with the help of Japanese dwarf. The treaty constituted a guarantee of security of her vast possessions including Hongkong, the Malaya peninsula, Burma and even India. The treaty also precipitated the Russo-Japanese War. The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 was another offshoot of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It may be re-called that by a term of the alliance, Britain recognized Japan’s special interests in the Korean question. Fortified by the Alliance, Japan moved on imperialistic path; tightened her grip over Manchuria through the Manchurian railway, the Yogohama Specie Bank and occupation of Russian lease-holds, spread her tentacles over China and dominated the whole region.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, in the first instance, for five years. It was renewed and revised in 1905 barely two weeks before the conclusion of the treaty of Portsmouth. In 1905, not only the treaty was renewed bit its scope was also extended. It provided for, as in the last agreement, the maintenance of peace, the integrity of China and the policy of open door. This time it took into consideration the respective rights and interest of both in Korea, China, Manchuria, India and the Far East in general. The Treaty provided that in case the rights of either power within the stipulated areas were assailed by an outside Power, the other should come to the aid of its ally. In renewing the alliance in 1905, both the Powers were guided by the possible menace from Russia. While Japan was apprehensive of a revengeful Russia, England feared that the defeat in the Far East might turn Russia once more to the Indian frontier regions. The treaty was again renewed in 1911 for period of ten years. After the defeat of Russia by Japan, however, England needed Japan more than Japan needed England.

After the British reapproachment with Russia in 1907, it was the German treaty which kept England bound with Japan. The two fought together in the First World War. The eclipse of Russia in 1917 and the defeat of Germany in 1918 removed Russian and German threats. Japan also became a potential danger to British interest. These factors brought the abrogation of the alliance in 1921.
3.2.2.4. Effects

The Meiji Emperor receiving the Order of the Garter in 1906, as a consequence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Emperor, to this date, is the only non-European member of the Order.

The alliance was announced on February 12, 1902. In response, Russia sought to form alliances with France and Germany, which Germany declined. On March 16, 1902, a mutual pact was signed between France and Russia. China and the United States were strongly opposed to the alliance. Nevertheless, the nature of the Anglo-Japanese alliance meant that France was unable to come to Russia's aid in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 as this would have meant going to war with Britain. Japanese armoured cruiser Nisshin of the Imperial Japanese Navy, in the Mediterranean (Malta, 1919).

The alliance's provisions for mutual defense prompted Japan to enter World War I on the British side. Japan attacked the German base at Tsingtao in 1914 and forced the Germans to surrender (see Siege of Tsingtao). Japanese officers aboard British warships were casualties at the Battle of Jutland in 1916. In 1917, Japanese warships were sent to the Mediterranean and assisted in the protection of allied shipping near Malta from U-boat attacks; there is a memorial there to the sailors who fell. The Treaty also made possible the Japanese seizure of German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator during WWI, a huge boon to Japan's imperial interests.

The alliance formed the basis for positive cultural exchange between Britain and Japan. Japanese educated in the UK were able to bring new technology to Japan, such as advances in ophthalmology. British artists of the time such as James McNeill Whistler, Aubrey Beardsley and Charles Rennie Mackintosh were heavily inspired by Japanese kimono, swords, crafts and architecture.

3.2.2.5. Limitations

There remained strains on Anglo-Japanese relations during the years of the alliance. One such strain was the racial question. Although originally a German notion, the Japanese perceived that the British had been affected by idea of Yellow Peril, on account of their recalcitrance in the face of Japanese imperial success. This issue returned at Versailles after WWI when the UK sided with the U.S. against Japan's request of the addtion of Racial Equality Proposal, 1919, proposed by Prince Kinmochi Saionji. The racial question was difficult for Britain because of its multi-ethnic empire.

3.2.3. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904 -1905

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which began with the Japanese naval attack on Port Arthur, had its roots in the simultaneous determination of both Japan and Russia to develop 'spheres of influence' in the Far East, mainly at the expense of China. Japan fought a very successful war against the crumbling Chinese Empire in 1894-95 and imposed a severe treaty. Japan demanded from China a heavy war indemnity, the island of Formosa, and Port Arthur and its hinterland. The European powers, while having no objection to the indemnity, did feel that Japan should not gain Port Arthur, for they had their own ambitions in that part of the world. Russia persuaded Germany and France to join her in applying diplomatic pressure on the Japanese, with the result that Japan was obliged to relinquish Port Arthur. Two years later Saint Petersburg forced the Chinese into leasing Port Arthur to Russia, together with the Liaotung Peninsula on which it stood. For Russia this meant the acquisition of an ice-free naval base in the Far East to supplement Vladivostok. For Japan it was a case of adding insult to injury.

The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 caused the European powers and Japan to send troops to China to suppress the rebels. When the fighting was over, Russian troops were occupying Manchuria. Russia promised to withdraw these forces by 1903, but failed to do so, wishing to hold Manchuria as a springboard for further expansion of her interest in the Far East. Meanwhile Japan was heavily engaged in Korea, successfully increasing her influence in that country. Russia also had interest in Korea, and although at first Russians and Japanese managed to peacefully coexist, it was not long before tensions on both sides led to hostilities. Negotiations between the two nations began in 1901 but made little headway. Japan then strengthened her position by forming an alliance with Britain. The terms stated that if Japan went to war in the Far East, and a third power entered the fight against Japan, then Britain would come to the aide of the Japanese.

During her negotiations with Japan, Russia did not expect the Japanese to go to war. After all, Japan was a newly emergent country, whose naval officers might have been trained in Britain and her army officers in
Germany, but several of those officers had begun their careers wearing armor and brandishing swords. The Russian army was the world's most powerful, or at least that is what the Russians believed. But the Japanese had other ideas. Japan knew that they could not win a long war fought over a vast expanse, but they could win a short localized war.

The first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on 30 January 1902, and the Russo-Japanese War began on 8 February 1904, just over two years later. The war lasted from February 1904 to September 1905, a comparatively short struggle by the standards of the major wars of the Twentieth Century.

Japan’s victory was decisive, but a long way short of total. On land, the Japanese forces won a series of battles: Yalu (May 1904), the siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905), Liao-Yang (August 1904), and Mukden (February – March 1905). At sea, Japan triumphed in a series of engagements, culminating in one of the greatest sea battles of modern times, with Togo’s crushing defeat of Rozhdestvensky’s fleet at Tsushima in May 1905.

By the summer of 1905, Japan was consistently winning the battles, but she was still a long way from winning the war. Moreover, she had suffered heavy losses in manpower, and financially, she had serious problems. Russia was on the brink of domestic revolution, but was pouring reinforcements along the Trans-Siberian railway to the Far East.

The major powers were anxious to bring the conflict to an end. France, Russia’s ally, was afraid that a Russian collapse would leave her alone in Europe, and also the conflict was placing a major strain on her banking system. Germany, too, was in favour of peace. She feared that a heavy Russian defeat might lead to revolution, and that this could be contagious. The United States did not want either side to win a decisive victory.

The upshot was the meeting of a peace conference at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August 1905, with the United States Government, led by President Theodore Roosevelt, playing the role of chairman, conciliator and intermediary. The peace conference lasted from 10 August to 5 September, and led to the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, ending the war.

3.2.3.1. Role of Western Powers

What was the role of the United Kingdom in all this? How had the Alliance worked? What part did it play in the events and successes of 1904-05? Overall, Britain’s role was that of the loyal and faithful ally, carrying out the terms of the agreement of 1902. This was accepted officially by the Japanese Government, although unofficially there was criticism of what Britain did – or rather did not do – and some feeling that she could have done more.

At the beginning of the war it is evident that there was uncertainty in London as to what would happen. There was no great confidence among British ministers that Japan would be victorious. Despite this, in an important move just before the commencement of hostilities, Britain rejected a French approach in January 1904 with the suggestion of mediation. Such a move reawakened memories of the three-power intervention against Japan in 1895. Britain would not interfere, or spoil Japan’s plans or cramp her room for manoeuvre.

The United Kingdom, along with the United States, played a major role in the financing of Japan’s war. Between May 1904 and July 1905, at least four major loans were successfully negotiated, and these were absolutely essential to the war effort. These were commercial transactions, not official Government help, but nonetheless vital.

With regard to the war at sea, Britain, while remaining within the boundaries of neutrality, played a positive and helpful role. Before hostilities commenced, Britain prevented Russia from buying two warships, available because of a cancelled order from Chile. The Royal Navy eventually purchased the vessels to stop them from falling into Russian hands. Again, Britain acted as an agent for Japan in purchasing two cruisers, built in Italy, and originally intended for Argentina. These arrived in Japan in March 1904 shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Britain did its best to obstruct and delay the passage of Rozhdestvensky’s fleet from the Baltic to the Far East. Apart from the rather bizarre events at Dogger Bank, the fleet was denied access to British ports and to supplies of high quality coal. Britain can take no direct credit for Tsushima, but it can claim some credit for the fact that it took the Russians so long to reach the Pacific. By the time that the fleet arrived off the coast of Japan, its
original objectives had long since disappeared. A recent article in War in History suggests that there was no formal
secret service agreement with Japan. There was
some monitoring of Russian naval movements during the war, and information was passed on to the
Japanese. The British helped the Japanese to improve their naval transmitters, and also provided assistance with the
range-finders installed in the Japanese warships at Tsushima.

The most important action that Britain took during the war was an indirect one, but it nevertheless had
decisive consequences. This was the conclusion in April 1904 of the Entente Cordiale with France. The Entente
was very much the product of the emerging situation in Europe, and it had no direct connection to the Far East—the
nearest it got to the region was Siam and the New Hebrides. But it took the tension out of the relationship between
France – Russia’s ally – and the United Kingdom-Japan’s ally and made it extremely unlikely that France would
come to Russia’s assistance. Britain’s global position improved significantly, and her obligations under Article III
of the 1902 Alliance now became something of a formality.

The United Kingdom played a semi-detached role in the peace negotiations in the summer of 1905.
Britain welcomed American attempts at mediation, and Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, agreed to support
them. He made it clear, however, that Britain would not put any pressure on Japan: 'we would be unable to bring
pressure on Japan with a view to her abating reasonable demands'. The attitude was correct, but at times it irritated
the United States, and it was something of a foretaste of what was to come! While the peace negotiations were in
progress, separate negotiations for a renewal and revision of the Alliance were also going ahead. This was a
positive behind-the-scenes boost for Japan.

The Russo-Japanese War brought victory to Japan, and it was a triumph for the Alliance. Japan fought its
war under the best possible conditions, and Britain was able to maintain its interests, and indeed improve its
position, by the agreement with France. Japan was now launched on its imperialist career in Northeast Asia. The
facts are, however, that she had the Alliance, she went to war, the Alliance worked, and she won.

3.2.4. The Treaty of Portsmouth

The Treaty of Portsmouth formally ended the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September
5, 1905 after negotiations lasting from August 6 to August 30, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine,
in the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt was instrumental in the negotiations, and won the Nobel Peace
Prize for his efforts.

3.2.4.1. Background

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was fought between the Empire of Russia, an international power
with one of the largest armies in the world, and the Empire of Japan, a nation which had only recently
industrialized after two-and-a-half centuries of isolation. A series of battles in the Liaodong Peninsula had resulted
in Russian armies being driven from southern Manchuria, and the Battle of Tsushima had resulted in a cataclysm
for the Imperial Russian Navy. The war was unpopular with the Russian public, and the Russian government was
under increasing threat of revolution at home. On the other hand, the Japanese economy was severely over-
extended by the war, with rapidly mounting foreign debts, and its forces in Manchuria faced the problem of ever-
extending supply lines. No Russian territory had been seized, and the Russians continued to build up
reinforcements via the Trans-Siberian Railway. Recognizing that a long-term war was not to Japan's advantage, as
early as July 1904 the Japanese government had begun seeking out intermediaries to assist in bringing the war to a
negotiated conclusion.

The intermediary approached by the Japanese side was the former United States President Theodore
Roosevelt, who had publicly expressed a pro-Japanese stance at the beginning of the war. However, as the war
progressed, Roosevelt had begun to show concerns on the strengthening military power of Japan and its impact on
long-term United States interests in Asia. In February 1905, Roosevelt sent messages to the Russian government
via US ambassador to St Petersburg. Initially, the Russians were unresponsive, with Tsar Nicholas II still adamant
that Russia would prove victorious in time. At this point, the Japanese government was also lukewarm to a peace
treaty, as Japanese armies were enjoying an unbroken string of victories. However, after the Battle of Mukden,
which was extremely costly to both sides in terms of manpower and resources, Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō judged that the time was now critical for Japan to push for a settlement.

On March 8, 1905, Japanese Army Minister Terauchi Masatake met with American minister to Japan, Lloyd Griscom, to convey word to Roosevelt that Japan was ready to negotiate. However, from the Russian side, a positive response did not come until after the loss of the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima. Two days after the battle, Tsar Nicholas II met with his grand dukes and military leadership and agreed to discuss peace. On June 7, 1905, Roosevelt met with Kaneko Kentaro, a Japanese diplomat, and on June 8 received a positive reply from Russia. Roosevelt chose Portsmouth, New Hampshire, as the site for the negotiations, primarily due to its cooler climate than Washington DC.

### 3.2.4.2. Portsmouth Peace Conference

The Japanese delegation to the Portsmouth Peace Conference was led by Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, assisted by ambassador to Washington, Takahira Kogoro. The Russian delegation was led by former Finance Minister Sergei Witte, assisted by former ambassador to Japan Roman Rosen and Friedrich Martens, a specialist in international law and arbitration. The delegations arrived in Portsmouth on August 8 and stayed in New Castle, New Hampshire, at the Hotel Wentworth (where the armistice was signed), and were ferried across the Piscataqua River for negotiations held on the base located in Kittery, Maine.

The negotiations took place at the General Stores Building. Mahogany furniture patterned after the Cabinet Room of the White House was ordered from Washington.

Even before the start of negotiations, Tsar Nicholas adopted a hard line, forbidding his delegates to agree to yield territory, pay reparations, or agree to any military limitations to Russian forces in the Far East. The Japanese initially demanded recognition of their interests in Korea, the removal of all Russian forces from Manchuria, and substantial reparations. The Japanese also sought control over Sakhalin, which had been invaded and seized in July 1905, partly as a bargaining chip in the negotiations.

A total of twelve sessions were held between August 9 and August 30. During the first eight sessions, the delegates were able to reach an agreement on eight points. These included an immediate cease fire, recognition of Japan's claims to Korea, and the evacuation of Russian forces from Manchuria. Russia was also required to return its leases in southern Manchuria to China, but to turn over the South Manchuria Railway and its mining concessions to Japan. Russia was allowed to retain the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria.

The remaining four session addressed the most difficult issues, that of reparations and territorial concessions. On August 18, Roosevelt proposed that Rosen offer to divide the island of Sakhalin to address the territory issue. However, on August 23, Witte proposed that the Japanese keep Sakhalin and drop their claims for reparations. When Komura rejected this proposal, Witte warned that he was instructed to cease negotiations and that the war would resume. This ultimatum came as four new Russian divisions arrived in Manchuria, and the Russian delegation made an ostentatious show of packing their bags and preparing to depart. Witte was convinced that the Japanese could not afford restarting the war, and also applied pressure via the American media and his American hosts to convince the Japanese that monetary compensation was something that Russia would never compromise on. Outmaneuvered by Witte, Komura yielded, and in exchange for the southern half of Sakhalin the Japanese dropped their claims for reparations.

The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5. The treaty was ratified by the Japanese Privy Council on October 10, and in Russia on October 14, 1905.

### 3.2.4.3. Effects

The signing of the treaty settled immediate difficulties in the Far East and created three decades of peace between the two warring nations. The treaty confirmed Japan's emergence as the pre-eminent power in East Asia, and forced Russia to abandon its expansionist policies there, but it was not well received by the Japanese public. Aware of Japan's unbroken string of military victories, the Japanese public was less aware of the precarious overextension of Japan's military and economic power. News of the terms of the treaty appeared to show Japanese weakness in front of the European powers, and this frustration caused the Hibiya riots, and collapsed Katsura Taro's cabinet on January 7, 1906.
Because of the role played by President Theodore Roosevelt, the United States became a significant force in world diplomacy. Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his back channel efforts before and during the peace negotiations, even though he never actually went to Portsmouth.

Japan did not achieve all her objectives at Portsmouth, and her gains barely matched her success on the battlefield. She did make some significant gains: (1) Russia recognised her paramount interests in Korea; (2) she acquired territories and interests in southern Manchuria with the transfer of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula together with the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway; (3) she acquired the southern part of the island of Sakhalin. But she wanted the whole of Sakhalin, and she did not achieve one of her main objectives, which she desperately needed, namely the payment of a Russian indemnity.

3.2.5. The Annexation of Korea

Korea under Japanese rule was the culmination of a process that began with the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876, whereby a complex coalition of Meiji government, military, and business officials sought to integrate Korea both politically and economically into the Japanese Empire, first as a protectorate in 1905, and officially annexed in 1910. Japan brought to a close the Joseon Dynasty and Korea officially became an integral part of Japan. Japanese rule ended in 1945. Administration of the Korean people continued until Japan's defeat at the end of World War II at which time Korea became an independent nation albeit divided under two separate governments and economic systems. The modernization and industrialization the Japanese brought to the Korean peninsula continues to be the subject of controversy between the two Koreas and Japan.

3.2.5.1. Background

During the late 18th to late 19th centuries Western governments sought to intercede in and influence the political and economic fortunes of Asian countries through the use of new methodologies such as "protectorate", "sphere of influence", and concession which minimized the need for direct military conflict between competing European powers. The newly modernized Meiji government of Japan sought to join these colonizing efforts and initiated discussions in Japan in 1873. This effort was allegedly fueled by Saigo Takamori and his supporters, who insisted that Japan confront Korea's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Emperor Meiji as ruler of the Empire of Japan, as well as for supposed insulting treatment meted out to Japanese envoys attempting to establish new trade and diplomatic relations.

In fact, the debate concerned Korea, then in the sphere of influence of China's Qing Dynasty which elements in the Japanese government sought to separate from Chinese influence and establish as a Japanese satellite. Those in favor also saw the issue as an opportunity to find meaningful employment for the thousands of out-of-work Samurai, who had lost most of their income and social standing in the new Meiji socioeconomic order. Further, the acquisition of Korea would provide both a foothold on the Asian continent for Japanese expansion and a rich source of raw materials for Japanese industry.

3.2.5.2. Political turmoil in Korea

Destabilization of the Korean nation may be said to have its start in the period of "Sedo Jeongchi" whereby, at the death of King Jeongjo, the 10-year-old King Sunjo ascended the Korean throne with the true power of the administration residing with his regent father, Kim Jo-Sun, as a representative of the Andong Kim clan. As a result, the disarray and blatant corruption in the Korean government, particularly in the three main areas of revenues- land tax, military service, and the state granary system-heaped additional hardship on the peasantry. Of special note is the corruption of the local functionaries (Hyangni), who could purchase an appointment as administrators and so cloak their predations on the farmers with an aura of officialdom. Yangban families, formerly well-respected for their status as a noble class, are increasingly seen as little more than commoners unwilling to meet their responsibilities to their communities. Faced with increasing corruption in the government, brigandage of the disenfranchised and abuse by the military, many poor village folk sought to pool their resources, such as land, tools, and production, to survive. Despite the government abolishing slavery and burning the records in 1801, increasing numbers of peasants and farmers become involved in Gye or "mutual assistance associations". At this time, Catholic and Protestant missions were well-tolerated among the Yangban, or elite class, most notably in and around the area of Seoul.
Animus and persecution by more conservative elements (Pungyang Jo clan), took the lives of priests and numbers of Korean nationals. Peasants continued to be drawn to Christian egalitarianism though mainly in urban and suburban areas. Arguably of greater influence were the religious teachings of Choe Je-u, (1824-64) called "Eastern Learning", which became especially popular in rural areas. Themes of Exclusionism from foreign influences, Nationalism, Salvation and Social Consciousness were set to music allowing illiterate farmers to understand and accept them more readily. Choe, as well as many Koreans, was also alarmed by the intrusion of Christianity and the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing during the Second Opium War. He believed the best way to counter foreign influence in Korea was to introduce democratic and human rights reforms internally. Nationalism and social reform struck a chord among the peasant guerrillas, and Donghak spread all across Korea. Progressive revolutionaries organized the peasants into a cohesive structure. Arrested in 1863 following the Jinju uprising led by Yu Kye-chun, Choe is charged with "misleading the people and sowing discord in society". Choe was executed in 1864, sending many of his followers into hiding in the mountains.

King Gojong, enthroned at the age of 12, succeeded King Cheoljong. King Gojong’s father, Heungseon Daewongun, ruled as the de facto regent and inaugurated far-ranging reform to strengthen the central administration. Of special note was the decision to rebuild palace buildings and finance it through additional levies on the population. Further inherited rule by a few elite ruling families was challenged by the adoption of a merit system for official appointments. In addition, Sowon- or private academies which threatened to develop a parallel system to the corrupt government and enjoyed special privileges and large land-holdings, were taxed and repressed despite bitter opposition from Confucian scholars. Lastly, a policy of steadfast isolationism was enforced to staunch the increasing intrusion of Western thought and technology.

3.2.5.3. Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876

Three years later, on 27 February 1876, the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876, also known in Japan as the Japanese-Korea Treaty of Amity was signed. It was designed to open up Korea to Japanese trade, and the rights granted to Japan under the treaty were similar to those granted Western powers in Japan following the visit of Commodore Perry in 1854. However, the treaty ended Korea's status as a protectorate of China, forced open three Korean ports to Japanese trade, granted extraterritorial rights to Japanese citizens, and was an unequal treaty signed under duress of the Unyo Incident of 1875.

As a result of the treaty, Japanese merchants came to Pusan, which became a center for foreign trade and commerce. Japanese officials there published Korea's first newspaper, the Japanese- and Chinese-language Chosen shinpo, in 1881. Chinese-language articles aimed at Korea's educated elite advocated for constitutional government, freedom of speech, strong rule of law and legal rights, and Korean-led industrialization. Few of these proposals came to pass. Japanese articles focused on business news, specifically "the stagnant Pusan trade" in rice and other farmed goods, which fluctuated wildly with weather conditions and the whims of the tax-levying elite class. It ceased publication sometime after May 1882.

3.2.5.4. Imo Incident

Daewongun remained opposed to any concessions to Japan or the West, helped organize the Mutiny of 1882, an anti-Japanese outbreak against Queen Min and her allies. Motivated by resentment of the preferential treatment given to newly trained troops, Daewongun's forces, or "old military", killed Japanese training cadre, and attacked the Japanese legation. Japanese diplomats, policemen, students and some Min clan members were also killed during the incident. Daewongun was restored to power briefly, only to be forcibly taken to China by Chinese troops dispatched to Seoul to prevent further disorder.

In August 1882, the Treaty of Jemulpo indemnified the families of the Japanese victims, paid reparations to the Japanese government in the amount of 500,000 yen, and allowed a company of Japanese guards to be stationed at the Japanese legation in Seoul.

3.2.5.5. Gapsin coup

The struggle between Heungseon Daewongun's followers and those of Queen Min was further complicated by competition from a Korean independence faction known as the Progressive Party (Gaehwa-dang), as well as Conservative faction. While the former sought Japan's support, the latter sought China's support. On 4
December 1884, the Progressive Party, assisted by the Japanese, attempted a coup (Gapsin coup) and established a pro-Japanese government under the reigning king, dedicated to the independence of Korea from Chinese suzerainty. However, this proved short-lived, as conservative Korean officials requested the help of Chinese forces stationed in Korea. The coup was put down by Chinese troops, and a Korean mob killed both Japanese officers and Japanese residents in retaliation. Some leaders of the Progressive Party, including Kim Ok-gyun, fled to Japan, while others were executed. For the next 10 years, Japanese expansion into the Korean economy was approximated only by the efforts of czarist Russia.

3.2.5.6. Donghak Revolution and First Sino-Japanese War

The outbreak of the Donghak peasant revolution in 1894 provided a seminal pretext for direct military intervention by Japan in the affairs of Korea. In April, 1894, the Korean government asked for Chinese assistance in ending the Donghak peasant revolt. In response, Japanese leaders, citing a violation of Convention of Tientsin as a pretext, decided upon military intervention to challenge China. On May 3, 1894, 1,500 Qing forces appeared in Incheon. The same day, 6,000 Japanese forces also landed in Incheon, producing the Sino-Japanese War. Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War, and China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Among its many stipulations, the treaty recognized "the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea", thus ending Korea's tributary relationship with the Chinese Qing dynasty, leading to the proclamation of full independence of Joseon Korea in 1895. At the same time, Japan suppressed the Donghak revolution with Korean government forces. With the exception of czarist Russia, Japan now held military predominance in Korea.

3.2.5.7. Assassination of Empress Myeongseong

The Japanese minister to Korea, Miura Goro, orchestrated a plot against 43 year-old Empress Myeongseong, and on 8 October 1895, she was assassinated by Japanese agents. In 2001, Russian reports on the assassination were found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation. The documents included the testimony of King Gojong, several witnesses of the assassination, and Karl Ivanovich Weber's report to Lobanov-Rostovsky, the Foreign Minister of Russia by Park Jong Hyo. Weber was the chargé d'affaires at the Russian legation in Seoul at that time. According to a Russian eyewitness, Seredin-Sabatin, an employee of the Korean king, a group of Japanese agents entered the Gyeongbokgung palace, killed Queen Min, and desecrated her body in the north wing of the palace.

When he heard the news, Heungseon Daewongun returned to the royal palace the same day. On 11 February 1896, King Gojong and the crown prince moved from Gyeongbokgung palace to the Russian legation in Jeongdong, Seoul, from where they governed for about one year, an event known as the Korea royal refuge at the Russian legation.

3.2.5.8. Democracy protests and the proclamation of the Korean Empire

After the Royal Refuge, some Korean activists established the Independence Club in 1896. They claimed that Korea should negotiate with Western powers, particularly Russia, to counterbalance the growing influence of Japan and Russia. This club had destroyed Yeongeunmun Gate as a Chinese tributary state and contributed to the construction of Independence Gate, and they held regular meetings at the Jongno streets, demanding democratic reforms as Korea became a constitutional monarchy, and an end to Japanese and Russian influence in Korean affairs. In October 1897, King Gojong decided to return to his other palace, Deoksugung, and proclaimed the founding of the Korean Empire. During this period, the Korean government conducted a westernization policy. It was not an enduring reform, however, and the Independence Club was dissolved on 25 December 1898 as Emperor Gojong officially announced a prohibition on unofficial congresses.

3.2.5.9. Prelude to annexation

Having established economic and military dominance in Korea, in October, 1904, Japan reported that it had developed 25 reforms which it intended to introduce into Korea by gradual degrees. Among these was the intended acceptance by the Korean Financial Department of a Japanese Superintendent, the replacement of Korean Foreign Ministers and consuls by Japanese and the "union of military arms" in which the military of Korea would be modeled after the Japanese military. These reforms were forestalled by the prosecution of the Russo-Japanese War from February 8, 1904, to September 5, 1905, which Japan won, thus eliminating Japan's last rival to
influence in Korea. Under the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed in September 1905, Russia acknowledged Japan's "paramount political, military, and economic interest" in Korea. A separate agreement was signed in secret between the United States and Japan at this time, which subsequently aroused anti-American sentiment among Koreans decades later. The Taft-Katsura Agreement between the U.S. and Japan recognized U.S. interests in the Philippines and Japanese interests in Korea. Given the diplomatic conventions of the times, however, the agreement was a much weaker endorsement of the Japanese presence in Korea than either the Russo-Japanese peace treaty or a separate Anglo-Japanese accord. Two months later, Korea was obliged to become a Japanese protectorate by the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 and the "reforms" were enacted, including the reduction of the Korean Army from 20,000 to 1,000 men by disbanding all garrisons in the provinces, retaining only a single garrison in the precincts of Seoul. On January 6, 1905, Horace Allen, head of the American Legation in Seoul reported to his Secretary of State, John Hay, that the Korean government had been advised by the Japanese government "that hereafter the police matters of Seoul will be controlled by the Japanese gendarmerie" and "that a Japanese police inspector will be placed in each prefecture". A large number of Koreans organized themselves in education and reform movements, but Japanese dominance in Korea had become a reality.

In June 1907, the Second Peace Conference was held in The Hague. Emperor Gojong secretly sent three representatives to bring the problems of Korea to the world's attention. The three envoys were refused access to the public debates by the international delegates who questioned the legality of the protectorate convention. Out of despair, one of the Korean representatives, Yi Jun, committed suicide at The Hague. In response, the Japanese government took stronger measures. On July 19, 1907, Emperor Gojong was forced to relinquish his imperial authority and appoint the Crown Prince as regent. Japanese officials used this concession to force the accession of the new Emperor Sunjong following abdication, which was never agreed to by Gojong. Neither Gojong nor Sunjong was present at the 'accession' ceremony. Sunjong was to be the last ruler of the Joseon Dynasty, founded in 1392.

3.2.5.10. Japan–Korea annexation treaty (1910)

In May 1910, the Minister of War of Japan, Terauchi Masatake, was given a mission to finalize Japanese control over Korea after the previous treaties had made Korea a protectorate of Japan and had established Japanese hegemony over Korean domestic politics. On 22 August 1910, Japan effectively annexed Korea with the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910 signed by Lee Wan-yong, Prime Minister of Korea, and Terauchi Masatake, who became the first Japanese Governor-General of Korea. The treaty became effective the same day and was published one week later. The treaty stipulated:

**Article 1:** His Majesty the Emperor of Korea concedes completely and definitely his entire sovereignty over the whole Korean territory to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

**Article 2:** His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the concession stated in the previous article and consents to the annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.

Both the protectorate and the annexation treaties were declared void in the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea because both treaties were obtained under threat of force, and that the Korean Emperor, whose Royal Assent was required to validate and finalize any legislation or diplomatic agreement under Korean law of the period, refused to sign the document.

This era is also known as Military Police Reign Era (1910-19) in which Police had the authority to rule entire country in every way. Japan was in control of the media, law as well as government by physical power and regulations.

3.2.6. Conclusion

The triple interventions also ironed the determination of Japanese to strengthen their nation. Learning new lessons Japan changed her policies. The Japanese ambition was to have a respectable place in the comity of civilized nations but Europeans behaved better with China, a hater of modernity and western nations. Suddenly, it dawned on the Japanese mind that the west respected armed might more than a peace loving civilization. Japan awoke to the development of her military and naval power in order to become ready for the future trial of strength, particularly with Russia. Russia’s ambitions and expansionist policy was a threat to Japan’s security. Soon after the
Triple Intervention, Japan thought the need for a positive foreign policy. Both Japan and England were apprehensive of Russian designs in the Far East, hence, the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in London on January 30, 1902 by British foreign secretary and Japanese minister. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement was no less than the merger of Japanese in European politics. The treaty enhanced Japanese prestige because for the first time in history, an Asiatic power had entered into an alliance with a European power on a place of entire equality. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, had its roots in the simultaneous determination of both Japan and Russia to develop 'spheres of influence' in the Far East, mainly at the expense of China. The Russo-Japanese War brought victory to Japan, and it was a triumph for the Alliance. Japan fought its war under the best possible conditions, and Britain was able to maintain its interests, and indeed improve its position, by the agreement with France. The Treaty of Portsmouth formally ended the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September 5, 1905 at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, in the United States. Japan annexed Korea both politically and economically into her Empire, first as a protectorate in 1905, and officially annexed in 1910.

3.2.7. Summary
- The ambition of recently empowered Japanese was to have a respectable place in the comity of civilized nations.
- Japan awoke to the development of her military and naval power in order to become ready for the future trial of strength, particularly with Russia.
- Russia’s ambitions and expansionist policy was a threat to Japan’s security. Soon after the Triple Intervention, Japan thought the need for a positive foreign policy.
- Both Japan and England were apprehensive of Russian designs in the Far East, hence, the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in London on January 30, 1902 by British foreign secretary and Japanese minister.
- The Anglo-Japanese Agreement was no less than the merger of Japanese in European politics. The treaty enhanced Japanese prestige because for the first time in history, an Asiatic power had entered into an alliance with a European power on a place of entire equality.
- The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, had its roots in the simultaneous determination of both Japan and Russia to develop 'spheres of influence' in the Far East, mainly at the expense of China.
- The Russo-Japanese War brought victory to Japan, and it was a triumph for the Alliance. Japan fought its war under the best possible conditions, and Britain was able to maintain its interests, and indeed improve its position, by the agreement with France.
- The Treaty of Portsmouth formally ended the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September 5, 1905 at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, in the United States.
- Korea under Japanese rule was the culmination of a process that began with the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876, whereby a complex coalition of Meiji government, military, and business officials sought to integrate Korea both politically and economically into the Japanese Empire, first as a protectorate in 1905, and officially annexed in 1910.

3.2.8. Exercise
3. Examine the causes, course and consequences of Russo-Japanese War in the history of Far East.
4. Elaborate the condition on which Japan annexed Korea.
5. Discuss the clauses and significance of Treaty of Portsmouth.

3.2.9. Further Reading

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Unit-3
Chapter-III
JAPAN AND FIRST WORLD WAR

Structure
3.3.0. Objective
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3.3.2. Japan and the First World War
3.3.3. London declaration
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   3.3.5.1. Circumstances under which Japan presented the twenty One Demands.
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3.3.0. Objectives
In this lesson, students explore the role of Japan during First World War and in the succeeding Peace settlement. After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

- trace the series of diplomacy took place in the world concerning Far Eastern Politics in the first world war year;
- identify the influence of Japan in China on the eve of first world war;
- understand the politics behind twenty one demand and shantung ultimatum of Japan on China;
- assess the role and gain of Japan in the Paris Peace conference and other peace settlement in the post first world war era;

3.3.1. Introduction
After the Russo-Japanese War Japan was the strongest power in Asia. In the next two decades it increased its stature and emerged as one of the five Great Powers, with a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. It was not long before this remarkable transformation had led to an equally remarkable change in world, and especially Asian, perception of Japan. Meiji Japan had projected the image of a young, vigorous country determined to free itself from restrictions imposed by imperialist powers, but it went on to impose its own colonialism on Taiwan, Korea, and South Manchuria. The disruption of the international order during World War I brought tantalizing possibilities. Some Japanese wanted their country to serve as a role model in reviving East Asian reform and reconstruction; others continued to hold the West as a model for national expansion.

It was during the year 1912 Mutsuhito was succeeded by his third son Yoshihito. Yoshihito was very weak and meek. He often suffered from ailments. During his period his country took part in the First World War along with the Allies. The first world war had enhanced still more the stature of Japan. She came to be counted among the Big Five nations of the world. Her navy occupied third place. In fact, the First World War came as a golden opportunity for Japan for the fulfillment of imperialistic ambition.

3.3.2. Japan and the First World War
The main features of the history of Japan during the period between 1867 to 1917 was her imperialism. With the beginning of the 20th century the Pacific problems grew up and developed centering Japan. As a result of her victory in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), Japan became confident of her strength and got an opportunity of establishing her influence in some parts of China. Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) opened an important chapter in world politics. Henceforth, the centre of world politics shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific region centering Japan. Within a few years of the treaty of Portsmouth Japan displayed her naked imperialism by occupying Korea.

The Great War first burst forth in Europe, but its effects were felt at once on the opposite side of the globe. These effects were both immediate and far-reaching. Momentous as were the results of the first year of the war in Europe, they were equally significant in Asia, and the making of the new map of the Orient was one of the most important features of the first stage of the great conflict.

3.3.3. London declaration
After the outbreak of Great War Japan could not remain neutral nor she wished to remain so. British colonial Secretary sir Edward Grey, in the beginning, favoured the policy of not obtaining help from Japan. In fact, England wished to keep Japan off war. But compulsions of war changed the British policy. British Ambassador Green met Kato, the foreign minister of Japan to seek its help in the event of war spreading to the Far East. But Japan was not bound in terms of alliance to declare war against Axis power. Under the above circumstances the following three views emerged in regard to war. First one to help the Allies, second to stay neutral and third to support Germany. After a long discussion among the Elder Statesmen Japan informed Britain to join war with the Allies. Thus Japan declared war on August 23, 1914.

Kato wished to keep France and Russia away from the alliance for he believed that it would weaken Japanese position. But Japan adhered to the declaration of London in October 1915. Moreover, China declared her neutrality in the war. Japan served on Germany the Shantung Ultimatum on August 15, 1914. There was no reply from Germany. So Japan declared war on Germany. The Japanese Navy blockaded the Port of Tsingtao and the
armies laid a siege of Kiachow. After the fall of Tsingtao Japan established he control over Shantung. Japan navy was operating in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans in co-operation with the British against German commerce raiders. German military bases on the Pacific Ocean-Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines, Yap and Yalut also fell to Japan.

3.3.4. Shantung Ultimatum

On August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia and France; just two weeks later Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany, demanding its complete withdrawal from its possessions in the Pacific. On August 23rd, Japan declared war; within three months, Tsingtao, the Oriental stronghold, of the Germans, with the co-operation of a small British force, was captured, and the Japanese were installed in Germany's place in the province of Shantung. Two months later, Japan presented a series of demands on China, divided into five groups, the acceptance of which would have placed China definitely in the position of a vassal state. After less than four months of negotiations, on May 8, 1915, China accepted four groups of these demands, leaving the fifth open for future discussion. Thus, in the first nine months of the first year of the Great War, Germany's political and military power were eliminated in the Orient; Japan had taken over its possessions in China; and China had been forced to concede to Japan extensive territorial rights, economic privileges, and military concessions of great strategic importance. Thus the ante-bellum situation in the Far East was entirely altered, and new problems of international policy and relations were created. The spark struck at Sarajevo had, indeed, kindled a world-wide flame; Europe and Asia, the Occident and the Orient, alike were to feel its transforming force.

On September 2, Japanese troops were landed on the coast of Shantung Province from where they marched overland to Tsingtao. China's fears concerning the possibility of its neutrality being violated seemed justified, as the Japanese army took possession of various towns and cities in the interior, as well as the railroad to the provincial capital; assumed control of the means of communication; and made requisitions upon the Chinese population. A small force of British troops were landed inside the German leased territory and co-operated nominally in the siege of Tsingtao. On November 16, the city surrendered and the German military and naval power in the Far East was eliminated.

Japan now had an opportunity to survey the world situation as affected by the war and to orient itself in relation to it. By the end of 1914 it was apparent that the war would not end quickly; momentous changes in national alignments were in progress; and an unequalled opportunity seemed to present itself in Japan for satisfying various territorial and economic ambitions. As later events demonstrated, these ambitions and aims were five in number. First, to succeed Germany in its position and possessions in Shantung; second, to consolidate the Manchurian territory won in the war with Russia and to add to it a part of Mongolia; third, to gain a controlling share in the iron output of China; fourth, to secure the military safety of Japan by rendering impossible the lease of any of China's ports or coastal islands; fifth, if possible, to enter into such close economic, military and political relations with China, as to make it, with all its vast resources, tributary to Japan. These five aims were expressed in the Twenty-one Demands served on China on January 18, 1915.

3.3.5. Twenty One Demands

The twenty one demands was the arrow of the naked aggression aimed at the economic and the political sovereignty of China. Japanese neo-imperialist attitude over China was clearly exhibited by the Demands. Torn by internal strife, confused by political opportunities of Yuan and dreaded by the outbreak of World War the condition of China became a deplorable one. It was no wonder that Japan wanted to fish in the trouble waters of China. At the same time, the unscrupulous policies of Yuan was foiled by the unscrupulous demands of Japan.

3.3.5.1. Circumstances under which Japan presented the twenty One Demands.

In 1914, the First World War broke out in which all the countries of Europe were involved. China tried to remain neutral, but she was forced to join the war eventually. At this time Yuan was trying to restore monarchy in China by himself becoming the successor of the Manchus on the throne. But the revolutionaries demanded the withdrawal of the proposal for restoration. There were in consequence internal disturbances. Revolt broke out in Yunan. Yuan sent the army to crush the rebellion. But he could not succeed in his effort. Other provinces followed suit. The governor of Yunan raised their standard of revolt. The situation was getting out of control. It was in the
midst of this confusion that Japan made her infamous twenty one demands. In August 1914, Japan had taken over the German leasehold in Shantung. Yuan was not able to prevent this aggression. In January 1915, Japan served on China the twenty one demands. These demands if accepted would turn China into a colony of Japan. The western powers which needed Japanese help in the prosecution of the war did not intervene. In the face of the aggressive demands of Japan, the nation united and stood behind the President. The details of these demands are as follows:

1. China would extend in Shantung all former privileges enjoyed by German to Japan.
2. Principal ports and cities in Shantung should be thrown open Japan.
3. Japan’s privileges in Liao Tung, Dairen and Inner Mongolia should be recognized.
4. China should agree to Japanese participation in the operation of Han-Yeh-ping Iron and Steel Works in Hupeh and Pingshiang colliery in Kiangsi.
5. Japan demanded that China should not lease any harbor along Chinese coast to any other power.
6. In China there should be Japanese advisers in political, financial and military department.
7. Police department in all the principal cities in China will be placed under Sino-Japanese supervision.
8. China’s arsenals should be jointly operated by both the countries.
9. China should accord to Japan the right of financing railways from Wuchung to Nanchang.
10. China was to permit trade and residence rights to the Japanese at all the important places in Shantung.
11. The lease of Port Arthur and the South Manchurian Railway should be extended for a period of 99 years.
12. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and inner Mongolia should have the right to lease or own land.
13. Japanese subjects should have full freedom to travel and carry on business in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
14. The Chinese Government should consult the Japanese Government whenever loans are obtained from a third power, against the security of the taxes of south Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
15. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in interior China should be granted the right of owning land.
16. China was to grant Japanese subjects all mining rights in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
17. China was to accord to the Japanese subjects spreading Buddhism in the country.
18. Japan demanded that China should agree to consult Japan in obtaining military advisers in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
19. China should not dispose of her rights and properties of Han-yeh-ping Company without the approval of Japan.
20. Mines owned by Han-yeh-ping should not be worked outside the company without its approval.
21. China was to accord Japan rights of building railways and exploiting mines in Fukein.

3.3.5.2. The Nature of these demands

The demands fall into five categories:

i. Those relating to Shantung.
ii. Those relating to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
iii. Those relating to Han-Yeh-ping Company-Joint operation China and Japan.
iv. Those relating to the lease of Chinese ports –non-alienation of coastal areas to any third power.
v. Those relating to miscellaneous- control by Japan of China’s several important domestic administration.

The first four groups if conceded by China, would not affect her formal independence, sovereignty or integrity. But actually she would be brought the away of Japan, in the manner of modern imperialism. But group five consisted of the sweeping demands which would have virtually deprived the Chinese Government of control over its own affairs. The employment of effective Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs, the joint China-Japanese Organization of the Police forces in important places; the purchase from Japan of a fixed amount of munitions of war 50 percent or more; and the establishment of Chino-Japanese jointly worked arsenals were included in these demands. The latter involved effective control over the armament and military organization of China. No sovereign Government would accept such a group of demands that would reduce it to a position of dependent state.
3.3.5.3. **Japanese Pressure**

The out-break of the first world war gave a great stimulus to Japanese industries. The industrial expansion not only needed the supply of raw materials but also a market place. The new industrial capitalists and commercial magnets forced the Japanese leaders to fulfill their demands. In turn, the Japanese Government headed by Okuma prepared and submitted the twenty one demands.

In presenting and pressing its demands the Japanese Government attempted to bring a double pressure to bear on Yuan. In the first place the possibility of military action upon China coerced her to concede to the demands. Secondly, the fear of Japanese support to Chinese revolutionary elements in Japan also compelled Yuan to view it seriously. The Japanese government threatened both the existence of China as a state and of Yuan Shih-Kai as its ruler, while at the same time offering a bribe to the President in the form of support for his personal and family aggrandizement.

3.3.5.4. **Chinese Opposition**

When the Chinese public came to know about the Japanese Twenty One Demands they became furious. A spontaneous public feeling of anger was turned towards the Japanese. News papers denounced the demands and promoted anti-Japanese sentiments. Nineteen Governors urged Yuan to withstand Japanese threat. They were in favour of resistance to the point of war. A fund called national Salvation Fund, was started and subscribed to by all people for the purpose of preparedness. There were public demonstrations. Japanese goods were boycotted; Chinese students in Japan returned to their own country.

3.3.5.5. **Yuan’s Submission**

Although all the factions of the country rallied under the banner of Yuan in resisting the Japanese pressure, Yuan was fully aware of the fact that China was not in a position to check the attempted military attack. The European powers which had maintained the balance of power in the Far East, and which had the real power to check the Japanese aggressions, were engaged in a life and death struggle in the European Continent. Yuan’s position in China was also somewhat unsteady. He had no other alternative than to accept at least some of the demands. Under the pressure of Japanese ultimatum in May 1915, Yuan accepted the first four groups, while putting reservation on the fifth. Then, without the consent of the legislature, he concluded a treaty with Japan. In the final agreement Group Five was asset aside for future consideration and not given up. Consequently, it continued to hung over the heads of the Chinese as a potential threat.

3.3.5.6. **The result of Submission of Yuan**

The twenty one demands had the unexpected effect of precipitating a fear of imminent extinction and a consequent outburst of nationalism. The news inflamed the public. The merchants organized the wide spread boycott of the Japanese goods. The people vowed to externally resist the great powers and internally expel the traitors. Yuan’s policy of appeasement towards aggressive Japan roused resentment among the Chinese people. Yuan’s popularity was very much lowered and his weakness was exposed to the public, who lost confidence in him. Although the Japanese scored a diplomatic victory over the Chinese, it did not quench the thirst of aggression, but wetted the appetite that resulted in further Japanese aggressive design.

3.3.5.7. **A review of the twenty one demand**

The review of these demands by any true friend of Japan is not a pleasant task. It is only fair to say that the liberal-minded statesmen of the Empire, because of the international suspicion aroused, look upon these demands with regret. Every friend of Japan and China hopes that the agreements will be reviewed at the final Peace Conference in the light of the principles for which the Allies are fighting.

Before the demands were presented to China there were various rumors current concerning them. Many Japanese statements were made advocating a more aggressive policy towards China. Perhaps the most important of these was a secret memorandum of the Black Dragon Society (so-named from its connection with the "Black Dragon" province of Manchuria). This statement was by chance disclosed some months after the serving of the Twenty-one Demands. After outlining the world's situation as it affected China and Japan, it emphasized the necessity of solving the Chinese question at once and of forming a defensive military alliance with China, and
named most of the objectives which were sought later in the Japanese Demands. It also contained a surprisingly accurate forecast of Japanese foreign policy as a result of the war.

As already indicated in the ultimatum to Germany and in Count Okuma's message to America, Japan had made statements concerning the return of Kiaochow and concerning any attempt to secure more territory or privileges from China. But a change of mind was indicated in December by certain statements made in the Japanese Parliament by Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Having been asked if Kiaochow would be returned to China, he stated that the question regarding its future was at present unanswerable, and further that Japan had never committed herself to return Kiaochow to China. This changed attitude was revealed again in the ultimatum which Japan presented to China in May to force acceptance of the Twenty-one Demands. In this ultimatum Japan used the non-restoration of Kiaochow as a weapon with which to coerce China into an acceptance of the Demands. In the ultimatum, she said in part, "From the commercial and military points of view, Kiaochow is an important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and after its acquisition, the Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China." Then, in an accompanying note, she added: "If the Chinese Government accepts all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum, the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China, made on the twenty-sixth of April, will still hold good." In other words, Japan was holding Kiaochow as a pawn to bargain with, and would continue to hold this territory, unless her other demands were satisfied.

These Twenty-one Demands were rather curiously prefaced by the statement: "The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the good neighbourhood between the two nations, agree to the following." They were presented by the Japanese Minister directly to the President, Yuan Shih-kai. The utmost secrecy was maintained and, when rumours became current, the Japanese Government officially denied their existence. A month later, it issued a statement listing only eleven demands, Group V and the more objectionable requests being omitted. On April 26th, in place of the original Twenty-one Demands, twenty-four were presented with slightly different wording. On May 7, an ultimatum was sent by Japan, demanding the immediate acceptance of the first four groups and threatening force if a favourable answer was not received. The fifth group was to be held over for future negotiations.

On May 8, China submitted, at the same time affirming in a supplementary statement that it was forced to take this step and that it would not be responsible for any consequent infringements upon the treaty rights of other nations or the principle of the "Open Door."

The conclusion of these negotiations marked the winning by Japan of most of its original objectives. The hope of making China entirely subservient had not been realized, but Japan's power over the Republic had been enormously increased and the acquiring of final control seemed only a matter of time.

The interest aroused among the nations by these negotiations was, of course, keen, and the matter attracted world-wide publicity. The United States was the only great power not involved in the war in Europe, and it was perhaps natural that it should be the one country openly to voice a protest against the settlement.

3.3.5.8. American opposition to the Japanese demands

Strained relations between Japan and China continued over the Twenty One Demands. The Japanese demands upon China created a strong reaction in the USA. The U.S. Secretary of State Bryan informed the Japanese government unambiguously that the USA would never recognize any treaty between China and Japan which would jeopardize the interest of USA and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of China or the international policy relating to China commonly known as the open door policy. Although Americas condemned the Japanese demands, she nevertheless acknowledge Japan’s special interest in the Chinese provinces of Shantung, Manchuria and East Mongolia.

The US warning, however, proved to be of the little avail and Japan secured most of her demands under the threats of war and persuasion. Japan gained supremacy in Manchuria. China agreed not to transfer any part of her own territory, any port or coastal region to any other power. In one word, Japan closed the door of China to Europe. Next, Japan tried to establish her supremacy in the Far East giving out the slogan of Asia for the Asians.
3.3.5.9. Japan Secured Assurance from Allies

Though China accepted Japan’s special position in Shantung, the Allies declared that the final decision on this issue would be taken after the end of the war. Hence, Japan endeavoured to secure assurance from the big powers separately in regard to her occupation of the province of Shantung. Soon Japan got an opportunity. In 1917 the allies appealed to Japan for her cooperation in protecting their merchants vassals from the Germany submarine attack. Japan agreed to help the Allies on condition that after the war, Britain, France and Italy would recognize Japanese authority over Shantung and some other parts of China. Next Japan opened negotiation with the USA. By the Lansing-Ishii Agreements the USA recognized Japan’s special interest in the Chinese provinces contiguous to Japan.

3.3.6. Lansing-Ishii Agreements

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement ensure Japan to believed that the United States recognized Japan’s special position in China. The United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. Consequently, Japan and the United States were fighting a war on the same side. The Japanese government dispatched Ishii Kikujirō as special envoy in order to coordinate bilateral relations so as to prevent any conflict of interest between the two countries.

It was, naturally, Britain, the ally partner of both Japan and the United States, that strongly hoped for the bilateral coordination. On September 3, 1917, prior to the beginning of official consultations between Ambassador Ishii and U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, the British ambassador to the United States paid a visit to Ishii. The British ambassador told Ishii that, because a satisfactory agreement between the United States and Japan was vital to Britain, he had explained to the U.S. government that Japan’s desire concerning the China issue and the Micronesian islands was quite legitimate.

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was an exceptional document in the history of U.S.-Japan relations in the sense that it made the United States endorse Japan’s special position in China. Had it been negotiated solely bilaterally between the two parties, Japan would never have obtained such an outcome.

This was only possible because, in the first place, Japan was fighting a war on the same side as the United States and because, secondly, the negotiation was aided by Britain’s strong influence and its skilled diplomacy. It would not be an overstatement to say that the greatest loss for Japan from the abolishment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in later years was Britain’s diplomatic influence, particularly concerning the United States.

On September 5, when Ishii visited the British ambassador this time, the latter said to Ishii: Although the United States also unofficially recognizes Japan’s special position in China, it seems hesitant to acknowledge it publicly. Because the U.S. government has never asked foreign governments to acknowledge its Monroe Doctrine, it would not give its endorsement even if Japan asks for it concerning China. Just like the United States, which appears to be content with the Monroe Doctrine without asking for foreign governments’ endorsement, perhaps it may be unnecessary for Japan to ask for U.S. endorsement in writing concerning its position in China.

Thus, the British ambassador even gave Ishii a hint about how Japan could back step in order to prevent the failure to reach an agreement from developing into friction with the United States.

Additionally, the British ambassador had been instructed by the home government to hand a document outlining how Japan had contributed to the Entente Powers since the beginning of World War I to the U.S. secretary of state. The British ambassador’s advice notwithstanding, Japan succeeded in making the U.S. government recognize Japan’s special position in China.

For one thing, the Japanese government had earlier obtained the pledge of the U.S. government concerning Japan’s special interest in Manchuria. When the then Ambassador to the Republic of China Paul Reinsch tried various plots to make inroads into Japan’s concession in Manchuria, Japanese ambassador to the United States Sato Aimaro asked Secretary Lansing for clarification in January 1917. Lansing assured Sato that the U.S. government had never issued such an instruction because it had recognized Japan’s special interest in Manchuria. Although Washington had never made a formal announcement on this issue, he said, it had de facto recognized Japan’s interest and, thus, Washington had no intention to infringe on it. In addition, the British ambassador to the United States acted as a skillful intermediary, leaving both Japan and the United States wide room for compromise. This benefitted Japan during the bilateral negotiations.
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was concluded on November 2, 1917, through an exchange of notes. The deal was struck by Lansing first sending a formal letter to Ishii. In his reply, Ishii directly quoted Lansing’s letter, thus signaling his agreement.

3.3.6.1. Background of the Agreement

If scrutinized closely, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was an enumeration of mutually contradictory principles, which later became controversial. First, the agreement stated that, in recognition of a general principle that special relations emerge between adjacent countries, the United States recognized Japan’s special interest in China, particularly where the territories of the two countries were adjacent to each other. Yet the agreement also declared that China was perfectly entitled to territorial sovereignty and that neither the United States nor Japan had any intention to obstruct China’s independence or its territorial integrity. Pointing to the open-door principle and the principle of equal opportunity vis-à-vis China, the agreement stated that it trusted the Japanese government’s guarantee that Japan would not take any action that would be unbenevolent to other countries’ trade with China, even in the region where Japan had special interests.

Although no significant gap in interpretation had existed between the two countries at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, differences emerged as time went on. At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1919, Lansing announced that the special interests referred to in the agreement did not include political special interest. In contrast, Ishii in his memoir Gaiko Yoroku (Diplomatic Commentaries) wrote: I must say it was a truly astonishing announcement. . . . Japan’s special interests in China that the United States had recognized were mainly of a political nature and those with an economic or commercial nature were only indirectly involved. Otherwise, the joint declaration between our two countries would have been meaningless.

On this comment, Ishii added that it should be noted that Lansing, under pressure from the Republican members of Senate, had been cornered to deemphasize the special interests as much as possible.

On this particular point, perhaps Ishii’s interpretation was accurate. After all, it was obvious to any reader of the agreement that the only special interest that would not affect either sovereignty or territory, or the economic interest of China, would mean nothing but Japan’s political influence in China. Furthermore, anyone knowledgeable about U.S. domestic politics knows that the U.S. government oftentimes does a similar thing to Lansing’s announcement in order to appease Congressional criticism.

Also, in terms of the region to which the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was applied, the United States took a very limited interpretation.

At a meeting with Japanese Ambassador Sato in 1917, Lansing specifically called Sato’s attention to the distinction between Manchuria, where Japan’s special interest is recognized, and Shandong, where Japan’s special interest is not recognized. It was a clear message that the United States had no intention of recognizing Japan’s special interest in China from the beginning, but had made an exception for Manchuria.

This treaty received wild enthusiasm in Japan and they interpreted the phrase ‘special interest’ in a wider sense. It should be admitted that the dispute which had arisen between Japan and America since the introduction of Dollar Diplomacy in the Far East, was definitely resolved by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement and the relations between the two countries improved. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement offered Japan a role to play in the Far East similar to that of America in Western Europe.

In short Japan emerged from the First World War as a great power in the Far East. During the war Japan not only maintained her friendship with Britain, but also secured recognition from the USA, France and Russia to her special position in the Far East.

3.3.7. Japan and the Paris Peace Conference

The Paris Peace Conference marked Japan’s debut on the world stage as a first-class nation. Her role in the war was not significant. But her status differed after the war. Therefore Japan anticipated that this new status would be recognized by the other powers. Such a recognition would also assure her supremacy over the Far East. The Japanese delegation led by Saionji Kinmochi and Makino Nobuaki, chief delegates plenipotentiary, included such future foreign ministers as Matsuoka Yosuke, Arita Hachiro, Shigemitsu Mamoru, and Yoshida Shigeru, as well as future prime minister Konoe Fumimaro. Having somehow survived the age of imperialism after opening its
doors and having managed to win the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, Japan in those days, however, was still a country bumpkin in the world. It was not equipped with the ability to play a major diplomatic role in the international arena.

The Japanese representatives Baron Makino Nobuaki and Viscount Chinda Sutemi put forward three demands at the Paris Peace Conference. Firstly, Japan asked for the cession of the Marianas, Carolines and Marshalls islands in the North Pacific ocean which belonged to Germany formerly. She also demanded the confirmation of her claims to the former rights of Germany in the Shantung province. The third demand of Japan was to issue a declaration regarding the acceptance of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals to ensure racial equality among states as a basis principle of the League of Nations that was in formation. These demands were based on the principle of conquest and possession. It was also backed by the secret treaties signed by the European powers with Japan and also with China in May 1915. However, when China consented to transfer Kiaochow to Japan on condition that Japan would return this leasehold to China by reserving for herself the right for the German economic right there, all these had legalized Japan’s claims for the possession of the Kiaochow province. During the discussions Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, France, Italy and Belgium also demanded for the inclusion of these provinces in their own. China herself desired to possess them. Ultimately the Mandates were created to settle the issue to the satisfaction of the American President.

The German islands of North Pacific came under the class “C” Mandate to Japan while England was to hold the mandate over the German South Pacific islands. As regards the declaration of racial equality the vote was divided and not unanimous. Therefore, the proposal was defeated. It was followed by a demand of the Chinese delegates for the abrogation of all the treaties of 1915. Thereby, the special position of Japan in south Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia were affected. Even Shantung was also to be lost. At this stage Japan threatened that she would withdraw from the conference if the demand for Shantung was not met with. Therefore, Woodrow Wilson upheld this by a reservation that Chinese sovereignty in Shantung would be restored in future. By this China felt offended and refused to sign the final treaty when this provision was included in the articles of the treaty. Though the gains of Japan were very meager it may be pointed out that she emerged as one of the Big Five Powers from the Paris Peace Conference. Her prestige was greatly enhanced in the international politics.

Japan had to rely on the skilled diplomacy of Britain, its alliance partner, to escape catastrophe during the most important negotiation at the Paris Peace Conference. After the delegation returned to Japan, Saionji reported to the Emperor on the exchanges during the Peace Conference. Saionji enumerated three major agendas that the delegation, regrettably, had failed to realize despite its best efforts. First, the Micronesian islands that Japan had wished to territorialize ended up being put under mandate of the League of Nations owing to the powerful argument made by the United States. Second, endorsement of Japan’s proposal for the abolishment of racial discrimination could not be secured due to adamant resistance from the British colonies. Third, even with the support of the Entente Powers on Japan’s position, China refused to sign the treaty on the Shandong Peninsula, raising sympathy among some members of the U.S. delegation.

3.3.8. Conclusion

The image of Japan that was held by its Asian neighbors suffered lasting damage at the end of World War I. The hopes of Chinese liberals, not to say revolutionaries, declined as Japan pursued Great Power politics in the matter of the Twenty-one Demands. Japan’s intervention in Siberia was motivated in part by fears that Bolshevism might spread south of the Amur River border, and the Terauchi government invested substantial sums of money (the “Nishihara loans”) in efforts to stabilize the northern border by backing conservative northern military leaders. The “modern” forces equipped in response were however soon crushed in the civil wars that now began to plague China. But nothing did damage to compare with the suppression of the March 1 independence demonstration in Korea and the May 4 demonstrations in China.

In the aftermath of the Allied victory in World War I there was widespread hope throughout Asia-certainly among students and intellectuals-that a new and more just world order was at hand. Some of this was poignant and naive, as in rumors in Korea that Woodrow Wilson would appear to restore the country’s sovereignty, but a more literate generation in China had every reason to expect that bases seized from the Germans would be returned by
the Japanese. The Twenty-one Demands had shown this would not be simple, but the Paris conference, Treaty of Versailles, and League of Nations might still correct this matter, as indeed Wilson had hoped they would. Unfortunately the Japanese, having been forced to abandon their demand for a statement of racial equality at Versailles, were in no mood to give way on matters of economic and territorial interest to them, and in this they had the support of agreements they had worked out with their European allies.

3.3.9. Summary

- Within two decades of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was the strongest power in Asia. It increased its stature and emerged as one of the five Great Powers, with a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. The First World War came as a golden opportunity for Japan for the fulfillment of imperialistic ambition.
- After the outbreak of Great War Japan could not remain neutral nor she wished to remain so. On the appeal of England, Japan joined the first world war on August 23, 1914, when Germany did not heard on Shantung ultimatum.
- Japan made her infamous twenty one demands in January 1915, Japan had taken over the German leasehold in Shantung. These demands if accepted would turn China into a colony of Japan. The western powers which needed Japanese help in the prosecution of the war did not intervene.
- The Japanese demands upon China created a strong reaction in the USA. The USA did not recognize the twenty one demand.
- The Lansing-Ishii Agreement signed in 1917 ensure Japan to believed that the United States recognized Japan’s special position in China.
- The Paris Peace Conference marked Japan’s debut on the world stage as a first-class nation.
- Though the gains of Japan were very meager it may be pointed out that she emerged as one of the Big Five Powers from the Paris Peace Conference. Her prestige was greatly enhanced in the international politics.

3.3.10. Exercise

1. Write an essay on the role played by Japan in the First World War.
2. Discuss the clauses and consequences of Twenty One Demand.
3. First World War include Japan in the big five power of the world. Discuss.
4. Bring out the importance of Lansing-Ishii Agreement for post first world war Japan.
5. Enumerate the gain and loss of Japan in the Paris Peace conference.

3.3.11. Further Reading


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Unit-4
Chapter-1

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1895-1939;
Economic development, Industrial growth, Agricultural development and Foreign trade.

Structure
4.1.0. Objective
4.1.1. Introduction
4.1.2. Political Development of Japan 1895-1939
  4.1.2.1. The Election
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4.1.3. Economic Development
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  4.1.3.4. Economy in the Inter War Period
  4.1.3.5. Emerging Economy
  4.1.3.6. Disaster and Economic Recovery
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4.1.7. Further Reading
4.1.0. Objectives

This chapter deals with the political and economic development of Japan from the first Sino-Japanese war to the starting of second world war. After reading this chapter, you will be able to:

- trace the origin of modern politics in Japan from Meiji Era to Military rule;
- describe the development of political idea, institutions and election in modern Japan;
- be acquainted with the condition favorable for the economic growth of Japan from late 19th to early 20th century;
- trace the Impact economic development of Japan in her society and polity;
- Appreciate the role of agricultural development for the economic growth of Japan.

4.1.1. Introduction

Victory in the First Sino-Japanese War brought immense glory to Japan. The newly modernize Japan with a modern political setup emerge in the arena of world power as major shareholder. Very soon Japan dominate the politics of entire Far Eastern World. This was possible because of a host of factor, such as the development of democratic governance like those of few western powers and unprecedented economic development of this pacific island nations. This chapter will discuss how the new political setup and economic measures resulted in the emergence of modern Japan.

4.1.2. Political Development of Japan 1895-1939

The first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) forms a watershed in the history of Japan. The constitutional Government of Japan was initiated by the proclamation of the constitution in 1889. There were Liberal Party (Jiyuto) and the Progressive Party (Kaishinto) during this period. The former was organized by Itagaki and the latter by Okuma. Gradually, ideals, principles and ideology were emerging within their groups. Military bureaucrats exercised great influence at this juncture.

In July 1890 Japan carried out its first national election under the Meiji Constitution. Japan’s was the first attempt to inaugurate representative government outside the narrow band of countries bordering on the Atlantic, and Japanese were well aware that many Western observers doubted that a country little more than two decades out of warrior rule could do so successfully. Constitutional government was the monopoly of industrialized and “advanced” countries of the West, and it seemed absurd to think that a country so recently “primitive,” a country whose people still had “thongs between their toes,” as one Japanese diplomat in Europe scornfully dismissed traditional footwear, could carry it off. Thus the grant of the constitution, and the election that followed, were solemn occasions that represented the hope for a different future.

Yet it was not the first election for those who took part. Prefectural assemblies had been elected since 1875 as part of the compromise with which the Meiji leaders lured Itagaki back into their ranks, and local councils of many sorts followed the same route. Most such, like the prefectural assemblies themselves, had powers that were sharply limited, and they were often designed as advisory bodies to cloak the authority of the appointed governors. Even so, this did not keep them from becoming thorny problems for those governors, and the adversarial nature of their responses to those governors mirrored the discontent that had surfaced in the political party movements of the 1880s.

The Meiji Constitution, drawn up during those same years, was designed as a generous gift of power sharing by a compassionate sovereign. But the sovereignty that made it possible to share was not lessened by that generosity, and the language of the constitution left little doubt that the throne remained paramount. The constitution had been worked out by Satsuma and Cho shu leaders who had accumulated towering prestige as founders of the regime and servants of the throne during careers in which they had developed strong ties of patronage across palace, official, business, and political circles. To a large degree, future characteristics of parliamentary government in Japan were to be seen in the politics of the period between 1890 and the end of the Meiji period in 1912, and that justifies a closer look at the first election and the early cabinets.

4.1.2.1. The Election

In its determination to minimize the possibility of rootless radicalism, the Election Law limited the franchise to men who paid a direct national tax of 15 yen. In 1890 the land tax provided 60 percent of government
revenue, and this provision meant that landlords would be well represented in the electorate and those it chose. The number of those qualified to vote numbered 450,365, a figure rather close to the total membership of the old samurai class. But most samurai had long since parted with their pensions, and the new electorate was geared to men of property. This was even more apparent in the provision for representation of very high taxpayers in the House of Peers; the fifteen highest taxpayers of each metropolitan city and prefecture could select one of their number every seven years, but the same rule stipulated that their wealth had to be in land, industry, or commerce. Securities, bonds, and stocks did not qualify as “property.”

More than one thousand candidates competed for the three hundred seats in the House of Representatives. The Jiyuto and Kaishinto, political parties that had sprung back to life by combining to campaign against “weak-kneed” government diplomacy in the late 1880s, provided the majority of these. But by 1890 it proved impossible to maintain the unity of the Grand Alliance, or united front, and the two parties were prepared for vigorous combat. There was also a broad spectrum of small and splinter groups. All election manifestos reflected the impassioned objections to the treaty reform proposals of the 1880s and stressed the importance of maintaining national dignity. There were also calls for party, or at least for “responsible,” cabinets, for greater freedom of speech and association, and for the reduction of taxes and government expenditure, with an underlying assumption that Japan stood at the threshold of a new age of participation and decision.

Election campaigning was accompanied by a fair amount of generosity; the return of favor for favor was deeply built into concepts of public morality. There was also some intimidation; strong-arm tactics were familiar to those engaged in party warfare of the 1880s. The turnout on that July day was, predictably, high. Of those eligible to vote, 97 percent did so. Of those elected 191 were commoners and 109 were former shizoku, an indication of the speed with which the class and status assumption of centuries had changed. Of those elected 125 listed agriculture as their profession and may safely be considered landlords. The next highest group (33) came from trade and commerce, followed by law, government officials, and journalism in that order. Two-thirds were less than forty-three years old. It is not surprising that from their numbers could come figures who would dominate electoral politics and the Imperial Diet until the years of World War II.

The economic power and local influence these voters had acquired under the old order gave them the confidence, self-interest, and potential for political action. Not infrequently, this was accompanied by a smug provincialism that saw the whole process as proof of the validity and superiority of Japanese society.

4.1.2.2. Politics under the Meiji Constitution

The Meiji Constitution said nothing about the prime minister or cabinet, but spoke of “Ministers of State.” Executive authority remained ambiguous, no doubt because it might be interpreted to interfere with the emperor’s powers. It was not explained how prime ministers were to be selected. In practice the senior statesmen decided on the rotation to be followed, after which the emperor charged the designee to form a government in what became known as the great command.

The constitution guaranteed many rights, but with the exception of the right to property they were invariably conditioned by the phrase “within the limits of the law”; property, of course, was central to a modern capitalist society. “Every law,” said Article 37, “requires the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Diet members were free from arrest “unless with the consent of the House” during the session, “except in cases of flagrant dereliction or of offenses connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble.” What turned out to be central to the Diet’s clout was the power of the purse. “The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget,” said Article 64. Article 71 went on to allow that “when the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.” From the very first session the sharpest conflicts between Diet and government centered on the budget. The House of Representatives would consider it first, and next the House of Peers.

As Japan entered its modern century of war and expansion, the Meiji state needed ever more revenue. The government could dissolve the Diet and call for new elections, as it did several times, but it could be no more
confident of besting the political party dominated House of Representatives thereafter, for too often the same men were returned.

The Diet had no say, however, in the formation of cabinets. Throughout the remainder of the Meiji period the continuity of the original group that had formed the institutions they now had to direct provided a remarkable study in what anthropologists might describe as "village governance." The persistence of Satsuma-Choshu domination in turn guaranteed the intransigence of the political party leaders who had experienced repression in the 1880s while being kept out of the drafting process. They had now been given an arena for combat, and made good use of it. All too often, they saw it as their mission to bring down governments made up of their enemies.

According to the constitution, the prime minister was seldom more than a first among equals. It was only late in life, and in some cases after their death, that they became national heroes. The usual reaction of the prime minister to an unpleasant impasse with the Imperial Diet was to resign and challenge his successor to do better. The oligarchs, as we may now call them, were frequently in disagreement as to how the government should treat the Diet. Yamagata began things with a lofty announcement that the government should be above party politics in the Diet, and that it was the Diet's duty to provide the legislation and money that was needed. When in trouble, he was not slow to use money or the threat or actuality of dissolution to try to bring the Diet to heel. Ito, determined to make the constitution he had created work, took a milder line and tried for cooperation with the Diet.

Another tactic was to manipulate the emperor in such a way as to bring the parties around. Ito, who was the most trusted of the emperor's ministers, used this tactic several times. When the Diet was withholding funds for naval expansion in 1893 an imperial rescript lowered all official salaries by 10 percent for six years and announced an annual palace contribution of 100,000 yen. Faced with this austere example, the House of Representatives complied.

From an early point military-civil relations were also at issue. The constitution reserved all functions of command to the sovereign, and the military officials who sat as ministers were quick to use this in their attempt to sway the government on the issue of increases in budget allocations. In 1892, when war and navy ministers refused to attend cabinet meetings and submitted their resignations, Matsukata was prepared to step down as prime minister, but the emperor told him there was no need to do so. In the end Matsukata resigned after all because of his difficulty in persuading the services to provide successor cabinet members. The question of military autonomy remained in the forefront of attention until 1900, when Yamagata secured imperial ordinances limiting service as war and navy minister to generals and admirals on active duty. From that point on the services had an important weapon at hand for the coercion of cabinet cooperation in service expansion. Military expenditure was indeed the fastest-growing part of government expenditure, and foreign war played a major role in this. Diet debates about budgets showed a lively awareness that Japanese taxpayers were being asked to provide a far higher percentage of their income than were their counterparts in Europe, where industrial and consumption taxes had long since passed land taxes as the principal source of government income.

It is clear that the inauguration of the Imperial Diet constituted a basic change in the rules of Japanese politics. In rural Japan change in the conditions of life was still slow, but at the center the clash between new interest groups struggling for the control of new institutions made the structured ritual of bakufu and domain government seem centuries earlier. The genro were frequently at odds as to how best to respond to the new challenge they faced, and their disunity provided openings for political party and splinter groups. The disunity of those groups in turn provided opportunities for the Meiji politicians. Throughout the first decade the importance of the House of Representatives grew, and by mid-decade Ito had found it advisable to offer a cabinet post to Itagaki of the Jiyuto. Matsukata, not to be outdone, brought Okuma on board, and in 1898 the oligarchs even experimented with the short-lived Okuma-Itagaki cabinet. It soon failed, but the need for cooperation with political parties in the Diet nevertheless became more pressing. Two years later Ito finally had his way and organized a party of his own, the Rikken Seiyukai, or Friends of Constitutional Government, into which he lured most of the Jiyu to Diet representatives. By that time party and tax battles had turned on the issue of rural-urban competition, each claiming the other should pay more of the bill for building the modern state. Economic change and developing industrialization guaranteed the outcome. The 60 percent of government revenues borne by Japan’s
farmers in 1890 had changed to half that percentage in 1900, with consumer (37 percent), business (8 percent), and customs fees (6 percent) steadily becoming more important.

After 1900 cabinet leadership shifted to a successor group with alternation between Saionji Kinmochi (1849-1940), Ito’s chosen successor as Seiyu kai leader, and General Katsura Taro (1847-1913), who could usually count on the support of the urban-based Kenseito representatives. A modus Vivendi had been worked out between the government and opposition groups. By now elements of future political life were firmly in place: a specialist bureaucracy, selected by merit and removed from party politics, military service specialists who regarded themselves as members of a selfless elite devoted to the emperor’s cause, firmly based political parties with strong constituency support in countryside and growing industrial sectors, and a top-level elite of senior statesmen who found it increasingly difficult to maintain control of the ship of state but who were hard to attack because they were, in institutional terms, invisible. The political parties had, in a sense, been co-opted, but they had also shown themselves essential to the operation of constitutional government. The process had not been without its problems, but Japan had emerged as the first non-Atlantic country to make a go of constitutional government and representative politics. Japanese had reason to be proud.

The Meiji era was not followed by as neat and logical a periodization. The Emperor Meiji symbolized the changes of his period so perfectly that at his death in July 1912 there was a clear sense that an era had come to an end. His successor, who was assigned the era name Taisho (Great Righteousness), was never well, and demonstrated such embarrassing indications of mental illness that his son Hirohito succeeded him as regent in 1922 and remained in that office until his father’s death in 1926, when the era name was changed to Showa. The 1920s are often referred to as the “Taisho period,” but the Taisho emperor was in nominal charge only until 1922; he was unimportant in life and his death was irrelevant. Far better, then, to consider the quarter century between the Russo-Japanese War and the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as the next era of modern Japanese history.

There is overlap at both ends, with Meiji and with the resurgence of the military, but the years in question mark important developments in every aspect of Japanese life. They are also years of irony and paradox. Japan achieved success in joining the Great Powers and reached imperial status just as the territorial grabs that distinguished nineteenth-century imperialism came to an end, and its image changed with dramatic swiftness from that of newly founded empire to stubborn advocate of imperial privilege. Its military and naval might approached world standards just as those standards were about to change, and not long before the disaster of World War I produced revulsion from armament and substituted enthusiasm for arms limitations. World War I and its aftermath, together with the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923, brought profound changes in social, intellectual, and urban consciousness. In some ways these years brought a growth in democracy and a setback in civil rights, and both found support within Japanese society.

4.1.2.3. Steps toward Party Government

The Meiji Constitution was deliberately vague on the subject of executive responsibility. Sovereignty and final authority in all matters rested with the throne, but at the same time the ruler had to be protected from active participation lest he be found fallible. What resulted was a curious sort of pluralism in which many participated and no one was ultimately responsible. The prime ministers were relatively weak, especially in the early years when they sat with ministers who were their equals. Cabinet ministers presided over relatively autonomous organizations; the Home and Justice ministries, with responsibility for local government and the national police, were particularly powerful. Since the emperor was in theory commander of all armed services, the ministers of the army and navy reported directly to him, but they in turn were selected from the generals and admirals on the active list by their respective general staffs. The lifting of this requirement between the years from 1913 to 1936 marked a significant, though temporary, step forward, but the services remained vital to the political process. Powerful bodies were beyond the control of the elected members of the House of Representatives. The Privy Council, made up of imperial appointees, had to be invoked for key decisions of constitutional interpretation and national policy. The House of Peers, a mix of hereditary aristocrats and imperial appointees, was susceptible to influence by government figures who, like Yamagata Aritomo, had the opportunity to nominate members. After each
successful war its lower ranks had been swollen by titles granted members of the armed services. In later years leading industrialists also took their place with other leading taxpayers and imperial appointees who included distinguished academics. In other words the House of Representatives, itself elected by voters who qualified for suffrage by a direct tax, was one contender for power, and badly outmatched except for the constitutional requirement that it approve the budget.

Thanks to this provision, cabinets had found it steadily more necessary to work out arrangements with the lower house, and in their struggles with it the Satsuma-Choshu oligarchs had to a large extent had to submerge the differences that divided them in order to present a solid and seemingly harmonious front. At first they had thought of political parties as a source of partisan disunity and tried to adopt a posture of transcendence or superiority, lecturing the representatives on their responsibility to cooperate.

After the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 the oligarchs found it wise to add party leaders with impeccable Restoration credentials to their cabinets. Itagaki Taisuke and Okuma Shigenobu came to hold seats under Ito and Matsukata respectively. In 1898 the genro, at Ito’s urging, even experimented with a cabinet jointly led by the two party leaders, but it soon failed because of internal disunity. Ito now got the idea of organizing his own party. He was tired, he wrote, of the horse-trading necessary for cooperation with the lower house, and he needed his own army instead of having to deal with mercenaries. His colleagues, particularly Yamagata, had been firmly opposed to this at first and blocked it. It was Yamagata who followed the Itagaki-Okuma cabinet, and it was then that he secured an imperial ordinance that restricted the service posts to commanders on the active list in order to safeguard governments from party control. Thus the services, by refusing to approve, or withdrawing, a minister, could block or bring down the cabinet.

It was in 1900 that Ito had his way and organized his party, the Friends of Constitutional Government (Rikken Seiyu kai). Most of its members were former Liberal Party adherents, drawn to the new organization by the lure of power and patronage under the leadership of the author of the constitution itself.

Yamagata remained hostile to the idea. He promptly nominated Ito as his successor prime minister before the latter’s preparations were complete, and then quietly sabotaged the new cabinet that Ito formed. Shortly afterward he managed to have the emperor appoint Ito to head the Privy Council, forcing him to end his role in party politics by ceding control to Saionji Kinmochi. Not long after that Ito’s assignment to Korea removed him from political altogether. The genro were thus far from united. For the early years of constitutional government the prime minister’s chair alternated between leaders from Satsuma and those from Choshu. After 1900 Satsuma was out of the running for over a decade, but a new alternation took place between Katsura Taro, an army protégé of Yamagata’s, and Saionji, as heir to Ito’s political party. It was now to some extent a Choshu world. But within that world rivalries remained: two powerful men, foreign policy alternatives, and civil-military priorities. What distinguished this last decade of Meiji was a rather patterned, gentlemanly competition of a sort possible only between men who had worked together for half a century and who had begun to be aware that other, new forces might threaten their ascendancy. No one was ever allowed to “fail,” and exquisite care was taken to avoid loss of face.

Katsura experienced a remarkable recovery. It was on his watch that the alliance with England was formed, the decision taken to stand up to Russia, and the Russo-Japanese War carried to its successful conclusion. The great Hibiya riots against the failure of the Portsmouth treaty to include a Russian indemnity forced Katsura’s resignation. He now recommended Saionji as his successor. In 1908, when disputes over the size of military appropriations brought Saionji down, he in turn recommended Katsura as his successor. This time the annexation of Korea stood as Katsura’s accomplishment, with the result that he was elevated in rank to duke or prince (koshaku). Katsura was far from a free agent, in other words, and his restiveness under these restrictions led him in turn to think about organizing his own political party, as Ito had done before him. His old mentor Yamagata still objected. In 1911 it was Saionji’s turn once again. He was in office during the Meiji emperor’s final illness, but shortly after that a dispute with the army once more brought him down. Saionji, the only court aristocrat (kuge) among the oligarchs, was now asked to serve as genro, and the last to be so honored. After the death of Yamagata in 1922 and Matsukata in 1924 it fell to Saionji, until his death in 1940, to advise the court on the selection of new
prime ministers. Katsura, for his part, was quietly removed from politics by being elevated to the imperial court as lord privy seal and grand chamberlain. Yamagata had not changed his mind about political parties.

Saionji’s eminence had given the Seiyukai access to power, but the most important political figure of the party was not Saionji, who was a rather languid aristocrat, but Hara Takashi (Kei, 1856–1921), who was to form a political party cabinet, the first to be structured and headed by a party politician, in 1918. Hara showed little doubt about his commitment to representative government and in particular the House of Representatives. Early on he voluntarily gave up his classification as “former samurai,” and he consistently resisted offers of a peerage that would have forced him out of the House of Representatives. For this some contemporary observers hailed him as “the great commoner.”

Hara made no particular effort to ingratiate himself with the ordinary people whose cause he was supposed to champion. He had begun as a government official; he held a number of important diplomatic posts, and worked particularly closely with Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. His background also included a period as editor of the Osaka Mainichi as well as business posts. He was, in other words, very much part of the establishment and he had a record that inspired confidence. In addition, however, he was an adroit participant in political decisions. He had played an important role in the establishment of his party in 1900. Thereafter he helped keep its members in line in Diet negotiations. More important, probably, was his skill in pork barrel politics. Under his leadership a broad-gauge railroad the length of the land that the military wanted was given up in favor of politically popular projects of local lines, roads, bridges, ports, and other improvements that gratified electoral supporters. At the same time Hara kept a careful eye on Yamagata, now easily the single most powerful of the oligarchs, and did his best to develop a position of trust with him. He made little headway in this for many years, but when he finally came to power he was rewarded by the old soldier’s frank admiration of the hard line he took on maintaining social order.

The orderly alternation of political power that characterized the last decade of the Meiji era broke down at the very inception of the next. Katsura had assumed his court positions and taken on the role of the new emperor’s political tutor a few months after Emperor Meiji’s death and a few months before Saionji, refusing to agree to the army’s demand for two additional divisions, resigned in December of 1912. The wrathful resignation of the army minister, General Uehara Yusaku, brought down the cabinet, and there was no hope that the army would nominate a successor unless its demands were met. What followed became known as the “Taisho political crisis,” and it became an important step toward political party cabinets. The council of genro, now much depleted despite the addition of Saionji, met repeatedly in search of a successor prime minister. A number of men, most of them Yamagata disciples, were approached, but none of them wanted to inherit Saionji’s problem. In December Katsura offered to break the deadlock by resigning his court offices to form his third cabinet. There was widespread shock and resentment, particularly on the part of politicians who had thought the day of party cabinets was finally at hand. They charged that Katsura had violated his word, forsaken his responsibilities to the young emperor, and dragged the court into politics. A political coalition was formed to “Protect the Constitution.” Katsura, meanwhile, had begun work on a new political party, the Rikken Doshikai, that drew its strength from the non- and anti-Seiyukai strength in the Diet, but he had become the focus of long pentup anger.

Katsura was followed by Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyoe in a “Satsuma” and “navy” cabinet. That cabinet, however, was soon brought down by discovery of corruption and kickbacks in naval contracts with foreign, especially German, suppliers. The genro, disconcerted once again, turned a last time to one of their own generation in the hope for stability and chose Okuma Shigenobu. Okuma was now close to senility and in no sense the maverick of his youth. He accepted the office of prime minister in the expectation of Diet support from the Doshikai, the party Katsura had launched, since many of its members could trace their political lineage to Okuma’s career. The real leadership of the cabinet, however, came from Kato Takaaki, who held the post of foreign minister. Kato’s influence on all aspects of the administration was so great that some of Okuma’s most trusted lieutenants were dismayed.

Kato had served as ambassador to Great Britain, and his fondness for things English was legendary. Yamagata sometimes referred to him disparagingly as “Our Englishman.” He failed to consult or even inform the senior statesmen in the way that had become usual; in the matter of the Twenty-one Demands, as will be seen
below, their caution would have been preferable to his headstrong tactics. This mattered, for diplomacy played a central role in Okuma’s administration. The relatively close coordination that had characterized Japanese policymaking during the rule of the oligarchs was now becoming slack and sometimes clumsy. After taking office Okuma dissolved the Diet and called for new elections; in those the Doshikai gained a solid majority, thereby ending the absolute majority the Seiyukai had enjoyed since its formation in 1900.

But not for long. In 1917 army and Choshu leaders managed to replace Okuma with General Terauchi Masatake. Terauchi tried to govern without securing the support of either party group in the House of Representatives, but this attempt to turn the clock back failed badly. Nature and economics conspired against the government when rice riots broke out in 1918. These began in July in fishing villages on the Japan Sea coast, where women gathered to protest the shipment of rice to the Osaka market, and followed communication lines to the great industrial cities of eastern Japan. The country was wracked by demonstrations, strikes, and riots that were directed against the rich and the police. Desperate to restore order, the government bolstered the police presence with armed troops; some 25,000 people were arrested, and 6,000 convicted, with sentences ranging from fines to execution. The social paroxysm of the rice riots, was an important element in the emergence of the Hara party cabinet. The government’s response was neither effective nor successful, and Japan needed a new prime minister once again.

By this time there were grounds to expect the elders to endorse a political party cabinet, but bureaucrats, peers, genro, and the military were still reluctant. Nevertheless in the aftermath of the rice riots there seemed no real alternative. Hara, who had played his cards very carefully, finally had his chance. He had avoided open rupture with Terauchi and quietly lent him his support, and he had even won the grudging respect of Yamagata. His cabinet, which lasted until his assassination in 1921, marked the real dawn of political party governments.

Even so, after Hara’s death conservative forces still dreamed of a system in which “independent” cabinets would be able to negotiate with a divided Diet without becoming dependent on the electorate. A cabinet was formed under Kiyoura Keigo. This, however, lasted just six months. The hapless Kiyoura government provoked a massive “Protect the Constitution” opposition movement that brought Seiyu-kai and Kenseikai (the new name adopted by the Doshikai in 1916) together into a powerful front that led to the appointment of Kato Takaaki as head of a coalition government in the summer of 1924. Political party cabinets now seemed certain to govern Japan in the future.

The chart of prime ministers and cabinets suggests some interesting things about the politics of Japan between the wars. One is the frequency of cabinet transfers. Meiji cabinets changed frequently, to be sure—there were eleven between the inception of the cabinet system in 1885 and the Russo-Japanese War—but only six prime ministers, as the leaders of factions, tended to serve in rotation. Between the Russo-Japanese War and the Manchurian Incident the velocity of rotation continued—there were eighteen cabinet changes—but now there were fourteen prime ministers. The search for stability was never very successful. Those who proposed candidates for succession never worked out a system that could combine acceptability to the plural institutions that the constitutional order had created with responsibility to the increasingly vociferous electorate. If different prime ministers came and went with such frequency, more and more of the everyday decisions had to lie with the bureaucracy, for that was where legislation originated.

There was also an impressive mortality rate among prime ministers. Both Kato Tomosaburo and Kato Takaaki died in office from natural causes, but in addition there were three assassinations—those of Hara, Hamaguchi, and Inukai, and of these Hara and Hamaguchi possessed particularly vital and virtually irreplaceable talents. The assassination of the three prime ministers in office was in each case related to problems of foreign policy. Hara fell victim to a rightist who objected to the way the prime minister had forced compliance with the naval limitations being worked out at the Washington Conference, Hamaguchi too had overruled navy opposition to reductions worked out at the London Naval Conference, and Inukai was murdered by young naval officers newly returned from the violence at Shanghai that the government had managed to stop. The flash point of violence was particularly low whenever civilian interference with military prerogatives was involved.
It is not surprising that as the party leaders came closer to political power they changed. In the early days of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement their constituency was smaller and made up of substantial citizens and local leaders. It was easy to denounce Satsuma and Choshu men who monopolized power, especially when the emperor himself had promised institutions of representative government. But in the Meiji institutional pattern the leaders became part of the palace system, or managed to draw the palace into their system; “hiding behind the throne,” in Ozaki’s words. In the early days demonstrations and public forums had drawn the participation of leading politicians; as late as the Hibiya riots against the peace with Russia the lead had been taken by stalwarts of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement. But in the interwar years the crowds were larger, rowdier, and less interested in speeches; urban workers and the poor began to predominate, and the politicians increasingly saved their rhetoric for one another on the Diet floor. The original leaders had been “popular,” but popular with their peers; they had less in common with the new urban crowd, and that crowd had its doubts about them as well.

4.1.2.4. The political agenda

Since the lower house of the Diet was the only elective organ of the national government, that meant control of the Diet by the House of Representatives, and since the political parties contested control of that house, “democracy” meant in practice governments elected and run by the political parties. The obstacles—senior statesmen, peers, Privy Council, military—were real, and this meant that tremendous effort had to be expended in wresting final authority from those groups. Since it was the emperor who had granted the constitution, moreover, this was the people’s right, and any obstruction of it by elements claiming to represent the emperor was in violation of the imperial pledge.

The widespread popular support for the “protect the constitution” movements of 1912–1913 and 1924, when Katsura and Kiyoura cabinets seemed a clear contravention of “constitutional government,” shows that this view had spread beyond the circle of politicians. This in turn led to demands for a wider, indeed a universal suffrage to make it possible for the people’s will to be known. The tax qualifications for voting rights at the outset of parliamentary government meant an electorate of approximately half a million males. Even before the end of the Meiji period efforts were under way to broaden this. A league to petition for universal manhood suffrage was first formed in 1897. It is interesting to see that from the very beginning its goals were preventive—heading off the social dislocation its leaders saw in Europe—and positive—the realization that popular opinion would count for more if there was more of it. As had been the case from the first days of Itagaki’s petition in 1874, there were also implications for nationalism and foreign policy. Popular indignation against Japan’s submission to the Triple Intervention would, the league’s founders felt, have been more effective if it could have been expressed by ballot. The Hibiya riots of 1905 in opposition to the Portsmouth treaty showed the same potential.

A petition for universal manhood suffrage was first presented to the Diet in 1900, and bills calling for that step were introduced several times before the House of Representatives voted for such a measure by a narrow majority in 1911. The House of Peers refused to agree, thus killing the bill. As Japan found itself allied with democratic powers in World War I this view gained support, and by 1919 the Kenseikai had endorsed universal suffrage despite the opposition of the majority Seiyu kai. Tax qualifications for the vote had been lowered in 1900 (from fifteen yen to ten) and again in 1919 (to three yen), but it remained obvious that rural landowners were disproportionately advantaged in comparison with un-propertied urban workers.

In the years after World War I public expressions of support for universal suffrage seemed to wane, partly because significant numbers of urban workers—the most likely supporters of demonstrations—began distancing themselves altogether from elective politics. This made the issue more urgent than ever to its proponents, who saw it as a way to stem the advance of radicalism. With the appearance of the Kato Takaaki coalition government in 1924 Kensei kai supporters of universal manhood suffrage had their way, and the bill passed in 1925. The legislation had been drafted with care. Suffrage was limited to men, although by this time a women’s suffrage movement had also been launched. The vote was restricted to males twenty-five years of age or over, but only if they had not been recipients of private or public welfare. In the years that followed reformers proposed lowering the age qualification, but no further action came until after Japan’s surrender in 1945, when the Allied Occupation ordered the enfranchisement of all men and women. Despite the shortcomings of the 1925 legislation, the change
was the most important political achievement of the era and it proved successful and significant. Up to this point general elections had usually been called by cabinets newly installed in power, and the voters’ discontent with the predecessor government, combined with election “management” by patronage and money, produced a Diet majority for the newcomers. As a result elections functioned rather like plebiscites, and more often than not served to endorse the ruling cabinet.

The first election held under the new rules was called in 1928 by Prime Minister General Tanaka Giichi, who clearly expected this tradition to continue. The electorate had now quadrupled, from roughly 3.25 to 12.5 million. To Tanaka’s surprise his government formed with only a narrow victory. His Seiyu kai won 219 seats, and the opposition Minseito 217, with the remaining 30 seats going to splinter (24) and “proletarian” (6) candidates, who drew 190,000 votes. What were the political parties? In one sense they were groups of professional politicians, some of whom shifted back and forth with dismaying indifference to principle. Loyalty, name recognition, and habit could make some constituencies very safe for the incumbent. Ozaki Yukio on one occasion lamented that Japan had no real parties, but only factions. Certainly he himself never stayed with a party very long, and he did organize his own faction for a time. On the other hand the parties were far from authoritarian, and even the Seiyu kai, in Hara’s prime, had an elective board of councilors that discussed important matters that were referred to it by the executive staff. The parties were no more subject to individual or personal hegemony than any other element of Japan’s political pluralism. As the electorate grew in size and the parties became more powerful leadership, as has been noted, began to be drawn from men who had gained administrative skill in civil and military bureaucracies. Those individuals saw that the parties offered paths to influence and power, while parties, locked in their own struggles for power, looked to such outsiders as men who could lead them to political victory.

The Seiyu kai’s election of General Tanaka as its president provided a perfect example of this; he needed support for his political and foreign policy goals, while his new followers wanted a powerful advocate. Hamaguchi Osachi (1870-1931), the last Minseito premier, provides an example. Born in a remote Tosa village in 1870, he became an adoptive son of a Hamaguchi family in 1889, graduated from the Imperial University in 1895, and stood for the examinations for the Ministry of Finance. He advanced rapidly, heading tax offices in various parts of the country. In 1917 he resigned to enter the Do shikai at the recommendation of Goto Shinpei, whom we first encountered as a young doctor sent to watch over Itagaki, and who went on to a varied career as diplomat, administrator, and empire builder. Hamaguchi first stood for election (from a Tosa district) in 1915, held subcabinet posts in the Okuma administration, and emerged as minister of finance under Kato Takaaki in 1924. Under Kato’s successor, Wakatsuki, he was appointed minister of home affairs. By now he was a recognized party and governmental leader and the logical head when the Kenseikai reorganized as the Minseito in 1927. When the Tanaka government fell Hamaguchi received the imperial command to form a cabinet, in the process becoming the first prime minister to have been born in Tosa, where the democratic movement had first begun.

Japan’s was not a system that produced or required silver-voiced orators Hamaguchi’s Tosa constituency was remote and small but it could produce men of courage and ability. One might have thought that universal manhood suffrage would stir great enthusiasm. The prospect did activate the crowds during the 1912 governmental crisis, and it was an announced goal of the second “Protect the Constitution” movement in 1924. It was a subject on which many could agree, from left-wing leaders who retained hope for democratic reforms to right-wing leaders who were confident that popular support for a strong foreign policy would help swing Japan out of its internationalist pose. But there were also opponents. Yoshino Sakuzo could write in 1916 that “among many Japanese intellectuals there is an incredible misunderstanding of and violent antipathy to universal suffrage.” Among urban workers enthusiasm was high for a time, but it waned as the climate of opinion became more radical. For other groups disaffection with Japanese politics, from behind-the-scenes control to political corruption, led not so much to enthusiasm for reformist candidates as to withdrawal into privatism, a trend that will be discussed below. And no doubt for even the most optimistic the speed with which the Tanaka government moved against liberals and the left after its setback in the 1928 election, and the way it crushed the incipient proletarian parties, must have served to weaken faith in the effectiveness of the popular voice and mandate.
Despite this the achievements of political party cabinets deserve respect. Each strong prime minister-Hara, Kato Takaaki, Hamaguchi showed a willingness to try the issue of civil-military relations, Hara after the Washington Conference, Kato in military retraction by four divisions, and Hamaguchi after the London Conference. Unhappily each died in office; two by assassination, and Kato from natural causes. Each of the three also showed awareness of the need for changes in the power structure if Japan was to follow what seemed to be the world currents of postwar democracy. These measures would have required changes in the powers and makeup of the House of Peers and of the Privy Council, both of which lagged behind liberal and even moderate opinion. Liberalism and democracy also required a willingness to treat Japan’s two new monarchs as constitutional kings rather than “living gods” as chauvinists of the 1930s preferred.

At the end of the decade the appearance of the Hamaguchi government offered hope for the realization of goals that intellectuals like Yoshino Sakuzo had set out a decade earlier. Before the Minseito came to power a “shadow cabinet” had mapped out a striking agenda that included legislation for reforming labor-management relations, improving tenant-farmer relations, extending the vote to women in local elections, and lowering the voting age. In foreign affairs the return of the career diplomat Shidehara Kiju ro to the Foreign Ministry seemed to promise a firm commitment to international cooperation and reason in relations with China, which was beginning to experience national (and nationalist) unity after two decades of intermittent civil war. Unfortunately a combination of economic disaster and military insubordination combined to defeat that program, and Hamaguchi’s death at the hands of an assassin in 1931 marked the end of an era. For all its shortcomings, it had brought significant change.

4.1.2.5. Rise of Military State

The 1930s were the most eventful and turbulent decade in Japanese history since the 1860s. Its early years witnessed the assassination or fatal wounding of two prime ministers, the murder of two other prominent public figures, the plotting of two abortive military coups, and the ending of governments headed by party politicians. In 1936 radical discontent among young army officers burst forth dramatically in the February 26th Incident, an attempted coup in which more establishment leaders were killed. This marked the peak of violence, but when Japan stumbled into war with China in 1937, the trend towards totalitarianism quickened pace. Trade unions were suppressed, with an Industrial Association for Service to Country taking their place, while in 1940 the political parties were dissolved to make way for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. As Japan entered into alliance with Germany and Italy in 1940 and then slid towards war with America and Britain, there were, unsurprisingly, no open voices of dissent.

Although Germany and Italy had little direct influence on Japan, Japan's economic and social situation in the early 1930s was closer to those of Italy and Germany. Not only had Japanese industry far surpassed agriculture in value of output, but the post-war decade had also been a period of dislocation and relative stagnation. Moreover, unemployment rose to unprecedented heights between 1929 and 1932, and the peasantry were reduced to desperation as agricultural prices plummeted. But although dissatisfaction with government policies and political and economic institutions was rife, Japan was not on the verge of a revolution.

The expansion of the zaibatsu—the huge financial/industrial combines—had adversely affected many small enterprises, while in Tokyo the growth of department stores cut the sales of ordinary retailers by over a third between 1922 and 1932. The resentment and frustration of small businessmen were reflected not only in the increasing public criticism of zaibatsu, but also in the formation of new political parties with such names as All-Japan Commerce and Industry Party, or Association of Friends of Commerce and Industry. It seems likely that such elements were also an important component of the hundreds of nationalist societies which sprang up in the 1930s, together with primary school teachers, petty officials, Buddhist and Shinto priests, and small landowners.

Even more than her economic and social situation, Japan's international position had much in common with Italy's and Germany's. She too felt aggrieved at her treatment at the Versailles peace conference and at the Washington naval limitation conference of 1921-22 and could consider herself a 'have-not' nation. Concern about international status led to concern about internal conflict and division, for one of the lessons of the First World War was the importance of national solidarity. As early as 1917 Major Koiso Kuniaki produced a report calling for the
preparation, during peacetime, of a war economy, supported by reform of the organisation of enterprise and finance, harmonisation of labour and capital, and improvements in educational facilities and social policy. This approach was shared by other officers and by the more radical civilian nationalists. When, in the 1930s, Japan's foreign relations deteriorated, hostility towards vested interests which seemed to impede national strengthening grew more intense and more widespread.

Not only were Japanese nationalists exceptionally oriented towards the past, many of them were strongly influenced by particular Japanese intellectual or religious traditions. Kita Ikki, for instance, who combined socialism with radical nationalism and whose writing was a major influence on the young officer movement, was devoted to Nichiren Buddhism, the most nationalistic of all Japan's religious sects. Like the Oyomei school of Confucianism, Nichiren tended to be associated with radical forms of the Showa Ishin mentality and to be more influential in the outer and less urban regions of Japan. Where Shinto, a much less intellectual religion, had an influence, it too was usually linked with the radical right. Orthodox Confucianism, in contrast, was promoted by the establishment as a support of conservative authoritarianism. However, it should be noted that many of the Japanese ultranationalists who most closely resembled European fascists also had a predominantly Western-style education. Such was also the case with the 'revisionist' or 'renovationist' bureaucrats, who favoured government reorganisation and the extension of government controls over the economy. Younger bureaucrats, moreover, were likely to have received some impression from Marxism during their time at university, and that could easily lead in a national socialist direction.

After the failure of the February 26th Incident only one further attempt was made to achieve a major reorganisation of power. Stimulated by the failure of successive Japanese governments to bring the China Incident to a satisfactory conclusion, army officers at central headquarters, backed by radical civilian nationalists, renovationist bureaucrats and leaders of the main socialist party, mounted a campaign for a new structure. In particular, the preparations for gearing the country for war which were embodied in the 1938 National General Mobilisation Law, together with the enormous increase in military expenditure, point rather to the expansion of the power of the military. Behind the scenes, too, the Military Affairs Bureau of the army frequently interfered in politics, often by intimidation. Above all, the army was mainly responsible for the uncompromising foreign policy which placed such a premium on national integration and greater state control within Japan. This was more than simple militarism. It was the army which produced the 1934 pamphlet which began with the Mussolini-style declaration, 'War is the father of creation and the mother of culture'. From 1910 it had attempted to spread its ideas among the population, especially in the villages, through its reservists' and young men's organisations, and in the 1930s this paid dividends. In so far as the army was the dynamic force which drove Japan towards its New Order in East Asia.

Nevertheless, 'military fascism' is a limiting expression which conveys only part of the character of the 1930s. Though less precise, 'Japanese fascism' may be preferable in that it draws attention to the similarities of anti-communism, anti-liberalism, ambivalence towards capitalism, emphasis on national community, and aggressive and ambitious foreign policy, which Japan shared with Germany and Italy. It is, as some have argued, true that these attributes are all to be found in the Japanese nationalism of earlier decades, but they were never so dominant nor pursued so intensely.

4.1.3. Economic Development

Japan's economic development was another aspect of the nation's modernisation that impressed westerners. Japan already had a number of key factors of production in place at the start of the period, and it made the most of these, as well as developing others. It had:

- large workforce;
- an educated workforce;
- a generally obedient workforce;
- an agricultural workforce of such size that a significant portion could be shifted into the industrial sector;
- accumulated capital in the private sector (mostly merchants);
• established business practices of some sophistication;
• despite overall limitations in its natural resources, a reasonable initial supply of basic energy sources in the form of wood, water, and to some extent coal and even iron (ironsands).

4.1.3.1. Early shortcomings: Technology and Entrepreneurs

Japan had all sorts of factors for her economic development except technology and entrepreneurs. The deficiency in technology, which included both equipment and expertise, was fairly rapidly made up. This was largely done by importing foreign equipment, employing numerous western technical advisers, and sending Japanese overseas on study tours. Japan had missed out on the Industrial Revolution but on the other hand it benefited from being a ‘late developer’. It could make use of ‘state of the art' technology that other nations had only developed after a century or more of costly trial and error.

As for entrepreneurialism, this could clearly not be left to foreigners. It should be Japanese people themselves who established and kept ownership of at least the major modern industries. In general the merchant houses from the Tokugawa period were not especially willing to take up the challenge of establishing modern industries, which they saw as too risky. Mitsui and Sumitomo were in fact the only major houses to do so. Rather, in most cases entrepreneurial initiative was taken either by the government itself or by the same ‘class' of lower-ranking samurai -often with peasant associations -who formed the government.

Meiji Japan's two best-known entrepreneurs, Iwasaki Yataro (1835-85), the founder of Mitsubishi, and Shibusawa Eiichi (1840-1931), the founder of the Osaka Spinning Mill and many dozens of other companies, both came from this type of peasant-samurai background. Both of them represented self-help in action. Shibusawa in particular was favoured by the government, for he frequently proclaimed that business success should be achieved for the good of the nation as well as the individual. This was exactly what the government wanted to hear. His philanthropism, seen in founding schools and homes for the elderly, also made him popular among the public. He helped greatly to remove for good the stigma that had often been attached to money-making in Tokugawa times. The government was again grateful to him for this, for such a stigma could have proven a problem for Japan's successful economic development.

4.1.3.2. Govt. measures to tackle the situation

However, at least in the early years, the government was disappointed at the lack of private entrepreneurs. It ended up having to establish many enterprises by itself. The hope was that these would serve as successful models for private industry to follow, but in practice results were often poor and uninspiring. The railway was one success, and whereas in the 1870s almost all railway construction had been by the government, by 1890 some 75 per cent of it was being done by the private sector. On the other hand, the government's ventures in the textile industry were notoriously unsuccessful. Fortunately, in their stead, Shibusawa's privately built and owned Osaka Spinning Mill proved a successful model. During the 1870s the government also set up factories in industries such as munitions, brick, cement, and glass, and took over a number of mines and shipbuilding yards.

Despite the government's hopes and efforts the economy did not fare too well in the early years of Meiji, and the nation was facing a financial crisis by the end of the 1870s. Causes included not only the poor performance of some of the government's own enterprises, but heavy expenditure on foreign advisers, the payments to former daimyo and samurai, the expenses incurred in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, and a relative lack of hard currency to back up paper currency. Serious inflation set in. Rice prices, for example, doubled between 1877 and 1880. As one counter-measure the government announced in 1880 the sale of non-strategic government-run industries. There were few takers, and eventually the government had to dispose of the industries at well below cost in some cases below even 10 per cent of their cost value. Sales were often made informally, without tender, to people with whom the government already had associations and were considered reliable. These people obviously felt an obligation towards the government, which helped the already growing bond between government and big business interests. The sale also helped concentrate much of industry into the hands of a small number of increasingly large organisations -later known unflatteringly as zaibatsu, or ‘financial cliques'.

Other counter-measures included the establishing of a central bank (the Bank of Japan, in 1882) and a budget surplus that would build up hard-currency reserves. The tight measures caused some hardship in the
agricultural sector in particular, but on the other hand this helped shift labour into the more modern industrial sector. By 1886 Japan had a stable financial system, with low interest rates, and the economy entered an upswing. From this point on Gross National Product was on average to grow steadily by over 3 per cent per annum till the end of the Meiji period. Exports, which the government was keen to promote, were also to grow steadily, rising from around 6-7 per cent of GNP in the late 1880s to around 20 per cent by the end of Meiji.

Despite the advance of industrialisation, the Meiji economy overall was dominated by agriculture, which occupied more than half the workforce throughout the period. Nevertheless, the value of agriculture as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product fell steadily, from 42 per cent in 1885 to 31 per cent at the end of Meiji. By contrast, the manufacturing sector's proportion over the same period more than doubled from 7 per cent to 16 per cent.

Within manufacturing, the light industry of textiles was particularly important. The government promoted domestic textile production as a means of cutting down on imports, often encouraging potential entrepreneurs by providing cheap equipment. Mill owners could also make use of very lowly paid female labour, and could locate their premises in rural centres. This meant cheap site costs and ready access to local agricultural workers wanting convenient by-employment. Textile output rose from around 25 per cent of total manufacturing output in 1880 to 40 per cent over the next 20 years. In a survey of non-government factories in 1884, 61 per cent were found to be in textiles.

During the last decade or so of Meiji, electrical goods quickly developed as another important manufacturing industry. Though western ownership was discouraged, Japanese companies in the field often formed joint ventures with western companies in order to acquire western technology. Today's well-known giant NEC (Nippon Electric Company) was started in 1899 as a joint venture between the American company Western Electric and its Japanese agent. Another giant, Toshiba, started from a joint venture in the early 1900s between America's General Electric and two Japanese companies, Tokyo Electric and Shibaura Electric (part of the Mitsui group).

4.1.3.3. Reversing Economy

In the 1870s Japan was overwhelmingly an importer of manufactured goods (91 per cent of all imports, of which most were textiles) and an exporter of primary products (including raw silk, 42 per cent of total exports). By the First World War, just after the end of Meiji, this was reversed. By that stage more than 50 per cent of all imports were primary products, and around 90 per cent of all exports were manufactured goods (of which around half were textiles). Japan was so successful in promoting the cotton textile industry as a means of import substitution that by the end of the period it was able to export the product, even though Japanese-grown cotton itself was of poor quality and raw cotton Building a Modern Nation had to be imported. The key point is that value was added in Japan. It had become a processing nation. Heavy industry also developed strongly towards the end of the period, partly in line with Japan's military campaigns. The strategically important industry of shipbuilding was vigorously promoted during the last 15 years or so of Meiji. From the mid-1890s the government provided heavy subsidies for purchases of Japanese-built iron and steel ships. During that 15-year period shipping and shipbuilding together received a massive 75 per cent of all government subsidies. The iron and steel industry was given a major boost by the government's establishment of the Yawata works in North Kyushu in 1901. The plant was to produce over half of Japan's domestic output of iron and steel through to the 1930s.

Throughout the Meiji period the government played an important guiding role in the economy, developing and maintaining relations with the business world, and offering assistance in areas it favoured. The exact nature of that role is the subject of considerable debate, for the Meiji period just as it is for the present day. The government's guidance may not always have been particularly helpful, for they certainly made mistakes and were not always consistent. Though they had goals, the path to achieving these was often far from smooth. Nevertheless, one thing was certain—the government was reluctant to leave economic development purely to market forces. It still is.

4.1.3.4. Economy in the Inter War Period

The Japanese economy was transformed during the interwar years. The institutional changes of the Meiji period had prepared the way; many changes had been made in advance of the necessity for them. The banking structure, for instance, was complete by 1900. There were hundreds of small banks formed by public subscription
that served the needs of ordinary citizens. Organized on the lines of public stock companies and among the first institutions to use Western business methods, these banks played an important role in daily life. There were others, however, government directed, that were established to meet the needs of future imperial expansion. These included the Industrial Bank. Like the Fifteenth (Peers’) Bank established to provide access to and direction for the generous financial settlements made with daimyo after the abolition of the domains, these could guarantee profitable returns on items of national importance like railroad and shipbuilding development. What was distinctive about Japan’s modern economic growth was that it not only took place without jeopardizing the traditional economy, but benefited from it. Unlike colonial economies in India or Indonesia in which unfinished goods were exported in exchange for consumer goods that had previously been produced by traditional means, Japan continued domestic production for domestic use.

Until the Russo-Japanese War, only a modest proportion of Japan’s workers—perhaps for the most part those in the government, security, and education were employed in the “modern” sector. It grew rapidly, to be sure, but its growth was made possible by the much larger number of workers involved in small enterprises utilizing traditional methods. As late as 1910, 87 percent of cloth looms were still hand powered. Modest and small-scale technological change proved more manageable than expensive imported machinery of the sort used in the early government-established mills, and because patterns of daily life changed little until the twentieth century the traditional sector was able to supply Japan’s needs. Over one-third of workers employed in “factories” were in establishments that had no more than ten workers. This extended to the production of silk, preeminently a household product in which one in five farm families participated, but also “modern” export goods like matches.

These could be produced by teams of households organized by manufacturers who borrowed from local banks to organize material and equipment; groups or teams of households worked separately to split the wood, dip the heads, make matchboxes, paste labels, and pack the final product. The two economies, traditional and modern, moved in tandem until at least the twentieth century. As the modern sector grew in size and importance its gains, and those for Japanese who worked in it, out sped those in the traditional sector, and the resulting pattern, often described as a “dual economy,” characterized twentieth-century Japan until the economic growth that followed World War II. Japan’s economic growth differed from the sequence experienced by the early industrialization in the West because of the government’s active role in favoring developments important to its “rich country, strong army” policy. Those priorities and goals were acceptable to most Japanese. A long view to future needs justified investment in enterprises that were initially unprofitable and frequently managed by ex-samurai government bureaucrats. Once the enterprises became profitable, however, there was no shortage of non-samurai businessmen who saw opportunities and joined in. This was early the case with textiles, in which country girls recruited by agents were kept in factory dormitories and received treatment so harsh that many tried to run away.

The government saw to it that trunk railway lines and arsenals were in its hands. More impressive is the pattern of administrative guidance provided to promote standardization, quality, and hence profitability. Village cooperatives, universal by 1914, spurred improvements in agronomy with short maturing strains that permitted double cropping, communal seedbeds and planting in rows to permit improved tillage, massive increases in fertilization, and better paddy drainage. Trade associations were formed under government direction, first on a local, and then on a prefectural, and finally a national, basis. Throughout all this the links to traditional guidance previously provided by Tokugawa period guilds (nakama) and social organization were recognized and utilized.

After the Matsukata deflation of the 1880s Japan’s economic growth included a number of cycles of downturn, but overall the trend was steadily favorable. Between 1886 and 1920 national output rose by a factor of six; thanks to the growth of population during the same period, however, per capita productivity averaged a more modest 1.8 percent annually. Moreover national (governmental) expenditure rose a good deal more rapidly than personal consumption, helping to account for the slow pace of change in daily life. Each of the wars sparked an economic boom and government expenditures rose, as did wages. In each case the war economy gave way to a postwar recession as a slackening of demand coincided with continued high or higher military costs that were deemed necessary to provide for occupancy and security for the new territorial gains and to cover Japan’s larger role in Asian and world affairs. There was never a “peace bonus” for the Japanese taxpayers.
The mood after the Sino-Japanese War was one of sullen resentment at the Triple Intervention, but it was in part compensated for by the large indemnity exacted from China in the peace settlement. The government had tried repeatedly to get a Diet budget allocation for a steel plant, but without success. The needs of war finally brought approval, and the bulk of the Chinese indemnity was used to defray the cost of the Yawata steel plant, which marked an important step in heavy industry.

The Yawata works came into operation in 1901. Even this, however, brought new needs, for as we have seen its dependence on imported coke and iron ore was reflected in the inclusion of China’s Hanyehp’ing works at Wuhan in the Twenty-one Demands. The Russo-Japanese War, however, produced no indemnity—that was why the Tokyo crowd was so indignant and it was followed by even greater military costs in Korea and South Manchuria and naval modernization. The government tried to counter this, it will be recalled, by the Local Improvement Movement and the emperor’s injunctions to diligence and frugality.

Yet it would be an exaggeration to conclude, as some have, that the Japanese were victimized by the “rich country, strong army” slogan to inherit a poor country, strong army fate. Both wars speeded the growth of the modern sector dramatically. Japan was no longer dependent on outside suppliers of military and peacetime machinery. There were massive subsidies for ship and weapon production. During the war with Russia, some European shipyards that had provided warships for Japan pleaded neutrality, but Japan was increasingly able to proceed on its own. Of seventy-seven ships commissioned by the Imperial Navy between 1905 and 1915, all but seven were built in Japan.

4.1.3.5. Emerging Economy

By 1914 Japan was one of only five countries (with France, Germany, England, and America) to be self-sufficient in the production of steam locomotives. All this helped prepare Japan for the commercial opportunities offered by World War I, which was by far Japan’s most profitable war. Its costs in lives and treasure were insignificant. The developed economies of the West were fully occupied in mutual destruction, unable even to exploit the colonial markets from which Japan had been excluded. Japan’s modern sector was prepared to fill this gap. The balance of payments with the West, long dominated by loans contracted during the Russo-Japanese War, was rapidly reversed, and Japan’s status changed from debtor to creditor. Japan’s national product rose at a rate of 9 percent a year, growing more than 40 percent during the war.

Iron and steel, vital areas in which Meiji Japan had been import-dependent, became profitable. Textiles grew apace and Japan was able to capitalize on arrangements built into the Treaty of Shimonoseki to expand investment and production in China, where Japanese-owned spindles increased tenfold.

Within Japan private investment in modern industry became more profitable than it had ever been, and the confidence and success of the new industrialists was symbolized by the establishment in 1917 of the Industrial Club, where the makers and shakers of the new economy met to dine, socialize, and plan. There was now a shortage of labor. Wages rose steeply, and with them the general price level. Soaring costs of food, made worse by profiteering and speculation, were an important element in the outbreak of the rice riots of 1918. In industry there was a rapid rise in the use of electricity as a source of power, though the total remained modest by Western standards. In 1919, for instance, one-quarter of plants employing five to fourteen workers relied on electric power, but even so that represented a fourfold increase since 1914. “In contrast with the industries producing military or investment demand,” Crawcour writes, “those producing for domestic or foreign consumption remained mainly labor-intensive, small in scale, and slower to accept technological innovation.” If the wartime boom was greater than had been the case with the earlier wars, however, so was the post-World War I depression that resulted from a return of international competition. Japan was left with a high rate of inflation that made it difficult to retain the markets developed during the war years. The government had encouraged rice imports from Taiwan and Korea in an attempt to counter the inflation of food costs that led to the rice riots of 1918, and as a result, with the return of peace, agriculturalists found themselves forced to compete with imports during the postwar depression. The economic downturn of the 1920s was severe, worsened by the earthquake that struck the Yokohama-Tokyo metropolis in 1923 and exacerbated by a bank crisis in 1927. In considering the decade-long struggle for political
liberalization it is important to remember that perceptions of deflation, depression, and economic crisis accompanied (and for some probably caused) the steps toward continental adventures.

The importance of the international economy to Japan was now greater than it had ever been. Japan was far more self-sufficient in chemicals and heavy industry than had been the case, but was also more reliant on exports of textiles and small, low-cost consumer goods than it had been. This made it important to end the inflation of costs and wages and return to a competitive price level. For some time business continued its scale of wartime investment and expansion, only to have the “bubble” burst in 1920 as orders dried up. The imbalance of imports over exports that had been stopped by the war soon returned, and stock prices tumbled dramatically. It was particularly the new and speculative enterprises that did poorly. The older giants of the economy, the zaibatsu, were usually able to weather the storm. Indeed, their ability to shop selectively among the newer enterprises that were now in trouble built up their power within the economy to the point that they became targets of abuse.

4.1.3.6. Disaster and Economic Recovery

The Hara government was searching for ways to curb and reverse the wartime inflation in order to return Japan’s fiscal policy to the gold standard, whose adoption in 1897 had been one of the triumphs of Meiji era direction. Together with its trading partners Japan had to abandon that standard during the war emergency; the United States, increasingly important to Japanese trade, had returned to it in 1919, but the Japanese depression of the following year forced delay. Worse disasters lay ahead. On September 1, 1923, the Tokyo Yokohama area was devastated by an earthquake that led to fires that raged for forty hours. An estimated 120,000 buildings were destroyed and 450,000 burned. Casualties were estimated to number 140,000, and 250,000 people lost their jobs. The national wealth had been estimated at 86 billion yen in 1909, but estimates of earthquake-incurred losses ran as high as 10 billion yen.

A disaster of this scope ruled out early measures for deflation and devaluation. Instead large-scale government support was raised in the form of “earthquake bonds,” and these continued to complicate fiscal policy for many years thereafter. Reconstruction brought a new surge of imports. Mitsui, for instance, having lost its headquarters building in the Nihonbashi financial center of Tokyo, immediately engaged American architects (Trowbridge & Livingston) and builders (Steward & Co.) to undertake construction of a palatial and imposing temple of commerce that was dedicated in 1929. Under such pressures an early return to the gold standard was impossible.

The exuberance of the postwar speculation had given way to a minor panic before the earthquake struck, but what came in 1927 was a genuine banking crisis. The Suzuki Trading Company, its sugar dealings involved with the Bank of Taiwan, declared bankruptcy and took in its train the Bank of Taiwan and a number of other banks. These included the Fifteenth (Peers’) Bank whose administrators, often referred to as Matsukata zaibatsu, had stubbornly retained its investments in shipbuilding despite the development of a worldwide glut of shipping; business was made worse by the program of naval disarmament that involved the discontinuation of some planned ships. The death in office of Kato Takaaki had brought a successor cabinet headed by Wakatsuki Reiji, and it was his government that was brought down by the banking crisis. The crisis could have been avoided or at least mitigated, for it had its roots in political antagonisms related to differences over China policy. The Bank of Japan required Privy Council authorization to shore up an ailing bank, but the Privy Council delayed for quite unrelated reasons because of its discontent with Foreign Minister Shidehara’s determination to avoid inflaming sentiment against Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang anti foreign acts in Nanking. In the final analysis, Thomas Schalow concludes, the crisis was brought on by “the Privy Council’s refusal to authorize the Bank of Japan to move sufficiently quickly to forestall the run on banks,” and that refusal in turn had its roots in “the Privy Council’s adamant opposition to the ‘weak kneed Shidehara’ approach to Japan’s foreign policy in China.” When the Fifteenth National Bank declared bankruptcy, the reduction in the fortunes of former daimyo families was striking. The Satsuma Shimazu, for example, saw their estimated worth of 6.5 million yen shrink to less than 180,000, and major firms like Kawasaki Shipbuilding, which had looked to the Fifteenth Bank for funding, suddenly found themselves in desperate financial plight.
Losses extended to the Imperial Household itself, which had made the Fifteenth Bank its official depository in 1913. The Wakatsuki cabinet was helpless. The run on banks, estimated to have claimed 11 percent of deposits nationwide, was so severe that the Ministry of Finance, in a desperate attempt to restore depositor confidence, hurriedly printed one-sided banknotes and stacked them ostentatiously in tellers’ cages. Thirty-two banks suspended operations.

It was under these circumstances that the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned and was replaced by General Tanaka Gi’ichi’s Seiyu kai. Tanaka appointed a veteran financial bureaucrat, Takahashi Korekiyo, as minister of finance. Takahashi declared a twenty-day bank moratorium, during which time his ministry reorganized the Bank of Taiwan. New government regulations set higher standards of deposit reserves for banks and encouraged bank mergers, and as a result the number of banks declined by one-third. As before, the stronger firms, zaibatsu and zaibatsu-allied, emerged in health, but in the process the great firms, their tentacles extending through all branches of Japanese society, also became intensely unpopular.

The problems Tanaka incurred in his “correction” of the Shidehara China policy have been better chronicled than his efforts to restore confidence to the economy. Takahashi was an advocate of expansionist economic policies, and returned to the pattern of “pump priming” in the interests of economic growth that the Seiyu kai had followed under the leadership of Hara earlier in the century. Relatively liberal government expenditures created a favorable setting for business. Small, secondary supplier plants grew rapidly in number. There was fierce competition between them, and this helped to keep prices low. The government did not try for direct control, but it did support many cartels, and its protectionist policies helped to restrict imports, from agriculture to steel.

With Tanaka’s fall in 1929 the opposition Minseito returned to power under the leadership of Hamaguchi Osachi. The party had preached fiscal responsibility and advocated an early return to the international gold standard. Hamaguchi was, it will be remembered, a veteran of extensive service in the Ministry of Finance. He had contester Takahashi’s liberal government spending during the Hara cabinet, and served as minister of finance under Kato Takaaki and home minister under his successor Wakatsuki. As his minister of finance he selected Inoue Junnosuke, a banker who had studied in England and served in the United States. Inoue had been president of the Bank of Japan before becoming finance minister in 1923, and it fell to him to keep the system going in the tumultuous days that followed the earthquake in 1923. After service in the House of Peers he had returned to head the Bank of Japan after the panic of 1927 broke out, and then resigned that post to join the Minseito and resume service as finance minister. This time the world depression that began in 1929 undid all plans. Inoue, intent on sound fiscal policy, was resolute about a deflationary policy, and he took Japan back on the gold standard in 1930. As it turned out his timing could hardly have been worse. Great Britain abandoned the gold standard that same year, and the United States was to do so soon. In the years of growing economic crisis, free trade was seldom any country’s highest priority.

The Hamaguchi cabinet, through its appointment of Shidehara Kiju ro as foreign minister, hoped for a policy of international cooperation and trade. Japan extended formal recognition to the new Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek in 1930. That same year Hamaguchi stood firm against objections from the Imperial Navy to force acceptance of the decisions reached at the London Naval Conference, which extended the quotas worked out at the Washington Conference to smaller warships.

Both men failed. Shidehara’s policies were doomed by new violence precipitated by the military in Manchuria, and Hamaguchi, fatally wounded by an ultranationalist, was succeeded after a brief interregnum by a new Seiyu kai cabinet headed by Inukai Tsuyoshi. Takahashi returned to the Ministry of Finance and resumed expansionist policies. Inukai was to be murdered in 1932, and Takahashi three years later. Throughout the world managed currencies signaled a decline of the internationalism that had characterized the post-World War I era. For Japan, where foreign trade to pay for raw materials was so important, these changes were particularly traumatic. They brought on an isolation that was intensified by the military steps that brought the country little honor.

4.1.3.7. Agricultural Development
The agricultural development did not lag behind during this period. Rice was the chief product of Japan. In 1919, there were 3,104,611 ‘Cho’ of land (One Cho is nearly equal to 2 and half of acres of land) devoted to rice only. The production of rice went on increasing. Scientific methods were introduced. The rice production increased six-fold by 1928 over the figures of 1882. Use of fertilizer, introduction of new modern technique, increased security from national calamities and development of markets are the reason behind the growth of rice production. Government also encourage the production of tobacco, cotton, vegetable and fruits etc.

4.1.4. Conclusion

The constitutional Government of Japan was initiated by the proclamation of the constitution in 1889. After the election in July 1890 Japan inaugurate representative government outside the narrow band of countries bordering on the Atlantic. The Meiji Constitution, drawn up during those same years, was designed as a generous gift of power sharing by a compassionate sovereign. The Meiji Constitution said nothing about the prime minister or cabinet, but spoke of “Ministers of State.” Executive authority remained ambiguous, no doubt because it might be interpreted to interfere with the emperor’s powers. Since the lower house of the Diet was the only elective organ of the national government, that meant control of the Diet by the House of Representatives, and since the political parties contested control of that house, “democracy” meant in practice governments elected and run by the political parties.

Japan's economic development was another aspect of the nation's modernization that impressed westerners. Japan had all sorts of factor for her economic development except technology and entrepreneurs. The deficiency in technology, was largely done by importing foreign equipment, employing numerous western technical advisers, and sending Japanese overseas on study tours. It could make use of 'state of the art' technology that other nations had only developed after a century or more of costly trial and error. In the early years, the government establish many enterprises by itself to serve as successful models for private industry. By 1914 Japan was one of only five countries with France, Germany, England, and America to be self-sufficient in the production of steam locomotives. The agricultural development did not lag behind during this period. Rice was the chief product of Japan. Use of modern technology and active support of government Japan became a major exporter of agricultural product.

4.1.5. Summary

- The constitutional Government of Japan was initiated by the proclamation of the constitution in 1889.
- In July 1890 Japan carried out its first national election under the Meiji Constitution and inaugurate representative government outside the narrow band of countries bordering on the Atlantic.
- The Meiji Constitution, was designed as a generous gift of power sharing by a compassionate sovereign. But the sovereignty that made it possible to share was not lessened by that generosity, and the language of the constitution left little doubt that the throne remained paramount.
- In the first general election of modern Japan, more than one thousand candidates competed for the three hundred seats in the House of Representatives.
- Election campaigning was accompanied by a fair amount of generosity; the return of favor for favor was deeply built into concepts of public morality.
- The Meiji Constitution said nothing about the prime minister or cabinet, but spoke of “Ministers of State.” Executive authority remained ambiguous, no doubt because it might be interpreted to interfere with the emperor’s powers.
- The constitution guaranteed many rights, but with the exception of the right to property they were invariably conditioned by the phrase “within the limits of the law”; property, of course, was central to a modern capitalist society.
- “Every law;” requires the consent of the Imperial Diet. Diet members were free from arrest “unless with the consent of the House” during the session, “except in cases of flagrant dereliction or of offenses connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble.”
- Emperor Meiji symbolized the changes of his period so perfectly that at his death in July 1912 there was a clear sense that an era had come to an end.
• The lower house of the Diet was the only elective organ of the national government, that meant control of the Diet by the House of Representatives, and since the political parties contested control of that house, “democracy” meant in practice governments elected and run by the political parties.

• Japan's economic development was another aspect of the nation's modernization that impressed westerners. Japan had all sorts of factor for her economic development except technology and entrepreneurs. The deficiency in technology, was largely done by importing foreign equipment, employing numerous western technical advisers, and sending Japanese overseas on study tours.

• Japan had missed out on the Industrial Revolution but on the other hand it benefited from being a ‘late developer’. It could make use of 'state of the art' technology that other nations had only developed after a century or more of costly trial and error.

• In the early years, the government was disappointed at the lack of private entrepreneurs, hence govt. establish many enterprises by itself.

• In the 1870s Japan was overwhelmingly an importer of manufactured goods and an exporter of primary products. By the First World War, just after the end of Meiji, this was reversed.

• By 1914 Japan was one of only five countries with France, Germany, England, and America to be self-sufficient in the production of steam locomotives.

• The agricultural development did not leg behind during this period. Use of fertilizer, introduction of new modern technique, increased security from national calamities and development of markets are the reason behind the growth of rice production.

4.1.6. Exercise

1. Write an essay on growth of modern polity in Japan from 1894 to 1939.
2. How the Meiji constitution provided a path for the successful democratic setup in Japan at par with western countries? Discuss.
4. Discuss how Japan emerge as an economic super power within a short period from the Meiji restoration in 1867.
5. Throw lights on the different aspects of economic development in Japan before 2nd world war.

4.1.7. Further Reading

• Kishimoto, K., Politics in Modern Japan, Tokyo, Japan Echo, 1997.
• Tsuru, S., Japan’s Capitalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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Unit-4
Chapter-II

JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1939, JAPAN AND SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1945; DEFEAT AND SURRENDER OF JAPAN

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4.2.0. Objectives

In this chapter, we intended providing you an insight into the development of Japanese foreign policy and internal condition in the interwar period up to the end of the Second World War. By the end of this chapter, the learners would be able to:

- understand the changing nature of Japanese role in the international affairs of interwar era;
- trace the development of Japanese society, economy, and polity in interwar period;
- survey the circumstances leading to the Second Sino-Japanese war in 1937;
- describe the growth of militarist Japan and subsequent entry into the Second World War;
- discuss the Japanese role in the Second World War on Japan; and
- examine the conditions leading to Japanese surrender as well as legacy Japan received after the war.

4.2.1. Introduction

The post-first World War era witnessed the emergence of Japan as a superpower. The result of war included Japan in the league of superpower of Atlantic. Growing power, successful economic growth, and changing political scenario influenced the domestic and foreign policy of Japan in the interwar period. Japan played an important role in the international affairs of interwar period. The dream of Asia for Asian and greater Asiatic Empire changed her foreign policy. Finally, her association with the fascist league brought her to the Second World War. Second World War for some time went in favor of Japan but finally, the dropping of the Atom bomb forced her to surrender before the allied power. The post-war era further changed the polity and society of Japan. This chapter will discuss the history of Japan from the Paris Peace Conference to the end of the Second World War.

4.2.2. Japan Foreign Policy during Interwar Year

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was the strongest power in Asia. In the next two decades it increased its stature and emerged as one of the five Great Powers, with a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. It was not long before this remarkable transformation had led to an equally remarkable change in world and especially Asian, perception of Japan. Meiji Japan had projected the image of a young, vigorous country determined to free itself from restrictions imposed by imperialist powers, but it went on to impose its own colonialism on Taiwan, Korea, and South Manchuria.

The disruption of the international order during World War I brought tantalizing possibilities. Some Japanese wanted their country to serve as a role model in reviving East Asian reform and reconstruction; others continued to hold the West as a model for national expansion. As Japan's Meiji leaders aged, the polity they had created also began to seem curiously old-fashioned in a world intent on self-determination, international cooperation, and popular participation. Throughout the world, monarchy and empire came crashing down; Ottoman Turkey, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and imperial China all broke up within a decade. One cannot fault Japan's leaders for finding it difficult to respond to such cataclysmic changes in the world order. In some cases it is possible to contrast the advocates of a "small Japan" to those of a "big Japan," but most Japanese were ambivalent, intent on the dignity and importance their country should be accorded, but uncertain how best to cope with new challenges they faced in Asia.

The image of Japan that was held by its Asian neighbors suffered lasting damage at the end of World War I. The hopes of Chinese liberals, not to say revolutionaries, declined as Japan pursued Great Power politics in the matter of the Twenty-one Demands. Japan's intervention in Siberia was motivated in part by fears that Bolshevism might spread south of the Amur River border, and the Terauchi government invested substantial sums of money (the "Nishihara loans") in efforts to stabilize the northern border by backing conservative northern military leaders. The "modern" forces equipped in response were however soon crushed in the civil wars that now began to plague China. But nothing did damage to compare with the suppression of the March 1 independence demonstration in Korea and the May 4 demonstrations in China. In the aftermath of the Allied victory in World War I, there was widespread hope throughout Asia—certainly among students and intellectuals—that a new and more just world order was at hand. Some of this was poignant and naive, as in rumors in Korea that Woodrow Wilson would appear to restore the country's sovereignty, but a more literate generation in China had every reason to expect that bases seized from the Germans would be returned by the Japanese. The Twenty-one Demands had shown this
would not be simple, but the Paris conference, Treaty of Versailles, and League of Nations might still correct this matter, as indeed Wilson had hoped they would. Unfortunately the Japanese, having been forced to abandon their demand for a statement of racial equality at Versailles, were in no mood to give way on matters of economic and territorial interest to them, and in this they had the support of agreements they had worked out with their European allies.

4.2.2.1. Suppression of Korean and Chinese Movement

Korean nationalist leaders were equally distressed that the League and the war settlement contained nothing for them, and resolved on a nonviolent demonstration calling for national independence on March 1, 1919. The date was set to coincide with funeral ceremonies for the last King/Emperor Kojong, who was regarded as a martyr to his country’s independence. Representatives of major religious communicates had been planning an appeal to the outside world since 1918, and the funeral date found Seoul crowded with mourners in white attire. The leaders signed their declaration of independence and waited quietly to be arrested. Japanese colonial authorities were startled and responded with extraordinary brutality and fury. Japanese records admit to some 500 killed and 1,500 wounded, but post-Independence Korean estimates run far higher, to more than 7,000 killed and 145,000 wounded. As late as the 1980s Japanese textbook references to the slaughter of nonviolent protesters as the suppression of “riots” poisoned relations between Japan and Korea. These events drew protests throughout the world, but also affected Japan, where they provided fuel for antimilitarist sentiment. The Hara Seiyu kai cabinet moved to lessen the authority of the army in selecting colonial administrators and setting policy, and a “policy of culture” tried to undo some of the harm the pointless violence had caused. Despite this the handling of the Independence declaration remained as a stain on Japanese rule and an ugly refutation of Japanese rhetoric of leadership in Asian modernity.

Two months after the Korean independence movement was suppressed, the May 4 demonstrations marked the dawn of modern Chinese nationalism. The cause was disillusion that the peace treaty signed at Versailles had no provision for the return of the German concessions in Shantung to China, but left them in Japanese hands. The Chinese officials who were blamed for accepting the Paris accord became objects of popular fury in Peking. Everywhere in China the discovery that Chinese hopes had been betrayed produced great demonstrations, and in May students from thirteen colleges and universities gathered to denounce the treaty and then converged on the residence of Ts’ao Ju-lin, a minister who was considered pro-Japanese, and put him to flight. The “May Fourth movement” is taken as shorthand for the larger cultural revolt against tradition and conformity. The birth and growth of the Chinese Communist Party took place in the atmosphere of alienation from Chinese society and culture of those years. Japan, which had been for a time the seedbed of the Chinese revolution and the exemplar of a modern national response to the threat posed by the West, was now coming to be seen as the single most important element of the imperialist threat that China faced. Complementary vibrations between anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and Japanese disrespect for China contained ominous potential for future disputes.

Fortunately these events were not by any means the sum total of Chinese-Japanese and Korean-Japanese interaction of the interwar period. Relations were too close, too complex, and too varied to be summed up in a single rubric of nationalist distaste. Japanese men of letters who traveled to China could find themselves warmly welcomed, and Chinese students trained in Japan could bring back equally warm memories of friendly and helpful teachers. Even in Korea, where the wounds were greatest and most personal, the interwar years saw the development of a new generation of students oriented to Japanese institutions and opportunities, and entrepreneurs eager to cooperate with Japanese enterprises in bringing modern institutions to Korea. The fact that such contacts and emotions could survive should probably be seen as measure of how great the opportunity for solidarity and friendship in East Asia might have been if it had not been weakened by Japanese imperialism.

4.2.2.2. Internationalism: The league of nations and Japan

Japan occupied a place of honor in the new League of Nations, which now replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in Japanese diplomacy. It was a mark of Japan’s growing status that Nitobe Inazo, the Sapporo student and Tokyo educator we have encountered earlier, was named under secretary-general, thereby symbolizing an era
of internationalism. A new generation of intellectuals, teachers, and students shared fully in the worldwide hope that this new era would find Japan taking its rightful place at world conference tables.

Others, and perhaps most, of the Meiji generation found the new international order badly flawed and regretted that in the absence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance there was no secure special place for Japan. Even so optimistic and committed and internationalist as Nitobe noted that the new League of Nations might be of little help in addressing the problems of Asia. He pointed out that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, Japan’s most important neighbors, were members, and that the organization provided a forum for the weak and querulous that seemed to limit the influence of Japan, which was the only major power in Asia. Even before this, however, there had been voices urging caution before subscribing to an Anglo-American view of the world.

Japanese were full of doubts about the benefits of the new international system. Doubts had already been raised by nationalists about the benefits of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but the new organization seemed to remove from Japan whatever protection that alliance had conveyed. It was not that much could be expected of the old alliance in the future, for the increasingly close cooperation between the United States and Great Britain raised doubts about the utility of the English alliance. It was clear that Britain would not support Japan in a possible struggle with the United States, but it was also clear that Japan lacked the strength to challenge both powers.

4.2.2.3. Japan in the Washington Conference order

Other voices resisted parochialism and spoke for internationalism, and the Washington Conference on naval limitations was one result. First, and most important, was the fact that all participating nations had embarked on massive programs of naval buildup during the war; none could sustain these in peace, but each needed the assurance that limitations on building would not disadvantage it in future competition. Second, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came up for renewal or replacement in 1922. It was obvious that Britain would never join Japan in a war against the United States, and therefore some new structure of security was required to replace it. And finally the turbulent state of Chinese politics made it incumbent on the powers to agree on cooperative steps in dealing with the floundering Chinese republic. Military equipment, so recently plentiful in Europe, was now flooding into Asia. There was thus every reason to convene a conference to address these problems. Ozaki Yukio, a confirmed political maverick, had returned from a postwar trip to Europe convinced that security could not be maintained without a cooperative agreement for arms retrenchment. A motion he filed in the House of Representatives was defeated by a crushing vote, but he then took the issue to the people by traversing the country to address large audiences about disarmament. In a crude public opinion poll he distributed postcards at all his meetings, and of the 31,519 that were returned to him, 92 percent favored his proposals. Clearly many Japanese were in favor of international cooperation.

At the Washington Conference, Japan was represented by Ambassador to the United States Shidehara Kiju ro, Tokugawa Iesato, and Admiral Kato Tomosaburo. The conference produced a network of interrelated agreements that can be described as the “Washington Conference system”; it set the parameters of Pacific policy and security for the rest of the decade. A Four Power Pact, with the United States and France included, replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Its members pledged themselves to respect the status quo in the Pacific and to consult if the security of any one power was threatened. Naval limitation was at the center of the negotiations that followed. In Japan a “fleet faction” had advocated the construction of eight battleships and eight cruisers. The Anglo-American counterproposal was for a moratorium on all construction of capital ships-battleships and heavy cruisers and adoption of a tonnage ratio of 10 for the United States and Great Britain to 6 for Japan. Japanese negotiators argued vainly for a 10/7 ratio, but accepted the smaller figure under the condition that substituted several newer ships for others to be decommissioned. The essential security for Japan, however, lay in the guarantee that additional bases would not be built in the Pacific Ocean sites, with exceptions made for Hawaii, Singapore, and Japan itself.

Japan’s fleet faction was discontented with this, but Admiral Kato’s prestige was great enough to quiet vocal naval opponents. These arms limitation agreements had no real precedent and seemed to bring an assurance of peace in the Pacific. It has to be remembered that they affected capital ships only, and that the extension of this to smaller ships at the London Conference in 1930 was far more rancorous. Aircraft carriers were still things of the
future and not regulated, but the Japanese, who had more confidence in the future of air power, managed to refit several battleships under construction and slated for “scraping” as aircraft carriers.

The last treaty signed, the Nine Power Treaty, was designed to protect Chinese sovereignty. The powers profiting from “unequal treaties” with China pledged to respect China’s territorial sovereignty, maintain the “Open Door” in trade, and cooperate in helping China achieve unity and stability. In the early 1920s Japan moved to live up to the commitments it had made at Washington. The former German holdings in Shantung were returned to China. Japanese troops were withdrawn from Siberia and Northern Sakhalin, and normalization of relations with the new Soviet government was worked out. Japan lived up to the commitments it had made with respect to naval limitations, and it was for some time a full participant in cooperative efforts to work out new tariff and customs arrangements for China.

In each of these cases, however, opinion within Japan was far from united; Prime Minister Hara lost his life to an assassin, the armed services had factions that sought a larger army and navy, and some argued the case for expansion, but there were reasons to think that Japanese leaders would be able to see the advantages of the new international order.

4.2.2.4. The immigration imbroglio

Arms agreements seldom survive distrust and suspicion, and the promise of the Washington agreements was soon marred by the resumption of immigration issues in the United States. The matter seemed to have been settled by the “gentlemen’s agreement” in which the Japanese “voluntarily” restrained immigration. In the 1920s the issue came up once more. Nativist sentiments in the eastern United States had been raised by the scale of immigration from eastern and southeastern Europe, while in the west anti-Oriental agitation had led to a series of Alien Land Laws making it difficult for immigrants to own or even lease land. In 1922 the United States Supreme Court ruled that Japanese were ineligible for citizenship because of prior legislation. California had adopted an Alien Land Law in 1920, and similar legislation was quickly adopted by fifteen other states. All this set the stage for congressional legislation. To understand the indignation with which Japanese greeted the Immigration Act of 1924 it is necessary to realize how unnecessary it was. Congress had adopted a quota system based on national origins in 1921; it was heavily weighted in favor of the countries of northern Europe, where quotas were so large that they were seldom filled. The baseline of residence for those quotas was 1910 (with 3 percent admissible); in 1923 the baseline was advanced to 1920, but the percentage lowered to 2 percent. One group now advocated moving the baseline back to 1890, reducing the Japanese quota to 246, but even that failed to satisfy nativists who wanted total exclusion. The legislation that emerged excluded immigrants ineligible for citizenship.

In an effort to prevent so egregious an affront to Japanese sensibilities, the secretary of state encouraged Japanese ambassador Hanihara to stress Japan’s adherence to the gentleman’s agreement. This he did, but ended his statement by expressing the fear that the proposed exclusion could have “grave consequences” on the otherwise happy relations between Japan and America. This phrase was then denounced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as a “veiled threat,” and it virtually ensured passage of the act. The legislation was deplored by much of the American establishment and by major United States newspapers, but it did lasting damage to the influence of some of Japan’s foremost internationalists. Nitobe Inazo, probably the most distinguished of these, vowed that he would not set foot on American soil until the offensive act was repealed, and went to considerable inconvenience in making his way to and from Geneva. Nitobe had dedicated his life to being a “bridge across the Pacific,” but in this instance the bridge broke down.

4.2.2.5. The emergence of nationalist China and Japanese reaction

The Washington Conference system ultimately fell victim to disagreements among the powers over the proper response to the rise of Chinese nationalism. Japanese were divided on the issue, but its consequences for Japan were so far reaching that the diplomatic policy adopted became a major issue in domestic politics.

There were reasons to expect a sympathetic response to Chinese nationalism in Japan. The two countries shared a commitment to East Asian civilization, and both had felt the injustice of the unequal treaties imposed by the West. No country had more people in China, more China specialists, or more knowledge of Chinese culture and civilization than Japan. Unfortunately the “China first” men who had worked with Sun Yat-sen were
outnumbered by others. Some prominent scholars argued that “China” was more civilization than nation, and that the Chinese, focused on family and village to the exclusion of the nation and state, were unlikely to make the kind of response to the modern world that Japan had made. This was the contention of a best-selling work by a distinguished China specialist, Professor Naito Konan, Shina ron (On China). This position had only limited tolerance for the facts that Manchu rule, imperialist intervention, and foreign example had begun to produce a new generation of Chinese. The May Fourth movement with its advocates of democracy and science as alternatives to the Confucian tradition that had left China defenseless in the face of outside aggression was leading to a social and cultural revolution. There was also a political change, encouraged by Soviet example and backing that helped transform a small Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) at Canton into a potent force. A military school (headed by Chiang Kai-shek) with modern weapons and tactics was supplemented by programs to train propagandists and activists to work with Chinese workers and students.

In North China the major warlords destroyed themselves in suicidal conflicts that raged in 1924 and 1925. In South China the Kuomintang and Communist groups merged in a national united front and prepared to seize on this opportunity by launching the “Northern Expedition” in 1926. When the troops reached Nanking, anti foreign feeling and disorganization resulted in a number of acts of violence against non-Chinese. Foreign Minister Shidehara came under attack for refusing to join other powers in countermeasures. Shortly after, when the Kuomintang forces reached Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek turned on his Communist allies in a bloody coup; the left-wing survivors retreated to Wuhan—where they, too, soon dismissed their Soviet advisers—while Chiang Kai-shek prepared for advancing north to Peking and national unification.

This political turbulence in China had a direct impact on Japanese politics; China policy became a potent issue. Japan’s failure to respond forcefully to the episodes in Nanking, it was charged, had weakened its prestige and honor. Shidehara, with an eye to Japan’s long-range relations with the commercial centers of central and southern China, stood firm. Chiang’s break with the Communists in Shanghai seemed to bear out Shidehara’s estimate of the Kuomintang promise, but the rival Seiyu kai had found an issue for attack.

Appropriately, the attack was led by a war hero and senior general who had resigned from the army in 1925 at the request of Seiyu kai leaders that he lead them out of the political wilderness. General Tanaka Gi’ichi (1864-1929) had served in Russia and considered himself an authority on Japan’s northern border. During the Russo-Japanese War he had provided help for a bandit leader, Chang Tso-lin. As imperial unity gave way to provincial warlords Chang was to emerge as the strongest force in Northeast China thanks to his Fengtien Army, which enjoyed Japanese favor and occasional advice. Chang’s proximity to Peking gave him a stake in national politics. Within Japan, Tanaka had been instrumental in the establishment of the nationwide network of reservist associations. He had served as army minister under Prime Minister Hara, and as Yamagata weakened and died in 1922 he emerged as head of the “Choshu faction” at army headquarters. Now, as head of the Seiyu kai, he brought with him an imposing set of qualifications to lead a government.

In 1927 a bank crisis was responsible for the fall of a Kenseikai government and left a political vacuum into which Tanaka led his Seiyu kai. A month after Tanaka took office, he ordered the transfer of Japanese forces to Tsinan in Shantung in order to protect the lives of Japanese residents and, incidentally, deter Chiang Kai-shek’s progress north to Peking. The situation was full of ambiguities. Some civilians and diplomats thought it wise to prevent the sort of attacks that had been directed against Japanese in Nanking earlier, while Tanaka’s successors in the General Staff were unenthusiastic about risking involvement in continental politics. As yet no lasting harm had been done, and before long the Japanese troops were withdrawn. Chiang Kai-shek resigned his political offices temporarily and traveled to Tokyo for talks with Tanaka. Both men thought they had reached an understanding. Chiang pointed out that it was important for Japan to avoid the appearance of support for the northern warlords, while Tanaka emphasized the need for Chiang to maintain an anti-Communist position and concentrate on political stability in central and southern China.

This was all well and good, but Chiang’s Northern Expedition was soon headed for Peking again. That city was temporarily under the control of Chang Tso-lin, who, like all the major warlords, saw himself as head of a national government. If things were allowed to take their natural course, and Chiang’s Northern Expedition
defeated the Fengtien Army and Chang Tso-lin was unhorsed, it could be anticipated that Chiang Kai-shek’s forces would follow him over the mountain pass that separated the Manchurian province of Fengtien from Peking. Japan would then face a Nationalist presence in an area it considered vital to its interests. Even Foreign Minister Shidehara, internationalist that he was, had made a distinction between Manchuria and China; Tanaka, militarist that he was, thought that it was essential to have Chang Tsolin in Manchuria as a buffer against Chinese nationalism.

4.2.2.6. Tanaka Memorial

In the summer of 1927 Tanaka convened a Far East Conference of Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Finance, and army, navy, and General Staff representatives to try to work out Japanese priorities. One of the unexpected results of this gathering was a spurious document that became known as the “Tanaka Memorial,” which purported to lay out a program of systematic expansion in China. Its origins have never been fully traced, but theories about its authorship have ranged from Chinese Communists to Japanese critics of Tanaka.

Unfortunately the document proved in some sense prophetic of future Japanese moves, and thus, understandably, contributed to belief in its authenticity. In contrast to a plan for expansion the conference produced a welter of conflicting opinions. In the end a rough consensus emerged to the effect that the emerging Kuomintang regime was likely to meet Japan’s standards for a stable and non-Communist government that Japan would be able to work with, but also that the Chinese should be assured that Japan would support Chang Tsolin’s efforts to hold on to his position in Manchuria. To Tanaka, this meant getting Chang Tso-lin out of Peking and out of harm’s way beyond the mountainous barrier to Manchuria lest the Kuomintang forces pursue him there.

This danger was soon at hand. When Chiang Kai-shek returned to China he resumed command of the Northern Expedition and prepared to move on Peking. In December 1927 Tanaka decided that the possibility of conflict in the area made it wise to send troops to Shantung again to protect Japanese nationals and Japanese interests. He hoped that if he sent them to Tsingtao they would be out of Chiang Kai-shek’s path of advance, while nevertheless available if needed. The division commander thought he knew better, however, and moved to Tsinan as the northern forces retreated. As might have been expected, a clash between Japanese and Chinese Nationalist forces broke out in May. Attempts for local settlement of whatever had prompted the clash failed when the Japanese military decided the national honor was at stake; when the Chinese would not accept the demands they made, Japanese troops occupied Tsinan. The Japanese now took over the area, imposed martial law, and held on until 1929.

Worse was to come. After Chang Tso-lin agreed to vacate Peking and return to his capital in Mukden, staff officers of the Japanese Kwantung Army, which had the mission of security for the Liaotung (Port Arthur and Dairen) Peninsula and South Manchurian Railroad, decided the time was ripe to precipitate a crisis that would, they thought, force their superiors to take steps to seize control of Manchuria instead of continuing to work with Chang Tso-lin. Within the Japanese military there was increasing talk of a “China problem” and a “Manchuria and Mongolia problem.” Impatient and restless young military officers thought they had the opportunity to hurry history. Colonel Ko moto Daisaku arranged to have the railway car in which Chang Tso-lin was riding blown up as his train was entering Manchuria. Ko moto’s hope that higher echelons would respond to take advantage of his rash act proved misplaced; there was no follow-up. Chang Tso-lin’s son took over command of his father’s Fengtien Army, and after his position was stabilized, announced his commitment to the new Kuomintang government that had been set up in Peking. Chiang Kai-shek, in turn, designated him commander of the “Northeastern Frontier” Army. For Japanese obsessed with the “Manchurian-Mongolian problem,” things were if anything worse than they had been before Chang Tso-lin’s departure from the scene in June of 1928.

4.2.3. World depression and Military expansion 1929-1932

The Great Depression did not strongly affect Japan. The Japanese economy shrank by 8% during 1929-31. Japan's Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo was the first to implement what have come to be identified as Keynesian economic policies: first, by large fiscal stimulus involving deficit spending; and second, by devaluing the currency. Takahashi used the Bank of Japan to sterilize the deficit spending and minimize resulting inflationary pressures. Econometric studies have identified the fiscal stimulus as especially effective.
The devaluation of the currency had an immediate effect. Japanese textiles began to displace British textiles in export markets. The deficit spending proved to be most profound. The deficit spending went into the purchase of munitions for the armed forces. By 1933, Japan was already out of the depression. By 1934, Takahashi realized that the economy was in danger of overheating, and to avoid inflation, moved to reduce the deficit spending that went towards armaments and munitions.

This resulted in a strong and swift negative reaction from nationalists, especially those in the army, culminating in his assassination in the course of the February 26 Incident. This had a chilling effect on all civilian bureaucrats in the Japanese government. From 1934, the military's dominance of the government continued to grow. Instead of reducing deficit spending, the government introduced price controls and rationing schemes that reduced, but did not eliminate inflation, which would remain a problem until the end of World War II.

The deficit spending had a transformative effect on Japan. Japan's industrial production doubled during the 1930s. Further, in 1929 the list of the largest firms in Japan was dominated by light industries, especially textile companies. By 1940 light industry had been displaced by heavy industry as the largest firms inside the Japanese economy.

4.2.4. Rise of Military State

The 1930s were the most eventful and turbulent decade in Japanese history since the 1860s. Its early years witnessed the assassination or fatal wounding of two prime ministers, the murder of two other prominent public figures, the plotting of two abortive military coups, and the ending of governments headed by party politicians. In foreign policy there was a decisive rejection of international co-operation as the Japanese army engineered the seizure of Manchuria and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. In 1936 radical discontent among young army officers burst forth dramatically in the February 26th Incident, an attempted coup in which more establishment leaders were killed. This marked the peak of violence, but when Japan stumbled into war with China in 1937, the trend towards totalitarianism quickened pace. Trade unions were suppressed, with an Industrial Association for Service to Country taking their place, while in 1940 the political parties were dissolved to make way for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. As Japan entered into alliance with Germany and Italy in 1940 and then slid towards war with America and Britain, there were, unsurprisingly, no open voices of dissent.

Although Germany and Italy had little direct influence on Japan, Japan's economic and social situation in the early 1930s was rather closer to those of Italy and Germany than was Spain's or Rumania's or Hungary's. Not only had Japanese industry far surpassed agriculture in value of output, but the post-war decade had also been a period of dislocation and relative stagnation. Moreover, unemployment rose to unprecedented heights between 1929 and 1932, and the peasantry were reduced to desperation as agricultural prices plummeted. But although dissatisfaction with government policies and political and economic institutions was rife, Japan was not on the verge of a revolution. After 1918, when spontaneous riots over the rocketing price of rice had spread over much of Japan, many conservatives and reactionaries formed or joined associations pledged to the maintenance or revival of Japanese traditional values. Some top leaders gave surreptitious support, not only to crude strike-breaking organisations, but also to the much more radical nationalist societies which now began to emerge. In this respect the situation in Japan, though less critical, was not unlike that in post-First World War Italy.

Another parallel between Japan, Germany and Italy can be found in the discontent of lower middle-class elements and the frustration and dissatisfaction of the young. The expansion of the zaibatsu—the huge financial/industrial combines—had adversely affected many small enterprises, while in Tokyo the growth of department stores cut the sales of ordinary retailers by over a third between 1922 and 1932. The resentment and frustration of small businessmen were reflected not only in the increasing public criticism of zaibatsu, but also in the formation of new political parties with such names as All-Japan Commerce and Industry Party, or Association of Friends of Commerce and Industry. It seems likely that such elements were also an important component of the hundreds of nationalist societies which sprang up in the 1930s, together with primary school teachers, petty officials, Buddhist and Shinto priests, and small landowners. The number of university and college graduates had risen from 9,208 in 1925 to 22,959 in 1929, but their chances of employment diminished in the same period from 66.6 per cent to 50.2 per cent, further slumping to 37 per cent in 1931. Although most radical students still turned
to the left, the number of right-wing student groups rose by 1933 to nearly a hundred. More than half the members of the Blood Brotherhood Band, which was responsible for two of the assassinations of 1932, were university students.

Even more than her economic and social situation, Japan's international position had much in common with Italy's and Germany's. She too felt aggrieved at her treatment at the Versailles peace conference and at the Washington naval limitation conference of 1921-22 and could consider herself a 'have-not' nation. Concern about international status led to concern about internal conflict and division, for one of the lessons of the First World War was the importance of national solidarity. As early as 1917 Major Koiso Kuniaki produced a report calling for the preparation, during peacetime, of a war economy, supported by reform of the organisation of enterprise and finance, harmonisation of labour and capital, and improvements in educational facilities and social policy. This approach was shared by other officers and by the more radical civilian nationalists. When, in the 1930s, Japan's foreign relations deteriorated, hostility towards vested interests which seemed to impede national strengthening grew more intense and more widespread.

When one turns to ideology, other similarities are immediately obvious. A particularly notable one is the almost tribalistic rejection of internal divisions, and acute sense of separateness from other races, conjured up by the oft-used term, 'national community'. There was, it is true, the difference that Japanese official propaganda depicted the Japanese people as an extended family, a doctrine which helps explain the efforts made by Justice Ministry officials, quite often with success, to bring arrested communists back into the fold. There were similar national differences, but fundamental similarity, between the nazi theoretical emphasis on the primacy of the rural community and its Japanese counterpart of Nohonshugi

Not only were Japanese nationalists exceptionally oriented towards the past, many of them were strongly influenced by particular Japanese intellectual or religious traditions. Kita Ikki, for instance, who combined socialism with radical nationalism and whose writing was a major influence on the young officer movement, was devoted to Nichiren Buddhism, the most nationalistic of all Japan's religious sects. Like the Oyomei school of Confucianism, Nichiren tended to be associated with radical forms of the Showa Ishin mentality and to be more influential in the outer and less urban regions of Japan. Where Shinto, a much less intellectual religion, had an influence, it too was usually linked with the radical right. Orthodox Confucianism, in contrast, was promoted by the establishment as a support of conservative authoritarianism. Among the urban educated elites, liberal values continued to be held, though often in muted form. However, it should be noted that many of the Japanese ultranationalists who most closely resembled European fascists also had a predominantly Western-style education. Such was also the case with the 'revisionist' or 'renovationist' bureaucrats, who favoured government reorganisation and the extension of government controls over the economy. Younger bureaucrats, moreover, were likely to have received some impression from Marxism during their time at university, and that could easily lead in a national socialist direction.

Where Japan differed most obviously from Italy and Germany was in the absence of an effective movement led by a charismatic leader and of any dramatic change in the political process. After the failure of the February 26th Incident only one further attempt was made to achieve a major reorganisation of power. Stimulated by the failure of successive Japanese governments to bring the China Incident to a satisfactory conclusion, army officers at central headquarters, backed by radical civilian nationalists, renovationist bureaucrats and leaders of the main socialist party, mounted a campaign for a new structure.

In particular, the preparations for gearing the country for war which were embodied in the 1938 National General Mobilisation Law, together with the enormous increase in military expenditure, point rather to the expansion of the power of the military. Behind the scenes, too, the Military Affairs Bureau of the army frequently interfered in politics, often by intimidation. Above all, the army was mainly responsible for the uncompromising foreign policy which placed such a premium on national integration and greater state control within Japan. This was more than simple militarism. It was the army which produced the 1934 pamphlet which began with the Mussolini-style declaration, 'War is the father of creation and the mother of culture'. From 1910 it had attempted to spread its ideas among the population, especially in the villages, through its reservists' and young men's
organisations, and in the 1930s this paid dividends. In so far as the army was the dynamic force which drove Japan towards its New Order in East Asia, it is easy to understand why some Japanese historians write of ‘gunfuashizumu’.

4.2.5. The Sino-Japanese War: 1937-1939

On the night of July 7, 1937, Japanese troops engaged in a minor skirmish with Chinese soldiers in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge just south of Beijing. On July 11 a local cease-fire took effect. Even so, the Japanese government sent additional troops from Korea and Manchuria. The Chinese challenged the Japanese positions, and further skirmishes took place. In late July Japanese forces attacked and occupied Beijing and Tianjin. Within a month of the Marco Polo Bridge incident a full-scale war was underway.

It is not clear who fired the first shots at Marco Polo Bridge. But in contrast to the events of the Mukden incident six years earlier, which sparked the takeover of Manchuria, it is clear that the Japanese cabinet under Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro authorized the decision to launch a major offensive. The army itself was divided between expansionists and a minority who feared a protracted war and wished to negotiate a cease-fire. Konoe sided with the expansionists. They wanted to control the iron and coal resources in North China. They also believed that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government would always remain a threat to Japan’s control of Manchuria and North China. The expansionist faction hoped to destroy the Nationalist regime and replace it with a friendly government.

Although he widened the war, Konoe initially sought to use military pressure to negotiate a settlement with the Nationalists. In the fall of 1937, Japanese forces extended their control south from Beijing. They occupied the Shandong peninsula and a large portion of the Yellow River. Aided by the navy, Japanese troops also took Shanghai. They then moved swiftly to occupy Nanjing by mid-December. But negotiations stalled. By early 1938, it was clear that the Nationalists would not recognize the Japanese conquests. Despite the loss of China’s three major cities, Chiang Kai-shek decided to withdraw to the west and continue a defensive war of resistance. In response, Prime Minister Konoe announced a new goal in January 1938. He issued a chilling call for a war to “annihilate” the Nationalist regime.

Even as he spoke, one of the worst massacres in a century of horrific acts of mass murder was underway in Nanjing. As Japanese troops entered the city in mid-December 1937, they began to round up civilians as well as surrendered soldiers. For seven weeks, through the end of January, they murdered tens of thousands of these people and raped countless women of all ages. The scope of the Nanjing Massacre remains controversial. Some Japanese historians insist on “low” estimates of perhaps forty thousand killed, while the Chinese government stands by a figure of three hundred thousand murders. A broadly accepted body count may never be reached, but there is no denying that Japanese soldiers carried out massive acts of atrocity.

Explaining why this massacre took place is as difficult as agreeing on a count of the victims. Frontline soldiers were certainly embittered by tough fighting en route to Nanjing. They were frustrated at the blurred line between Chinese soldiers and civilians, and they feared guerrilla attacks. They were also subject to harsh discipline. Like soldiers everywhere, they were taught to hate a dehumanized enemy. That soldiers in such circumstances might run amok and vent aggressive rage on civilians or disarmed troops is sad but not surprising. One finds too many such examples in the modern history of warfare.

The greater puzzle, and the greater crime, is that the Japanese high command in Nanjing allowed the roundups, rapes, and killings to proceed for weeks on end. Authorities in Tokyo were probably informed as well, but they took no decisive steps to rein in the troops. It may be that high-level Japanese in both Nanjing and Tokyo, frustrated at the inability to negotiate favorable terms, hoped that the example of these murders would destroy the Chinese will to resist. If so, they were as mistaken as they were brutal.

Over the following months the Japanese army expanded its control by seizing further key cities and railway lines. The military situation then reached a stalemate in the fall of 1938. Japan had committed six hundred thousand troops to the field, but they were barely able to defend the cities and railway lines in the occupied regions. The occupiers had little control over the countryside, and troops faced constant threat of guerrilla attack. Japanese forces murdered civilians as well as soldiers in numerous other incidents throughout the course of the war,
especially in North China. Terrorizing the population in this way appears to have been part of a broader, ultimately failed military strategy to “pacify” the Chinese people.

The Nationalist government eventually retreated to the far western city of Chongqing, where it was protected from Japanese attack by mountains and sheer distance. In addition, tensions with the Soviet Union erupted in a major—although little re-reported—series of battles in the summer of 1939 along the border of China and Mongolia, a region called Nomonhan. The better equipped Soviet forces overwhelmed the proud Kwantung Army. The Japanese lost about twenty thousand soldiers to battlefield death or illness, out of a total of slightly over sixty thousand troops.

In the effort to better control the three hundred million Chinese in the occupied areas, Japan created and recognized a new Chinese government to administer these regions in March 1940. It was led by Wang Jingwei, a rival to Chiang in the Nationalist movement. He shared with the Japanese a distrust of both the Soviet Union and the Western powers. He justified collaboration with Japan’s military forces by claiming that the two sides shared a vision of pan-Asian unity against these outside forces. But the Japanese forced him to accept a humiliating “treaty” that undermined any claims he might make to popular support. Wang’s regime remained weak. It depended on Japanese military backing for its survival.

Since the mid-1930s, a minority of strategists had warned that Japan should not overextend its forces. It was Ishiwara Kanji, the planner of the Manchuria takeover, who argued most forcefully at the highest levels that Japan lacked the resources to control China. He feared the Soviet Union and the West above all. He consistently urged the government to focus on building Manchuria while conserving strength to deal with these potential enemies. These views were not in favor. In the fall of 1937, Ishiwara was shoved aside and relegated to a succession of minor posts. But his worst fears came to pass. Japan’s rulers trapped their soldiers in the swamp of a continental war. They were unwilling to retreat, but unable to overcome their foes.

Having failed to break the deadlock in China, Prime Minister Konoe resigned his position in January 1939. Over the next eighteen months, three men in quick succession served as prime minister: the ultranationalistic career bureaucrat Hiranuma Kiichiro, followed by two military men, General Abe Nobuyuki and Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa. They pursued a combination of strategies to break the China stalemate by isolating Chiang and destroying his will or ability to survive. With the West, they tried diplomacy to induce the United States and Britain to recognize their position in China. To the north their diplomats sought to neutralize the threat of the Soviet Union, thus freeing the Kwantung Army forces for action in China. To the south, they considered both diplomatic and military steps to neutralize or eliminate the hold of the British in Malaysia, the French in Indochina, and the Dutch in Indonesia. This was desirable for two reasons. Japanese control of Southeast Asia would deliver strategic natural resources such as oil, rubber, and tin to the military. It would also provide a base to encircle and attack the Chinese Nationalists.

4.2.6. Facing the communist international 1935-1937

The foundation for the Axis agreement was laid with the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Nazis when they seized power were hostile to the Soviet Union. The Japanese were hostile to the Bolsheviks beginning in the World War I period. Japanese relations with the Soviets which had been damaged with the seizure of Manchuria worsened when Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936). The Japanese and Germans signed a protocol in Berlin aimed directly at the Soviet Union (November 25, 1936). The purpose was to “guard” against the Communist International. The agreement was very simple. It was signed by Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Joachim von Ribbentrop German Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. The agreement was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. Japan and Germany agreed if attacked by the Soviets to consult on what measures were needed. The two countries also agreed that neither would conclude political treaties with the Soviet Union. Germany agreed to recognize the Japanese puppet regime of Manchuko. Italy subsequently joined the Anti-Comintern Pact (1937).

The Nazis shocked the world when despite years of offensive expression aimed at Communism and the Soviet Union, they signed a Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939). It one of the great diplomatic misnomers, the Non-Aggression Pact was in fact the green light for World war II. The Non-Aggression Pact violated the terms of
the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Nazis did not consult with either Japan or Italy before signing the Non-Aggression Pact. This lack of consultation and joint planning was to be a feature and glaring weakness of the future Axis Alliance.

4.2.6.1. Background

The foundation for the Axis agreement was laid with the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Weimar Government had cooperated with the Soviet Union, in part because both were shunned states after World War I. The Allies has intervened in the Russian Civil War. The Germans did not because of Allied distrust of any German military role, although the situation in the Baltic was complicated. Hitler wrote in strident terms about both Communist and the Slavs. The Nazis when they seized power were hostile to the Soviet Union. Hitler was reportedly impressed with Japanese actions in Manchuria. The Japanese were hostile to the Bolsheviks beginning in the World War I period. Japanese relations with the Soviets were damaged with the seizure of Manchuria (1931). The Japanese disturbed by Soviet support for Chima. The Soviets signed a Nonaggression Treaty with China (August 1936). This was followed by the sale of Soviet aircraft and munitions to China. Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were damaged further when Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936).

4.2.6.2. Japanese-German Agreement-1936

The Japanese and Germans, two staunchly anti-Communist countries bordering on the Soviet Union, signed a protocol in Berlin aimed directly at the Soviet Union (November 25, 1936). The purpose was to "guard" against the Communist International. The agreement did not specify the Soviet Union by name, but as the only Communist country and the country which had the Comintern firmly after his control, there is no doubt that it was aimed at the Soviet Union.

The agreement was very simple. It read, "The Imperial Government of Japan and the Government of Germany, in cognizance of the fact that the object of the Communist International (the so-called Komintern) is the disintegration of, and the commission of violence against, existing States by the exercise of all means at its command, believing that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social welfare, but threatens the general peace of the world, desiring to co-operate for defense against communist disintegration, have agreed as follows.

**Article I:** The High Contracting States agree that they will mutually keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communist International, will confer upon the necessary measure of defense, and will carry out such measures in close co-operation.

**Article II:** The High Contracting States will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is menaced by the disintegrating work of the Communist International, to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of the present Agreement or to participate in the present Agreement.

**Article III:** The Japanese and German texts are each valid as the original text of this Agreement. The Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signature and shall remain in force for the term of five years. The High Contracting States will, in a reasonable time before the expiration of the said term, come to an understanding upon the further manner of their co-operation."

The Pact was signed by Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Joachim von Ribbentrop German Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

4.2.6.3. Significance

Hitler and subsequently Benito Mussolini used the Anti-Comintern to position themselves as the defenders of Western civilization against the threat of Soviet Bolshevism. The agreement was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. Japan and Germany agreed if attacked by the Soviets to consult on what measures were needed. The two countries also agreed that neither would conclude political treaties with the Soviet Union. Germany agreed to recognize the Japanese puppet regime of Manchuko in Manchuria. The primary significance, however, is that the Anti-Comintern Pact laid the foundation for the future signing of the Axis agreement (1940).
4.2.7. Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (1939)

The Nazis shocked the world when despite years of vituperative rhetoric aimed at Communism and the Soviet Union, they signed a Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939). It was one of the great diplomatic misnomers, the Non-Aggression Pact was in fact the green light for World War II. The Non-Aggression Pact violated the terms of the Anti-Cominintern Pact. The Nazis did not consult with either Japan or Italy before signing the Non-Aggression Pact. This lack of consultation and joint planning was to be a feature and glaring weakness of the future Axis Alliance.

Japan was shocked by the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact and renounced the Anti-Comintern Pact (August 23, 1939). The Japanese were initially reluctant to accept Hitler's 1939 offer to formally join the German-Italian Axis alliance. The German defeat of the Netherlands and especially France apparently caused the Japanese to reverse their position. The defeat of the French and the occupation of the Netherlands meant that the colonies of these countries in Southeast Asia were vulnerable. The Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia) were particularly important because of their oil resources. Rubber was another important resource available in the region. Japan had been importing oil from the United States, but America was increasing pressure on Japan to end the war in China. The Japanese thus joined the Tripartite Pact (September 27, 1940). Germany, Italy, and Japan pledged “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means” when any one of them was attacked by “a Power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict”. This of course meant the Soviet Union and the United States. Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, making the country a member of the Axis military alliance (September 27). The Pact allied Germany, Italy, and Japan and became known as the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, or more commonly Axis Alliance.

The Germany after launching Barbarossa, the massive invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) attempted to revive the Anti-Cominintern Pact. The Pact was renewed for another 5 years (November 25, 1941). This was the Nazi diplomatic effort to present his invasion as a European crusade against Bolshevism. The signatories of the expanded pact were: Bulgaria, China, (Japanese puppet Nanking regime), Croatia (Nazi puppet state), Denmark (Nazi occupied), Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Manchukuo (Japanese puppet state), Romania, Slovakia (Nazi puppet state), and Spain.

4.2.8. Japan and the European War 1939-41.

As Hitler’s regime moved toward war in Europe, the Hiranuma government was attracted to the idea of an alliance with Nazi Germany to counter both Soviet and Western power in Asia. The ground had been prepared by the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936. This committed Japan and Germany (Italy joined in 1937) to cooperate to oppose communism. Each state agreed to reach no agreements with the Soviet Union without the other’s consent. Hitler violated this pact in August 1939 when he suddenly announced a nonaggression treaty with Stalin. With the failure of his strategy of cooperation with Germany, Hiranuma’s credibility collapsed. Furious at Hitler’s betrayal, he resigned as prime minister.

When Hitler invaded Poland and France the following month, the Abe and Yonai cabinets pursued a course of neutrality in the European war and slightly shifted the aim of their diplomacy. They made tentative efforts to engage American and British help to negotiate a settlement in China. But the army continued to press for an Axis alliance. It forced Prime Minister Yonai to resign because he preferred to seek accommodation with the British and Americans.

At this point, in the summer of 1940, Prince Konoe Fumimaro returned to power amid great elite and popular hope that he would provide strong leadership and construct a “New Order” abroad and at home. His lineage as an aristocrat close to the imperial family gave him particular legitimacy at this time of crisis. His first major initiative came in September when he concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. It committed the Axis powers to support each other against the United States, should it enter the war. By this move, Japanese leaders hoped that the path to a southern advance had been cleared. In June 1940 Hitler’s troops had entered Paris, and the Germans set up the collaborationist Vichy regime to rule over occupied France. The Vichy government administered French colonies as well. The Tripartite Pact enabled the Japanese to negotiate an agreement with the
Vichy authorities to station troops in the northern region of the French colony of Indochina (Vietnam). It is doubtful that an independent French government would have accepted the presence of Japanese troops.

The response of the United States would determine whether Japan’s southern advance might succeed. Tensions between the United States and Japan had been building for some time. Throughout the 1930s, the Americans supported Chinese self-determination with strong words, but they had committed no significant resources to the Nationalists. Some business interests hoped to cooperate with Japan in the economic development of Manchuria. But in July 1939, hoping to send a signal of resolve that would deter Japanese expansion, Roosevelt broke off the Japanese-American commercial treaty. This step freed the United States to place an embargo on exports to Japan, if deemed necessary.

When Japan moved into northern Indochina, the Americans indeed countered with a gradually expanding export embargo. This further provoked Japan’s war hawks. They began to argue for a preemptive strike against the United States and its allies. Hitler complicated these calculations when he broke his peace with Stalin and attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941. Japan chose not to join Hitler’s new war. Its goals in the south required peace in the north, and two months earlier, in April 1941, Konoe had concluded a neutrality agreement with the Russians. He followed this by extending Japan’s hold over Indochina, gaining Vichy permission to occupy the entire peninsula in July 1941. The agreement left Japan as the virtual ruler of the former French colony.

The Americans countered this advance with a strong and threatening move. Roosevelt immediately pulled together an international embargo that cut off all foreign oil supplies to Japan. He also offered below-cost military supplies to the Chinese. Without oil the Japanese government could not sustain its military or economy. It faced a difficult choice. It could agree to American conditions for lifting the embargo by retreating completely from China. Or it could follow the hawks and attack the United States and British, taking control of the Southeast Asian oil fields by force and hoping to negotiate for a cease-fire from that strengthened position.

For a time, it pursued both courses. Japanese diplomats sought in vain to negotiate a formula for a partial retreat in China that might satisfy both their own reluctant army and the United States. The Japanese military, meanwhile, drew up plans for a bold attack that might force the Western powers to recognize its hegemony in Asia. Diplomacy continued late into the fall of 1941, even as Konoe was replaced by General Tojo Hideki. In the event of all-out war, the senior statesmen wanted a military leader at the helm. In an unusual concentration of power, Tojo simultaneously held positions as army minister and prime minister.

4.2.9. Pearl Harbor Incident and afterward

By November it became clear to the key figures in the cabinet that a satisfactory diplomatic agreement was impossible. Japan was willing to withdraw only from Indochina. The United States would accept no less than withdrawal from all of China, except for Japan’s pre-1931 holdings in southern Manchuria. In a meeting before the emperor on November 5, the inner cabinet agreed that if a final round of negotiations did not win American acceptance of Japan’s position in Asia, the army would launch a major offensive to conquer the British and Dutch colonies of Southeast Asia and the American possessions in the Philippines. The navy would carry out a simultaneous attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Last-minute negotiations indeed produced no agreements. The Foreign Ministry intended to hand over a long memorandum notifying the Americans that negotiations were terminated in essence a declaration of war just before the Pearl Harbor attack. It took Japan’s embassy staff in Washington so long to decode, translate, and type the memorandum that it was in fact delivered just after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (December 8 in Japan).

Thus ended a complex set of diplomatic and military maneuvers. Japan had plunged into a war that proved devastating for people throughout Asia. At key moments Japanese leaders grievously miscalculated the consequences of their actions. In 1937 the majority of the Japanese military, as well as civilian bureaucrats, politicians, intellectuals, and the press, failed to understand the force of nationalism in China, which fueled Chinese resistance. Likewise, in 1940-41 prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, Japan’s leaders did not realize that the United States would be willing to cut off trade with Japan to defend the British and Dutch colonies. In the fall of 1941, as they made the decision for war, they understood well enough that American industrial power made a prolonged
war with the United States unwinnable, but they naively convinced themselves that the Americans lacked the will to pursue such a war in distant lands.

It is true that the American moves to block Japan’s advances in 1940 and 1941 confirmed the views of those in Japan who saw war as inevitable. For this reason, some historians blame the Americans for taking steps that led to the war. But it is difficult to argue that a different American response would have avoided a war. If the Americans had responded in conciliatory fashion, the logic of expansionism would almost surely have led the Japanese military to view this as weakness and take further aggressive steps. Japanese rulers were blind to the possibility that others would not bend to their will. Beginning in 1931, they consistently responded to tension on the borders of the empire by pushing forward rather than standing in place or stepping back. Insofar as such tensions were virtually inevitable, the invasion of Manchuria set in motion a chain of events that led inexorably to war.

4.2.10. The Asia-Pacific War 1941-1943

The Pacific War began with swift dramatic victories for the Japanese army and navy. The attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed the heart of America’s Pacific fleet. Of its nine battleships, six were destroyed entirely and two damaged seriously. A daring drive down the Malay peninsula drove out the British and delivered Singapore to Japanese control in February 1942. The campaign for the Philippines ended in victory by May. American general Douglas MacArthur was forced to retreat to Australia. In these first six months of the war, the Japanese also took Burma from the British. They secured control of the sprawling possessions of the Dutch East Indies from Indonesia to Borneo and the Celebes. They occupied the islands of the Central and South Pacific (see map on p. 205).

The Pearl Harbor attack has become enshrined in American memory as an immoral “sneak attack.” The Japanese apparently intended to provide minimal advance notice, although not enough to allow the United States to prepare defenses in Hawaii. In any case, American policymakers by late 1941 had ample evidence that the Japanese were considering war and were likely to launch an attack soon, somewhere in Asia. In addition, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan had made good use of a surprise attack at Port Arthur. American military strategists in 1941 might have anticipated a similar tactic, but the United States commanders in the Pacific were complacent and ill prepared. Ironically enough, Western observers in 1905 praised the Japanese military for its brilliant strategy.

For all these reasons, condemnation of the mode of Japan’s attack rings rather hollow today. At the time, however, anger at the tactic, and the devastating toll of thirty-seven hundred Americans killed or wounded in a single day, sparked a fierce desire for revenge in the United States. “Remember Pearl Harbor” became the watchwords of the war, and reverberations echoed well into the postwar era in the form of a stereotypical view of the Japanese as untrustworthy. At the time, anger at the attack also allowed President Roosevelt to bring the United States into the war against the Axis powers in Europe, something he had hesitated to do until that time in the face of reluctant public opinion.

People in Japan greeted these victories with jubilation. The government and media justified the campaign with grand claims that Japan was pursuing a war to return Asia to Asian control. But a huge practical task faced the Japanese government. It suddenly possessed a vastly expanded empire, roughly four thousand miles from north to south and six thousand miles from west to east. In what manner, and by what logic, would it be ruled? In 1938 Prime Minister Konoe had proclaimed Japan’s intent to create a New East Asian Order as an equal partnership of China and Japan. In 1940, as a prelude to the move into Indochina, the government expanded its vision to call for creation of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere that included Southeast Asia. But neither the military nor the bureaucracy had made extensive plans for consolidating control of these new possessions.

Officials improvised their strategy as they went along. They ruled the older colonies more harshly than ever. In Korea the government-general mobilized students into factories and imposed a massive migration on as many as four million adults. They were forced to work as mine workers in Japan and as prison guards and laborers building airstrips in China. Thousands of young women were sent throughout Asia and forced to serve the sexual needs of soldiers. Taiwanese males were recruited into a “volunteer corps” to provide military and support services operations in various parts of Asia and the Pacific. They in fact had little choice in the matter. Many of those who
remained on the island were mobilized into “public service brigades” to work in fields and factories. The manner of rule varied in the newly conquered regions of Southeast Asia. In a gesture toward anti-colonialism, Japan sponsored nominally independent states in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines, while Japanese occupying forces ruled Indochina and Indonesia more directly. The government did not begin planning for a Greater East Asia Ministry until the spring of 1942, and it founded the ministry in November of that year. The ministry never became a powerful agency of integrated control. Representatives of the five states that constituted the Co-prosperity Sphere (Burma, Thailand, China under Wang Jingwei, the Philippines, and Manchukuo) held just one Greater East Asia Conference, in Tokyo in November 1943. It was marked by praise for pan-Asian solidarity and condemnation of Western imperialism, but few practical plans to integrate or develop the region economically.

In practice, local Japanese military commanders dictated policy. They suppressed independence movements directed at the Japanese themselves while nurturing anti-Western independence fighters who pledged allegiance to Japan. The army sponsored the Burma Independence Army, led by anti-British Burmese nationalists. They joined forces with the Japanese troops that conquered Burma in early 1942, but by 1944 they had turned against the Japanese colonial rulers with an underground resistance movement. In similar fashion, the Japanese army recruited captured Indian soldiers in Singapore into the India National Army. With grand promises to help him out the British from India, the Japanese army convinced a fervent Indian nationalist, Subhas Chandra Bose, to lead this force. In the spring of 1944 his army of about ten thousand men joined a Japanese force of more than eighty thousand for the disastrous Imphal Campaign, a drive from Burma across the border into India. The Japanese could not deliver logistical support to these forces, and an estimated seventy-five thousand Japanese and Indian troops died of disease or in battle. In Vietnam, in contrast, the Japanese harshly suppressed the Vietminh nationalist movement until the very end of the war. The army also confiscated much of the Vietnamese rice harvest in 1944 for use by its troops in the Philippines. This led directly to a famine that took almost one million lives.

Throughout the empire such cruel episodes squandered the goodwill that the Japanese initially won by ousting the Western overlords on behalf of a grand vision of Asian solidarity. Initial hopes among Indonesians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese that Japan would forcefully promote national liberation were betrayed. Even so, the brief interlude of Japanese control had an important long-run impact. Independence movements organized during the war, whether with inconsistent Japanese aid or in the face of Japanese repression, survived into the postwar era. They ultimately doomed the continuing hopes of the French, Dutch, and British for a return to the prewar system of colonial control.

The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere amounted to little in part because the tide of war turned quickly against Japan. The failure of Japanese forces to take the Coral Islands in May 1942 was followed by a major defeat in the battle for Midway Island in June, just six months after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese navy lost four aircraft carriers that were the core of its fleet. The Americans and their allies then began a long, grinding drive toward the Japanese home islands. Submarine and air attacks devastated the Japanese merchant fleet. This cut off the homeland from the empire and crippled the domestic economy. The Americans largely ignored the huge land forces entrenched in China, Indochina, and Indonesia. They concentrated on a two-pronged drive across the Pacific. General Douglas MacArthur pushed to retake the Philippines from New Guinea, while the American navy under Chester Nimitz attacked strategic Japanese-held islands in the central Pacific. The capture of Saipan in July 1944 placed the main islands in range of American bombers. Japan’s air defenses were helpless against high-flying B-29s, which rained down fire-bombs on civilian homes as well as factories. The war was essentially lost at this point, a full year before the Japanese surrender.

4.2.11. Mobilizing for Total War

Parallel to their push for a New Order in East Asia, bureaucrats, military men, political activists, and intellectuals issued loud calls for a New Order at home. A diverse assortment of men-and a few politicized women looked above all to Prince Konoe Fumimaro to unite varied actors and remake Japan. The New Order slogan came into widespread use in 1938 during the time of Konoe’s first cabinet. It pulled together strands of thinking that had been emerging since the 1920s. Self-styled advocates of “renovation” sought to remake the economic, political,
and social order. They wanted to restructure industrial workplaces and agriculture and transform cultural life as well.

Advocates of a new order envisioned a flowering of indigenous practices that would transcend those of the decadent West. Yet they pursued a path sometimes wittingly and sometimes not with clear parallels to that of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascist in Italy. They sought to replace messy pluralism with central planning and control of the economy, authoritarian rule grounded in a single unified political party, and firmer social discipline. Like Western fascists, they glorified mobilization for war as the “mother of creation.” The pursuit of war was both catalyst of change and the result of these changes.

The Economic New Order was the brainchild of “economic bureaucrats” and military men centered in the Ministry of Commerce and the Cabinet Planning Board. They worked together with intellectuals in the Showa Research Association a think tank close to Prince Konoe. One leading architect was the Ministry of Commerce bureaucrat Kishi Nobusuke, who came to head the Munitions Ministry at the height of the war. Such people wanted to replace messy competition and profit-seeking with “rational” control of industry. They believed industry should serve “public” goals of the state, not private goals of capital. They argued that depression and social conflicts were inevitable in free market economies and undermined national strength. Only a state-controlled form of capitalism could resolve chronic conflict and crisis.

Economic controls were strengthened most dramatically under the Konoe cabinets of June 1937 to January 1939 and July 1940 to October 1941. A key step came in 1938 when the Diet ratified a National General Mobilization Law. It stipulated that once a “time of national emergency” was declared, the bureaucracy could issue any orders necessary without Diet approval “to control material and human resources.” To win passage of the law, Konoe promised that the China war did not constitute such an emergency. But within one month of Diet approval, he nonetheless activated the law. The state had gained vast new authority to mobilize “material and human resources.” Few areas of social or economic activity remained outside the reach of this order.

The Konoe government used the Mobilization Law in 1941 to create one capstone of the Economic New Order. This was the system of Control Associations brought into being by the Important Industries Control Order. The order allowed the Ministry of Commerce to create super cartels called “control associations” in each industry. These bodies were given power to allocate raw materials and capital, set prices, and decide output and market share quotas. In practice, the presidents of zaibatsu firms sat on the boards of each control association together with bureaucrats. By collaborating with the state, big business managed to retain significant authority over the cartels and control associations.

Smaller businesses, too, retained some autonomy for several years after the Economic New Order was proclaimed, but in early 1943, the government created a uniform national system of industrial associations (called “unions”) with mandatory membership. Thousands of small manufacturers were forced to pool resources into these groups and dissolve themselves as independent firms. These industrial unions usually shifted to military production. Small-scale textile manufacturers, for example, were ordered to put their machines in mothballs and produce parts for airplanes as subcontractors for the giant industrial firms. Advocates of top-down mobilization for economic efficiency and social order pushed for a Labor New Order parallel to these economic reforms. Beginning in the mid-1930s Home Ministry bureaucrats and police officials had been planning to set up factory-based councils of worker and management representatives. These were to feed into a pyramid like structure of regional and national federations.

In July 1938 the Home and Welfare ministries launched the nominally independent and voluntary Federation for Patriotic Industrial Service. The few remaining unions almost all supported the war and cooperated with managers already. They quietly coexisted with the federation. Many large companies joined the federation by renaming existing factory councils-founded in the 1920s as alternatives to unions-as Sanpo units. Owners of smaller factories, where neither unions nor councils were previously in place, were reluctant to join the federation. It appeared a distraction at best and a threatening form of outside interference at worst. The local police typically stepped in to force these factories to form Sanpo units. By the end of 1939, nineteen thousand enterprise level units had been formed, covering three million employees.

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In 1940 under the second Konoe cabinet, the government took full control of the Patriotic Industrial Service Federation. It forced Japan’s five hundred remaining unions (360,000 members) to dissolve. It mandated that all workplaces in the nation were to form factory councils. By 1942 Sanpo consisted of some eighty-seven thousand factory level units that enrolled about six million employees.

Federation supporters hoped the councils would build morale and solidarity among employers and employees as well as help expand production for the “holy war” in Asia. The model for this effort was the Nazi Labor Front put in place several years earlier in Germany. In practice, the councils were greeted with apathy by employees. One man reported that “we basically slept through meetings” while another called the councils “a complete waste of time.” Owners and managers similarly held low expectations of the groups and gave them no authority. Sanpo was ultimately of little value to wartime mobilization. It did, however, establish the precedent of including white-collar as well as blue-collar employees in workplace organizations. It offered official and high-profile lip service to the belief that all employees were valued members of the nation and the corporation. The postwar union movement would build on as well as transform these wartime precedents.

Wartime mobilization severely restricted the autonomy of managers and employees in several respects. Under the Mobilization Law after 1938, bureaucrats in the Home and Welfare ministries worked with school principals to assign new graduates to war industries. In 1941 as the war intensified and adult male employees were drafted into the army, the government put a labor draft in place to replace these workers. It authorized the conscription of adult males ages sixteen to forty and unmarried women ages sixteen to twenty-five. Over the following years roughly one million men and another million adult women were drafted into workplaces. The women were typically moved from domestic labor into the workplace, while the men were usually shifted from a “peacetime” job into a munitions plant or other strategic industry. Between 1943 and 1945, three million Japanese schoolboys and schoolgirls were drafted into plants producing for the war effort. Another one million Koreans and Chinese were sent from the continent to Japan and put to work in factories and mines under harsh supervision and dismal conditions.

Once on the job, employees had less and less freedom as the war progressed. Between 1939 and 1941 the government also under authority of the Mobilization Law issued a complex system of job registration and work passports that outlawed job changes. Simultaneously, the state restricted wages with increasingly severe regulations. Officials wanted to help employers and slow inflation by stabilizing labor costs.

The bureaucrats who devised these controls were moved in part by suspicion of the free market. Their regulations declared that the employment relation was no longer a contract between private parties. Rather, the primary obligation of managers and workers alike was to the state. Bureaucrats hoped to improve morale and productivity by forcing employers to offer a “living wage” that would rise with seniority to meet the increased needs of older workers with families. By 1943 Welfare Ministry officials had forced managers at thousands of companies to rewrite their personnel rules. All employees were to receive pay raises twice a year. Employers were given only limited discretion to reward talented producers or penalize poor performers. By these rules, the existing informal practice of giving seniority-linked raises to valued workers was systematized and extended to millions of employees. The postwar union movement would build on this reform.

The state also exercised more authority than ever in wartime agriculture, acting with a similar bias against the free market. In 1939 the Ministry of Agriculture put in place controls on rice prices and on the rents landlords could charge to tenants. As with wage controls, the goals were to stop inflation and to encourage production, in this case by protecting tenant cultivators. The state took virtually full control over the purchase and sale of rice and other foodstuffs with the Food Control Law of 1942. The government not only set the price of wholesale rice. It also took over distribution and retail sales, buying crops from rural producers and selling them to consumers in towns and cities.

Agricultural controls offered incentives to the actual cultivators at the expense of landlords. The Food Control Law set up a two-tiered pricing system. The government purchased “landlord rice” collected by landowners from their tenants at one price. It bought the remainder of “producer rice” directly from tenants or small-scale owner-cultivators at a higher price. The government at first paid a 20 percent premium for producer
rice. By the end of the war it offered producers double what it paid to landlords. By this time, two-thirds of the rice crop was covered by the control apparatus. The government had bolstered the fortunes of cultivators and weakened the social prestige as well as the economic base of landlords.

The projects to mobilize for war by transforming industrial work and farming were riddled with contradictions. Labor regulations sought the goal of a secure “living wage,” but government inspectors on the spot allowed companies to give large incentive premiums to fast young producers. Agrarianist rhetoric exalted village harmony, while incentives set tenants and cultivators against landlords. Such contradictions were most glaring in the state’s approach to the economic role of women. With millions of men taken from the workplace to the military, the logic for drawing women into the work force was compelling. Yet deeply held beliefs about proper gender roles were equally compelling to many. The Home Ministry in 1942 refused to draft women into workplaces “out of consideration for the family system.” Prime Minister Tojo put it most grandly: That warm fountainhead which protects the household, assumes responsibility for rearing children, and causes women, children, brothers, and sisters to act as support for the front lines is based on the family system. This is the natural mission of the women in our empire and must be preserved far into the future.

By late 1943, government officials recognized the need to somehow square the circle and, in the words of one bureaucrat, “simultaneously mobilize Japanese women while giving rise to their special qualities associated with the household.” They put in place a virtually mandatory program to bring at least unmarried women into the workplace. All single women between twelve and thirty-nine were ordered to register as potential workers in the so-called Women’s Volunteer Labor Corps. Pressures from neighborhood associations made it virtually mandatory to join. Between 1943 and 1945, some 470,000 women had gone to work in this program. This accounted for about one-third of the total increase in wartime female employment.

Yet even at the peak of the mobilization effort in 1943 Prime Minister Tojo noted that “there is no need for our nation to draft women just because America and Britain are doing so.... The weakening of the family system would be the weakening of the nation.... We are able to do our duties here in the Diet only because we have wives and mothers at home.” Influenced by such views at the top, the overall mobilization of women’s labor power proceeded in a comparatively halting fashion. Between 1941 and 1944, as many as 1.5 million young and adult women entered the labor force, producing a total of 14 million women working outside the home at the peak of the wartime economy. They made up 42 percent of the civilian labor force. The increase reflected market demand as well as state coercion. Women and their families needed money, and factories needed workers. Although the increase was significant, it contrasts sharply to the 50 percent rise in the United States and the even larger increases in the numbers of women workers in the wartime Soviet Union, Germany, or Britain.

Just as the economic reforms of the war years often fell short of the ambitious goals of planners, or foundered on internal contradictions, so did a parallel drive for a Political New Order produce mixed results. It began as a drive of some bureaucrats and officers to replace the existing political parties with a single mass party along the lines of Hitler’s Nazis. It ended halfway to that goal. No energetic mass party was created, but in 1940 all existing parties were dissolved. A sort of political cheerleading squad called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) replaced them.

Advocates of a new mass party coalesced around Prime Minister Konoe in 1937 and urged him to head a mass campaign against the established parties. They were principally concerned with muzzling the Minseito and Seiyukai, which were still vigorous enough in the Diet session of 1937-38 to force the government to delay or slightly modify its legislative agenda. They also viewed low voter turnout as a form of resistance. In the view of New Order supporters, individualism or socialism had poisoned the masses, rendering them insufficiently committed to the agenda of the emperor’s ministers. The campaign for a Political New Order was intended to transform apathy into enthusiastic support for the state.

During his first cabinet, Konoe focused on building consensus among opposed elite factions, so he shrank from the confrontational effort to lead a new party. The next two years witnessed a complicated series of struggles between advocates and opponents of the New Order. Key figures in the military, the bureaucracy, the Social Masses Party, and the civilian right, who supported a relatively pure fascist regime, placed their hopes in Prince
Konoe. They saw a need for a powerful organ of mass mobilization to channel the economic and spiritual energies of the population in support of state goals. Against them stood most party politicians and their supporters, particularly the zaibatsu leaders.

At the outset of his second term as prime minister in July 1940, Konoe finally moved to proclaim a Political New Order by creating the IRAA. All political parties were required to dissolve themselves, and elected politicians were told to join the new association as individuals. But just as the zaibatsu accepted but co-opted the system of economic controls, the Minseito and Seiyu kai parties preserved some prerogatives within the new structure.

The Diet election of 1942 nicely demonstrates this halfway result. About 1,000 candidates contested for 466 seats. The IRAA put forward a government-approved slate of precisely 466 men. This included 247 incumbents and 20 former Diet representatives, a significant continuity from the previous decades of party politics. Roughly 550 independent candidates ran for office as well. These included another 150 party politicians. The official IRAA candidates won 82 percent of the seats (381 of 466). All the incumbents on the IRAA slate were reelected. Many party men, whether those serving in the IRAA or those elected as independents, continued to command the local loyalty of their constituents. To a considerable extent, the individual members of the established political parties remained a part of the ruling system.

Yet they were certainly a far meeker group of people than in the past. A total of 199 newcomers were elected to the Diet, a higher turnover than in previous elections. And all the Diet members were now acting less as representatives of popular interests than as transmitters of state interests to the people. They no longer constituted an organized or independent political force. The vast majority supported Prime Minister Tojo. Those who did not kept their doubts private or faced arrest and prison.

Taken as a whole, state mobilization programs fell short of their more ambitious, even totalitarian goals to “renovate” the nation. Significant though limited pluralism remained. Neither the Economic New Order nor the Industrial Patriotic Federation nor the IRAA brought the state total control over Japanese subjects. Yet the drive to mobilize society for war, and remake it in the process, did change the relation between state, society, and the individual. The Diet became a peripheral institution. Relatively independent organizations of socialists or feminists, of factory workers or tenant farmers, of businessmen or party politicians were dissolved or transformed. The state became more intrusive than ever. Political expression was tightly and harshly monitored.

This new order was promoted using the latest technologies, from radio to newsreels and cinema. It linked people to the state and the emperor through a vast network of organizations that had been created in the modernizing endeavors of previous decades. These bodies were now more closely managed by the state: youth groups, women’s groups, village and neighborhood associations, workplace councils, agricultural and industrial producers’ unions. The wartime order was cloaked in a traditionalistic rhetoric that glorified ancient loyalty to the emperor, but in many ways it was exceedingly modern.

4.2.12. Ending the War

People in Japan lived through most of the war with remarkable public perseverance, despite mounting private doubts. But toward the end, signs of social breakdown increased. Chronic absenteeism in urban workplaces throughout Japan reached 20 percent daily even before air raids forced workers to flee the cities. After the raids began in 1944 and 1945, absentee rates often came to a full 50 percent of the work force. Wildcat disputes over wages and work conditions rose in number. The military police also noted an alarming rise in passive resistance such as anti-government graffiti.

As they observed these trends, and as they realized that the war had turned decisively against Japan, some leaders in court, diplomatic, and business circles and a few military brass concluded that even a nearly total surrender would be preferable to the consequences of a doomed last battle. Most prominent among them was Prince Konoe Fumimaro, the former prime minister upon whom the more radical reformers had pinned great hopes several years back. Konoe and others were terrified at the prospect that the Soviet Union might enter the war against Japan. The group around Konoe feared above all that a prolonged war would crush the imperial institution.
They came to identify a three-pronged threat: Foreign attack might combine with unrest from below and revolutionary plans from above to destroy the spiritual and cultural heart of their world.

These fears especially the fear of a domestic revolution initiated by high-level military and bureaucratic radicals were exaggerated. Factional conflict near the war’s end indeed set Konoe and his allies against the army leadership in particular. But this was not a fight setting pro-emperor conservatives around the throne versus anti-emperor revolutionaries in the military. The dispute centered on the question of who posed the greater threat to the imperial institution: the United States or the Soviet Union. Army officers who feared the Americans even entertained desperate plans to evacuate the emperor to the Asian continent with Soviet protection during a final battle for the homeland. Their opponents preferred to take their chances by accepting the American conditions for peace.

The army strategy prevailed in the first stage of the war’s endgame. Prime Minister Tojo resigned in July 1944. He had lost the support of the court, the navy, and his own cabinet ministers. But these elites believed they could not control the military, so another army man, General Koiso Kuniaki, succeeded him. In February 1945 Konoe made a desperate attempt to take the initiative from army hardliners. He presented a plea, known as the Konoe Memorial, to the emperor in person. He urged Hirohito to make peace with the United States, even at the cost of unconditional surrender. This, he argued, was the only way to “extricate the people from the miserable ravages of war, preserve the kokutai, and plan for the security of the imperial house.”16 The emperor appeared intrigued, but did not follow his advice to replace the prime minister with someone willing to take this course. Several of the men who helped Konoe formulate his proposal were briefly jailed, including the diplomat and postwar prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru. Koiso continued his public stance of confidence in the aggressive pursuit of the war, but he secretly made overtures to the Soviet Union seeking its help in working out a peace agreement.

This approach had clearly failed by the spring of 1945. Facing strong American pressure to join the war, the Soviets announced they would not renew their neutrality pact with Japan. Koiso resigned in April 1945. In an atmosphere of grave crisis, he was succeeded by Admiral Suzuki Kantaro. As Suzuki was forming his cabinet, American forces launched the fierce battle for Okinawa. By the time the United States took the island in June, the fighting had taken 12,500 American lives and left a stunning toll of 250,000 Japanese dead (including 150,000 civilians). By this time Germany had surrendered, and fire-bombing had turned Japan’s cities to rubble.

Those with access to accurate reports were well aware that continued fighting was hopeless. But Suzuki and the others in the inner circle of senior statesmen around the throne feared the uncertainty of a peace that might bring down the imperial institution more than the certainty of a war that would yield nothing but continued death and destruction. Through July and the first days of August, they continued to make diplomatic maneuvers based on the fantasy that the Soviet Union might mediate a surrender that would guarantee the emperor’s survival.

Only the combination of the two atomic bombs, dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9), the declaration of war by the Soviet Union (August 8), and, a Soviet invasion of Manchuria (August 9), led the emperor himself to end the war. Even in the face of these blows, it took nearly a week to reach the point of surrender. At midnight on August 9, after a daylong conference in his presence, the army and navy chiefs of staff and the army minister were still holding out. They wanted Japan to negotiate a surrender without an Allied occupation or any Allied war crime trials. Siding with the prime minister and two other members of the Supreme Council of State, the emperor cast the deciding vote to surrender with the sole condition that the imperial institution be preserved. The Americans offered the unsettling reply that the Japanese people would be allowed to decided the emperor’s fate, despite the fact that top-level planners in Washington intended to keep the emperor in place and use him to facilitate a smooth occupation. On August 14, perhaps believing that he would fare better under American than Soviet control, the emperor broke another deadlocked conference to accept the American surrender terms. The following day, he broadcast this news directly via radio to the entire nation. On September 2, the surrender document was signed aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.
4.2.13. Burdens and Legacies of War

The war bequeathed a complex legacy. It left deep physical and emotional scars both inside and outside Japan. More than fifty years later, these wounds are not yet healed. At the same time, the war laid the groundwork for a very different postwar world.

By temporarily ousting the British, Dutch, French, and American rulers from Southeast Asia and the Philippines, the Japanese rulers both intentionally and unwittingly hastened the demise of colonialism in Asia. By developing modern industries in colonies from Korea to Manchuria to Taiwan, they fostered post-war industrialization. But the superintendents of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere won little thanks and much enduring hatred for their repressive practices of colonial and wartime rule, in Korea and China above all. Millions of people suffered from the unrelenting pursuit of empire and war. The roll call of devastation included the Nanjing Massacre, uncountable further atrocities in China, the Vietnamese famine, and the hopeless campaign of the Indian National Army. In addition, nearly thirty-six thousand British and American prisoners of war died in captivity. This represented more than one-fourth of all captured soldiers. The survivors nursed intense anger for decades.

Another group of war victims received much less public attention at the time or immediately after the war. These were the many thousands of young girls or women who were forced to work in euphemistically named “comfort stations” near the front lines of battle. About 80 percent were Koreans, and the remainder included Chinese, Japanese, and a small number of European women. Recruiters told some women they were hired as waitresses or servants. They simply captured others at gunpoint. Once at the front, all the women were forced to serve as prostitutes for Japanese troops. The soldiers were typically required to pay for the services of these women. From their perspective, the comfort stations appeared little different from the licensed brothels throughout Japan proper. But many of the women received no pay. Others received “pay” in the form of military tickets whose only use was to purchase daily necessities such as soap or food. The women thus worked in conditions closer to slavery than to prostitution. What further distinguished the plight of the “comfort women” from the common wartime phenomenon of prostitutes selling themselves to soldiers was the hands-on role of Japanese authorities. From cabinet ministers to local commanders, state officials authorized, regulated, and in some cases directly managed the comfort stations. As with the death toll in massacres, the precise number of women forced into sexual slavery will never be known. Estimates range from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand.

The war was also traumatic for the Japanese people. About 1.7 million soldiers died between 1937 and 1945. As many as three hundred thousand prisoners of war perished in Soviet detention camps after the war. Air raids left nine million homeless and killed nearly two hundred thousand civilians. The two atomic bombs killed an additional two hundred thousand people immediately. All human beings within a two-mile radius of the epicenter were incinerated in an instant. Hiroshima and Nagasaki became hellish zones of fire, death, and total destruction. Another one hundred thousand or more bomb victims died in the following months and years because of the lingering effects of radiation sickness. The overall Japanese death toll of close to 2.5 million, and above all the unprecedented experience of atomic bombing, left to survivors a powerful sense of themselves as victims and not perpetrators of war. The experience of defeat sparked a deeply felt revulsion toward all wars among millions of Japanese people.

Policies of the war years also consolidated what has been called “the 1940s system,” although it is more accurately described as a “trans-war” set of programs. The famous postwar practice of industrial policy was rooted in the years of trial-and-error efforts from the depression era through 1945. During this time bureaucrats constructed enduring institutions to guide and control the private economy. They also nurtured complex ongoing networks of major manufacturers and subcontracting suppliers, which would continue into the postwar era. The effort to mobilize for war likewise sparked changes in systems of landholding, work organization, and gender roles. Landlords lost power. Blue-collar workers were given materially empty but ideologically potent promises of equality with managers. Women were pulled into workplaces in record numbers. Certainly Japan’s surrender marked a great divide in modern history. But the dramatic new postwar departures in every area, from social and
cultural life to politics and international relations, would build upon such wartime experiences in subtle and surprising ways.

### 4.2.14. Conclusion

The post-first world war disruption of the international order led some Japanese to project their country to serve as a role model in reviving East Asian reform and reconstruction; others continued to hold the West as a model for national expansion. The Washington Conference, produced a network of interrelated agreements that can be described as the “Washington Conference system”; it set the parameters of Pacific policy and security for the rest of the decade. The Great Depression did not affect Japan. The depression, resulted in a strong and swift negative reaction from nationalists, especially those in the army. From 1934, the military’s dominance of the government continued to grow. Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. In 1937, Japanese troops engaged in a minor skirmish with Chinese soldiers in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge just south of Beijing, which led to Sino-Japanese war of 1937.

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was the stage when Japan entered into the Second World War. The attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed the heart of America's Pacific fleet. Of its nine battleships, six were destroyed entirely and two damaged seriously. The Pacific War began with swift dramatic victories for the Japanese army and navy. The long war came to an end on dropping of two atomic bombs, dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9), the declaration of war by the Soviet Union (August 8), and, a Soviet invasion of Manchuria (August 9), led the emperor himself to end the war. The war bequeathed a complex legacy. It left deep physical and emotional scars both inside and outside Japan. More than fifty years later, these wounds are not yet healed. At the same time, the war laid the groundwork for a very different postwar world.

### 4.2.15. Summary

- The post-first world war disruption of the international order led some Japanese to project their country to serve as a role model in reviving East Asian reform and reconstruction; others continued to hold the West as a model for national expansion.
- Japan occupied a place of honor in the new League of Nations, which marked Japan’s growing status that Nitobe Inazo, was named under secretary-general, thereby symbolizing an era of internationalism.
- The Washington Conference, produced a network of interrelated agreements that can be described as the “Washington Conference system”; it set the parameters of Pacific policy and security for the rest of the decade.
- In the summer of 1927 Tanaka convened a Far East Conference of Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Finance, and army, navy, and General Staff representatives to try to work out Japanese priorities.
- The Great Depression did not affect Japan. By large fiscal stimulus involving deficit spending; and second, by devaluing the currency Japan rescued herself from the debacle.
- The depression, resulted in a strong and swift negative reaction from nationalists, especially those in the army. From 1934, the military's dominance of the government continued to grow.
- The 1930s were the most eventful and turbulent decade in Japanese history as during its early years witnessed the assassination two prime ministers and rise of military rule.
- In 1937, Japanese troops engaged in a minor skirmish with Chinese soldiers in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge just south of Beijing. This finally led to Sino-Japanese war of 1937.
- Japanese relations with the Soviets which had been damaged with the seizure of Manchuria worsened when Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936). Italy subsequently joined the Anti-Comintern Pact (1937).
- In 1939, Hitler invaded Poland and France the following month, which resulted in the declaration of second world war, however confined to Europe.
- The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was the stage when Japan entered in to the Second World War. The attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed the heart of America’s Pacific fleet. The Pacific War began with swift dramatic victories for the Japanese army and navy.
The long war come to an end on dropping of two atomic bombs, dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9), led the emperor himself to end the war. The war bequeathed a complex legacy. It left deep physical and emotional scars both inside and outside Japan. More than fifty years later, these wounds are not yet healed. At the same time, the war laid the groundwork for a very different postwar world.

4.2.16. Exercise
1. Discuss the various aspects of foreign policy of Japan in the inter war era.
2. How Japan project her ambition of greater Asiatic empire? Discuss.
3. Write a essay on the anti-Comintern Pact.
5. Discuss the political economy of Japan during second world war.

4.2.17. Further Reading
- Kishimoto, K., Politics in Modern Japan, Tokyo, Japan Echo, 1997.

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Unit-4
Chapter-III
POST WAR JAPAN-JAPAN UNDER AMERICAN OCCUPATION (1945-51)
Democratization, Demilitarization, Socio-Economic reforms;
Economic Progress of Japan, 1951-1980

Structure
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4.3.0. Objectives
In this chapter we intend to provide you an insight into the Post Second World War history of Japan. By the end of this chapter you would be able to:

- **know the situation of Japan on the eve of her surrender and occupation by allied army;**
- **understand rise and growth of Japan as a result of Post War Reconstruction;**
- **describe the various reforms carried out in Japan as a measure of reconstruction;**
- **assess some aspect of political development in Japan in the post world war era;**
- **discuss the major milestone achieved by Japan in her miracle economy in the contemporary world;**
- **assess the new role plying by Japan in the modern world affairs.**

4.3.1. Introduction
On August 15, 1945, the emperor of Japan announced the nation’s surrender to the Allied powers with his first radio broadcast ever. Some of his stunned listeners would later recall that August noon as an instant of “rebirth.” For these people, the surrender was a moment when past experience and values were rendered illegitimate. They decided to chart a totally new course, whether personal, on behalf of a national community, or both. Other listeners, already struggling to find food and shelter in bombed-out cities, fell into a condition of despair and passivity. Still others-especially those in positions of power-resolved to defend the world they knew. Despite the shared national experience of defeat, individual experience varied greatly.

4.3.2. Post War Japan: Reconstruction
After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the American forces under General MacArthur occupied Japan for nearly six and half years. Although in name an Allied responsibility, the occupation of Japan was primarily an American affair. There were set up of Far Eastern Commission at Washington and an Allied Council at Tokyo. General MacArthur was the supreme commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). The Washington Far Eastern Commission merely laid down policies for the SCAP and the Tokyo Council was a consultative and advisory body. General MacArthur was autocratic, austere and decisive and he was respected and admired by the traditional Japanese mind which had been accustomed to obey an autocrat. He carried on military administration of Japan in his own way. He was called “Caesar of the Pacific”. He and his staff issued instructions and the latter faithfully carried them out.

4.3.3. Fundamental Occupation Policy
In 1945 Japan entered into the period of occupation by the allied nations of World War II, although the fact was that the United States solely directed the occupation policy. The method of occupation was “indirect rule.” A national government continued to remain, while the final policy maker was the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ SCAP) led by General MacArthur or the government of the United States in Washington, D.C. The ultimate goal of the US occupation of Japan was to change Japan into a peaceful nation. In order to achieve this goal, the United States believed that demilitarization and democratization were needed through major institutional reforms. Economic recovery was not part of the occupation policy.

The motive to suppress the rise of communism heavily influenced the occupation policy around the time of the beginning of the Cold War. Left-wing groups more or less enjoyed increasing popularity after the war. The change in the occupation policy resulted in the restriction on the meaning of “democratization” and the solidification of power of the conservative circles in Japan. Accordingly, “demilitarization” began to be interpreted in a loose manner. However, this does not mean that the ultimate goal of the pacification of Japan was lost. The anti-communist stance was explained as contributory to the creation of the peaceful state of Japan. Above all General MacArthur was required by the Allied Powers to implements the followings:

- i. To limit Japanese sovereignty to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and some islands.
- ii. To destroy Japanese military establishments.
- iii. To expel from office all those who had been associated with militarist politics.
- iv. To punish war criminals like Premier Tojo.
- v. To frame a democratic constitution.
vi. To encourage the development of organizations in labour, industry and agriculture that would help
the expression of popular will.

vii. To promote economic development and

viii. To recognize the educational system so as to make Japanese youths appreciate democratic values.

In other words General MacArthur was required to train the Japanese people in the paths of peace,
progress and democracy. In sharp contrast to people in Japan, the American occupiers who began to arrive in
September 1945 were well fed, well equipped, and overflowing with confidence. They brought a vision of far-
reaching reform. For nearly seven years the Japanese people faced the unprecedented experience of occupation by
a foreign power wielding the authority to rewrite laws, restructure the economic and political system, and even
seek to redefine culture and values.

The occupation in theory was a collective endeavor of the Allied powers. A four-nation Allied Council for
Japan was created in early 1946 to advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). An eleven-
member Far Eastern Commission was charged to formulate occupation policy and review SCAP actions. In fact,
the supreme commander, in the imposing person of General Douglas MacArthur and a mostly American staff,
took orders from the U.S. government and paid scant attention to these bodies. As a matter of convenience, the
acronym SCAP quickly came to refer both to MacArthur himself and to his extensive administrative bureaucracy.

4.3.4. Constitutional Reforms

GHQ was initially led by liberal intellectuals from the US who aspired to implement idealistic policies in
Japan. Its crystallization was the new Constitution, which stipulated the renunciation of war as the sovereign right
and the respect for fundamental rights of individuals (proclaimed in 1946; effective in 1947). The present
constitution of Japan known as Macarthur Constitution begins with the sentence, “We, the Japanese people do
proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this constitution. The Mikado
derives his position from the will of the people. He is only a symbol of the unity of the people.”. in the Meiji
Constitution the Mikado was the real head of the State, but there were Army and Naval chiefs and the Genro or
erlder statesmen who wielded tremendous influence over the Emperor. They formed the invisible Government of
Pre-war Japan and they were not accountable to Parliament; they were responsible to the Mikado. All that was
removed by MacArthur and the Mikado was required to discharge his duties in consonance with the advice
rendered to him by ministers responsible to the Japanese Diet consisting of the House of Representatives and the
House of Peers. Thus, the Emperor stepped down as the head of the state and became the “symbol” of the nation.
This was a result of the direction from General MacArthur who believed in the role of the Emperor for keeping
domestic stability and counterbalancing communist movements. The Constitution was mainly drafted by the
Americans, but approved overwhelmingly by referendum. It has remained unchanged for almost 60 years. Other
laws including civil law and criminal law had to be modified in accordance with the enactment of the new
Constitution. Hence, Mikado or the Emperor became a Constitutional Monarch and Japan came to have a
Parliamentary Democracy from the end of the War.

4.3.5. Security Sector Reform: Demilitarization

The security sector reform was at the core of the occupation policy of transforming Japan into a peaceful
nation. The first priority was disarmament and demobilization of the Imperial Forces of Japan. This reform was
completed quite smoothly and thoroughly due to the military defeat and the “unconditional surrender” of Japan.

The initial American strategy in Japan was encapsulated in two words: demilitarize and democratize. To
achieve the first goal, SCAP dissolved the army and navy immediately: Japan’s armed forces were officially
disbanded on November 30. To follow up on this order was a daunting task. It meant demobilizing the gigantic
Japanese military, and repatriating to the home islands a total of 6.9 million people. When the war ended, nearly
ten percent of the population of Japan was overseas: 3.7 million soldiers and 3.2 million civilians in Korea,
Manchuria, Taiwan and the Chinese main land, as well as the far-flung wartime empire to the south. With the
exception of about 400,000 people who remained prisoners in the Soviet Union, and smaller numbers left behind
in Manchuria, demobilization and repatriation were completed by the end of 1948. While this was a relatively
swift and smooth process, to absorb such a vast number of people was a complex undertaking which left a legacy
that has not yet been fully studied or understood. Repatriates, both civilian and military, often felt out of place back “home,” regarded with a mixture of pity for their poverty and scorn for their role in pursuing what now appeared to have been a hopeless war. Returned veterans were prominent among those who organized politically in the 1950s and thereafter to pressure the government to rearm and revise the American-imposed reforms of the occupation era.

Other demilitarizing steps focused on those outside the military who had supported the war machine. In October 1945 the Americans disbanded the oppressive Special Higher Police (dubbed “thought police” by Western critics). Between 1945 and 1948, the occupiers purged over two hundred thousand men from positions in the government and business world who were judged responsible for leading the war effort. They disestablished the official state Shinto religion. During and immediately after the war, the allies tried some six thousand military men for conventional war crimes, such as abuse of prisoners. They convicted and executed over nine hundred. They also set in motion an ambitious plan for war reparations. Significant portions of Japan’s industrial plant were to be loaded onto ships and given to the wartime victims of Japanese expansion in Asia.

The most significant arena of retribution was the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also called simply the Tokyo Trial. It dragged on from May 1946 to November 1948 and put Japan’s wartime rulers on trial. Beginning with General Tojo Hideki, twenty-eight men were charged with both conventional war crimes and the newly minted crime of engaging in conspiracy to wage war. All were found guilty of some charges. Tojo and six others were executed. Another seventeen defendants were sentenced to life in prison.

The United States in 1945 sought to do far more than demilitarize Japan and punish the nation’s leaders. It was striving to reconstruct the entire world in its image, Japan included. In this spirit, SCAP imposed a rush of reforms in the fall of 1945 and 1946. They were based on a simple logic: Militarism stemmed from monopoly, tyranny, and poverty. To construct a peaceful, no-militaristic Japan required more than just disbanding the military. It required vast reforms to smash authoritarian political rule, equalize political rights and even wealth, and transform values.

SCAP announced the first major reforms in October 1945, with declarations that guaranteed freedoms of speech, press, and assembly and the right to organize labor or farmer unions. SCAP also ordered the Japanese government to extend civil and political rights to women. A bit later, in December, the occupiers told the Japanese government to undertake land reform that would allow tenant farmers to purchase their fields.

Although pre-war Japan was immersed in “ultra-nationalism,” it was also true that the ordinary citizens were frightened to be conscripted to the Imperial Army and were more or less annoyed by oppressive domestic state authorities. At the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese were afraid of the occupation troops, but gradually began to trust them under the internal supervision of the American military police. There was a feeling that “from now on it is enough to trust American authorities, because Japanese authorities were powerless and useless.” GHQ solidified such a public sentiment and implemented radical reforms. The dissolution of the Imperial Forces of Japan was complete. It was only in 1950, at the time of the Korean War, that Japan reorganized a military unit as a “Reserved Police” by the order of GHQ. That was transformed into the Self-Defense Forces in 1954.

The police was a target of reform as well. The Police’s special secret bureau notoriously known as “Tokkou” in pre-war Japan was disbanded shortly after the occupation began. Detained “political criminals” were released. The legal bases of the oppressive regime, the Security Police Act and the Maintenance of the Public Order Act, were abolished. While there were those who wanted to keep Japan’s highly centralized and efficient police mechanism even among GHQ circles, MacArthur took side with GHQ’s Civil Affairs Department by imposing democratization and decentralization of the police. Accordingly, there appeared a new police system composed of 30,000 state local policemen and 95,000 local administrative policemen in 1947. The Ministry of Interior, the core agency of pre-war centralized Japan, which controlled religion, local governments, police, and construction, was abolished. The Ministry of Interior had been a symbol of the Japanese governmental system since the time of Toshimichi Okubo who tried to imitate Imperial Germany under Bismarck. But this does not
mean that the ordinary people liked the Ministry. The disbandment of the Ministry in the context of the distribution of power to the local governments took place in a tranquil manner.

The Local Government Act was proclaimed in 1947 and became effective in 1948 together with the Constitution. In pre-war Japan, local institutions were recognized simply as branch bodies of the national bureaucracy. They were transformed into a democratic one by introducing elective local governments with power to enact municipal ordinances.

The Japanese Constitution renounces war as an instrument of national policy or as a method of settling international disputes. Thus, immediately after the war Japan was disarmed, the army and navy were disbanded and naval bases were destroyed. A few years later however, she was allowed to re-arm. In 1950 she was allowed to have a small army, navy and air force, known respectively as the ground, maritime and air self defense force. Having disarmed Japan, the occupation authorities reformed the social and political life of the country.

4.3.6. Reform in Human Resources

It was also important that GHQ expelled pre-war leaders from the public sector. In fact, by 1948 around 210,000 people were expelled from the public sector. The main purpose of this action was to renovate public sectors without the ideological influence of “ultra-nationalism.” But it can be noted that the purge was later directed toward communists rather than ultra-nationalists. GHQ recognized the punishment of wartime leaders as indispensable for psychological disarmament of the Japanese. The Far East International Military Tribunal was established and prosecuted 28 politicians and others including a wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo for the reason of violations of “crimes against humanity,” “crimes against peace,” and so on. The so-called Tokyo Tribunal was the second attempt of international war crimes tribunals in world history following the Nuremberg Tribunal. Eventually, all the accused persons but one with mental disorder were convicted; nine persons including Tojo received death sentences and 16 got life imprisonment.

4.3.7. Reform of the Economic System

In the economic field GHQ sought to disband zaibatsu or economic combines. GHQ believed that zaibatsu was the war machine that influenced the government by controlling financial, industrial and commercial fields. First of all, the stock holding companies of the four major zaibatsu were disbanded. Their stocks that amounted to 42% of the net asset of paid capital in Japan at that time was redistributed and sold to buyers including employees. GHQ then disbanded 10 “zaibatsu” families that constituted the core of zaibatsu managements. In 1947 the Antimonopoly Act and the Excluding Excessive Concentration of Economic Power Act were introduced so that 325 companies of zaibatsu would be disbanded.

The Excluding Excessive Concentration Economic Power Act was criticized by the conservative circles in the United States who insisted that disbandment of firm monopoly was not necessary. The applicable range was diminished into 18 companies and only 11 companies were actually divided. That banks were not disband at the time definitely affected the course of Japanese economy. In 1946 the Financial Emergency Measures Act to counteract inflation in the post-war period introduced a limit on the amount of deposits that can be withdrawn and imposed compulsory deposits. This radical measure restored the credibility of banks by increasing the amount of bank capital and put them at the core of Japanese economy. Monopoly groups of firms with each bank at the core to compete with each other were the foundation of “corporative capitalism” of Japan.

GHQ disbanded family managements of zaibatsu, but did not establish a system of ownership by individual investors. As a result, a form of capitalism came into existence, which was based on corporative possessions. This economic structure later came to be known as the “Japanese corporative capitalism,” which was to achieve the time of High Growth of Economy.

4.3.7.1. Labor Reform

The protection of the rights of labor was one of the indispensable agenda. GHQ believed that the economic reason of Imperial Japan’s invasion was its unfair competitiveness in the world market, so-called social dumping. Japan’s social structure to make economic gains was based upon exploitation of labor and Japan continuously sought to expand its territory in order to find more labor to exploit. GHQ tried to create “fair capitalism” by protecting the rights of labor and nurturing trade unions in order to prevent invasions.
In line with this belief, the Labor Union Act was enacted to give workers the right to unite, the right of group negotiation, and the right of dispute. In 1946 the Labor Relation Adjustment Act established a system of arbitration for employers and employees (Labor Commission). In 1947 the Labor Standards Act was enacted to correct pre-war notorious labor customs. In order to observe the compliance with these Three Labor Acts, the ministry of labor was established for the first time in Japan.

Immediately after the war, Japan had 13 millions of the potential unemployed as a result of demobilizations and disbandment of the military and military-related companies. Under this circumstance, employees hastily began to form labor unions to protect their own lives. In 1945 the rate of organizing labor unions was 3.2%. In 3 years it rose to 55.8%. However, GHQ’s attitude changed due to repetitions of labor strikes and the beginning of the Cold War. GHQ banned strikes by public servants in 1948. It also revised the Labor Union Act in order to restrain labor union movements.

4.3.7.2. Farmland Reform

Food shortage in Japan shortly after the war was so serious that the public distribution system was dysfunctional and the price of rice in black markets was beyond the financial capacity of ordinary workers. In order to counteract this situation, the government of Japan initiated a farmland reform. It was intended to create more independent farmers and a cash payment system for rent. But this attempt of “the first farmland reform” was insufficient and thus GHQ started “the second farmland reform.”

The Special Measures to Create Independent Farmers Act and the Revised Farmland Adjustment Act of 1946 enabled the government to directly buy land owned by non-residential landlords and limited the size of land that residential landlords can possess to 1 chobu. Independent farmers can possess land up to 3 chobu. As a result, 80% of cultivated land in Japan was emancipated in 2 years. The cash payment system was introduced at a low rate and based on contracts. As the remaining rented land was only 9%, most Japanese farmers became independent, or both independent and renting. In addition, the 25% rent rate was at first introduced, but soon a fixed low amount to pay to a landlord was established. This further decreased the gains of landlords in accordance with the rise of rice prices. The percentage of their gains, which was almost 50% in pre-war Japan, dropped to 2% in 1947. Furthermore, the price of farmland was valueless in the time of rapid inflation. Landlords who controlled rural areas of Japan became ruined.

The farmland reform raised the productivity of independent farmers and established a system to give farmers fruits of labor. The percentage of the agricultural sector in tax revenues of the government rose from 8% in 1945 to 32% in 1947. The farmland reform certainly constituted a base of Japan’s High Growth of Economy.

Nevertheless, the reform to produce a post-war system of independent farmers had an effect of keeping micro farmland owners and farmers. After the time of the High Growth of Economy, Japanese agriculture suffered from its lack of international competitiveness due to the structural problem of its low productivity.

GHQ focused upon a reform in land possession relations. Thus, it was not interested in enlarging agricultural management units to increase productivity. The political intention of GHQ was to destroy the pre-war economic structure by expelling the landowner class and at the same time it intended to increase the number of independent farmers in order to contain communism. In fact, rural areas continued to remain a solid electoral foundation for the conservative government party. The farmland reform was a factor to stabilize Japan’s post-war political environment. At the same time, the “agricultural reform” to increase productivity remained untouched throughout the post-occupation/reconstruction time in Japan.

4.3.8. Education Reform

GHQ thought that in order for Japan to be a peaceful nation, a new educational system was necessary to repudiate pre-war ultra-nationalistic and militaristic views and also to convey to the youth the ideals of liberalism and democracy. Under the circumstance of purging pre-war educationists, 110,000 teachers voluntarily resigned and 5,000 were forced to leave their jobs. The first US Educational Mission of 1946 recommended that the new goal of education be set up as “nurturing citizens with necessary knowledge and free spirit of a quest.” The Emperor’s Words on Education were institutionally abandoned and the Basic Law of Education drawn from new ideas was passed in 1947. Institutionally, following the US, a 6-3-3-4 system was introduced. After the restoration
of sovereignty, while democratic principles were kept as educational ideals, adjustments to change “what our nation finds alien” were conducted.

4.3.9. Economic Recovery

Since the goal of GHQ’s policy was to transform Japan into a peaceful nation, economic reconstruction was not a major agenda at the initial period. Rather, there was the understanding that the occupation forces should not take responsibility in economic reconstruction and that the Japanese ought to persevere in any economic plight caused by the war. With the rise of anti-communist movements and dissatisfaction with the enormous cost of the occupation of Japan in the United States, however, GHQ gradually shifted attention from reforms to economic reconstruction. Now GHQ thought it indispensable to develop Japanese economy in order to prevent the spread of communism and to maintain autonomy and stability of Japan.

Complying with the order from the US government, GHQ proclaimed “9 principles of Economic Stability” in 1948. The so-called “Dodge Line,” economic policies named after Joseph Dodge, was adopted in 1949. Dodge as well as the Japanese government of Prime Minister Yoshida implemented a highly reduced budget, while pursuing reduction in budgets for social welfare and education, bankruptcy of middle- or small-size firms, dropping down of prices of agricultural products, layoff of a large number of public servants, and weakening of labor unions.

Before the time of the Dodge Line, the government of Japan had established the “Reconstruction Finance Corporation” so that it was able to intensively finance important industries like coal and steel. It introduced “subsidies for price difference” in order to encourage supplying industrial goods that were cheaper than consuming goods like food. The US assistance in importing materials that constituted 70 or 80% of the total amount of imports was also transferred to the important industries. But the Dodge Line forced the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to stop new finances in 1949. The Shawp Mission came to Japan to find the way for stable tax collection and advised on a “direct income oriented system” based on income tax to individuals and corporations at the national level and land tax and residential tax at the local level. This advice determined the basic taxation system in Japan.

The Dodge Line advanced rationalization of private firms and resulted in an increase in the number of the unemployed. It was the Korean War Economic Boom of 1950 that enabled Japan to overcome this crisis. The waves of modernization and rationalization as a result of the Dodge Line terminated re-use of old equipments and encouraged capital investment for renewal. In 1951 the Japan Development Bank was established to replace the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in order to finance important industries like electricity, shipment, steel, and coal intensively. The Bank further advanced modernization of equipments. The “special redemption system” introduced by the revision of the Special Measures on Taxation Act in 1951 increased the amount of redemption of specific machines and ships that were identified as contributory to reconstruction of Japanese economy. The Promotion of Firm Rationalization Act of 1952 also makes possible special redemptions of equipments for modernization and research. The revision of the Fixed Rate of Customs in 1951 introduced the exemption from taxation of important equipments imported from abroad.

As a result of these efforts, the number of middle- and small-size firms rapidly increased in Japan. They were also active in allying themselves with larger firms. The National Finance Corporation Act of 1949, the Mutual Banking Act of 1951, and the Finance Corporation for Middle- and Small-Size Firms Act of 1953 were enacted to establish a functionally diversified finance system for middle- and small-size firms. It is worth noting that two thirds of workers in this period were those who took jobs after the war.

4.3.10. Beginning of the Cold-War

It is worth noting that the liberal tendency of GHQ changed due to the beginning of the Cold War between the capitalist camp led by the United States and the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union. In 1950 the Cold War began in Asia too with the invasion of South Korea by North Korea backed by the Soviet Union and China. The United Nations led by the United States intervened militarily to counteract it. General MacArthur now assumed the commandship of this United Nations forces. The goal of the occupation policy was reset to make Japan a
member of US allies. GHQ promoted the so-called “red purge” to expel communists from the public sector and restore wartime leaders as the anti-communist shield.

The Korean War gave an economic boom to Japan that was suffering from the post-war stagnation. Japanese industries, which had not found a moment to fully recover, functioned as the wartime supply base. This was the momentum that led to “miracle recovery” in the period of the High Growth of Economy from the late 1950s.

4.3.11. The Establishment of the Post-war Political System

The new “peaceful nation” of Japan was formed by two factors in reality; stability based on the security alliance with the United States in foreign policy and stability based on “Japanese capitalism” in domestic policy.

The “indirect rule” of the government of Japan, after a few years of confusion, resulted in the establishment of the government of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, pro-Anglo-Saxon former diplomat, who came to have an absolute majority in the Diet. Yoshida achieved the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 (effective in 1952) only with the nations of the capitalist camp, which critics called a “partial treaty.” Yoshida simultaneously signed the US-Japanese Security Treaty in order to secure a US defense shield for Japan. Yoshida continued to keep pro-US conservative policies even after the restoration of sovereignty and solidified fundamental principles of Japan’s post-war foreign and domestic policies. Then after, Japan remained divided between those who were pro-US and conservative and those who were anti-US and progressive. The power balance and the tension between them remained almost unchanged throughout the Cold War period.

The conservative camp succeeded in focusing on domestic issues by maintaining stable foreign relations. The conservative camp or the Liberal Democratic Party continued to be the government party for almost the entire post-war period by meeting the interests of economic and agricultural fields, and led Japan’s reconstruction and economic development. After Nobusuke Kishi resigned as Prime Minister due to the political turmoil as a result of the revision of the Security Treaty with the US in 1960, Hayato Ikeda advocated the “Income Doubling Program” and oriented the interests of the people into enriching private lives in the age of High Economic Growth.

The progressive camp could not form a majority in the Diet, but often mobilize mass anti-government movements. Especially, at the time of the renewal of the US-Japanese Security Treaty in 1960, there arose large protests and demonstrations. Mass movements around city areas further heightened and culminated in the late 1960s in the form of anti-Vietnam War and student protests. However, up to the 1970s, these movements got radicalized and divided into political sects. They often clashed with each other and accordingly lost the public support.

Social disturbances and anti-government movements continuously took place from the period in which the various reforms under the military occupation were implemented to the period in which the stable structure of domestic and foreign policies was formed. But Japan never experienced a big social change in society after the 1970s and went into the age of stabilization based on the long-term governance of the conservative party. The “peaceful nation” Japan as a crystallization of post-war reconstruction took almost 30 years to consolidate its established form.

4.3.12. Toward recovery and independence

Economic recovery was also a basic ingredient of postwar stabilization. At the outset of the occupation, SCAP rejected any responsibility for helping Japan’s economy to revive. Left to their own devices in an uncertain context, business leaders combined fear with greed in disastrous ways. The early postwar government offered reconstruction subsidies to major firms in hopes the funds would be used to revive production. Rather than processing them into finished goods, businesses found it more profitable to use these funds to buy and resell raw materials to black market brokers. Many of the industrial plants that had survived stood idle. From 1945 to 1949, inflation surged out of control.

The first glimmer of hope in the effort to revive confidence and restart production came in 1947. Economic policymakers observed a vicious cycle of coal shortages that inhibited the recovery of other industries, especially the crucial iron and steel industry, in turn keeping coal demand low. Their answer was the Priority Production program. Drawing on wartime experience, bureaucrats in the Ministry of Commerce allocated both
coal and imported fuel on a preferential basis to steelmakers. This allowed steel companies to revive production and feed steel back to the coal industry, which in turn could rebuild the mining infrastructure and raise productivity. The program succeeded modestly in reviving both industries and generating coal supplies for other customers.

But throughout 1948 the economy remained relatively stagnant, and inflation continued to surge. The Americans were now committed to Japan as Asia’s “bulwark against communism,” in the words of Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall. They were now anxious to promote economic recovery.

As a step in this direction, the United States in February 1949 sent a special financial advisor to Tokyo, a Detroit banker named Joseph Dodge. He was an orthodox economist who detested government support or regulation of the economy. SCAP took his advice and imposed a harsh medicine in three doses: a balanced budget, the suspending of all state loans to industry, and the abolition of all state subsidies. SCAP also followed the advice to set a favorable exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar to encourage Japanese exports. This “Dodge line” program indeed halted inflation, but industry found itself starved for capital. In the spring of 1950, a year after this deflationary program had been implemented, Japan appeared on the brink not of recovery but of a deepening depression.

In June 1950, just as it appeared SCAP’s medication might kill the patient, the Korean War began. This tragedy across the straits conferred great fortune on Japan. With the war came a surge of American military procurement orders placed with Japanese industries, which were located conveniently close to the front. In the years 1951-53, war procurements amounted to about two billion dollars, or roughly 60 percent of all Japan’s exports. Japanese leaders tastelessly celebrated what Prime Minister Yoshida called a “gift of the gods” and businessmen dubbed “blessed rain from heaven.” From 1949 to 1951 exports nearly tripled, and production rose nearly 70 percent. Corporations began to show profits for the first time since the surrender, and they responded with a surge of investment in new plants and equipment. The gross national product began to increase at double-digit rates. Japan’s recovery was underway.

With reforms in place and the economy on the mend, and with the Korean War placing great demands on American military resources, pressures in Washington mounted to end the occupation. The end came sooner than many had anticipated; in 1945, some top officials in the United States had spoken of the need to occupy Japan for two decades, or even a century. As it turned out, the era of formal occupation lasted just under seven years.

Some of America’s wartime allies were reluctant to sign a treaty so quickly that would bring the occupation to a close. The British, the Chinese, and Southeast Asian governments wanted a harsh peace with reparations paid and with strong guarantees against a revival of the Japanese military. Led by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the United States negotiated vigorously on multiple fronts to hasten a settlement. It concluded defense agreements with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand that assuaged the fears of these nations. Asian nations were also given the right to follow the treaty by negotiating bilateral reparations agreements with Japan. In September 1951, representatives of forty-eight nations met in San Francisco and signed a treaty to end the state of war that still formally existed with Japan. The occupation officially ended in April 1952.

Several key issues remained unresolved. The United States retained control of Okinawa indefinitely, although most Japanese saw the island as part of their nation. Both the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the mainland People’s Republic of China wanted to sign the treaty as the sole Chinese government. Neither was invited to the peace conference, and Japan was instructed to reach agreements on its own. And the Soviet Union and other European communist states walked out of the conference. They were particularly angry that a large force of American troops was going to remain in Japan after the occupation ended. The Soviets retained control of several disputed islands just north of Hokkaido.

Two hours after the San Francisco treaty was signed, the United States and Japan ratified the controversial U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It granted the United States the right to keep bases and troops in Japan. The official mission of the troops was to protect Japan from attack and guarantee international peace and security. From the perspective of the Americans and many in Asia, the function of the American troops was to contain Japan as much as to protect it. Not surprisingly, the security treaty faced much opposition in Japan. Some on the political left quite
logically saw it as a violation of Japanese neutrality and the principle of unarmed peace enshrined in the constitution. They feared that U.S. troops made Japan a lightning rod for an attack by America’s enemies. Others on the left, together with many in the conservative camp, saw the treaty—again with considerable justification—less as a violation of Japanese neutrality than as a betrayal of its sovereignty. They scorned Prime Minister Yoshida for accepting a “subordinate independence.” Yoshida indeed had been convinced for several years that an American military presence and a secure, if subordinate, place in a Pax Americana was the best Japan could hope to achieve. He got his way. But the agreement that some labeled a “second unequal treaty” would be subject to fierce debate and political struggle for decades.

The occupation forces arrived in 1945 determined to engineer a root-and-branch transformation of Japan. They did change a great deal, but a considerable portion of the old order of imperial Japan, and the revised order of wartime mobilization, remained in place when the Americans packed their bags in 1952.

The occupiers had intended to destroy the zaibatsu, seen as the moneybags of militarism. They had intended to destroy the centralized control held by the bureaucracy over key realms such as education and policing. They had intended to purge from public life, forever, the militarists in the army and navy and their supporters in civilian life, politicians and businessmen as well as intellectuals. Japan’s American rulers made attempts in each of these areas. But by the early 1950s, the subsidiaries of the prewar zaibatsu were on the way toward regrouping around banks instead of holding companies, the prewar political parties had survived to dominate the Diet and cabinet, and the civilian bureaucracy was as strong as ever, or perhaps even stronger. These enduring features of political and economic life are what one historian has called the “passage through” of the old guard, from prewar, through war, to postwar. The relative stability of postwar Japan, however, rested on more than continuity in the power of the old guard, even though various trans war continuities noted earlier were important. The postwar order also was rooted in great changes that would endure: in civil rights granted under the constitution as well as in land reform, labor reform, and legal changes for women that went well beyond what Japan’s rulers would have enacted on their own. These gave more people than ever a stake in the system. The postwar stabilization of Japan was far from a static process involving little change. It was precisely the result of massive change. Reforms accelerated changes underway and set renewed struggles in motion. The political and social realm ultimately settled into a sort of isometric stability: Important, and occasionally explosive, tensions remained at the center of society, culture, and politics, but these were ultimately contained.

Over the next several decades, as the economy boomed, the three interlocking institutions of big business, establishment political parties, and the bureaucracy achieved a remarkably durable hegemony. This postwar stability was importantly rooted in the “passage through” of the old guard. But one also sees great social stability anchored in large and growing middle classes focusing their energies on gaining a stake in the system through education and employment in factories as well as office buildings. This was the legacy of the reforms.


The Japanese economy expanded at a stunning pace from 1950 through the early 1970s. These two decades, beginning with the Korean War boom, have come to be called the “era of high speed growth” by historians. At unprecedented speed, Japan changed from a site of destruction and poverty to a place of prosperity. How did this happen? The so-called economic miracle was in part produced through the transforming magic of the market. But in important and distinctive ways, it was a managed miracle guided by the Japanese state. The experience of high growth was also a costly one. Jobs were often grinding, with long hours and tight discipline. Benefits were unevenly distributed between cities and country, between men and women, and between employees at large and small workplaces. Environmental damage was immense.

Change came more slowly in the realm of social experience. But several years after the postwar economy took off—from roughly the late 1950s into the 1960s—a postwar society took shape that differed greatly from the trans-war Japan of the wartime or immediate postwar era. A way of life identified with what people called the “new middle class” rose to prominence. The middle class in Japan presented a powerful set of standardized images of a typical life. More people than ever came to share in experiences understood as those of middle-class or
“mainstream” society. Nonetheless, some important social divisions persisted, and others were reshaped but not erased.

Japanese leaders in the bureaucracy and ruling political party, working in tandem with corporate executives, actively sought to manage these trends toward more standardized patterns of middle-class social life. A variety of programs supported particular versions of family and domestic life, schooling, and the workplace. Like its economic history, the social history of postwar Japan was shaped by numerous state programs to influence the thought and behavior of ordinary citizens.

4.3.13.1. The postwar “Economic Miracle”

Over the twenty-three years from 1950 to 1973, Japan’s gross national product (GNP; the total value of goods and services produced in a year) expanded by an average annual rate of more than 10 percent. Such a record of growth over such a long period of time had never been seen in world economic history. Only a few minor downturns, such as that in 1954 caused by the end of the Korean War, show up as slight dips on a growth chart that runs smoothly and sharply upward. Measured in U.S. dollars, the Japanese GNP totaled just $11 billion in 1950. By 1955 it had more than doubled to about $25 billion. By 1973 it had increased an additional thirteen-fold, to $320 billion. Measured comparatively, the Japanese economy stood at 7 percent of the American in 1955 and ranked below all the major European economies. By 1973, Japan’s GNP had climbed to nearly one-third of the American total. Its economy was the third largest in the world, after the United States and Soviet Union. Equally remarkable was the sustained and massive investment in new technology and manufacturing plants. The standard measure for such basic investment is gross capital formation.

During the heart of Japan’s high-growth era, from 1955 to 1973, rates of capital formation averaged more than 22 percent per year. As with GNP, these rates are historically and comparatively without parallel. While such growth had no precedent, the change in economic structure had historical roots. At the cutting edge of the postwar surge stood producers in iron and steel, shipbuilding, automobiles, and electronics. Most of these same heavy industries and many of the same companies had led the economic surge of the militarized economy of the 1930s. They now proved able to prosper through peacetime as they had during wartime. The overall weight of heavy industrial production increased from 45 percent in 1955 to 62 percent by 1970, and the prominence of light industries such as textiles fell sharply.

As early as 1962, the British magazine *Economist* ran a feature story on what it called Japan’s postwar “economic miracle.” The term stuck. It has come to be a shorthand description of the postwar decades of high growth. Historians and economists have produced a growth industry of their own trying to offer logical, this-worldly explanations for this seemingly astounding development. One important part of the postwar story was the unusually favorable international environment. Economies boomed in other countries as well—observers used the term “economic miracle” for Germany as well as for Japan. The global economy overall grew unusually fast in the 1950s and 1960s, at a rate of 5 percent per year. The United States led the way in negotiating a more open trading system through treaties such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in (GATT) in 1947. As a result, the total volume of international trade more than tripled over these two decades. In addition, cheap and reliable energy supplies in the form of oil from the Middle East and elsewhere fueled industrial expansion at relatively low costs. Finally, in this more open world economy, relatively affordable licensing agreements gave Japanese (and other) businesses unusually open access to a host of new technologies from transistors to steel furnaces. These allowed productivity to rise quickly and consistently.

4.3.13.2. Factors responsible for economic miracle in Japan

But the above mentioned conjuncture of international fortune smiled on the entire capitalist world. Why did Japan’s economy grow with particular speed? A few of the international factors favored Japan more than others.

America’s continued military presence and the constitutional limitation on Japan’s own military spared the government from high defense costs. The Korean War stimulated exports at a key moment. And a favorable exchange rate from 1949 through the early 1970s functioned as a sort of export subsidy. But a full explanation of economic growth must look in addition to domestic factors. Entrepreneurship is one of them. A new generation of
daring younger managers took charge of established companies and founded new ones. They were helped in part by the occupation era purges, which forced many top managers of the wartime economy into early retirement. In several famous cases, they defied the cautious warnings of government bureaucrats to invest in new fields and new technologies, despite the presence of experienced global competitors.

The government advised automakers, for example, to consolidate via mergers, the better to compete with Detroit’s Big Three. Instead, Toyota, Nissan, Isuzu, Toyo Ko-gyo (Mazda), and Mitsubishi all decided to produce full lines. Even more remarkably, an upstart motorcycle company founded by Honda Soichiro defied bureaucratic warnings and entered the auto market in 1963 with great long-run success. In similar fashion, a bold executive in Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Nishiyama Yataro, spun off his company’s metal division to found a new iron-and steelmaker in 1950. He proposed a massive investment in a fully integrated, state-of-the-art iron and steel plant. When state bureaucrats denied access to domestic capital, he obtained funding outside Japan, from the World Bank. By 1961, the Kawasaki Steel Company had established itself as the fourth largest producer in the nation. And in 1953, two young mavericks, Morita Akio and Ibuka Masaru, struggled for months with reluctant state officials before winning permission to purchase a license to make transistors. Beginning with the radio in the 1950s, their infant company, Sony, soon emerged as the global leader in quality and innovation in consumer electronic goods.

In general, Japanese private companies expanded quickly and fearlessly. They borrowed massive amounts from banks and took on large debts. Private banks, as well as public institutions such as the Industrial Development Bank, drew on individual savings to channel capital to businesses large and small. The typical ratio of debt to equity for a Japanese company in the high growth era stood at 75:25, far different from the prewar economy, where a typical debt level was closer to 40 percent. Because output and revenue (aided by inflation) grew so quickly, corporations were able to repay these loans without major trouble.

The high quality of human capital was another important domestic factor that boosted the postwar economy. As compulsory education was extended through middle school under the occupation, young working people in Japan were increasingly well educated. Employees of all ages were delighted at the prospect of a return to normalcy and a chance to work for themselves, instead of sacrificing for the military. An unprecedented proportion of the work force joined labor unions—over 50 percent at the peak in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Organized workers were often militant in their actions and demands. But they were also energetic and committed on the job, willing to work long hours and master new skills. As new technologies came on line and were used effectively, productivity increased substantially. Labor productivity in manufacturing rose 88 percent in the decade from 1955 through 1964.

In addition to working hard as producers, ordinary Japanese played important roles as both savers and spenders. In sharp contrast to the prewar era, but continuing trends from the war years, ordinary Japanese wage earners saved unusually high proportions of their income. The average household saved under 10 percent of its income in the early 1950s, but savings rates soared steadily as the economy grew. They reached 15 percent by 1960 and topped 20 percent by 1970. Households have continued to save in excess of 20 percent of income since then. These funds, deposited in savings accounts of commercial banks or in the government-run postal savings system, made up a vast pool of capital available for investment in industry.

But even as they saved, ordinary citizens happily spent their growing salaries on a wide range of consumer goods. To be sure, export markets were crucial to the economy; exports earned dollars that were vital to finance continued investment in foreign technology. But from the 1950s through the early 1970s, exports accounted for just 11 percent of GNP. Over the same time span, the capitalist economies of Western European nations exported an average of 21 percent of their GNP. Domestic demand, including the retail consumer market, was therefore a significant engine of growth. Consumers, like industrial producers, continued trends of the 1920s and 1930s that were interrupted by the war. They flocked to stores to buy a widening array of household and leisure goods: washing machines and electric rice cookers, radios, record players, and then televisions. These were costly purchases. In 1957, a typical new TV sold for eighty-five thousand yen, roughly two and one-half months’ income for an average urban family. Nonetheless, by 1963, more than four of every five households in the nation owned a
television. Overall, real per capita domestic consumption rose at an annual rate of 7.5 percent between 1955 and 1973.

The most controversial domestic element in postwar economic history is the role of the Japanese state. The government did not run a “command economy” on the Soviet model. Private businesses took significant initiatives, sometimes against official advice. But even so, Japan’s postwar economic story is not a simple tale of a free market miracle. State management, which grew out of practices improvised in the prewar and war years, was extensive. These practices are summed up by the term industrial policy, and they made a difference. The Japanese government (assisted by SCAP during the occupation era) retained important wartime powers over access to key resources such as foreign exchange and technology licenses. It used these powers as levers to support some business ventures and discourage others. In the immediate postwar years, this formal authority played a major role. Over time, the weight of state intervention shifted to more informal practices not written into law, called “administrative guidance.” The most important guiding agency was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). It was the successor to the prewar Ministry of Commerce, which became the Munitions Ministry at the height of the war. This agency was renamed the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1945 and was once more relabeled, as MITI, in 1949. Other government bureaus that played important roles included the ministries of Finance, Transport, Construction, and Post and Telecommunications and the Economic Planning Agency.

At the most general level, the government fostered a climate of confidence by acting as economic cheerleader and sign-painter. A series of “five-year plans” issued by the Economic Planning Agency beginning in 1948 had no binding force. But they signaled to private investors that the state was interested in the success of certain industries and stood ready to step in as lender; as facilitator of access to foreign exchange, raw materials, or technology licenses; and as rescuer should problems arise. The government role as business booster brought a certain (perhaps jealous) scorn from foreigners. In one famous incident in 1962, the French president Charles De Gaulle referred to visiting Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato as “that transistor salesman.”

In more hands-on fashion, state bureaus protected and nurtured nascent industries. Through the 1960s, they used old-fashioned tariffs as one tool to limit imports. In addition, a Japanese company needed to convert yen to dollars in order to import and required government permission to buy dollars. The government could use this power to obstruct imports and protect Japanese firms from foreign competitors in domestic markets. The state also nurtured favored Japanese companies with all manner of benefits. Government lending agencies offered low-interest loans to targeted industries. Bureaucrats arranged technology licenses and gave tax breaks to firms in sectors designated for growth. A rush to invest in such firms often resulted in excess capacity. In such cases, MITI might broker a “depression cartel.” These were industry wide agreements by which major firms coordinated their cuts in output to ensure that all were able to survive.

The benefits of such practices could be substantial, and they were not necessarily limited to privileged insiders. In the 1950s, to give one example, MITI pressured the major iron and steel producers to share the costs, and the benefits, of a single license for the cutting-edge technology of the basic oxygen furnace. The free market alternative would have been for each interested producer to pay the Austrian inventor for its own separate license. Japanese producers in this way obtained a critical technology for a small fraction of the cost borne by American steelmakers. They were then able to forge ahead of their global competitors by more swiftly building a new generation of production facilities.

This informal mechanism of state intervention in the economy came to be called administrative guidance. It was a cornerstone of the trans-war political economy. It drew on relationships and practices first improvised in programs from the 1920s and 1930s to rationalize industrial production by encouraging or compelling cartels in major industries. Bureaucrats in the postwar era further developed these practices of managed capitalism, but they used less coercive forms of persuasion than during the war. They left more room for the market to reward those who used government help effectively, and their interaction with businessmen proved considerably more constructive.
4.3.13.3. Trans-war patterns of community, family, school, and work

The concept of a trans-war system can be used to describe political and economic arrangements improvised from the depression through the war and into the postwar era: industrial policy and the reorganization of business combines, labor-management relations, women’s changing roles in the labor force, or agrarian land reform. It is also possible to speak of a set of trans-war social patterns. For the first decade or so after World War II, the social structure and the texture of people’s lives shared much with a trans-war era that stretched from roughly the 1920s to the 1950s. A heterogeneous society was marked by enduring diversity and division in community and family life, in schools, and in workplaces.

Wartime scarcity, bombing, and evacuation had briefly devastated urban society in the early 1940s. But a vibrant city life revived even before the economy recovered. The flow of migrants to major cities, underway since the nineteenth century, resumed as well. In the 1950s and 1960s, roughly one million people left the countryside for cities each year. The gradual spread of suburban living had started with the construction of commuter rail lines and new residential neighborhoods in the 1910s and 1920s. Cities such as Tokyo and Osaka continued to sprawl in the 1950s and 1960s. They served as magnets for those looking for a bright, new, modern life. Japan’s urban population rose from 38 percent of the nation in 1950 to 75 percent by 1975.

Migration to the cities did not deplete the countryside. After the war, millions of soldiers came home to rejoin their families or start new ones. The result, in Japan as elsewhere, was a dramatic baby boom. At the peak from 1947 to 1949, births numbered nearly 2.7 million per year. Overall, between 1945 and 1955 the population of Japan increased by 18.6 million. This sharp rise kept the rural population high even while millions moved to the cities. Japan’s agricultural population at the end of World War II accounted for roughly 50 percent of the populace, or 36 million people. A decade later in 1955 this absolute number of people stood unchanged, although the proportion of the population in rural areas had fallen. Dynamic urban and rural societies were part of the heterogeneity of trans-war Japanese life.

The trans-war social world was also notable for the diversity in the way people came to be educated and earn their livings. Despite occupation era reforms, the school system through the 1950s remained a hierarchy with three very different, and quite respectable, exit points: the end of middle school, the end of high school, and graduation from college or university. From the late 1940s through the 1950s increased numbers of youths advanced to high school, but even in 1955 roughly half of all youths ended their education when they graduated middle school. Another third completed high school, and approximately 15 percent went on to college. This education-based hierarchy with roots in the prewar and wartime eras connected neatly to the workplaces of the 1950s. Middle-school graduates, both male and female, took jobs as blue-collar operatives with relatively limited future prospects. Boys leaving high school could enter skilled production or clerical positions with a reasonable expectation of rising at least to foreman, in some cases beyond. Girls with high school degrees could move into secretarial jobs in the offices of prestigious companies. Male university graduates entered elite managerial positions in corporate and bureaucratic offices. But, as in most of the industrial capitalist world of the early postwar decades, women graduating from universities faced tremendous barriers to such careers, with occasional exceptions such as teaching in public schools. Gender and education in these ways combined to channel people into jobs with sharply different levels of responsibility and pay.

As in the prewar era, the world of work was extraordinarily diverse. While a significant minority followed their education by working for wages outside the home—whether in factories or mines, in government offices, or at companies large and small—the majority of adults in the city as well as the countryside continued to work in small, home-based family businesses or farms. In the 1950s, as before the war, more than half of the nation’s labor force consisted of family members working on a family farm or fishing boat or in a small family-owned retail, wholesale, or manufacturing shop. The husband would be counted as the business owner. The wife, on a farm or in a vegetable market or a barber shop, would work alongside, counted as “family labor.” Government statisticians did not classify these women as “employees.” Typically they shared the overall revenues as a family member but received no wages. From the 1930s through the 1950s, well over two-thirds of women workers fell into this category of family labor. These women and their families were the core of Japan’s “old middle class” of the
prewar and trans-war era: shopkeepers, small traders, and small manufacturers. They remained a dominant presence in the neighborhoods of postwar Japanese towns and cities.

Variety in family type was part of the trans-war social pattern as well. Nuclear families had already accounted for 54 percent of all families in the 1920s. Most of the remainder were extended families of three generations under one roof. Trans-war society was marked by the coexistence of these two forms of family life.

The material conditions of daily life of the 1950s also retained qualities that were part of an old trans-war world more than a new postwar one. Photographs of the 1950s resemble those of the 1930s more than the 1970s. People in the countryside wore sandals and kimono-style everyday clothing. Houses still had thatched roofs, roads were unpaved, and oxen plowed fields. Labor on farms was scarcely mechanized. A photograph of a young woman’s hands taken in 1963 could just as well have been taken from the early days of the century. Farm work was arduous and literally left scars. Some exciting consumer innovations were spreading in cities and in the countryside. But until the late 1950s, these consumer goods were not basically different from those of the 1920s and 1930s: electric lighting, radios, record players, and telephones.

The routines of daily life were similarly enduring from prewar days through the 1950s, with a similar mix of the cosmopolitan and the local. A social survey of “laboring households” in the Tokyo region in 1950 revealed that more than two hours of a woman’s average day-every day were devoted to sewing. Some of this domestic work was done with sewing machines, following store-bought patterns. It was part of a commercial world of fashion that had been celebrated flamboyantly in department stores since early in the twentieth century. But much sewing, whether by hand or machine, consisted of mending old clothing. The role of homemaker thus remained a time-consuming occupation demanding considerable skill. The modern consumer realm of ready-to-wear clothing coexisted with a significant realm of home-based, noncommercial reproductive activity.

In other ways, as well, a local world of home-based, partially commercialized activity coexisted with a world of mass, bureaucratized, profit-seeking institutions. Cultural and leisure activity through the 1950s, as before the war, remained tied to community events such as festivals at Shinto shrines or Buddhist temples or holiday visits to nearby sites or ancestral villages. The great milestones of individual and family life—birth, marriage, death—were commemorated in relatively intimate settings. The vast majority of people in Japan until the late 1950s were born at home, not in hospitals. They were attended by midwives, not doctors. Most people died at home. Funerals and weddings usually took place at large rural homes or at temples and shrines, rather than at commercial establishments dedicated to providing these services.

4.3.14. Shared experiences and standardized life ways of the postwar era

Profound social changes then took place across the decades of rapid growth. To an important extent, the economic ground had been equalized by events of the war and immediate postwar years, ranging from the fire-bombings and SCAP’s land and labor reforms to the massive inflation that destroyed much of the wealth of the prewar elites. Against this background, trends toward standardized ways of life accelerated sharply as the economy grew. The gap between rural and urban life shrank. A greater majority than before came to grow up in nuclear, rather than extended, families. The gap between those with higher and basic education diminished. The extent of hierarchy within many workplaces also decreased. It would be a mistake to overstate this decline in social division and produce a false stereotype of Japan since the 1970s as a paradise of homogeneity. But it is undeniable that from the 1950s through the 1970s the realm of shared experience among people in Japan expanded, as trans-war gave way to postwar society.

The spread of shared experience was accelerated by physical changes in the landscape that brought people more easily and quickly in contact with each other. In 1946 barely more than 1 percent of Japan’s 900,000 kilometers of roads were paved. By 1970, 15 percent of roads had been covered with pavement, including a modest 640 kilometers of toll expressways. By 1980 the paved total had tripled to 46 percent of all roads. The high-speed “bullet train” began service between Osaka and Tokyo in 1964. This cut travel time between the two cities from eight to three hours. Known as the bullet train outside Japan, it was more prosaically called the “new trunk line” (shinkansen) in Japanese. But the train was anything but ordinary. It both transformed the sense of
distance between Japan’s greatest urban centers and stood as a proud symbol of technological achievement in the forefront of global progress.

As the landscape was literally bulldozed at a rapid pace, the countryside began to shrink in a figurative sense as well. Both the number as well as the proportion of full-time farmers declined sharply and steadily, from 2.1 million full-time farm households in 1955 to well under half that number (830,000) in 1970. The proportion of the labor force employed in agriculture fell below 20 percent by 1970. But part-time farming expanded simultaneously. Mechanization—and the small size of the average landholding—made this possible, as did the movement of new forms of employment to the countryside. Using better roads, and able to afford motorcycles and cars, working-age people began commuting from villages to jobs at factories or offices in nearby towns or cities. At home, grandparents took care of grandchildren and tended vegetable or rice fields. The adult children would help on the weekends. Farm villages came to resemble suburban communities, emptied of adult men and women on weekdays. By the 1970s, this transformation of the countryside had diminished the gap in lifestyles between people in rural, urban, and suburban Japan. In extreme cases, the demographic shift to the cities had created empty ghost villages. More typically, rural villages survived in this new form.

At the heart of the standardization of social experience across the landscape was a process in which large-scale, bureaucratic, and commercial institutions touched people’s lives to an unprecedented degree. Public schooling and military service had defined the modern social experience since the nineteenth century, but other institutions expanded their reach dramatically in the postwar era. Hospitals became the almost universal sites for birth and death. Weddings were transformed into lavish and costly spectacles, aggressively marketed and expertly performed in thousands of hotels and wedding halls nationwide. Funerals and the various anniversary memorial services of Buddhist observance were also increasingly provided by such enterprises. As bullet trains, automobiles, and jet travel came within reach of the middle class, standard commercial packages of mass tourism at home and abroad surged in popularity. In 1960, just 120,000 people traveled overseas. By 1970, the number was nearly one million, and by 1980 nearly four million Japanese citizens traveled outside the country.

Two key sites for this standardization of social experience were schools and workplaces. Education changed greatly from the end of the 1950s through the 1960s. The high school entry rate soared. From about 50 percent in 1955, it reached 82 percent of the potential cohort in 1970 and 94 percent by 1980. Large proportions of students also went on to two- or four-year colleges. By 1975, 35 percent of high school graduates entered college each year, a rate exceeding most European societies and approaching that of the United States. Only a tiny minority ended their schooling before high school. The education hierarchy had been compressed from three tiers to two.

As before, public universities were the most prestigious ports of entry to elite positions. But one important feature of mass higher education sets this era off sharply from the trans-war years. Access was remarkably equal. In the 1960s, the children of the poorest families in the nation won admission in precise proportion to their numbers in the overall population. This was a stunningly egalitarian profile of student backgrounds. It resulted not from affirmative action, but from the high level and the standardized quality of teaching in public schools across the nation. It also reflected the fact that merit-based exams denied wealthy parents the chance to “buy” entrance with a donation to a favorite university.

An additional factor was perhaps the devastation of the war and early postwar inflation, which had eroded the position of old elites and equalized the distribution of wealth. The newly egalitarian schools became a sorting machine for the middle-class masses. The result was the notorious experience called “examination hell.” To enter top high schools and then the best colleges, the only measure that mattered was performance on the entrance examination. Students spent long hours and years cramming for these tests. If they failed to win a place at a coveted elite school, they often took a postgraduate year (or two) to study more and try again. It was designed both to sort young people and to discipline them. Vast experience at repetitive cramming for dull exams prepared young boys, especially, for a demanding, competitive working routine as an adult.

Japanese workplaces also took on new standardized “postwar” characteristics. The majority of workers no longer held family-based jobs; they worked for wages outside the home. The proportion of family workers in the
labor force dropped from two-thirds of all in the late 1950s to under half by the end of 1960s. This change affected women as well as men. Between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of women workers who were employed outside the family sector rose from 42 to 53 percent.

A second key postwar change in the workplace ran parallel to that in the schools. Hierarchy was compressed, and a more egalitarian spirit spread. As almost everyone went on to high school in the 1960s and 1970s, the high school diploma came to define a floor rather than a privileged middle point of entry. A better educated and better disciplined work force was one result. Another result was a much smaller gap between white- and blue-collar work, especially among men. When prewar managers with college degrees and technicians with high school diplomas had supervised production workers with a middle school or grade school education, the differences in experience and expectations were great. By the 1970s, when virtually all employees had gone to school through age eighteen and college education itself imparted relatively little new knowledge or skills, the gap between the skills brought to the job by blue-collar high school recruits and white-collar college grads was much smaller.

In the new social order of the high growth era, the experience of family life was also standardized to a significant extent. The proportion of nuclear families rose through the 1960s, reaching a plateau of just under two-thirds of all families by 1975. At the same time, single-member households—typically young unmarried wage earners living in company dorms or apartments—increased from 3 percent in 1955 to 14 percent by 1975. Extended families fell from one-third of all to one-fifth. Nuclear families comprised the heart of what commentators in the late 1950s began to call Japan’s “new middle class.” The expanding new middle class took up residence in the growing suburbs of Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and other cities. In the booming decades of the 1960s through the 1980s, huge apartment blocks called danchi sprouted up in what had been rice or vegetable fields. Over one million units were built by public housing authorities. Private developers also put up single-family homes sprawling in all directions out of these cities for the more successful middle-class citizens.

New architecture drew on innovations of the prewar era to promote a “modern” living space. Bedrooms were separated from the dining/kitchen area. Tables with chairs replaced floor-level seating. Children often had their own separate bedrooms. In the typical nuclear families of the high-growth years, the husband commuted by train from such a home to a demanding full-time job in an office or a factory. The wife often took on a part-time job, but she devoted herself primarily to the care of their children, rarely more than two in number.

As people yearned for this new sort of home, they yearned for each other in new ways as well. In upper-class and middle-class Japan of the early twentieth century, marriages were typically arranged, although a minority and somewhat subversive ideal of love as the basis of marriage had appeared. In the 1950s, the arranged marriage was still quite common in the new middle class of white-collar salaried workers.

Partners were introduced by parents, relatives, friends, or a professional marriage arranger. They would meet several times for a brief “look-see” (the omiai) before deciding whether to wed. But the custom of dating became popular among college youths and young workers in these years, and the word for date (deeto) was imported from English. Gradually but steadily, the ideal of the “love marriage” won the day. Increasingly extravagant weddings to celebrate such marriages came to define the founding moment of the standard family of postwar Japan.

At the same time, the worlds of work and family remained quite separate for many middle-class men and women. A man’s commitment to his company—especially for white-collar employees—generally required him to join the after-hours life of drinking and socializing with workmates or customers, often in the company of female bar hostesses. The so-called water trades of the female companion combined elements of the café’ culture of the 1920s and the elite world of the highly cultivated female entertainers known as geisha, generally stopping short of prostitution but not ruling out occasional liaisons with customers. The water trades flourished in Japan from the 1960s onward, generating billions of dollars in revenues for thousands of bar owners and their employees.

4.3.15. Global Power in a Polarized World: Japan in the 1980s

The emergence of Japan as a prosperous, confident, and peaceful nation was a striking development of postwar global history. At home, from the 1970s through the 1980s, some people swelled with pride bordering on
arrogance at national achievements. They chafed at the jealous criticism of foreigners. Some spoke nostalgically of
the vanishing of older ways of life. They worried that the younger generation had lost the focused commitment of
their seniors. Others argued for a greater openness to the world, more tolerance of variety, or more equality in the
worlds of men and women. They protested that ordinary Japanese, working long hours and commuting long
distances from cramped homes, were not fully sharing the fruits of affluence.

Views from outside mixed attitudes of envy with admiration. In the eyes of some, the image of Japan
turned sharply from economic miracle to economic menace. Others looked to a “Japanese model” as an alternative
form of capitalism more successful than the Western or American version. In this regard, the decade of the 1980s,
in particular, was a remarkable moment of satisfaction and congratulation, unimaginable in the early postwar era
and premature in retrospect.

4.3.16. New roles in the world and new tensions

The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972 eliminated a major legal remnant of the American
occupation. Although U.S. troops and bases remained on the island, the long-awaited return of sovereignty offered
the possibility of a new equality in the relationship of the United States to Japan. But two events of the previous
year, the so-called “Nixon shocks,” undercut this promise. In July 1971, U.S. president Richard Nixon announced
the stunning news of his plan to visit the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In short order the United States and
the People’s Republic of China established normal diplomatic relations. Then, in August, Nixon announced that
the United States would abandon the gold standard and allow the cost of the dollar to fluctuate against other
currencies. The value of the yen rose sharply, reflecting Japanese economic power but also making Japanese
exports considerably more expensive.

Both of these announcements had major consequences for Japan. The fact that Nixon made them without
consultation or even prior notice angered the Japanese government and public. They concluded with much
justification that the American government did not fully trust the Japanese state or regard it as an equal partner.
Most galling was that for two decades, despite considerable domestic opposition, the Japanese government loyally
had followed the American policy of isolating and “containing” the communist regime in China. When the
American policy turned on a dime, the Japanese were left embarrassed and scrambling to catch up. They did so by
opening diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1972. China-Japan economic links slowly developed in the 1970s. They
took off in the 1980s with the Chinese turn to de facto capitalism, and China became one of Japan’s leading trading
partners.

Thus, despite the Okinawa reversion, the Nixon shocks marked a new era of chronic tension in the
partnership between Japan and the United States, in economic matters especially. Beginning in 1965, Japan’s
balance of trade with America had shifted from chronic deficit to a slight surplus of exports over imports, and in
the 1970s, a flood of Japanese products to the United States began to overwhelm the flow of American exports to
Japan. By the mid-1980s, Japanese exports to the United States were valued at more than double the amount of
American exports to Japan. Annual U.S. trade deficits with Japan stood at roughly fifty billion dollars.

The basic pattern was consistent. Japan imported huge amounts of oil, raw materials, and food, while it
exported finished manufactured goods of increasing value and quality. The result was not only a chronic export
surplus with the advanced capitalist world, but also chronic political tension, with the United States above all.
America’s most famous manufacturers were unable to match the price and quality of competitive Japanese goods.
In electronics, for example, twenty-seven U.S. firms produced televisions at American factories in 1955. By the
1980s, only one, Zenith, continued to manufacture TV sets in the United States.

Faced with this tough competition, American executives and labor unions from as early as the 1960s
began to complain vociferously about what they viewed as unfair trade. They accused Japanese producers, with
considerable justification, of charging high prices in protected domestic markets while “dumping” products
overseas below cost to win market share. Japanese firms, they said, could make up for losses at the initial stage of
market entry by raising prices later, when American competitors had retreated or folded.

In any case, the Americans used their political leverage to contain Japan’s trade advances. A series of
acrimonious negotiations produced agreements in which Japanese exporters “voluntarily” agreed to limit their
sales to the United States, most notably in textiles (1972), steel (1969 and 1978), color TVs (1977), and then automobiles (1981 through 1993). In 1988, the U.S. Congress passed a trade bill whose “Super 301” clause granted the government the power to unilaterally decide that the domestic markets of Japan or other foreign countries were unfairly closed to imports and unilaterally impose penalties on exporters of those countries in retaliation. The likelihood that this law would be invoked against Japan provoked harsh Japanese criticism that it revived the gunboat diplomacy of the nineteenth century, when American or British warships dictated the terms of trade to weaker states all around the world. Indeed, soon after the law was passed, the Americans used the threat of Super 301 sanctions to enforce access to Japanese markets in supercomputers, satellites, and wood products.

Above all, the automobile quotas dramatically brought into focus the turnaround in Japanese and American fortunes. General Motors and Ford had long been the pride of the American industrial heartland and the engine of postwar prosperity. Their products had symbolized the good life of the American Dream for decades. Now, unless the government helped them with trade quotas, these humbled giants could not convince Americans to choose their vehicles. Consumers by the millions were turning to economical, increasingly reliable cars from Toyota or Nissan, Mazda or Subaru. Trade tensions sometimes erupted in nasty symbolic displays, as when American autoworkers protested by smashing to bits a Japanese car in front of TV cameras. They led to at least one tragic instance of racial violence. In 1982, two autoworkers beat a young Chinese-American man in Detroit to death with a baseball bat. It appears that they attacked him in the belief that he was Japanese. Their trial produced the extraordinarily light sentence of three years’ probation and a modest fine. The American government also pressed a case for a more general restructuring of United States-Japan trade and economic relations through the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, the two governments agreed to appoint a small group of so-called wise men to offer advice on long-range steps to reduce trade friction. A decade later, from 1989 to 1990, American and Japanese trade negotiators were still focused on broad structural issues in the so-called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). The idea was to change the underlying structure that produced economic imbalance, such as American budget deficits and low savings rates, and Japanese import barriers, such as the cumbersome distribution system that inhibited price competition. The talks produced various sensible ideas, but few were politically feasible.

As Japanese banks and corporations accumulated huge reservoirs of foreign exchange, investment followed the trade routes. Japanese institutions began to invest in American treasury bills. These purchases financed the ballooning U.S. budget deficits of the 1980s. In addition, Japanese corporations committed large sums to building manufacturing plants in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Japan’s global foreign direct investments (FDI) stood at barely one billion (U.S.) dollars in the mid-1960s. By 1975, total Japanese FDI topped fifteen billion dollars, and by the end of the 1980s cumulative FDI came to roughly fifty billion dollars. North America was the site of about 40 percent of these investments, followed by Europe, Asia, and Latin America. As Japan’s economy-and land prices-soared, Japanese investors made some particularly high-profile purchases of famous American properties that struck them as relative bargains, such as the Pebble Beach golf course (1990) and the venerable Rockefeller Center in the heart of Manhattan (1989). These deals sparked headlines in the United States of Japanese “takeovers” and “invasions.”

Despite such denunciations, the economies of the United and Japan were more interdependent than ever. Policymakers understood this. Even while government negotiators continually argued about trade, state officials also cooperated in multilateral as well as bilateral economic policy. In 1964, Japan had joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a body that primarily addressed common issues of the advanced industrial economies and their relations to the rest of the world. Then, beginning in 1975, the heads of state of the seven leading capitalist economies, including Japan, began a regular series of annual “summit” meetings. The role of host nation rotated among the members, who came to be called the “group of seven” or “G-7 nations.” They discussed coordination of macroeconomic policies to control inflation and encourage growth and trade. In addition, the finance officials of the G7 nations, and a core “G-5” group that also included Japan, began to meet on a regular basis in the 1980s. Japan’s participation in these meetings was a sign of the nation’s central role in the global economy. This was a source of pride. It was also, however, a source of pressure on Japan to design economic policies to serve international as well as national interests.

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Among the most important decisions of the G-5 was the Plaza Accord of 1985 (named after New York’s Plaza Hotel, where the ministers met). To help their own industries, the finance ministers sought to boost Japanese imports by coordinating currency purchases to strengthen the yen. They also asked the Japanese government to stimulate domestic demand. The Finance Ministry obliged with a policy of low interest rates and fiscal expansion. To boost domestic spending it doled out huge grants to local governments to invest in all manner of projects from roads and bridges to amusement parks and museums. Easy money had complex effects. It helped companies to invest in state-of-the-art technology that could lower production costs and sustain global competitiveness despite the rise in the yen. It also provoked the dramatic asset inflation of the late 1980s, Japan’s so-called bubble economy.

Japan’s relations with Asia and the rest of the world also involved a complex mix of tension and cooperation. Postwar economic relations with Asian nations developed slowly. In the 1950s the Japanese government had restored economic ties to Southeast Asia with reparations agreements. In four separate treaties with Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Vietnam Japanese companies gave $1.5 billion worth of manufactured goods to the governments of these countries. The Japanese government paid the bill. Building on the connections created by these reparations deals, trade gradually expanded. By the 1980s, the United States accounted for roughly one-third of Japan’s export trade. But China, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Southeast Asian nations together stood a close second as trading partners, well ahead of Europe.

Considerable historical irony attended this development. As the Allied occupation drew to a close, American strategists had supported a revival of Japan’s “empire to the south.” They had expected Southeast Asia to be Japan’s most important economic partner, playing a semi-colonial role as customer for Japanese manufactured goods and source of raw materials. As it turned out, Japan indeed built solid economic ties in Asia. Yet, despite the imperial presence of its troops on Japanese soil, from the 1950s through the 1980s it was the United States that played an even greater role in a semi-colonial pattern as seller of raw materials to Japan and buyer of manufactured goods.

Unsettled issues of the wartime era marked and marred Japan’s postwar, postcolonial relationship with the governments and people of other Asian nations. Although the Soviet Union and Japan normalized diplomatic ties in 1956 and opened trade relations, the two countries did not conclude a treaty of peace. A dispute over territory stood in the way. Both governments claimed sovereignty over what Japanese called their “northern islands” located at the southern end of the Kuril chain. The disagreement remains unresolved to this day. Despite the reparations agreements and expanding economic ties, Southeast Asians often criticized Japanese businesses for what they considered to be predatory trading and investment practices that left no benefit to the host nations. In 1974, the Japanese public was shocked when major anti-Japanese riots greeted Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei during a visit to Bangkok and Jakarta.

The most complex postcolonial relationship was that with Korea. Facing opposition from the Japanese left, from North Korea, and from many within South Korea, the Japanese and South Korean governments could not negotiate the Treaty on Basic Relations until 1965. As finally concluded, this agreement recognized the Republic of Korea (South Korea) as the sole legitimate Korean government. It negated the validity of the 1910 Japanese annexation of Korea and all prior treaties. South Korea waived future reparations claims, but Japan extended $800 million dollars (U.S.) in economic aid. Economic ties flourished through the 1970s, and in the 1980s especially. By 1990 South Korea was Japan’s third largest trading partner. But serious tensions persisted. In 1973 agents of the Korean CIA kidnapped Kim Dae Jung, a prominent Korean opponent to the authoritarian regime of President Park Chung Hee, from a hotel in Tokyo. They took him by force to Seoul. These actions clearly violated Japanese sovereignty and infuriated public opinion in Japan. Koreans, on their part, remained deeply enraged at their treatment by the Japanese during the decades of colonial occupation and war. Thus, when a Korean resident of Japan attempted to assassinate President Park Chung Hee in 1974, the assassin’s long-term residence in Japan painted the Japanese with a sort of guilt by association in this context of historical animosity.

From this low point in the mid-1970s, the Japanese government made substantial efforts to improve its relations with Asian countries. At a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo expressed a strong desire to strengthen Japanese cooperation with Southeast Asia.
Following this, Japanese and ASEAN officials began to meet regularly. Japan greatly increased its foreign aid spending (official development assistance, or ODA) in the 1980s. In 1991, it became the world’s largest donor, surpassing the United States. Japan has remained the world’s leader in the annual dollar value of development aid since then. The largest share of Japanese ODA (roughly 60 percent) went to Asia. Direct investments offering employment opportunities increased substantially as well.

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro took the lead in promoting stronger ties with Korea in the early 1980s. He promised substantial economic aid ($4 billion). In an important symbolic step during Nakasone’s term as prime minister, the Showa emperor (Hirohito) gently apologized to the visiting South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan for the brutality of the colonial era. He noted his “sincere regret” for the “unfortunate past.”

But it remained difficult for the Japanese government and people to erase the distrust held by many Asians. In 1982 Japan’s Ministry of Education sparked a huge outcry from China and South Korea when it suggested that the authors of public school history textbooks make revisions that minimized Japan’s aggression. The ministry’s textbook office, for example, recommended relabeling the “invasion” of China in 1937 as an “incursion.” Japanese and world media generally described these as required changes. In fact, the government had made nonbinding “suggestions,” and the textbooks were not changed. But understandably, for the Japanese government to suggest that treatment of the war be toned down in this way was sufficient to infuriate Koreans and Chinese, in particular. The governments of South Korea and the PRC made formal protest to the Japanese state over the incident. In 1986 the minister of education further enraged Koreans with a claim that the Koreans were in part responsible for the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

From the 1980s through the 1990s, major political figures made a succession of such volatile comments on Japan’s recent history, on one occasion minimizing the scope of the massacres in Nanjing, on another asserting that Korea was colonized willingly rather than by force. Each such pronouncement sparked outrage abroad and usually cost the speaker his job. These controversies originated in the sharply polarized view of Japan’s responsibility for World War II. Significant differences remained alive not only between Japanese people and others but also within Japan.

Those on the Japanese left blamed military and bureaucratic elites together with corrupt, illiberal politicians and monopoly capitalists for pursuing expansionism and military conquest without regard to the human costs. They contended that the war was both strategically unwise and morally unacceptable, although they generally questioned the morality of the leaders and not ordinary people. They saw popular support for the war as the result of censorship, manipulation of the education system and mass media, and outright suppression of dissent.

In contrast, many government officials and conservative intellectuals developed a very different understanding of the recent past. Some of them defended Japan’s wartime motives as pure. They claimed that the nation led a war to liberate Asia from the grip of Western imperialism. They pointed to the fact that the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia ended Dutch and British colonial rule and began the process by which the French were ousted from Indochina. They gave less attention to the inconvenient facts of Japan’s own colonial rule in Korea or Taiwan, or later in Manchuria and China. They gave less attention to the inconvenient facts of Japan’s own colonial rule in Korea or Taiwan, or later in Manchuria and China.

If anything, arguments over “war responsibility” increased in their intensity as the war receded into the past. The effort to deny responsibility fell on increasingly receptive ears at times of economic friction, when many Japanese felt they were unfairly criticized for simply working hard and succeeding in the global economy. Thus, through the 1980s, Asian hostility to Japan was kept alive not simply by old memories of the past. It was fueled anew by the unwillingness or inability of many Japanese people, including cabinet ministers, to look back on that past with sympathy for the experience of others.

4.3.17. Economy: Thriving Through the Oil Crises

Through the 1970s and 1980s tensions with Asia and the West were chronic but contained. They did not provoke a major crisis at home in part because of the soothing effect of continued economic growth and the spreading fruits of affluence. After a brief recession during the first oil crisis, the Japanese economy recovered quite smartly. From 1975 through the end of the 1980s, it grew at remarkably consistent pace, with average annual rates of GNP growth ranging from 4 to 5 percent.
The contrast with the performance of other advanced capitalist economies, not to mention the Soviet Union, was striking. In Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, economic growth was anemic, inflation and unemployment were high, and labor protests were widespread. The major European economies grew at half the Japanese pace, or less. In the United States the late 1970s were years of so-called stagflation: stagnant growth rates and double-digit inflation. In the early years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, from 1980 through 1983, the industrial heartland—now dubbed the “rust belt”—experienced a deep recession. Unemployment in major midwestern states climbed to the range of 10 to 13 percent in these years.

In Japan, not only was the economy growing, but inflation was modest and unemployment remained below 2 percent. In addition, through the 1970s and 1980s, Japan’s industrial productivity increased at the fastest rates in the world. In the late 1980s, corporate Japan turned particularly exuberant in its behavior, at home as well as abroad. Businesses embarked on a record surge of investment in new plants and equipment. Rates of gross fixed capital formation were close to 30 percent of GNP annually between 1985 and 1989, numbers comparable to the pace of investment in the peak years of high growth in the 1960s. It is no wonder that people in Japan looked around the world with increasing confidence at their success and good fortune.

Many looked with particular pride at what had come to be called “the Japanese management system.” Japanese manufacturers in the 1960s had proved able to produce quality goods in an era of expansion and global growth. Now they showed the ability to adjust and prosper in tough times. In the 1970s they faced soaring energy costs and weak foreign demand. In the 1980s they faced soaring export costs because of the expensive yen. They adjusted with a drive toward what pundits dubbed “streamlined management.”

Firms facing excess capacity, slack demand, or high costs eased out thousands of workers with the cooperation of their unions. The shipbuilding industry, for example, eliminated 115,000 jobs between 1974 and 1979. This cut overall employment in that industry by roughly one-third. Facing tough competition from new Korean mills in the late 1980s, the top five iron and steel producers likewise cut employment by one-third. Few workers were fired outright in either case. Those targeted for streamlining were reassigned to subcontractors or offered inducements to take “voluntary” early retirement. Large companies expanded flexibility by hiring increased numbers of women as part-time workers who were easily let go when business slackened. For similar reasons they contracted numerous auxiliary functions to outside firms. They spurred on the remaining workers by increasing the weight of annual merit ratings in decisions about promotions and raises.

Even as they streamlined work forces, corporate managers carried on a famous drive to increase quality and contain costs through innovation in the workplace. The emblem of this was the movement for quality control (QC). This campaign began in the 1950s as something called “statistical quality control (SQC).” It was an American import. In first the United States and then Japan in the 1950s, expert staff used charts and sophisticated analysis to examine work processes and impose changes that would raise productivity or quality.

The Japanese innovation in production management that attracted global attention was to draw the entire work force into the QC movement. From the 1960s through the 1970s, first supervisors such as foremen and then rank-and-file operatives and clerical staff formed thousands of study groups called QC Circles. Roughly eight to ten men and women would meet regularly, sometimes on their own time, to learn basic problem-solving and statistical techniques. They would then analyze their jobs and come up with strategies to make work more productive or efficient, or in some cases safer and less taxing.

The movement was made possible by high levels of employee education. It was also enabled by managerial commitments to job security, since QC groups often came up with changes that reduced the need for employees in a given work group. The “extra” personnel were usually reassigned to other jobs. By the late 1980s over two million working men and women in Japan had been registered at one time or another in over 260,000 quality circles. Critics noted, with justification, that participation was hardly voluntary as management claimed. Those who did not join faced retribution in promotions or raises. Polls showed that a substantial portion of the participants considered the circles “burdensome” or “stressful.” But many of these groups did offer workers a welcome chance to apply their own rich knowledge of their jobs to upgrade their skills as well as to raise productivity or improve quality.
By the affluent 1980s, the once loud dissenting voices of militant unionists on the inside of the corporation, or citizen activists on the outside, were scarcely audible. Foreigners flocked to Japanese factories to study the secrets of the managerial system. Highly paid Japanese consultants re-exported the revised “total quality control” (TQC) program to the United States. Japan had become an extraordinarily corporate-centered society. The majority of people believed that what was good for the company was good for the larger society.

4.3.18. Conclusion

On August 15, 1945, Japan surrender to the Allied powers, the American forces under General MacArthur occupied Japan for nearly six and half years. Although in name an Allied responsibility, the occupation of Japan was primarily an American affair. General Mac Arthur was the supreme commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). He carried on military administration of Japan in his own way. He was called “Ceaser of the Pacific”. The ultimate goal of the US occupation of Japan was to change Japan into a peaceful nation. For that, the United States believed that demilitarization and democratization were needed through major institutional reforms. Economic recovery was not part of the occupation policy. SCAP not only introduced constitutional reforms but also economic reform, educational reforms, labour and farm land reforms were carried out.

The occupation officially ended in April 1952 and Japan got her independence. Soon after freedom for Allied Army, Japan started the miraculous journey of becoming the most developed nation of the world. Japanese economy expanded at a stunning pace from 1950 through the early 1970s. Profound social changes then took place across the decades of rapid growth. Trends toward standardized ways of life accelerated sharply as the economy grew. The gap between rural and urban life shrank. A greater majority than before came to grow up in nuclear, rather than extended, families. In the new social order of the high growth era, the experience of family life was also standardized to a significant extent. The emergence of Japan as a prosperous, confident, and peaceful nation was a striking development of postwar global history.

4.3.19. Summary

- On August 15, 1945, Japan surrender to the Allied powers, the American forces under General MacArthur occupied Japan for nearly six and half years.
- Although in name an Allied responsibility, the occupation of Japan was primarily an American affair. There were set up of Far Eastern Commission at Washington and an Allied Council at Tokyo.
- General Mac Arthur was the supreme commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). He carried on military administration of Japan in his own way. He was called “Ceaser of the Pacific”. He and his staff issued instructions and the latter faithfully carried them out.
- The ultimate goal of the US occupation of Japan was to change Japan into a peaceful nation. For that, the United States believed that demilitarization and democratization were needed through major institutional reforms. Economic recovery was not part of the occupation policy.
- The present constitution of Japan known as Macarthur Constitution was proclaimed in 1946 established a Constitutional Monarchy and a Parliamentary Democracy in Japan.
- To transforming Japan into a peaceful nation disarmament and demobilization of the Imperial Forces of Japan was taken place.
- The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also called simply the Tokyo Trial dragged on from May 1946 to November 1948 and put Japan’s wartime rulers on trial.
- Although pre-war Japan was immersed in “ultra-nationalism,” it was also true that the ordinary citizens were frightened to be conscripted to the Imperial Army and were more or less annoyed by oppressive domestic state authorities.
- The Japanese Constitution renounces war as an instrument of national policy or as a method of settling international disputes.
- In the economic field GHQ sought to disband zaibatsu or economic combines as the GHQ believed that zaibatsu was the war machine that influenced the government by controlling financial, industrial and commercial fields.
The protection of the rights of labor was one of the indispensable agenda, hence GHQ tried to create “fair capitalism” by protecting the rights of labor and nurturing trade unions in order to prevent invasions. Other reforms include, farmland reform and Education Reform are also introduced.

Initially, economic reconstruction was not a major agenda for GHQ, but with the rise of anti-communist movements and dissatisfaction with the enormous cost of the occupation of Japan in the United States, GHQ gradually shifted attention from reforms to economic reconstruction.

The new “peaceful nation” of Japan was formed by two factors in reality; stability based on the security alliance with the United States in foreign policy and stability based on “Japanese capitalism” in domestic policy.

The occupation officially ended in April 1952 and Japan got her independence. Soon after freedom for Allied Army, Japan started the miraculous journey of becoming the most developed nation of the world.

Japanese economy expanded at a stunning pace from 1950 through the early 1970s. These two decades, beginning with the Korean War boom, have come to be called the “era of high speed growth” by historians. At unprecedented speed, Japan changed from a site of destruction and poverty to a place of prosperity.

Profound social changes then took place across the decades of rapid growth. Trends toward standardized ways of life accelerated sharply as the economy grew. The gap between rural and urban life shrunk. A greater majority than before came to grow up in nuclear, rather than extended, families.

The high-speed “bullet train” began service between Osaka and Tokyo in 1964. It both transformed the sense of distance between Japan’s greatest urban centers and stood as a proud symbol of technological achievement in the forefront of global progress.

At the heart of the standardization of social experience across the landscape was a process in which large-scale, bureaucratic, and commercial institutions touched people’s lives to an unprecedented degree.

In the new social order of the high growth era, the experience of family life was also standardized to a significant extent.

The emergence of Japan as a prosperous, confident, and peaceful nation was a striking development of postwar global history.

4.3.20. Exercise
1. Write a note on the surrender and occupation of Japan by Allied army at the end of second world war.
2. Bring out the reforms carried in Japan by GHQ for post war reconstruction of Japan.
3. Write a note on economic recovery of Japan in the post second world war era.
4. Give an account on the socio-economic reforms in Japan in the post second world war era.
5. How Japan transform herself from a war ravaged country to world most developed nation? Discuss on the of Socio-Economic Progress of Japan, 1951-1980.

4.3.21. Further Reading

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The End