INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
MAJOR CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

By

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1. IDEALISM

Introduction

After the World War 1 international relations was introduced as an academic discipline. The earliest theoretical approach adopted was the idealist approach. International relations scholars take stock of their work from time to time. As an organized discipline IR (international relations) has generated enormous literature since the First World War. It is necessary to periodically review IR as an organized academic discipline. Idealism therefore finds place both in classical or traditional and contemporary theories. The idealist approach to theorizing derives from philosophy, ethics, history and law. As its major concern is with international organization or institutions and with international law, it is also named as legal-international approach. Classical idealism as a political theory is traced to Plato. This theory is applied in modern ways as IR.

George Kateb has defined utopianism as a persistent tradition of thought about the perfect society in which perfection is defined as
harmony. This harmony is in fact, a mere short-hand way of referring to a number of social conditions.

Idealist approach laid great emphasis on norms, values and thus gave a normative dimension to international politics.

Modern Idealism emerged in the eighteenth century and is regarded as the major source of inspiration behind the American and French revolutions. In order to understand the process of creating a realist disciplinary history, and its relationship to progress and identity, we must have a working knowledge of texts from the days when ‘idealism’ supposedly reigned supreme. The world ravaged by the two world wars with millions being killed witnessed efforts on the part of some thinkers to conceive and design a world that would be based on cooperation, mutual understanding, trust, fellow feeling and non-violence. It would be certainly an idealistic reconstruction and portrayal of a world different from an anarchical international system likened to Hobbesian state of nature where all the nations were constantly in a state of war guided by their narrow selfish interests and impulses of egoism of power.

EXONENTS AND THEORETICIANS

One can trace this approach in the various earlier and twentieth century systematizations of international relations theory. Among scholars and statesmen who support idealism are Saint-Simon, Kant, Bentham, Kelson, Vattel, Wilson, Alfred Zimmern, Gentz, Herren Ranke, Corbett, Friedmann, Jessup, Claude Mitrany, Jenks, Russell, Deutsch,
Haas, Nye, Falk, Best, Bailly, Walzer, Brown and Maclean, Lasswell, Chen, Goodwin and F. C. Northrup, etc.

REPRESENTATIVE CLASSICAL IDEALISTS

As noted earlier, idealism belongs both to classical and contemporary theories. Major Representatives of classical idealism are Kant, Hobson, Angell, Wilson and Russell. Hobson while criticizing modern imperialism gave an interesting plan for what could be called anarchic peace through social democracy. He recommends policies and reforms. He believed that genuine nationalism produces cosmopolitan internationalism.

REPRESENTATIVE CONTEMPORARY IDEALISTS

Among the representatives of contemporary idealists are Richard Rosecrance, Robert O. Keohane, Charles E. Osgood and Richard A. Falk. Rosecrance is in favor of peace through free trade because he anticipates an anarchic world in which trading nations are on the upswing. Keohane is a theorist of international regimes. He explains that after the decline of American hegemony regimes develop a measure of autonomy and help to stabilize the international system. Like Rosecrance, Keohane maintains that path to peaceful order goes through a decentralized world. Osgood is a proponent of unilateralism, for reversing escalation by unilaterally induced tension reduction and by initiating a veritable spiral of peace.

IN SEARCH OF IDEALISM

In order to understand the realist-Idealist’ debate we must begin with an exposition of the ‘idealist’ writings of the interwar period. We should
inquire into the ‘real academic practices’ and the ‘real individuals’ contributing to the discipline in the interwar period. Such a project unfortunately encounters numerous difficulties.

- No thinker claims to speak authoritatively for the ‘idealists.’
- No one is accepted by others as an authority on ‘idealism’.
- International organization and International Relations were just in formative stages of development as academic disciplines during this time. (between 1st and 2nd world war)
- Academic journals devoted to international organization or international Relations were rare. During the above period one possible solution to these difficulties would be to examine the writings of known realists for their references to ‘Idealist’ scholars. This proves problematic in that most realists refer only to the philosophic tradition of ‘idealism’ and its supposed reemergence in the interwar period without ever actually citing an incidence of a modern ‘idealist’.

ASSUMPTIONS

Kelley, Jr. and Wittkopf observe: What transformed their movement into to a cohesive paradigm among western scholars were the assumptions about reality they shared and the homogeneity of the conclusion their perspectives elicited. According to them, idealists projected a world view usually resting upon the following axioms:

1. Human nature is essentially ‘good’ and capable of altruism, mutual aid and collaboration.
2. The fundamental instinct of the humans for the welfare of the others makes progress possible;

3. Bad human behavior is the product not of evil people but of evil institutions and structural arrangements that create incentives for people to act selfishly and harm others including making war;

4. Wars represent the worst feature of the International system;

5. War is not Inevitable and can be eliminated by doing-away with the Institutional arrangements that encourage it

6. War is an international problem that requires global rather than national efforts to eliminate it and therefore,

7. International society has to reorganize itself to eliminate the institutions that make war likely;

8. Idealism reposes faith in reason, international peace and order as a natural condition among progressive people tied by mutually shared political, economic and other interdependent interests in a shrinking ‘self-integrating world’.

EXPLANATION

The idealists offer the following explanations and remedies for solving international problems and for reforming international anarchy.

1. States are main actors and units of analysis in the mainstream international organizational aspects of this approach. Progressive reform of the operations of the foreign state system is possible through its institutional/legal reorganization.
2. Moral nations should act according to moral principles in their international behavior, avoid all kinds of traditional power politics, and follow policies of non-partisanship.

3. Attempts should be made to create supranational institutions to replace the competitive and war-prone system of territorial states. Setting up of the League of Nations and the U.N.O and an insistence on international Cooperation in social matters as approaches to peace were symptomatic of idealists institutional solutions to the Problem of war.

4. The Legal control of war was also suggested. It called for new transnational norms to check the initiation of war and, should it occur, its destructiveness.

5. The international institutional/legal restraints on conventional nation-state diplomacy, state-craft, balance of power and warfare through Collective Security, Pacific settlement, multilateral conference diplomacy, and the mobilization of institutionalized international public opinion, etc.

6. Another way suggested by idealists was to eliminate weapons. The attempts towards global disarmament and arms control were symbolic of this path to peace in the days of idealism.

7. The efforts should be made to see that the totalitarian forces cease to exist, as the idealist’s believe that the struggles so far have been between democratic and totalitarian states. Totalitarian regimes have been the main causes of war in the world. Their elimination would pave the way for peace and harmony in the world.
THE ‘IDEALIST’ MODELS The following models were propounded during the inter war period with a view to establishing peace and security in the world by eliminating war.

WORLD FEDERALISM

The proponent of this model discovered the cause of war in the division of the world into territorially fixed, geographically bound sovereign states as defined in Westphalia in 1648. The world federalist solution is not to eliminate the territorial nature of the state, but rather to impress upon states the necessity of ceding certain aspects of sovereignty to a higher authority. Thus international organization into some type of federation of states is a solution to war.

The Marquis of Lothian, a British diplomat and well known supporter of world federalism provides the conventional argument of the day for international organization into a federation of states. Lothian asserts three propositions about international life. First, war is an inherent feature of an anarchical system of sovereign states. Second, previous attempts to end war through international organization or law such the League of Nations or the Kellogg Pact were doomed to failure in such system of states. Finally, the absence of war can only be brought about through a commonwealth of nations that will extend the rule of law throughout the world. He feels and understands that a world commonwealth or the federation of even a group of like minded nations is still a long way off.

Spencer (1923:392) suggests that the special task the ‘student of Political Science in its international phase’ is to use history as a means
to study the evolution of ideas and institutions that replace anarchy with order. This order can take three forms- an ‘H.G Wellsian structure’ of a unified world state- ‘after millenniums’; the present order of multiple sovereign states which generally observe international law, but still lapse into war on occasion; or a federal combination of unity and multiplicity which is called internationalism. Spencer is realistic about the timetable for the creation of some form of international union and world consciousness, and at times he declares this work to be of decades, centuries or even millenniums.

Lynch (1911) suggests that while the 19th century was one of national development, the 20th century will be one of international development. He argues that evidence for this proposition abounds as many instances of intergovernmental cooperation, such as the first and second Hague conferences and non-governmental international meetings such as the young men’s Christian associations and various conferences of the world’s religions are becoming more frequent during this time period. As a result of these contacts across nations, individuals will transcend their blind and exclusive devotion to one nation and develop a sense of world citizenship and devotion to humanity and justice for all men.

Edwin Ginn took up the cause of world federalism as the solution to war. Like many of the proponents of world federalism he argued for a series of international institutions including an International Supreme Court, International Executive, International Parliament and most controversially International Police Force. In addition to these international institutions Ginn argued that an international sense of
community or feeling of world citizenship was necessary to persuade states to participate in this type of system. Being a good American he was naturally disposed to believe that the answer to the problem of war would be some form of world federalism based upon the American model.

Another proponent of this model Eagleton argues that to remove war from the international scene requires an international organization of states designed to which all states belong, willingly or not with a program wide enough to meet all the needs for which war might be urged and with a force behind it capable of overcoming all resistance.

Culbertson envisions a voluntary association of two or more leading sovereign states opens to all states, the object of which is to establish adequate machinery for collective defense of its members against aggression. The world federation embodies the ideal of world citizenship, to be achieved eventually through gradual evolution. But it is not yet the brotherhood of man. It is not a guarantee of eternal peace. It is realistic and it puts war into a strait jacket tighter than any yet devised.

**ANARCHY/SOVEREIGNTY**

The discourse that emphasizes the problematic nature of anarchy and state sovereignty for international organization weaves it way through many of the texts examined in this excavation of the ‘interwar’ literature. Several scholars debate the logical foundations of sovereignty and its supposed consequences in the international system. Cornejo provides an argument linking the security of the individual to
the sovereignty of the state. He maintains that states in order to justify the resort to war must appeal to the egoism of each individual to satisfy or resist ambitions of conquest. The egoism of the individual in society is then projected unto the egoism of the state in the international scene. The state maintains the unity of the egoistic individuals by recalling its egoism in the international realm. Thus, if the individual is to survive, the state must survive and that means that war is a necessary feature of interstate relations.

Another scholar Reeves suggests that individual security would be enhanced if the state ceded some aspects of its sovereignty to a higher authority. He argues that the notion of democratic states surrendering sovereignty to an international organization is nonsensical because states are not sovereign. The real source of sovereign power is the people not the state. Should the people in these states come to the conclusion that they would be better protected by delegating part of their sovereignty to bodies other than nation states, nothing would be surrendered but rather increased autonomy would be acquired. What is advocated some form of world federation to abolish war between states as it has been eliminated between individuals in domestic society.

Another group including Laski argues that power of the state must be limited by law. Korff argues that

Legal sovereignty can never more be an unlimited power; it must be strictly bound by legal limitations. If we consider sovereignty from this point of view we see that it is no longer dangerous politically. In other words, we can keep the idea of sovereignty in our conception of the state and need not be afraid of it, so long
as we attribute to it a purely legal character, which in itself implies the existence of limitations and is a negation of all-powerfulness.

**Lothian** links the anarchy of the international economy to the anarchy of the international political system by arguing that it is interstate anarchy which is the fundamental cause of poverty and unemployment, of the partial breakdown of capitalism, and of war in this modern world.

**Laski** (1933), like Lothian (1935) is concerned with the dual anarchy posed by the international political economy. He states that a world divided into sovereign states cannot by reason of their sovereignty successfully organize their relationships upon any basis which can reasonably assume that peace is permanent. Due to increased economic interdependence Laski finds that it is obvious that the national state is an impossible unit of final discretion. The effect of sovereignty in the economic realm is the push toward imperialism and war. The solution reflects Laski’s concurrence with H.G. Wells that there are really no effective middle terms between the anarchy of the pre-League world and a world state in the full sense of the term. Laski argues that a society of Socialist states with economic planning for the entire world is the best option to preserve the peace.

**Angell** agrees that the existence of a number of independent sovereignties side by side, each a law unto itself with no general ‘rule of the road’ governing their intercourse has always involved war. Angell observes that in the course of history the wars fought under the condition of anarchy have always been brought to an end by substituting the principle of authority or a federal bond for anarchy. He
believes that there are many different arrangements of authority to choose from in superseding international anarchy. According to Angell the main obstacle to achieving some type of supranational authority is that we have made of national sovereignty a god; and of nationalism a religion, so that even when the most solid advantages for international cooperation are offered they are rejected impulsively.

Suggesting some form of international organization above the state Eagleton cautions that states should divest some measure of their sovereignty to an international organization to avoid the constant state of war within which all states find themselves.

DISCIPLINARY CONCERN

The disciplinary concern of idealist approach includes internationally institutionalized and organized structures of peace to save man from the sufferings of modern warfare; the problematic of human and biological planetary survival.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

Idealist theory can be criticized on many counts. Most of the assumptions on which it is based are only partially correct. Though full of ideals and norms, yet it is far from reality. No wonder it is dubbed as imaginary, impracticable and thus utopian. Suggestions given by it to reform the international situation are difficult to be implemented.
World government or world federation is nowhere in sight. Kegley and Wittkopf rightly remarked: “Much of the idealist program for reform was never tried, and less of it was ever achieved”.

According to Coulombs and Wolfe, “the dual problems facing the idealists are to be found in the nature and in the implementation of their ideas”.

Jordon criticizes, “once they find men not accepting the ideas to which they subscribe, the idealists all too frequently decide to ‘force men to be free’.

CONCLUSION

Thus, Idealism fails to provide a coherent explanation of international politics. The idealist wants rules and an empire but does not recognize the need to learn the maxims or ‘science’ of international politics in order to deal with cases in which these attribute do not exist. In the initial stage of international studies it provided a definite and rather uncomplicated point of focus. Thus, contributions in this area have helped to clarify the nature, structure and framework of the working of an international system, praises Thompson.

SUMMERY

Between the two world wars (1914-45), numerous thinkers developed idealist theories of international relations. Their principal objective was to promote a world free of wars and establish a co-operative relation amongst community of nation states. Their chief ideas were as follows.
• They were inspired by classical idealist political thinkers (say Plato) and argued that it is possible to create a world nation state can have harmonious relationship without war and conflict. Harmony and perfection were the two most important ideas.
• As creation of states has helped in preventing minimizing conflict between individual creations of international organizations. Federation can minimize conflict among states.
• Men by nature are good and peace loving it is the state and its ego which creates conflict. As men are good state can also be good. Reason, peace and order can lead to harmony.
• Weapons and arm need to be limited to reduce wars. International legal mechanism (court of justice) can also restore conflict among nations.
• Totalitarian states must be abolished and democratic states must be established to promote peace.
• The idealist floated several ideal to achieve world peace and harmonious international relations. World federalism, creation of an international consciousness. People are to gradually–increasingly identify themselves as members of humanity and not mere citizen at specific nation states.
• Non political international organizations (including social, cultural, literacy etc) can promote international identification, collective groups, as a bull work of defense against war can also work.
• People are ultimately sovereign. They must gradually agreed to surrender them partly (at least) to an international state. Poverty, unemployment, difference in economic prosperity and
even capitalism are the causes of war and these need to be contained. A more just world must be created. Socialist state with economic planning is an option.

- States must surrender a part of its power to an international organization.

  Idealism is considered to be utopian, unrealistic and impractical. The true value of idealism lies in the goals it sets before us.

**REALISM**

**INTRODUCTION**

Realism has been the most dominant school of thought in the post-world war it international relations and still continues to have relevance in the present international relations scenario. The principal line of thinking of the realist school is in terms of power and its exercise by states. In other words, it is chiefly concerned with real politics. Whereas realism demands that immediate requirements should not be neglected for the sake of the present. Realists argue that even in future the national interest will continue to be the supreme political value and the idealists argue that in future the main concern of man would be human values. The realists hold that it is useless to spend energy on policies aimed at long-term objectives and utopian ideas which appear impracticable. The realist approach has little in common with the idealist or utopian approach which regards power polities as only an abnormal or passing phase of history.

The basic assumptions of realism are:
1. The international system is anarchic.

2. Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system.

3. States are rational unitary actors each acting under the consideration of its own national interest.

4. National security and survival are the primary ‘national interest‘ of each state.

5. In pursuit of national security, states strive to increase national power.

6. National power and capabilities of determine the relations among states.

7. National interest, defined in terms of national power, guides the actions of the states in international relation.

   The seeds of realism, however, could be traced to the writings of political philosophers like Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian who wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war and is also cited as an intellectual forerunner of real politics, Chanakya’s Arthasastra, Machiavelli’s Prince, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, Otto von Bismarck, a Prussian statesman who coined the term balance of power and Carl von Clausewitz a nineteenth century Prussian general and military theorist who wrote on war in which he propounded his greatest dictum that war is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means.
Their understanding of real politics deeply influenced the political realists’ perspective of looking at world politics especially from the viewpoint of human nature which they relocated in the sphere of reified states. This leads to a discussion on the propositions put forward by some of the political philosophers and how they helped in the “construction of state”, construction of masculinity” and construction of warrior mentality” in the discipline of International Relation.

**Chanakya’s Arthashastra**, discusses the principles of statecraft at length. The title, Arthashastra, which means “the science of material gain” or “science of polity”, does not leave any doubt about its ends. Kautilya suggested that the ruler should use any means to attain his goal and his actions require no moral sanction. The problems and solutions he has suggested to the kings are still having practical significance and relevance.

**Machiavelli’s classic work** The Prince is an embodiment of what a prince should actually be and the ways he should wield his power in order to gain and maintain his sway over his state and perpetuate himself in power. To the attainment of this end the prince is advised to resort to all unprincipled and unethical means not sanctioned by any religious or scriptural nuances and still be virtuous. He should combine in himself the attributes of both a lion and a fox to be exercised according the convenience of the demands of the situation. What redounds to perpetuation of power over the state is morality to the prince not some otherworldly nuances. The instrumentalities of power are the guiding star to the prince not people’s established views and beliefs. He gives a masculine character to the statecraft as he described
fortune as female who is always to be trusted and is always attracted by the ‘vir’, the man of true manliness, a friend of the brave and those who are “less cautious and more spirited.” If a virtuous and prudent ruler wishes to master fortune, then Machiavelli’s advice is to “strike and beat her and you will see that she allows herself to be more easily vanquished by the rash and the violent than by those who proud more slowly and coldly”.

**Hobbes** in his Leviathan portrays a state of nature, which is horrific and undoubtedly anarchic. The root cause of this anarchy lies at the basic characteristics of human nature, which persuades every man to be enemy of every man for three principal causes:

a. Competition  
b. Diffidence  
c. Glory

Therefore, in such a condition there are “no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues. In such an anarchic situation a Hobbesian bargaining took place by which every man entered into a contract with every man to bargain with an authoritarian regime identified with leviathan- a mortal God to provide them security and escape from this war like situation.

Political realists, deriving their basic assumptions from these philosophic expositions, believe that mankind is not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered, egoistic and competitive. Since
states are nothing but projections of individuals unto these they propagate that states are also inherently aggressive and obsessed with security and power; and that territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing powers. The international system is the Hobbesian state of nature characterized by absence of any centralized authority. In this state of nature as all individuals were depending on themselves for their own security. They are placed in a self help situation as all states in the Hobbesian world are relying on their own resources and strength to meet any challenges to their security. That means, the self help system is always inadequate when it is countered and challenged by similar self help systems. This results in a situation of security dilemma in which every individual in Hobbes state of nature and every state in the international system gets trapped quite apprehensive of others’ strength. For this all states are in a state of competitive arms race to avoid the situation of self help and security dilemma situation when all are in a state of apprehensiveness, distrustfulness and deceitfulness of similar other states. The security is a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made. The chief proponents of political realism were E.H. Carr, N.J. Spykman, Reinhold Niebuhr, George F. Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson. Their principal writings were published between 1939 and 1966.

E.H.CARR AND REALISM

The efforts of the liberals to establish a peaceful order through international organizations, disarmament, open diplomacy, self-determination and other lofty ideals were vehemently criticized by Carr (1939) in his polemical work The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1919-1939). It
was dangerous, he believed, to base the study of international politics on an imaginary desire of how we would like the world to be. He was of the opinion that “the technological aspect of the science of international politics has been conspicuous from the outset... the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study which consequently made it markedly and frankly utopian. International relations in its initial stage was a discipline in which wishing prevails over thinking, generalizations over observations and in which little attempt is made at a critical analysis of existing facts or available means. What were needed according to Carr, was a more rigorous approach which emphasized the realities of power in international politics rather than one which took as its starting point, an image of how the world could be. He believed that realism was “a necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism’ which had ignored the central element of power in its consideration of international politics. Car refutes the liberals’ belief that international concord could be achieved by the widest possible application of their views of peace, harmony of interest, collective security and free trade. These are nothing but the ideologies of the dominant group concerned with maintaining their own predominance by asserting the identity of its own interest with those of the community. Realists on the other hand, believed the pursuit of national power was a natural drive which states neglected at their peril. Nation states which eschewed the pursuit of power on principle simply endangered their own security. For Carr, the pursuit of power by individual states took the form of promoting national interest a term later to be more broadly defined as the foreign policy goals of every nation. For Carr, as for all realists,
conflict between states was inevitable in an international system without an overarching authority regulating relations between them. Understood as primarily a critique of liberal internationalism, Carr’s work was not put forward as a meta-theory of international relations. For him ethics was a function of politics and morality was the product of power.

**MORGENTHAU AND REALISM**

Political realism in International Relations reached its zenith and assumed a grotesque stature in the hands of Han. J Morgenthau in his seminal work *Politics among Nations: The struggle For Power and Peace* (1948) which comes closer to being a realist textbook. Morgenthau’s account of world politics is underpinned by the contrast he draws between two schools of modern political thought and their conceptions of the nature of humanity, society and politics. The first which closely resembles liberal utopianism believes that a rational and moral political order derived from universally abstract principles can be achieved by conscious political action. By contrast the second school, with which Morgenthau identifies and that he calls realism believes the world’s imperfections are the result of forces inherent in human nature. His six Principles of political realism summarize his theoretical approach to the study of international relations as outlined below:

1. Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature which is unchanging. Therefore, it is possible to develop a rational theory of politics and international relations based on these laws that reflects these objectives laws.
2. The key to understanding international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. It sees politics as an autonomous sphere of action. It imposes intellectual discipline, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. There is no room for moral or ethical concerns, prejudices, motives, political philosophy, ideology or individual preferences in the determination of foreign policy because actions are constrained by the relative power of the state. The national interest which ought to be sole pursuit of statesmen is always defined in terms of strategic and economic capability.

3. Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The forms and nature of state power will vary in time, place and context but the concept of interest remains consistent. The political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise.

4. Universal moral principles cannot be applied to state action in their abstraction though the state behavior will certainly have moral and ethical implications. Individuals are influenced by moral codes but states are not moral agents. They must be filtered through concrete circumstances of time and place.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from the moral excess and political folly. Universal moral
principles are not a reliable guide to state behavior. Interest is the perennial guide and standard by which political action must be judged and directed.

6. The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere from every other sphere of human concern, whether they be legal, moral or economic. This helps to see the international domain as analytically distinct from other fields of intellectual inquiry with its own standard of thought and criteria for the analysis and evaluation of state behavior.

DISCIPLINARY CONCERNS

The realist theory’s subject areas of disciplinary study are pointed out by A.P. Rana which are outlined below:

- First, maintenance of national security and nation-state survival as a prerequisite for the protection of manifold interests of thousands/millions of the nation-state’s citizenry.
- Second, maintenance of a relative degree of possible international order in an international anarchy through the rational pursuit of the national interest.
- Third, maintenance of a relative degree of possible international peace through workman-like manipulations of national diplomacy and balance of power.
- Final, state centric conceptions of justice through the maintenance of national security/survival through the rational pursuit of the national self-interest.

CRITICAL EVALUATION
In spite of its universal acceptability as one of the guiding principles of foreign policy realism has been subject to various criticisms.

1. **Power—not the only motivation**
   In emphasizing power as the principal motivation for political behavior realist theory has not produced an acceptable definition of power. Measuring power presents formidable problems. There is no common unit into which the power is converted for measurement in realist writings. Moreover, power is necessarily related to the objective for which it is to be used. The amount and type of power vary with national goals. In addition, realists have been criticized for allegedly having placed too much emphasis on power to the relative exclusion of other important variables. In Stanley Hoffman’s view “it is impossible to subsume under one word variables as different as: power as a condition of policy, and power as a criterion of policy; power as a potential and power in use; power as a sum of resources and power as a set of processes”.

2. **Flawed view of human nature**
   Morgenthau’s realism was based on a priori assumptions about human nature which by definition cannot be tested or verified to any meaningful extent. He makes a number of claims about the biological basis of the human drive for power and domination, without explaining other aspects of the human conditions which are not as egoistic.

3. **Unilluminating concept of national interest**
   The national interest concept has been the object of criticism. According to Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, “That national
interest is a necessary criterion of policy is obvious and unilluminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of the national interest”. Moreover it is difficult to give operational meaning to the concept of national interest. State leaders are constrained by many forces in interpreting the national interest. They are often captive of their predecessors’ policies. They interpret national interest as a result of their cultural training, values and the data made available to them as decision makers. According to Michael Joseph Smith, realists having adopted Max Weber’s ethic of responsibility have not presented a competent set of criteria for judging responsibility.

4. **Construction of reality**

Drawing from the Eurocentric system of the past the realist thinkers tried to apply a series of political concepts to the understanding and analysis of a vastly different contemporary global international system. According to Stephano Guzzini realist theory is best understood as an attempt to translate the maxims of nineteenth century European diplomacy into general principles of American social science. Such efforts have shaped academic research agenda and influenced policy makers. Different from what the reality is, such a mind set well entrenched by realist school in the realm of academic and policy making represents a construction of reality that led to policy action and academic analyses.

5. **Normative in theoretical orientation**
Discovering the inexorable laws in the historical past which guided the nations the realist school holds that it would be the basic objective of the nations at present to fit them into this straitjacket if they are not doing so. If nations obey laws of nature, which the realists have purported to have discovered, why is it necessary to urge them, as realists do to return to the practices based on such laws? Although history provides many examples of international behavior that substantiate classical realist theory, historical data offer deviant cases. In calling on states to alter their behavior, the realist becomes normative in theoretical orientation and fails to provide an adequate explanation as to why political leaders sometimes do not adhere to realist tenets in foreign policy.

6. **Obstructs alternatives**

The central concerns of realism are related to holding that states are the primary actors and basic units of analysis, inter-state behavior takes place in an ungoverned anarchy and the behavior of states can be understood as pursuit of power defined as interest. The present structure and operation of international relations accepts this underlying reality. Realism was an argument from the historical necessity. It offered an account of the reproduction of the state system and in the sense that it contributed to the perpetuation of the international system by providing it with an intellectual rationale, realism obstructed paths to alternative historical developments. It persuasively explained why international politics was never likely to resemble liberal democratic orders.

7. **Realism represents class relations**
Marxists have argued from this that realism is primarily concerned with the reinforcement and reproduction of capitalist relations of production at both the domestic and international levels, and that the system of states structurally supports this mode of production. It is sometimes argued that there is a link between realism and ruling class interest in leading industrial societies. Realism may well play a significant role in reproducing a world order which favours dominant classes. Robert Cox criticized realism for its failure to recognize how its contribution to international stability preserves social and economic inequalities within and between societies.

8. **Realism identified with conservatism**

If there is an identifiable ideology associated with realism it is the more general idea of conservatism. As Buzan puts it, realism is “the natural home of those disposed towards conservative ideology”. Realism aims at an accurate representation of the reality of global politics as opposed to a way of thinking in which some higher state is imagined or conceived of as course of action. As has been pointed out by McKinlay and R. Little realism seeks to resist change and foreclose alternative political practices. It marginalizes those theories offering alternative or contradictory accounts of the reality of world politics.

9. **Autonomous politics a misnomer**

Political sphere cannot be fully autonomous. Man is political, economic, social, religious and moral at the same time. All these fields and aspects are interrelated and integrated. Aristotle had
long suggested that the study of politics should integrate all the facets of human nature.

CONCLUSION

The realists maintain that their approach is still relevant in the present international relations. The realist theory is pioneer and ranks as the most important attempt thus so far to develop a theory of international relations. In Robert Keohane’s words, “Realism provides a good starting point for the analysis of cooperation and discord, since its tautological structure and its pessimistic assumptions about individual and state behavior serve as barriers against wishful thinking. According to R.B.J. Walker, political realism should be viewed “less as a coherent theoretical position in its own right than as the site of a great many contested claims and metaphysical disputes”.

SUMMERY

- States are the principal characters in international relations, understanding the dynamics of the state not idealistic, normative and values etc determine the state policies. State policies are determined by national interests, security interest and power structures. Wars are combination of state politics. Chankya (Ancient India), Machiavellie (Medieval Europe), Bismark (German politician in 19th Century) etc recognized the “Real” status of the states. They essentially hold that state does not always act as a moral or ethical entity but act as the national interests and security concerns. Hobbes argued that men act out of
competition, diffidence and glory. They surrender their power to govern themselves to state, Leviathan for security and to avoid war.

- In modern times many thinkers after witnessing the world wars and several other national conflicts and analyzing their causes felt that idealism is an inadequate theoretical framework to explain IR. They developed a theory based on real political scenario.
- State must be recognized. Its nature must be identified. Conflict between states is inevitable. As an overreaching international organization it is difficult to control them. Ethics and morality must admit power politics and state policy.
- IR must recognize true human nature promoted by interest in terms of power. State is a dynamic institute, though it is constantly guided by interest, all the factors do not remain constant. Moral principles are not the guiding principles. Power is not the only motivating factor biological aspects of human life need to be recognized. We must recognize morality, class relationship and politics. IR must integrate all aspects of human life and state

**NEO-REALISM**

**INTRODUCTION**

The realist tradition suffered a setback due to the emergence of the neo-liberal thought; especially the challenge posed by ‘pluralism’. State
centrism of the traditional realists received a serious jolt as pluralists emphasized the fact that the state may be a significant actor in international relations but it is not the sole actor. In other words, they acknowledged a plurality of actors in international relations as will be discussed just here. The pluralist’s challenge to realism was soon met by a new brand of realists, and the forerunner among them was Kenneth Waltz. Waltz in his famous works, Man, the State and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics (1979) came up with his ideas of world politics which is popularly known as neo-realism (new realism). The realist tradition has furnished an abundant basis for the formation of what is termed a neorealist approach to international-relations theory. It injects greater rigor into realist tradition by defining key concepts more clearly and consistently. Neo-realism has embraced what is termed structural realism identified with the writings of Waltz.

WHAT IS NEO-REALISM?

Waltz argues that the key difference between international and domestic politics lies not in the regularity of war and conflict but in the structure of international system, there is no other way to secure oneself other than self-help which will ultimately lead to security dilemma because security build up of one would result in insecurity of others. The resultant anarchy for the neo-realist is, therefore, due to the presence of a higher power over the sovereign states. Thus, the sources of conflict or causes of war, unlike what the traditional or classical realists argue, do not rest on the human nature but within the basic framework of the anarchic structure of international relations. Thus, in a self-help system, the logic of self
interest provides a basis of understanding the problem of coordinating the interests of individual versus the interests of common good and the pay-off between short-term interests and long-term interests.

Neo-realists did not overlook the prospects of cooperation among states also. But the point of contention was that, states, while cooperating with each other, tried to maximize their relative power and preserve their autonomy.

EXONENTS

In the late seventies and early eighties of twentieth century neorealism as an influential school of international politics like realism, its antecedent, the state is central. It gives importance to the structuralist mode of analysis to reinforce, reassert and validate realist premises after taking due cognizance of the critique of realism made in the 60s, 70s and in the present times. Neo-realism adds an element of casual analysis not found in traditional realist scholars-Morgenthau, Grotius, Hoffmann. These scholars have not developed an orderly and systematic version of realism. Neo-realism, on the other hand, is systematic as for it the primary explanation for state behavior is the very structure of the nation –slate-system. That is why it is also known as systematic theory. Prominent proponents of this school of thought are: Waltz, Gilpin, Axelord, Bull, Keohane, George and Schroeder. Others who have taken neo-realist position are Ranke, Hintze, Cohen, Tucker, Krasner, Andrews, Kratochwil, Herz, Spegell, Nadel, Buckley, Holsti, Zolbery, Gourevitch, Holbraaad and Nye. Main exponent – Kenneth N. Waltz endeavors to put balance of power theory on a disciplined and modern footing by taking recourse to scientific method.
ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions of neo-realism are partly similar to traditional realism Grotian as well as Morgenthau’s discussed in the previous chapter although reinforced by the demonstration of the lack of feasibility of alternative modes of organization of international society, the absence of a minimum universal consensus, the implicit perils and the empirical and moral indefensibility of radical change in the structuralist imperative.

A structural theory suggests that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, and that the whole acts autonomously to constrain the parts. It assumes that international relation conform to orderly patterns of wholes and parts: the whole is the international system; the parts are the actors within it.

According to Waltz, there are two types of international relations theories: one reductionist theory starts with the parts and moves to the wholes, systematic theory does the reverse; reductionist explanation the structure among the parts, the structure of the whole.

Basic principles

Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) set the tone for some of the most controversial methodological and theoretical debates in IR in the 1980’s and 1990s. Much of the neorealism-neoliberal debates can be seen as a reaction to this book and a response to those reactions. The arguments, which Waltz
began, underscored the importance of third-image explanations. **First image** explanations locate causes of international outcomes say the cause of war, “in the nature and behaviour of men. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity” (Waltz Kenneth, 1959: 16). **Second-image** explanations locate causes in the internal structure like capitalism; similarly, international peace results from a particular form of government like democracy (Ibid: 80-164). Alluding to Rousseau’ stag hunt and the then prevailing game theory, Waltz stated that the first and second-image explanations were insufficient. In a situation of strategic interdependence such as that of great powers an actor’s optimal strategy depends on the other actor’s strategic considerations. In order to understand what the actors will do one has to take into account the constraints that define the strategic setting in which the actors interact in addition to looking at the attributes of the actors. The third image locates causes “within the state system” (Ibid: 12). An illustration from microeconomic theory explains the potential importance of third image. The price is higher and the output is lower in a monopolized market than in a competitive one. But first and second image accounts, which Waltz collectively calls reductive explanations in Theory of International Politics, do not explain these
differences. In both markets, the attributes of the actors, which are firms in this case, are identical: every firm tries to maximize its profits and consequently produces the level of output at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue. What accounts for the variation in price and output between these markets is not variation in the attributes of the units but variation in the environment or market structures in which they act. This is the essence of the third image. The first and second image explanations are basically reductive. Fixing constraints and varying units’ attributes comprise the essential conceptual experiment underlying reductive explanations. The third image is mainly systemic explanations. Fixing the units’ attributes and varying the constraints facing the units comprise the fundamental conceptual experiment underlying systemic explanations. After highlighting the importance of third image or systemic explanations, Waltz sets the second objective in Theory of International Politics. He sees structure as a “set of constraining conditions” (Waltz: 73). A second goal for Waltz is to specify a restricted set of constraints that provide a way of conceiving of a political system and then to demonstrate the power of this formulation by showing that it tells “us a small number of big and important things” (Waltz, Reflection on Theory of International
Politics: 73). Waltz defines a political structure in terms of ordering principle of the system, the functional differentiation of units and the distribution of the units’ capabilities. His objective is to explain why the anarchic international system tends to reproduce itself. He believes that international system has a precisely defined these three dimensional structure:

1. **Ordering principle of the system**

The ordering principle of the system is anarchical not hierarchical. The absence of a central authority leads to a self help system where the quest for survival requires the states to seek security through the accretion of military power. The ordering principle of the system forces the states to perform exactly the same primary function regardless of their capacity to do so.

2. **The functional differentiation of units**

In this anarchic system each state is a separate, autonomous and formally equal, and to realize its interests it must count only on its own resources and no one else can be counted on to do so. Then, all the important functions must be performed by each and every state.

3. **The distribution of the capabilities of the units of the international system**
States cannot be differentiated by its functions but they differ vastly in their capabilities. This distribution of capabilities, which is unequal and shifting, defines the relative power of the states and predicts international system can be distinguished from another by the distribution of capabilities between states. “Structure, properly defined is transposable” (Waltz, “A Response to My Critics” in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics: 330).

According to Waltz, balance and bandwagon are the two choices before the states in an anarchic system. The states always prefer balance to bandwagon. The power of others is always a threat not a lure. The weak states have no other alternative than always to form alliances with leading powers.

**Differences between Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s analysis**

Classical realism is primarily based on a pessimistic portrayal of human nature. Self interested, competitive, concerned with self preservation and lust for power behaviour are found embedded in human nature. Since self preservation is the sole motive in aggrandizing power, Morgenthau argues that each state must act selfishly. Deriving its ontological foundation from Hobbes, Morgenthau argues that such behaviour leads ultimately to conflict. “What the one wants for himself, the other already possesses or
wants, too. Struggle and competition ensue.... Man cannot (therefore) hope to be good, but must be content with not being too evil” (Morgenthau, 1946). In short, classical realism assumes that competition and conflict between states are inevitable, and the roots of the struggle for power emanate from the human nature.

Neorealism or structural realism pursues a different approach to explain the nature of conflict between actors in international relations. The roots of interstate conflict are found embedded in the absence of a central authority that can enforce rules and agreements, and not in the nature of human beings as in the case of classical realism. The absence of a central authority results in an insecure, self help situation in which the actors are impelled to act competitively, regardless of their individual nature or personal preferences. This situation is called anarchy not in the sense of chaos but in the sense of absence of world government, which can enforce rules in international relations. Thus, anarchy originates in an insecure international system bereft of any central government not in human nature and states must act to eliminate or reduce this insecurity through a policy of balancing against others’ power capabilities, and bandwagoning a coalition that supports an aggressive state, in hopes of turning its aggression elsewhere.
In the classical realism desire for power is considered as an end in itself because the behaviour of the states leads to power oriented strategies. In neorealism the need for such strategies arises to compete for security.

On the question about the effect of polarity on war and peace both classical and neorealism differs. The key to understand this difference lies in the impact of uncertainty on the decision to go to war. The increase in the number of main actors in the international system increases uncertainty. When the number decreases, uncertainty decreases. For classical realists strategies are rooted in the human desire of power as an end in itself, and then certainty leads to war because certainty simplifies the aggressors’ calculations for war, and uncertainty leads to peace because action is deterred by the threat of third party intervention. In the classical realist theory bipolarity gives more certainty and leads to war and multipolarity leads to peace as it is characterized by uncertainty. On the other hand, in the neoclassical realist analysis insecurity is originated in the anarchic condition of international system, which impinges on states to accumulate more power as a systemic requirement to give more security to them. As the number of main actors increases, the system is more anarchic and therefore more insecure. The states are
thus compelled to resort to drastic actions to reduce insecurity. In other words uncertainty gives more opportunities to aggressor to act and certainty leads to peace. In the neorealist analysis bipolarity leads to peace as it gives more certainty than multipolarity.

According to neo-realism an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others. The term “security dilemma” describes the condition in which states, unsure of others’ intentions, arm for the sake of security, setting in motion a vicious circle of response and counter response. Security dilemmas result from situations in the view of neo-realism and not from states’ desire as in the case of classical realism.

“By concentrating on the nature of the system-level structure, Waltz avoided the need to make assumptions about human nature, morality, power and interest. Neo-realists were thus able to see power in a different way. For the classical realists power was both a means and an end, and rational state behaviour was simply accumulating the most power. Neorealists found that a better guide was provided by assuming that the ultimate state interest was in security, and while gathering power often ensured that, in some cases it merely provoked an arms race. Yet while power was no longer the prime motivator, its distribution was the major factor
determining the nature of the structure” (Martin Dunn, “Realism in International Relations” available at http://www.geocities.com/virtualwarcollege/ir_realism.htm).

**Neo-realism and post classical realism**

Recent years have witnessed a split of realism into two competing branches- Waltz’s neo-realism and post classical realism. Both are state centric; both view international politics as inherently competitive; both emphasize material factors, rather than nonmaterial factors, such as ideas and institutions; and both assume states are egoistic actors that pursue self help. Notwithstanding these similarities, differences between the two veer round the issue of whether states are conditioned by the mere possibility of conflict or states make decisions on the probability of aggression. According to neo realism the possibility of conflict decides the actions of states, which are seen as always adopting a worst case perspective. On the other hand, post classical realism rejecting the notion of worst case reasoning holds that states are understood as making decisions based on assessment of probabilities regarding security threats (See Wendt, 1992: 404 and Keohane, 1993: 282-83).

The first disagreement concerns the discount rate. It is argued that neo realism’s emphasis on the possibility of conflict is
emblematic of the view that actors heavily discount the future favouring short-term military preparedness over longer term objectives when they conflict. To the contrary postclassical realism does not consider the long term objectives as always subordinate to short term security requirements often requiring states to make intertemporal trade offs (Stephen G. Brooks, 1997).

The second disagreement concerns state preferences. All realists are of the view that military security is state’s prime responsibility and it is founded on a state’s material substructure. But disagreement brews when these priorities conflict. In the case of conflict between material capacity and military preparedness, neo realism gives primacy to the latter. In postclassical realism’s analysis “the rational policy makers may trade off a degree of military preparedness if the potential net gains in economic capacity are substantial relative to the probability of security losses” (Ibid).

EXPLANATION

Martin explains this theory in the light of Waltz’s work. Wartz gives explanations at the systematic level it is the anarchic nature of the international system that accounts for sameness. Power is means not an end: the attainment of secure independence is the highest end. Counterweights are set and a balancing mechanism begins function-
hence balance of power theory. According to Wartz, states do not seek to minimize power but merely to balance it.

According to Waltz, a bipolar system is more likely to produce balance than a multipolar system. The introduction of this idea into traditional balance of power theory accounts for what is called neo-realism.

In sum, neo-realist theory endeavors to provide scientific weight to traditional power-political ideas of hierarchy and balance of power. Neo-realism also sharpens identification and justification of the political realist’s moral philosophy.

**DISCIPLINARY CONCERNS**

Disciplinary concerns or subject areas of disciplinary study are similar to traditional realists in the forging with more explicit emphasis on

1. Systematic moral primacy of world order and within it the intermediate imperative of an existing international order of its;
2. Peaceful possibilities within the framework of an existing given ‘war system’ in the absence of any cogent possibilities of moving into a less anarchic international arena of a ‘peace system’; Waltz’s four P’S poverty, pollution, population and nuclear proliferation.

**CRITICAL EVALUATION**

The first major criticism which can be leveled against realism is that like idealism, realism is also lopsided and stresses solely on power and power struggle, i.e.; power monism’. The traditional realists formulated their views in reaction to the liberal utopians of the 1920s and 1930s.
Consequently, they put greater emphasis on “power politics”, state sovereignty, balance of power and war.

For the realists, states were the only important actors in international relations. According to Stanley Hoffman, this theory is full of anomalies and ambiguities and ignores the discussion of ends.

Cox (1986) places the neo-realist theory in the category of ‘problem solving approach’ to international relations when this may be little more than a cover for and rationalization of immoral and unethical behavior. The idea of “national interest” likewise needs to be rendered more “multidimensional and contextually contingent”, but not necessarily abandoned. Tickner stresses “I am not denying the validity of Morgenthau’s work” but only asking for a negotiation with the ‘contentious others’.

Central to Waltz’s theory is his assertion that international relations can be divided into system and unit level of analysis, with what he terms structure representing the international system level of analysis. The focus of his theoretical effort lies at the international system level. Therefore, he gives relatively little attention to unit factors because they lie outside his definition of structure. Waltz has neglected both the role of units and the impact of the structure of units themselves on the behavioural pattern their members.

According to neoliberal institutionalist critics, a theory of international politics must include the domestic politics of the units, to the extent that they shape foreign policy. According to such a conclusion, Waltz can be faulted either for drawing too narrowly the
conceptual boundary between the system and its units or for having too narrowly defined the term structure and assuming that only the international system level contains structure.

According to Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, Waltz’s focus on power and its distribution at the structural level heavily discounts the authority and organizational dimensions of international parties. Instead, it is suggested that, in addition to power, there is general agreement that rules, regimes, and international institutions need to be brought into the definition of international political structure.

As Linklater has pointed out a major problem with unit-structure relationship is that it leaves little or no room for systemic change induced by the units themselves. States are virtually powerless to change the system in which they are trapped. While this argument allows Waltz to explain the persistence and longevity of the international system, it is by definition hostile to the idea that the system can be fundamentally altered by the states which comprise it.

Waltz also denies that greater levels of economic interdependency amongst pose a threat to the condition of anarchy, despite Rosecrance’s claim that trading state is displacing the military state in the contemporary world. Use of force has been counterproductive in the post-second world war period because it threatens the stability of the global trading and finance system. Doyle’s argument that liberal democracies have transcended their violent instincts- and the insecurities engendered by anarchy- and have learnt to resolve their differences peacefully is relevant here. The pacification of a core of
liberal democracies and the increasing number of states choosing liberal democratic orders poses challenge for neo-realism’s contention that the units can do little to alter the structure of the system.

Waltz also discounts the rationalist view that though it is anarchic in structure, the international system is also normatively regulated. The idea of international society with common interest and values, rules and institutions, where conflict is mollified by mutually recognized requirements for co-existence undermines the neo-realist view that states are incapable of altruistic behavior.

The epistemological critiques of neo-realism by Ashley and Cox expose the conservative ideology which underwrites Waltz theoretical approach. Both adopt a critical approach to neo-realism, highlighting the extent to which it naturalizes or refines the international system by treating structures which have a specific and transitory history as if they were permanent, normal or given political fixtures. As Linklater argues, by emphasizing recurrence and repetition in the international system neo-realism cannot envisage a form statecraft which transcends the calculus of power and control. For Cox neo-realism reduces international relations to great power management by legitimating the very political order it is describing-one which favours the powerful and hostile to change.

Moreover, neo-realism is faulted for having presumably reduced politics to those dimensions that are conducive to interpretation by reference to rational behavior under various structural constraints. Because of its focus on structure, neo-realism is said to have ignored the social basis and social limits of power.
The state-as-actor world of neorealism is faulted for having imputed to the state the role of unitary actor, the behavior of which is shaped by the structure of the international system. Neorealism, it is suggested was statist before it was structuralist.

CONCLUSION

Neo-realism provides a convincing account of why the foreign policies of nation-states are so familiar, despite their very diverse internal natures. It also provides a more sophisticated explanation for the persistence of the international system. However, it exaggerates the autonomy states enjoy from their domestic conditions, overstates the importance of structure and underestimates the potential for states to transform the international system.

Finally, although realist disciplinary historians have posited a large impact of contextual, real-world events on ideas within international relations, few have examined instances of reverse causality. The neoliberal neorealist debate has virtually excluded the examination of the impact of ideas on international relations until only recently. Realists are apt to view ideas as the clothing within which states wrap their interest-driven decisions for public consumption. The realists point that the ‘idealists’ unrealistic nations of world peace led to the tragedy of world war IT, but what tragedies has the realist tradition been party to. Under realism power is an end in itself. Under neo-liberalism power is needed to achieve security. Realism holes multi polarity of balance at power leads peace. Neo-realism holds bi-polarity. Neo-realism recognizes the increase in the security of one
leads to insecurity of others. Neo-realism views military preparedness and material capacity is important.

LET US SUM UP

- The theory of realism as followed by neo-realism or a new realism. Waltz, Wilpin, Axelord, Prall, Keohane, George and Schroedes are prominent thinkers of this school.
- The Neo-realism theory accepts the primary of state but argues that state alone is not responsible. It recognizes other factors (i.e. other than state) determining IR.
- Neo-realism recognizes that states may co-operate with each other yet maximize their relative power. They reexamine balance of power theory in a scientific manner.
- One may move from parts to the whole or from the whole to parts. The whole is the international system and the states are the parts which operate within the whole.
- Causes of war can be traced to human nature, internal structure of capitalism, the dynamics of state system, market system and environmental issues etc. IR theory must systematically explain or analyze the contribution of each factor. In other words models of IR structures must be built. Units must be defined, Units must be differentiated.
- There are similarities and difference between realism and neo-realism, between Morgenthau and Waltz. Realism traces conflict to human nature. Neo realism traces conflict to the absence of an international authority to enforce peace.
INTRODUCTION

The system theory or, to call it by its more appropriate name, the general system theory is result of the behavioural revolution in social sciences. It developed out of the anxiety of the social scientists to evolve a general body of knowledge by integrating the various disciplines of social science. The development of systems theory in its present form started more than two decades ago when some scholars began to feel that important opportunities for research were being lost because of a rigid compartmentalization of social disciplines. Thus the system theory has been in aspiration the consequence of a movement aimed at the unification of science and scientific analysis.

The origins of the general system theory can be traced back to the thinking of Ludwig von Bartalanffy who was no behaviouralist. He was a biologist who in 1920s laid stress on the need for unification of science. The central concept developed in this regard was that of system which has since become a basic conceptual asset of the general system theory.

System theory

The system theory originated primarily due to the behavioral revolution in social science. The desire of the new genre of social scientists, to evolve a general body of knowledge by integrating the various disciplines of social sciences, finally led to the emergence of a host of theoretical approaches inspired by natural science methods. The chief among them was the systems analysis and prominent contributions in the field of international polities
were made by Easton (1965), Kaplan (1957), McClelland (1966), Rosenau (1961), and Boulding (1956), among others.

There has, however, been no real unanimity among the scholars on the meaning of the system. Various definitions have been provided for the term “system”. Thus, according to Bartalanffy, a system is “a set of elements standing in interaction”. Another definition provided by A. Hall and R. Fagen would view a system as “a set of objects together with relationship between the objects and between their attributes”. According to a third definition provided by Colin Cherry, a system is “a whole which is compound of many parts... an ensemble of attributes”.

There is no clear agreement among scholars on the meaning of the term international system. There are three major usages of the term system that are generally followed explicitly or implicitly.

In the first usage, system means such an arrangement of international actors in which interactions are identifiable. James Rosenau is the most noticeable representative of the first usage. According to him, a system is considered to exist in an environment and to be composed of parts which, through interactions are in relation to each other. In this sense there are identifiable and regular patterns of action. The first is concerned with description.

In the second usage, system refers to a particular arrangement in which the nature of the arrangement itself is considered the most important variable in explaining the behaviour of states. The second is concerned with explanation. Kenneth Waltz is the exponent.
In the third usage system is the application of special types of approaches to the study of international politics. The third is concerned with analysis of international reality.

The second and third usages are more important. System as an explanation makes an identification of the major variables determining international behavior.

KAPLAN’S SIX IMPORTANT RULES OR MODELS

Morton Kaplan has been the chief exponent of system theory in international relations. He conceives international system as an analytical entity for explaining the behavior of international actors and the regulative, integrative and disintegrative consequences of their policies. The positive element in Kaplan’s thinking is the consideration of the possibility of ‘change.’ Thus he studied the behavior of a system under changing conditions. He stated that there is some coherence, regularity and order in international relations and it is constituted of two things: “international system” and “nation-state system”. The international system is composed of subsystems and a set of actors, both international and supranational and is characterized by interactions among them. Nation-states are the primary actors and their role changes with the change in the international system. Kaplan describes six models of international system. They are:

1. The balance of power system
2. The loose bipolar system
3. The tight bipolar system
4. The universal system
5. The hierarchical system
6. The unit veto system

THE BALANCE OF POWER SYSTEM

According to Kaplan, the period between 1815 and 1914 experienced a golden age of balance of power (BOP). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the system started faltering as rules started to be flouted by major international actors. Finally, the whole Bop system collapsed with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Kaplan also suggested certain basic rules for the functioning of the balance of power system. These rules meant that one takes the following steps.

1. Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight.
2. Flight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities.
3. Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor.
4. Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system.
5. Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principles.
6. Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to reenter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification.
7. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.
In Kaplan’s view, these feature would heap keep intact the balance in relation. Failure would mean an end to balance and ultimately, the system.

THE LOOSE BIPOLAR SYSTEM

The loose bipolar system is that which corresponds to a situation in which two super powers are surrounded by a group of smaller powers and non-aligned states and in which the existence of nonaligned states makes the power of the two major actors loose. The loose bipolar system, often recognized as the ‘cold war’ model, envisages an international system that comes into operation when there are only two superpowers leading their respective competitive blocks and there is also a simultaneous presence of non-member block actors and universal actors. The loose bipolar system differs from bipolar system in many respects:

1. Supranational actors as well as national actors participate in the loose bipolar system.
2. Supranational actors are divided into a subclass of bloc actors like NATO and communist bloc and the universal actors like the United Nations.
3. The norms of the system among the actors differ according to their roles.
4. The loose bipolar system has a considerable degree of inherent instability because of the action of the non-member actors or of the universal actor is rarely of decisive importance in matters of policy formulation.
THE TIGHT BIPOLAR SYSTEM

The tight bipolar system is one in which non-aligned states will have disappeared and the system will operate only around two super power blocs. The second important thing can manifest itself either in the elimination of the universal actors or in the loss of their role functions. This is because the universal actor cannot mobilize uncommitted actors. Nor can the universal actor mediate between the two super powers.

THE UNIVERSAL SYSTEM

This system could develop as a result of the extension of the functions of essential actors in a loose bipolar system.

1. In this system the universal actor is sufficiently powerful to prevent war among national actors who retain their individuality and jockey for more and more power.
2. This system will be an integrated system.
3. It will possess integrated mechanism and will perform judicial, economic, political, and administrative functions.
4. National actors will try to achieve their objectives only within the framework of the universal actor.
5. This will be a system within which prestige and reward will be allocated to national actors and also to individual human beings.
6. This system will integrate the value structure of its member actors and establish a frame of reference within which disputes and value conflicts will be settled.
7. Here the interest of national actors will have to be subordinated to the interest of the international system as a whole.

This system emerges when the world gets transformed into a federal world state based on the principle of mutual tolerance and universal rule of law. The system almost resembles a world federation.

**THE HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM**

Such system will come into existence when a single universal actor absorbs all the other states either through conquest or treaty. The system will be directive if found on the basis of would conquest. It would be non-directive when power would be distributed among units according to hierarchy under the domination of a single national actor. The states as territorial units are, thus transformed into functional units. The non-directive system is based on will and the directive system on force.

**THE UNIT VETO SYSTEM**

The unit veto system is one in which the weapons that exist are of such a nature that any national actor can destroy any other before being destroyed itself. This a system that corresponds to the state of nature described by Hobbes. This is a kind of system when all the states would possess equal potentialities to destroy each other. The mere possession of deadly weapons and nukes would deter the attacks on a particular state. Therefore, this system retaliate threats from every other state.

1. Universal actor cannot exist in this system.
2. The unit veto system can develop from any other international system but cannot develop from the hierarchical system unless the system is in the process of internal decay.
3. The unit veto system can remain stable only if all the actors are prepared to resist threats and retaliate in case of an attack.

Kaplan added four more new categories into his six models. These are: the very loose bipolar system, the détente system, the unstable bloc system and the incomplete nuclear diffusion system.

The very loose bipolar system

It is characterized by an ever going search for arms control and for accommodation between the various blocs. The bloc structures suffer from a good deal of weakening, although their existence continues.

The détente system

It means a system in which the Soviet society becomes more open and less aggressive and the American society becomes less defensive of the international status quo. Both will compete with each other without assuming any dimension of conflict.

The unstable bloc system

It would be a system in which the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union would be increased and the two countries would be highly suspicious of each other. Agreements on arms control would also not be possible in this system. Areas of conflict will increase.

Incomplete nuclear diffusion system
This system would exist when there would be fifteen or twenty nuclear powers in addition to the two super powers-US and Soviet Union. The smaller nuclear nations in this system would possess minimum deterrence.

**CRITICAL EVALUATION**

Kaplan’s system theory has been severely criticized by many authors. His typology of international relations into six systems has been arbitrary and one can minimize or maximize such categories in another analytical framework. Out of his six models, only first two were in actual operation. The balance of power existed mostly in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and the loose bipolar system became workable only in this century.

According to Kaplan the loose bipolar system was to be converted into tight bipolar system in which there would be no non-aligned nations.

It is inadequate theory as it ignores many concepts which are necessary for the completeness of the system theory. Kaplan never explained the forces and factors that determine the behavior of states.

Hoffmann criticizes it as “a huge misstep in the right direction-the direction of systematic empirical analysis.” He observes of this theory endeavors to make universal at the expense of our understanding of the field of political science.

The system theory does not predict what will actually happen, but it only forecasts what would happen if certain conditions develop, which
rarely, if ever, develop exactly as envisaged. The hypothesis cannot be tested correctly on the basis of empirical observation. Therefore, the models appear to be too far away from reality to be testable. They are based on postulates about the behavior of the included variable, “which are either too arbitrary or too general; the choice here is between perversion and platitude.” Besides, this theory neglects the domestic determinants of the national actors and Kaplan’s model ignores the forces of change operating within or across the actors.

In spite of several criticisms Kaplan will always be remembered for his contribution to international relations in the form of a high systematic and comprehensive theory through a fairly comprehensive explanation of historical illustrations, Kaplan believes that this perspective will provide a useful guide to the development of a general international theory.

DECISION-MAKING THEORY

INTRODUCTION

This theory was developed especially in the sphere of foreign policy-making. It is quite common that decisions are made at various ways in all political and international systems. The decision-making approach tries to comprehend the complete process of decision-making at national, international or comparative levels and its relation to policy formulation. This theory was initiated in 1954 by Snyder, Buck and Sapin. It examines international politics through the analysis of the complex determinants of state behavior. This approach became more
popular in the United States as there was a growing urge among the scholars to focus on decision making and governmental process.

The decision-making approach has two fundamental purposes. One is the identification of “crucial structures” in the political realm where changes take place, where decisions are made, and where actions are initiated and carried out; while the other is a systematic analysis of the decision-making behavior which leads to action. Thus the decision-making approach focuses inquiry on actors called decision-making and on the state defined as the decisional unit. It is obvious, then that the action of the states is seen through the actions of decision-makers. The emphasis of decision-making approach is on devising a conceptual framework that could help us in the reconstruction of the situation as defined by decision-makers. Thus the facts and data for our study should be selected on the basis of what explains the behavior of decision-makers.

MEANING AND EXPLANATION

The decision-making approach lays emphasis on the question as to how and why a nation acts in international politics in a particular way not the other. As the state of knowledge about international politics is not perfect, the choice of decision-making as a focus of study is wise. A good way to study is where decisions are made because much of the processes of international politics revolve there.

Decision-making is a “process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of
one project to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers.”

**DETERMINANTS**

The actions of the decision-makers are also determined by three determinants:

1. Spheres of competence
2. Communication and information
3. Motivation

However, there are also certain limitations to decision-making and decision outcome. The limitations can arise from outside the decisional system and limitations arising from the nature and functioning of the decisional system.

**FACTORS**

The foreign policy is examined and the following factors are studied:

1. Purpose of the foreign policy;
2. Decision-makers;
3. Principles of decision-making;
4. Process of decision-making and policy planning
5. Means of decision-making and policy planning
6. Internal situations of the state, and
7. External factors

There are external and internal factors which also influence process of decision-making. The internal factors include the role of public opinion, socio-economic conditions of the people, geographical and
demographic factors and others. Among the external factors the important ones are the actions, reactions and counteraction of other states as a result of the decisions taken by the people established in authority there.

ASSUMPTIONS

This approach assumes that activities are more or less explicitly motivated and behavior is not at random. It is based on the assumption that the analysis of international politics should be centered, in part, on the behavior of those where action is the action of the state viz; the decision-makers. It conceives of state action as resulting from the way the identifiable official decision-makers define the situation of action. It sacks “to determine why decision is made at all and why a particular decision is made rather than some other.”

It considers all the elements and factors that enter into the considerations of a decision-maker such as the internal setting, external setting and the decision-making process. This official decision-maker takes action in the name of the state. Therefore, his definition of the situation, his expectations, perception, his personality and final choice as well as the various agencies and processes involved in decision-making.

MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING THEORY

Proponents of decision-making on foreign policy are of two types. One group regards the state as the sole actor and gives little importance to internal variables. The second group gives due cognizance to internal dynamics. This group is further sub divided into two categories. While
one of them emphasizes the role of organizations, the other puts stress on the interaction among governmental actors in this regard. All these three models of foreign policy-making, proposed by Allison keeping in view Cuban missile crisis are discussed by Frankel in brief as follows:

THE RATIONAL POLICY MODELS

The rational policy model is based upon the assumption that the states are the unitary actors according to realism. Decision making processes of each state can be studied as though it were a unitary actor—a monolithic unit with few or no important internal differences. Rationality or rational choice is defined as purposeful, goal oriented behavior. It means the individual responding to an international event... uses the best information available and chooses from the universe of possible responses that alternative most likely to maximize his/her goals. Rational choice goes through the following steps:

1. Problem recognition and definition. The decision makers when face an external problem, they first define its characteristics objectively on the basis of full information about the actions, motivations and capabilities of other actors as well as the character of the international environment.

2. Goal selection. The persons involved in making of foreign policy must determine what they want to accomplish. It requires the identification and ranking of all values in a hierarchy from most to the least preferred.

3. Identification of alternatives. It involves making an exhaustive list of all available policy options and an estimate of costs associated with each alternative.
4. Choice. It ultimately chooses the single alternative with the best chance of being achieved. Before that a rigorous process of means-ends, cost-benefit analysis takes place.

Theodore Sorenson- one of President Kennedy’s closest advisors suggested eight steps that decision makers must pass through before arriving at a final decision. This happened in case of Cuban Missile crisis.

1. Agreeing on the facts
2. Agreeing on the overall policy objectives
3. Precisely defining the problem
4. Canvassing all possible solutions
5. Listing the possible consequences that flow from each solution
6. Recommending one option
7. Communicating the option selected.
8. Providing for its execution.

**Impediments**

Despite the virtues associated with rational choice model impediments to its execution are substantial.

1. Bounded rationality. The available information is often insufficient and inaccurate to recognize the emergent problem and make an appropriate response. The decision makers thus face the problem of bounded rationality (Simon 1982).
2. Value complexity and uncertainty. Determining what goals serve best national interest is difficult given the environment
marked by value complexity and uncertainty. The existence of competing values about a single issue forces value trade offs.

3. Overloaded policy agenda and short deadlines. Policy makers work with overloaded policy agenda and short deadlines. There is little room for leaders to reflect on their decisions. Further, policy makers’ inability to rapidly gather and digest all large quantities of information constrains their capacity to make informed choices.

4. Satisfying behavior. The decision makers rarely make value maximizing choices. Instead of selecting the option with the best chance of success, they typically choose an alternative that appears superior to those already considered. Herbert Simon describes this as satisfying behavior.

5. Two level games. There is incompatibility between domestic demands and external diplomacy. Decision makers must play two level games. Decision makers are often fraught with varying beliefs, values, preferences and psychological needs. So disagreements exist among policy makers about the goals. These procedures may be better described as muddling through or making incremental policy changes through small steps (Lindblom 1979).

THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICAL MODEL

Making and executing a state’s foreign policy generally involves many different governmental organizations called bureaucracies. They increase efficiency and rationality by assigning responsibility for different tasks to different people. They define rules and standard
operating procedures to be followed while decisions are to be made or tasks are to be performed.

In his book on Cuban missile crisis, Essence of Decision (1971) Graham Allison identified two elements in this model- one is the organizational process and the other is the governmental politics. **Organizational process** reflects the constraints that organizations and coalition of organizations place on decision makers’ choices in policy making. The other **governmental politics** draws attention to the pulling and hauling that occurs among the key participants and caucuses of aligned bureaucratic organizations in the decision process.

Another way in which large scale bureaucratic organizations contribute to policy making is by devising **standard operating procedures** (SOPs). These routines effectively limit the range of viable policy choices.

Governmental politics is related to the organizational character of foreign policy making in complex societies. Participants in the foreign policy making often reflect their **organizational affiliations**. ‘Where you stand depends on where you sit’ is a favourite aphorism reflecting these bureaucratic imperatives.

**Intensely political.** Since bureaucrats in the foreign policy establishment are concerned with the primary responsibility of protecting national interest, they are obliged to fight for what they convinced as right. The consequence is that different groups pulling in different directions produce a result- a mixture of conflicting preferences and unequal power of various individuals-distinct from what any person or group
intended (Allison, 1971). Rather than being a value maximizing process, then policy making is itself intensely political.

**Parochial**

Bureaucratic agencies are parochial. Every administrative unit within a state’s foreign policy making bureaucracy seeks to promote its own purposes and power. Organizational needs come before the state’s needs sometimes encouraging sacrifice of national interest to bureaucratic interest.

This bureaucratic parochialism breeds competition among the agencies charged with foreign policy responsibilities. Far from being neutral or objective they try to take policy positions designed to increase their own influence relative to that of other agencies. They are very much averse to being constantly interfered with or deeply penetrated into by political leaders.

Every bureaucracy develops a shared mindset or dominant way of looking at reality akin to the groupthink characteristic of cohesiveness and solidarity that small group show.

Bureaucracies which are often self serving and guardian of status quo are averse, stubborn, unwilling and unresponsive to the changing times. This resistance of bureaucracies to change is one of the major problems that foreign policy making is confronted with.

**History making individuals model**

This model revolves round the dominant thinking that individual leaders are the movers and shakers of history and main determinants of foreign
policy in a state. Hitler, Napoleon and others can come under this category. How can such a view be reconciled with the realist view that leaders hardly make a difference and all leaders are engaged in rational decision making? This can be explained by bringing out a difference between **procedural rationality and instrumental rationality**. **Procedural rationality** is the foundation of the realists’ billiard ball image of world politics. It views all states as acting similarly because all decision makers engage in the same cool and clear headed end-means calculation. **Instrumental rationality** is a more limited view that says simply that individuals have preferences and when faced with two or more alternatives they will choose the one they believe will yield the preferred outcome.

Too much importance is ascribed to individual leaders in this model. Bill Clinton observed in 1998 that great presidents do not do great things. They have got a lot of other people to do great things. Even Henry Kissinger urged against placing too much reliance on personalities. Most leaders operate under a variety of political, psychological and circumstantial constraints that limit what they can accomplish and reduce their control over events. As Margaret G. Hermann has observed, the impact of leaders is modified by at least six factors:

1. What their world view is
2. What their political style is like
3. What motivates them to have the position they do
4. Whether they are interested in and any training in foreign affairs
5. What the foreign policy climate was like when the leader was starting out his/her political career
6. How the leader was socialized into his or her present position

The impact of leaders’ personal characteristics on their state’s foreign policy generally increases when their authority and legitimacy are widely accepted by citizens.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

Though the decision-making approach becomes a handy tool to study foreign policy process, it has been criticized on several grounds. Scholars, though they acknowledge the positive contribution of this approach, at the same time contend that this approach is partial. Decision-making approach is impressive and an innovation over the traditional power centric approaches but it has failed to provide a comprehensive study of international relations. Again it suffers from state-centrism by putting more emphasis on states as actors. It neglects objective realities. It also focuses more on the motives and actions of the decision-makers and completely ignores the impact of other factors on international politics.

Firstly, Hoffmann is doubtful if politics is never really made of conscious moves and choices that can be examined in terms of neat categories. Yet it is the chief assumption of this theory.

Second, it neglects all those things that are not the mere addition of separate decisions made by various units. It may be correct for foreign policy analysis, but it is too weak for the rest of international relations.
Third, this theory gives only post hoc explanations and historical reconstruction of particular decisions.

Fourth, this theory is based on the principles of indetermination and fails to suggest which one of the numerous elements that go into the many sides of the box is really relevant.

Fifth, the theory goes ahead with a value-free approach in as much as it merely endeavors to analyze the various decisions taken in the realm of foreign affairs without caring for as to which decisions are right and which are wrong.

Sixth, causes may sometimes dominate, and man may be compelled to make a certain decision because otherwise he would face personal risks he dare not take.

CONCLUSION

In the end it can be said that this theory has contributed a great deal to the understanding of the process of foreign policy making, which all other theories have ignored. This theory successfully analyses deeper roots of behaviors pattern of states. In facts, it is a greater improvement on institutional approach. Instead of simply describing interaction of states it provides an explication of diverse patterns of interaction. This approach also disregards the importance of norms and values in national and international politics. Further, there are no uniform methods or techniques of analyzing the decision-making process. Nevertheless, this theory is an improvement upon the institutional
approaches as it tried to provide an explanation of the behavioral pattern of the states under different circumstance

GAME THEORY

INTRODUCTION

Game theory is based on an abstract form of reasoning arising from a combination of mathematics and logic. As a branch of pure mathematics the theory of games sets forth mathematical postulates from which mathematical conclusions are derived. Nearly all game theorists agree that the theory with which they deal is addressed to what is rationally correct behavior in situations in which actors engage in interaction in the form of a game with specific strategies, goals and preferred outcomes. Here the actors are trying to win or maximize gain or minimize loss. For centuries kings and military officers have played war games (not actual wars) as a practice of strategies. Game theory in modern time is also applied other social sciences, not only in psychology and economics.

WHAT IS GAME THEORY

Game theory provides a number of advantages for the analysis of international relations. It requires that a conflict situation or decision process be examined from the point of the utilities and disadvantages that alternative courses of action are offered to each participant. Since it postulates a setting in which both sides make rational calculation of their own self-interest game theory offers the opportunity of viewing
one’s antagonist as something other than an incompetent swine or omniscient superman. Because game theory can offer the opportunity for quantitative procedures and for the systematic treatment and comparison of otherwise diverse situations advocates of game theory have tended to argue that if a problem is genuinely understood it can also be represented by a mathematical model. But its opponents have countered by saying that such reduction of a problem results in oversimplification and sterility. Here are elements of truth in both arguments.

To understand the operation of game theory it is first necessary to grasp some relatively straightforward definitions and assumptions. A basic assumption made by game theory involves a special kind of rationality borrowed from economics in its essentials. One such definition is offered by Anthony Downs:

A rational man is one who behaves as follows: (1) he can always make decisions when confronted with a range of alternatives: (2) he ranks all the alternatives facing him in his order of preferences in such a way that each is either preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other: (3) his preference ranking is transitive: (4) he always chooses from among the possible alternatives that which ranks highest in his preference ordering: and (5) he always makes the same decisions each time he is confronted with same alternatives.

In other words, each side in the game has consistent and transitive preferences. The decision-makers, or players, may be person’s social groups of any kind, or countries. In any given game, the
players usually have divergent goals and trace two or more possible outcomes to which they assign different values.

**EXPOENTS**

A game theory takes inspiration from the model of parlor games of conflict and cooperation, and by analogy applies these to similar real life situation in the world. The theory of games was primarily propounded by mathematicians and economists. Neumann and Morgenstern developed this theory in the sphere of economics. Later on it was applied to many fields of social science including international relations with modifications. Shubik, Schelling, Rapoport, Deutsch, Riker etc. take recourse to this theory for explaining international politics.

**ASSUMPTIONS**

Game theory is mathematical and deductive in form and tenor. It relies on some axioms and assumptions. Conflict situations are treated as games and strategies are chosen logically using these axioms and assumptions. Gaming offers a way for laboratory testing of real life situations. Solutions are derived from deductive reasoning. The game theory also assumes these five elements without them no game can be played.

**STRATEGY**

The core concept of game theory is strategy. It implies a skillful plan of the previous decided set of moves to be taken as and when the
expected moves of the other side requires them. The strategy takes into account the potential behavior of opponents and assumes that within limits of particular situations the range of strategy is not unlimited. The rational behavior is that which aims at the selection of a strategy by each player that will maximize the chances of victory. A strategy that is pure takes care of all contingencies under a single instruction. However, whether it is pure or mixed, the aim of strategy is to play against anything which the opponent may do.

PLAYERS

The game theory assumes an opponent and no game can be played without the players. Political games cannot be played single-handedly. For the game to start and continue, and player needs the others.

RULES

Game theorists assume that there are rules that regulate any game. This is evident whether playing football, bridge or poker. These rules set the parameters within which the players are to move and apply their strategies against the opponents. Without the rules no game can be played.

PAY-OFFS

It refers to what the game is worth at the end. As a result of what one player does, some may win and situations where no one wins completely, but there is usually always a pay-off. In any given game the players usually have divergent goals and face two or more possible outcomes to which they assign different values or pay offs. Each player
tries to maximize his own payoffs while keeping in mind the fact that he must act in the presence of other players with conflicting or at least divergent interest whose choices will partially determine the outcome and pay off of the game.

INFORMATION

The amount of information available and the mode of signaling would significantly influence the strategies of rival players. In strategic games, the players work out signals to communicate to each other both to encourage friends and to mislead opponents.

EXPLANATION

The purpose of the game theory is first to formulate principles which could specify what is rational behavior in certain social situations and second to formulate on the basis of those principles the general characteristics of that behavior (Mahendra Kumar). According to him, the theory develops mathematical formulations about choice making among alternative courses of action when it is impossible to control all the factors which govern the outcome because of the actions of others.

Shubik has also explained purposes of the gaming. These are:

1. Operational games are designed for cross-checking other techniques employed for the task;

2. These are intended to furnish further planning, exploration and testing of the specific operations.
3. These elicit group opinion and judgment on specific policy matters;

4. 'Brain-storming' for forecasting and others operational applications;

5. Advocacy uses of games.

Kinds of games

There are different kinds of games on the basis of number of players and pay-off structures. Game of two players is called zero-sum game whereas game of more than two players is known as n-person game. Then there are variable-sum games or non-zero-sum games or mixed-motive games. Then there are variable-sum games or non-zero-sum games or mixed-motive games. These are different from zero-sum games in regard to the pay-off structures. The variables-sum games are further divides into two sub categories; first, game of ‘chicken’ and second ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.

ZERO-SUM GAMES

In situations in which the total of the ‘pay-off’ is fixed, clearly the gain of one player must be at the cost of the other. These are the so called ‘fixed-sum games’. If all the gains and losses are equal, as in chess or poker, we speak about a ‘zero-sum-games’. In the situation of stark conflict rationality obtains as each player can calculate his probable gains and losses and find out the most rational strategy which he can adopt on the basis of calculating their chances at least in the long run. The basis of this strategy is the MINIMAX or MAXIMIN
concept. Each player aims at the highest possible gain at the cost of the highest possible loss of the opponent but will accept the smallest possible gain if he knows that this is likely to be the most that he can obtain. Conversely, if a player cannot avoid losses he will naturally seek the relatively smallest loss and his opponent will have to limit his expected gain accordingly. If the two players rationally choose the worst of the best and the best of the worst respectively, a stable solution called a ‘saddle point’ is occasionally found. Strictly speaking, the utility of this strategy can be validated only in an extended series of plays, not in a one shot game.

When the number of players increases, the strategy becomes that of n-person zero-sum-games. In this game, it is not feasible to calculate the results of the game on the basis of a clear loss and gain to any particular player. Whenever there is an increase in the number of players, a new situation develops. This situation is characterized by the form of coalitions and the emergence of ties between those coalitions. In this type of game, there is often a tendency among the participants to extract maximum gain by forming coalitions. In international politics, William Riker’s N-person zero-sum games’ model can structure much of UN diplomacy, for instance, when a state seeks support for its national position or the problem arises of including states under undesirable regimes in an alliance which means paying the cost, as shown in the attitude of NATO to the Colonel’s regime in Greece to Franço’s Spain.

**VARIABLE-SUM GAMES**

Zero-sum-games do not frequently occur in real life; in the majority of situations players not only can win something competitively
but frequently they can also collectively alter the pay-off by combining and co-coordinating their actions. The situation can always be interpreted and structured otherwise and certainly can develop into a different structured across time. For instance, the French relations with Germany developed from zero-sum-game in the early postwar period, when the French wished and hoped to be able-to keep the Germans down, into a variable-sum-game within the communities in which cooperation changed the competitive character of the game and rapidly increased the pay-off for both sides.

Two basic types of the variable-sum games are fundamental. The first is the game of mutual threats graced with the name ‘chicken’. Its paradigm is the situation in which two drives drive fast cars directly at each other and the one who swerves is disgraced as ‘chicken’, according to the original teenage to have been originally evolved, while the winner is acclaimed as a hero; if both continue, they clash; if both swerve simultaneously, neither wins but both avoid disgrace.

**CHICKEN GAME**

The first is the game of mutual threats graced with the name ‘chicken’. Its paradigm is the situation in which two drivers drive fast cars directly at each other. The relationship can be more clearly illustrated with a pay off matrix for Chicken in this figure. Each driver has two choices: to swerve or not to swerve and the one who swerves is disgraced as ‘chicken’, according to the original teenage gang code in which the game was supposed to have been originally evolved, while the winner is acclaimed as a hero; if both continue, they clash; if both swerve
simultaneously, neither wins but both avoid disgrace. Two drivers are here designated as A and B.

Four possible strategies can occur in the abstract model of the ‘Chicken’ situation:

1. Both players may ‘cooperate’ (cc) by swerving at the same time, saving their lives without incurring disgraces;

2. Both ‘defect’ (DD) and collide with fatal results.

3. Players A cooperates by swerving while players B goes on and wins (CD)

4. Players B cooperate through swerving while player A goes on and win (DC).

Each player has two alternatives. He may swerve, a course of action that will be designated as a_1 for A and b_1 for B or he may refuse to swerve which we will label as a_2 for A and b_2 for B. Each box or cell in the pay off matrix represents one of the four possible outcomes. The pay off to A is shown in the lower left hand corner of each cell, the payoff to B in the upper right. The numbers assigned to the various outcomes reflect the values or utilities that each of the rational players derives from the possible outcomes. Thus if both swerve (designated as ab) they each neither gain nor lose and they each receive a payoff of zero. If A swerves and B does not (ab) then A receives a payoff -10 reflecting the loss of face and B’s payoff is +10 reflecting his gain of status. If both fail to swerve then the payoff value of -100 is placed.
In the game of Chicken each player has a dominant strategy which in this case happens to be swerving: hence the outcome $a_1 b_1$ is regarded as being the most probable. This is due to what is called the minimax strategy. Neumann and Morgenstern in their work The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour argue that the rational approach to each player is to adopt a strategy that guarantees the best of the worst possible outcomes in other words they posit a damage minimizing strategy in the face of the assumption that the environment will threaten the worst possible harm. Thus rather than deciding on the basis of maximizing the opportunity for gains, a player is to choose the strategy that assumes the least bad outcomes or minimize his losses. In Chicken this means that A is expected to observe that the worst that can befall him should he choose to swerve is a payoff of $-10$, whereas should he choose not to swerve the worst possible outcome is $-100$. Therefore A will choose to swerve. Player B makes the same kind of calculation and also chooses to swerve. The outcome $a_1 b_1$ is dominant and the game tends toward a certain equilibrium or saddle point.

**Applicability to International Relations**

The Chicken game is analogous to crisis confrontation between America and Russia. In this analogy, with the United States being substituted for A and the USSR for B, the
decision to swerve could be thought of as stepping back from the brink of nuclear war. While refusing to swerve can mean pursuing a given policy with total resolution even at the risk of nuclear war. The dominance of the swerving strategy within the game of Chicken offers an aid to understanding why a nuclear peace has been maintained between the two super powers in the postwar period. It also illuminates the kind of logic that may have applied at the time of 1962 Cuba crisis. When after their eyeball to eyeball confrontation with the United States, the Soviets gave in, suffering a certain loss of face but avoiding nuclear war.

There are ramifications of the Chicken game when applied to the study and practice of international relations. These include the techniques or pre-commitment and the accompanying uses of irrationality. Herman Kahn in ‘Thinking about the Unthinkable’ has applied the Chicken game to provide for the adoption by one of the players a course of preliminary action that would convince the other of the unshakable determination to refuse to swerve once the race begins. Since such advance refusal would be irrational. A actually seeks to convince B of his irrationality. Thus before climbing into his car he may swagger, boast, threaten and attempt to appear generally irate and unreasonable. Furthermore, he may give the impression of drunkenness, which he may underscore by throwing empty liquor bottles out of the window of his vehicle. He may put on dark glasses to reduce his vision, despite the confrontation taking place in the dead of night and lastly, once the cars are headed toward each other, he may detach the steering wheel and hurl it out of the window thus confirming his unalterable precommitment to an unswerving course.
What the irrationality and accompanying techniques seek to accomplish is to convince B of A’s absolute dedication to the strategy of refusing to swerve. If B swerves, he loses face(-10) and if he refuses to swerve he dies(-100). Thus B as a rational player will necessarily seek to minimize his losses by choosing to swerve. A’s uncompromising stance aided by his display of irrationality will have produced a handy victory.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b₁ (swerve)</th>
<th>b₂ (don’t swerve)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a₁b₁ (both swerve)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+10 gains status</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>a₁b₂ lose face</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-10 loss face</td>
<td>-100 death</td>
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<tr>
<td>a₂b₁ gain status</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>a₂b₂ (crash)</td>
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<td>death</td>
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**CHICKEN’ B**

a₁ Swerve

a₂ don’t swerve
### The US versus the USSR as a Chicken Game

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<td>(a_1)  \ (both swerve)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>gains status</td>
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<td>(a_2)  \ (crash)</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-100</td>
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**Prisoner’s Dilemma**

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<td></td>
<td>b₁</td>
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<td>a₁</td>
<td>swerve</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(restraint)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>(total restraint)</td>
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**Prisoner’s Dilemma**

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<td>b₁</td>
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<td>silence</td>
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<td>a₁b₁</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a₁b₂</td>
<td>1 year</td>
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### US-USSR Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A: Silence</th>
<th>B: (USSR)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a₁</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a₂b₁</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a₂b₂</td>
<td></td>
<td>(both confess)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-30</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>5 years</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A: Confess</th>
<th>B: (USSR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>a₁</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a₂b₁</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 years</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-50</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **a₁** - Silence
- **a₂** - Confess

- **b₁** - (low arms spending)
- **b₂** - (high arms spending)

- Important USSR advantage
- Serious U.S. disadvantage
PRISONER’S DILLAMMA

There is another game that offers thought provoking insights into the nature of international relations but that does not provide the possibly dangerous lessons of Chicken. Prisoner’s Dilemma has been stated in a variety of forms and with differing numerical utilities but it too is a game whose essentials remain similar throughout the various descriptions. In one popular interpretation two suspects are arrested and separated. The public prosecutor is certain they are guilty of a specific crime but lacks evidence sufficient for conviction in a trial. He tells each prisoner that each has two alternatives: to confess to the crime the police are sure they have committed or not to confess. If both do not confess then the prosecutor will book them on a minor trumped up charge such as illegal possession of a weapon and they will both get relatively minor punishment (one year in jail); if both confess they will be prosecuted but he will recommend less than the most
severe sentence five years each. If one confesses and the other does not then the confessor will get lenient treatment for turning state’s evidence (three months imprisonment) where as the latter will suffer the maximum sentence (ten years).

Examining the matrix it is found that because each prisoner wants to maximize his own utilities, his rational strategy is to confess. The rational or dominant outcome is that both prisoners confess and both get five years. The rational outcome is not the best outcome. Were they both to remain silent they both could spend only one year in jail instead of five. But player A calculates as follows: he does not know what B will do: if A chooses silence($a_1b_2$) the worst possible outcome would be ten years in jail(-100); if he chooses to confess($a_2$), the worst possible outcome would be five years(-50). The minimax strategy thus dictates that he pick the least damaging of the worst possible outcomes, so he necessarily chooses to confess. A can also look at the situation another way: if he is silent his possible payoffs are one year(if B is silent) or ten years( if B confesses); If he confesses, his possible payoffs are three months(if B is silent) or five years(if B confesses). Obviously, A prefers three months to one year and five years to ten years and since he has no communication with B nor control over B’s choice’ he is better off to choose confess regardless of what B does. Unfortunately for A, B makes the same calculations and also chooses to confess. The strategy of confession strictly dominates. The unique saddle point of the game is $a_1b_2$ mutual confession and five years in prison in prison for each despite the fact that had both remained silent both would have spent only one year in jail.
Applicability to International Relations

The above lesson is immensely revealing when applied to international relations because it can show how a situation may lock two participants into conflict regardless of their individual wishes and even though both may be neither evil nor stupid. A model of the US-USSR arms race provides a good analogy. Here the US faces virtually the same calculation as player A in Prisoners Dilemma. If the US chooses low arms spending, the worst possible outcome for it is that the USSR will continue high arms spending and thus obtain a strong military and political advantage internationally at a cost to the US of -$100 and a gain for the USSR of -$50. If the US chooses high arms spending, the worst possible outcome is a mutually costly arms race. If the US chooses low arms spending it will be seriously disadvantageous. Similarly USSR chooses high arms spending regardless of what US does. The dominant outcome is an arms race \((a_2 \ b_2)\).

The rational strategies which seem to be indicated by the prisoner’s dilemma pattern are:

A. To initiate cooperation in the hope that, in the not every long run, will be reciprocated.
B. To persist with it as long as it is reciprocated.
C. To retaliate without fall to repeated or frequent defection by the other party;
D. To renew from time to time a sequence of two to three cooperative moves to give the adversary the opportunity to shift to a sequence of mutual cooperation;
E. To remind the adversary constantly of the pay-off matrix since the permanent display of such a matrix during play sequences greatly increases cooperative behavior.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

The game theory is not without shortcomings and draw backs. Kaplan, Deutsch, Frankel, Schelling have pointed out so many limitations of this theory.

- First, international politic can neither be equated with nor actually it is a game. The game theory cannot project the real world. The major drawback is that rules of the game in international politics are defined by the participating states. Without any centralized authority who can play the role of an umpire these players change the rules as they play or they wish.

- Second, game theory does provide some insights into ticklish dilemma that a decision maker faces under certain conditions. It assists the decision maker not only to behave rationally himself in certain international situations but to judge what rational behavior is on the part of an opponent.

- Third, it is a theory that explains the logical structure of different kinds of conflict situations; but as a structural theory it is neither descriptive nor normative criticizes Jordon. It classifies conflicts of which only some can have prescriptive or normative rules. This is applicable to only zero sum games which rarely or never exists in international politics. For most international
situations the rational value scale of the adversary is difficult to discern, thus no definite prescription of what to do can be given. In international politics one cannot know with certainty the preferences and values of one’s opponents. One can merely guess and conjecture.

- Fourth, the human rationality is constrained by time and circumstances. According to Baral, “A player can calculate in advance the possible implications of some moves, but up to a point”. In international politics states do not have leisure time to think of optimal strategy like chess or poker players. According to Frankel, “the costs of looking for the optimal solutions are too heavy, often prohibitive and all we can aspire to do is to satisfy our objectives, to make sure that we achieve no less than the minimum essential for their satisfaction”.

- Fifth, the game theory can be applied with some success merely to cases of two-person, zero-sum games. Such cases are very meager in international politics whereas mixed games are the rule. Schelling’s main objection is that this theory in its zero sum form has contributed very little to problems like limited war, deterrence, surprise attacks, atomic blackmail and massive retaliation.

- Sixth, even a two-person game is not necessarily zero-sum in character. Baral points out, “It may be; it may not be so”. Sometimes zero sum games can be converted into mutual advantages through mutual cooperation and trust. Similarly, an N-person game which on some occasions may be zero sum may also be a game of variable –sum.
• Seventh, one should not forget that values are hierarchical and the pay-offs are quantifiable. But this gradation of values is a cumbersome job. A number of values like honour, prestige, psychological satisfaction and trust etc are difficult to quantify. By not giving importance to these values while fixing the amount of payoffs may make the victory hollow and doubtful. A winner may find that he has actually lost.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, game theory rests on some very special assumptions. For example, the numbers in the payoff matrix reflect arbitrary calculations about certain values. To the extent that these figures are wisely arbitrary they can reflect useful information that the analyst or researcher knows on the basis of careful investigation into the subject matter. Yet even if individual preferences were measurable, game theory assumes that these are fixed. Taking into account all these limitations, game theory still has considerable value. This theory very rarely resembles real life in diplomacy. It has a restricted applicability to most issues of international politics. This is because, “game theory usually assumes that most games have an end but international politics resembles rather an unending game in which no great power can pick up its marbles and go home”, observes Deutsch.

Let us sum up

• Game theory was developed in economics, psychology and business administration to explain the dynamic of market and human behavior. Model was developed in business studies and
social science. Many scholars also found Game theory useful to explain IR. Reasoning on mathematical principles is used to develop various games which can explain IR.

- The cold war era witnessed several face off situation and brinkmanship diplomacy between former USSR and USA. Game theory was used to analyze such diplomatic and military crisis.
- Zero sum game, chicken game and prisoners Dilemma game were the important models developed under game theory.
- Though game theory offers fascinating model for IR understanding yet it has many limitations. The situation in reality is not simple rather it is too complicated to be reduced particular game models.

**UNIT-II**

**POWER**

**INTRODUCTION**

Power is the crux of politics-local, national and international. Since the beginning of humanity power has been occupying the central position in human relations. In order to comprehend international politics and relations the study of the concept of power is a must. The relations between the state and power are very close. In order to attain power, the resources must be used and so used that a nation becomes able to influence the behavior of other nations, for the capacity to do so is the is in contradistinction with the deification given by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan who define power as participation in decisions.

**MEANING AND NATURE OF POWER**
Power, influence, authority and capability are related terms and often used interchangeably and loosely. Such a use creates a conceptual confusion. An attempt has been made to remove this confusion by defining each term separately in the following paragraphs.

The master of statecraft in ancient India- Kautilya wrote about power in the fourth century B.C as the “possession of strength” derived from three elements knowledge, military and valor.

While defining power, Schleicher also makes a distinction between power and influence. Power is the ability to make others do what they otherwise would not do by rewarding or promising to reward or by depriving or threatening to deprive them of something they value. To Dahl power is “ability to shift the probability of outcomes.” According to him, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. Thus, power is the ability to control the behaviour of the ability to control the behaviour of others in accordance with one’s own intentions and interests.

DIMENSIONS OF POWER

Deutsch gives three dimensions of power that can be easily measured and that allow analysis to quantify and rank the actual and protected capabilities of nation states. In brief these dimensions are as follows:

DOMAIN OF POWER

Domain answers the question, over which power is exercised. Power is often exercised over people, territory and wealth.
Domain can be divided into internal domain and external domain. In the context of international relations only the external domain is relevant.

**A. RANGE OF POWER**

Deutsch defines range as “the difference between the highest reward and the worst punishment which a power-holder can bestow upon some person in his domain”. Range has also internal and external components within its territory a state may control its people by benign and tyrannical measures. Governments can exercise power over their subjects both through rewards as well as punishment. The rewards include welfare measures, demarcation rights, facilities etc.

**B. SCOPE OF POWER**

The scope of power, in the words of Deutsch, is “the set or collection of all the particular kinds of classes of behavior, relations and affairs that are effectively subjected to governmental power”. This ‘set of collection’ embraces all the types of activities a governmental seeks to control, domestic as well as foreign. For example most of the Latin American countries are economically and politically controlled by the US albeit they are not its formal colonies.

**KINDS OF POWER**

There are three types of power which are explained below:

**A. PHYSICAL POWER**

Military strength of a state is known as physical power. Both USA and USSR were top ranking powers owing to their military might.
Government of a state enjoys political power because of the subordination of the military to the political authority. As a result of rapid technological development, the physical power of the state is divided among its different wings such as the armed force, the air force, the navy and of late, the nuclear force with its missiles.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER
It is a power over public opinion. It consists of symbolic devices that are utilized to appeal to the emotions of men. Psychological power is used very tactfully. In India, the republic day parade of the local made tanks and weapons is meant to impress upon the other nations its growing military power. Psychological power is usually employed to weaken the opponent countries by spreading disloyalty among their people and instigating them against their government.

C. ECONOMIC POWER
Economic power is the ability to control the behavior of other nations by having greater control over economic goods and services. Economic development enhances the capacity of a nation to influence others through persuasion and also enables it to resist persuasion and punishment by others and both of them are the important methods of power. Economically prosperous state possesses the ability to buy and the ability to sell and both are used to increase a nation’s power through international trade. The developed countries follow that
has been propagated as economic aid policy towards the developing countries.

ROLE AND USE OF POWER

Power in international relations may be used by nation for various purposes, the chief among them are:

NATIONAL SECURITY

Defense of its territory and sovereignty is the main purpose of any modern state. National security is the vital national interest as well as major determinant of foreign policy of every nation. Power plays a significant role in achieving this purpose. Many nations have fought defensive wars. A defensive war may be pre-emptive or preventive.

PRESERVING STATUS QUO

The policy of status quo aims at preserving the distribution of power prevalent at any time in history. The moment in history taken as a reference for pursuing the status quo policy is often, the termination of war. After the end of a war peace treaty is signed indicating the new shift in power. Nations following the policy of status quo utilize power to preserve the new shift in the balance of power.

CHANGING STATUS QUO

Nations also use power to change status quo in their favor or pursue a policy of imperialism. Any effort to change the existing
distribution of power in its favor means that state is following a policy of imperialism, Alexander, Napoleon, Hitler and more recently Saddam Hussain used military power for their expansion.

USE IN DIPLOMACY

Power is also utilized by a nation’s diplomats. Diplomats of a powerful country act more confidently in their diplomatic activities than diplomats of less powerful states. Power helps nations at the negotiation table. The Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung once wrote: “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. Likewise it can be said that diplomatic strength comes out of political power. If a country is powerful its diplomats can effectively employ the means of persuasion and reward and their threat of punishment and use of force will carry more weight during diplomatic negotiations and manoeuvring.

ENHANCING PRESTIGE

Enhancement is related with the show and demonstration of power. For this reason nations occasionally display power and strength before the other nations of the world in various ways. When the USA tested the atom bombs in the pacific in 1946 she invited a large number of foreign dignitaries to see the fact that the USA was bombing a group of ships larger than many of the world’s navies.

SERVING NATIONAL INTERESTS
Power is used not only to fulfill vital national security and independence, preserving status quo and prestige etc. but also to accomplish other national interests. These may be geographical, political, economic, social, educational, scientific, technical, strategic, and cultural and so on. Power is thus the main tool used by nations to fulfill their various national interests.

**METHODS OF EXERCISING POWER**

The question arises how a nation can influence another nation? How can it exercise power? There are four means and methods by which one nation can influence or control other as per its own desire. There are:

1. Persuasion
2. Rewards
3. Punishment
4. Force

1. **PERSUATION**

   It is the most common and widely used way of exercising power. In this method what a nation A does is to influence another nation B by way of arguments or superior logic or to redefine the whole situation so that nation B changes its mind about what it ought to do.

2. **REWARDS**

   The rewards can be material in the shape of territory, military aid, weapons, troops and training facilities. The rewards may be economic in the form of aid, loans, grants, capital supply, technical assistance etc. Political rewards consist of support for another nation’s viewpoint in international conferences and forums.
CONCLUSION

Research along the above lines may lead to the conclusion that the traditional image of the international system’s power structure needs to be modified in some particular way, for example by taking into account new patterns of international interdependence. If a power structure is to fulfill certain minimum requirements in terms of significance, duration and simplicity, then there is perhaps nothing that deserves to be called ‘the power structure of the international system’. The very notion of an international power structure may be oversimplified enough to be more misleading than helpful.

POWER BASE ELEMENTS

There are various elements of power. These elements are sometimes loosely called the determinants of power also, but it is wrong doing so. For, the elements of power do not determine power; their possession only helps the acquisition and growth of power. The various power base elements are:

1. Geography
2. Size
3. Location
4. Climate
5. Topography
6. Natural resources and availability of raw materials
7. Economic development
8. Military preparedness
9. Political structure and leadership
10. Ideology
1. GEOGRAPHY

Geo-politician such as sir Halfords Mackinder (1869-1947), Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), Karl Haushofer (1869-1964) and Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943) attached great importance to geography. Mackinder in his “heartland theory” expounded, “who rules East Europe commands heartland; who rules heartland commands World Island; and who rules world island commands the world.” Geography, therefore, may be regarded as the most stable determinant of national power. This includes the size of the territory, topography, location relative to sea, and landmasses relative to other nations and control of strategic places.

2. SIZE

The size of states varies from one state to another, but the most important factors, which contribute to its national power, are the state’s internal organization, its capacity for foreign political unity and if it is capable of providing it with the capacity of containing a large population and a large varied supply of natural recourses.

3. LOCATION

More important than size is the geo-strategic location of the state in the sense that, position of a state in relationship to other land bodies and to other states which profoundly affects the culture, economy and both its military and economic power.

4. CLIMATE
It is another geographical feature that plays a crucial role in determining the national power. Climate affects the health, temperament and energy level or the population. It is closely related to productivity.

5. **TOPOGRAPHY**

It not only determines the density of population, which a region can support, but the climate of the land. Wind, rainfalls temperature and consequently soil conditions are influenced by the position of the land, sea and mountains.

6. **NATURAL RESOURCES AND AVAILABILITY OF RAW MATERIAS**

Natural resources are available naturally to the states in the form of soil and its products and minerals. These in turn help the states to develop industrially, economically and also military. The most noteworthy incident shaking the international economy was the oil embargo by the OPEC countries in 1973. Self-sufficiency in food, mineral and energy resources has also helped the United States and Russian foreign policy choices.

7. **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

The economic performance of a state in terms of GNP per capita provides the key to understand the state’s ability to utilize its natural and human resources which adds up to its national power and determines its policy choices and menu. However, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has forwarded a different view of development.

8. **MILITARY PREPAREDNESS**
Military capability is the most determining factor as far as national power and prestige is concerned. Russia, the United States and China have huge army under their command as compared to Iceland, Costa Rica, Maldives, Mauritius and other small countries.

9. POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP

The political structure of a state and the nature of the ruling elite determines to a greater extent the direction and realization of national polices and also influences the formulation of foreign policy of a state the quality of rule is also an important factor in considering the effectiveness of national power.

10. IDEOLOGY

Ideology is also an important element of national power. Padelford and Lincoln defined ideology “as a body of ideas concerning economic, social and political values and goals which pose action programme for attaining their goals.”

MEASUREMENT AND LIMITATIONS

This objective is sought to be realized with the help of several devices which act as limitations on nation power. The major limitations on national power of each state can be discussed as under:

1. Balance of power
2. International law
3. The world public opinion
4. International morality
5. Disarmament and arms control
6. International organization

1. BALANCE OF POWER

The balance of power is a sort of limitation on the national powers of a nation. In international politics the power of a nation of group is used to prevent a particular nation from imposing its will upon other. Power is a crude and unreliable method of limiting the aspirations for power in the international scene. They do not pursue certain ends and use certain means because of moral limitation.

2. INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is another important limitation on the power of nation. These certain rules regulations which regulate the conduct of one independent state with the other, power is the basic necessity without which no nation can realize its national interest nor can execute its national policy. If each nation used its power in unlimited terms against her neighbor, the world society would come to an end.

3. THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION

Another limitation on the power of a nation which is more exclusive and lacks analytical precision is the concept of world public opinion. No nation can exercise the selfish ends in violation of the world public opinion. This world public opinion effectively guards the interests of humanity as a whole.

4. INTERNATIONAL MORALITY

Just, as human behavior in a society is regulated by a set of moral norms or rules, likewise behavior of states in the international
environment is limited by international morality. International morality is “a generally accepted moral code of conduct which nations usually follow in international relations”. It acts as a limitation on the national power of each state.

5. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Efforts at disarmament through League and U.N have also limited the national power. This aspect has acquired much importance in our days. An effort has been made through various conventions to control the use of nuclear weapons which have the potentialities to destroy the entire world.

6. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The United Nations and all other international organizations help in the curtailment on national powers of state. The U.N with the mission of maintenance of international peace and security does not intervene in the internal matters of any state, but it can act as a check on the unfair and unlimited use of power by states.

MEASUREMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

When the power of nation is measured this implies a comparison with other nations. A comparative analysis of the power of two or more countries can take on different forms. A situationally conditioned comparison pertains to a particular situation. In practice this can be expected to mean the study of the distribution of power within a certain delimited context. One example would be the power position of Nigeria in a certain geographic region, such as West Africa.
1. Power is always a relative one
2. Permanent factor
3. Military strength
4. Single factor
5. Interdependence
6. Judge the productivity of a nation

**CONCLUSION**

A conceptual analysis of the kind undertaken above cannot in itself provide any factual evidence of what is the essence of the power of nations. But it has produced indications as to how the necessary empirical research to clarify the nature of power bases should be organized.

When the concept of power base is assessed it is vital to make a distinction between the various research aims that could possibly be attained if a better and more systemized knowledge about the power of nations were available.

One important field of investigations which is dependent on an accurate measurements of national power is the assessment of the ‘would be radical changes’ of the power structure of the international system.

**NATIONAL INTEREST AND RELEVANCE OF IDEOLOGY**

**INTRODUCTION**

National interest is the most crucial concept in international relations. It is the key concept in foreign policy as it provides the material apparatus on the basis of which foreign policy is formulated. While formulating foreign policy all statesmen are guide by their respective national interests. In the last decade and a half,
elaboration of a number of theoretical approaches to international relations has perhaps been the major development in that field. Quite a number of separate and for the most part, fruitful theoretical orientations have been devised, and the obvious gap which had exited for so many years has now begun to be filled up. At present it appears that a period of consolidation and expansion from within has set in, in which the various theories must be interrelated and tested through practical application.

Both Henry Kissinger and Robert Art make it clear that the identification of national interest is crucial for the development of policy and strategy. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. “Interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions.” They help answer questions concerning why a policy is important. National interests also help to determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy.

MEANING AND NATURE OF NATIONAL INTEREST

Frankel divides the various attempts to define national interest into two broad categories- objective and subjective approaches.

The first category embraces those approaches which can be defined or examined with the help of some objectively definable criteria.

The second category contains those definitions which seek to interpret national interest as a “constantly changing pluralistic set of objective references.”

The task of defining national interest becomes more cumbersome as the domestic and international activities of a state overlap. It is a synthesis of the objective and subjective approaches. In most of the nation-states, the “iron law of oligarchy” is prevalent, implying that governmental decisions are made only by a few men and women. These decisions are often taken in such a way as to promote the national interest as this notion is perceived and defined by the decision-makers, at the best; they are justified by being related to the national interest. A renowned
British scholar of international relations, Hugh Section-Watson, has recommended that the expression “national interest” is a misnomer as governments, not nation-states, make foreign policy. The terms “state interest” and “government interest” are, therefore, more appropriate.

**DEFINITIONS OF NATIONAL INTEREST**

The definition of national interest relies on the stand taken by a particular person about various pairs of extremes such as ideas versus self interest, idealists versus realists, short term and long term concerns and traditional and individual concerns.

In a very generic sense, national interests are “that which are deemed by a particular state (actor) to be a ...desirable goal.” The attainment of this goal is something that the identifying actor believes will have a positive impact on itself. Realization of the interest could enhance the political, economic, security, environmental, and/or moral well being of a populace and the state (actor) or national enterprise to which they belong.

Lerche and Said define it as “the general, long-term, and continuing purpose which the state, the nation, and the government all see themselves as serving.”

Dyke defines it as that which states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other.

**Foundation of national interest**

The state having an interest can mean holding an objective or subjective stake in something, but also crucially being affected either positively or negatively by that stake. Both usages of interest are relevant to this analysis. With the development of science and technology and a materialistic view of the universe national interest defined in spiritual theology was shifted to being defined in objective material conception. This is understood as something gainful in economic and tangible terms to be quantifiably measured. According to Beard, this
can never be an objective or quantifiable process because interests cannot be separated from human motive and concern. There is no such thing as an objective reality called the national interest. Consideration of the national interest is a subjective assessment. As far as policy is concerned, interest inheres in human beings as motive or force of attention, affection and action. According to Beard, interest, subjectively considered, may take the form of an idea, and every idea pertaining to earthly affairs is attached to some interest considered as material thing and is affiliated with social relationships. There are no ideas without interest, and no interest without ideas.

This claim has important implications for all analyses of the national interest which attempt to disaggregate its component parts. It represents a challenge to claims made by classical realists that permanent, fixed national interest can be identified as objectives which should determine the conduct of the foreign policy of states. It also means that the national interest cannot be reduced to its component parts for scientific measurement and assessment.

Any analysis of the national interest must entail an inquiry into the ideas which express and represent the interest to be considered.

The general will

At the basis of claims for the national interest is an assumption that a political community can speak with a common voice. This is referred to as general will by Rousseau- the common expressions of a political community which cannot be reconciled with the particular interests. The bond of society is that identity of interest which all feel who compose it. Societies have common interest which should form the basis of decision making and policy. For critical perspectives of the national interest, the claim that a complex society can have common interest is largely a myth which serves the interest of dominant groups. Perhaps Rousseau had in mind Thucydides remark that an identity of interest is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals.

Raison d’etat
The transformation of raison détat into national interest started from Machiavelli. He argues in his book The Prince that survival of the state was the paramount political consideration for rulers- an end in itself. The means necessary to achieve this goal are less important than the end itself.

USES FOR NATIONAL INTEREST

Interests serve as the foundation and guiding direction for the formulation of policy for a nation state, there is more often than not a direct correlation between the nation’s interests and foreign policy. In most cases,” statesmen, think and act in terms of interest.” Those interests believed to be the most significant for the attainment of a policy objective will earn the greatest amount of emphasis during the policy formulation process. They should be designed to tell the policy-making why and how much he should care about an issue. Interests help determine what kind and how much attention should be given to both challenges or threats and opportunities.

TYPES OF NATIONAL INTEREST

Robinson has pointed out six types of national interest which are as follows:

I. Primary interests
II. Secondary interests
III. Permanent interests
IV. Variable interests
V. General interests
VI. Specific interests

PRIMARY INTERESTS

Primary interests include protection of the nation’s physical, political, and cultural identity and survival against encroachment from the outside. Primary Interests can
never be compromised or traded. All nations hold these same interests and must defend them at any price.

II. SECONDARY INTERESTS

Secondary interests are those falling outside of primary interests but contributing to it. For example protecting citizens abroad and maintaining proper immunities for a nation’s diplomats are secondary interests.

III. PERMANENT INTERESTS

Permanent interests are those which are relatively constant over long periods of time; they vary with time, but only slowly. An example of this kind is provided by the determination of Britain to maintain freedom of navigation during the past few centuries for the protection of her overseas colonies and growing trade.

IV. VARIABLE INTERESTS

Variable interests are those which are a function of the entire cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interest, partisan politics and political and moral folkways of a given nation. In other words, they are what a given nation at any particular time chooses to regard as its national interest. These interests are considered vital for national good in a given set of circumstances. Interest can diverge from both primary and permanent interest.

V. GENERAL INTERESTS

General interests are those which the nation can apply in a positive manner to a large geographic area, to a large number of nations, or in several specific fields (such as economic, trade, diplomatic intercourse, international law, etc.) An example would be the British interest in the maintenance of a balance of power on the European continent.

VI. SPECIFIC INTERESTS

Through the logical outgrowth of the general interests, specific interests are defined in terms of time and space. For example, Britain regarded it as a
specific national interest to maintain the independence of the new countries for preserving balance of power in Europe.

Thomas W Robinson has included three more national interests:

VII. IDENTICAL INTERESTS

Identical interests between nations are those national interests which those nations hold in common. For example, Greta Britain and U.S have had an interest in assuring that the European continent is not dominated by a single power.

COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS between nations are those which, although not identical, at least are capable of forming the basis of agreement on specific issues.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS are those not included in identical and complementary interests. It should be noted, however, that today’s conflicting interest can be transformed tomorrow through diplomacy, occurrence of events or passage of time into common or complementary interest. The same thing might be said about the possibility of transforming identical or complementary interests into conflicting interest.

SURVIVAL AS NATIONAL INTEREST OR HANS MORGENTHAU’S CONCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

In discussing Morgenthau’s view of the national interest, let us divide the subject as follows:

1. Definition and analysis of the national interest.
2. basic statement of the relation between interest and power ;
3. national interest and morality ;
4. propositions about the national interest ;
5. national interest and nuclear weapons ;
6. national interest and international organization.
According to Morgenthau, “the concept of national interest is similar in two respects to the ‘great generalities’ of the constitution, such as the general welfare and due process. In Morgenthau’s opinion, the minimum requirement of nation states is to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states.

Mahendra Kumar observes: “perhaps the only level at which it can be defined is the level at which it can be defined is the level of survival. It is difficult to define national interest either as more or less as survival. Not being a clear defined quantity, national interest is rather a psychological phenomenon which is subject to drastic changes that may result from internal shifts in power or from a change in a nation’s values”.

Instruments and methods for the promotion of national interest are well explained by Palmer and Perkins. It will be pertinent to rely on their views while dealing with these instruments and methods. These can be briefly explained as follows:

1. Diplomacy
2. Alliance
3. Propaganda
4. Psychological and political warfare
5. Economic methods
6. Imperialism and colonialism

1. DIPLOMACY

It consists of the techniques and procedures for conducting relations among states. Diplomacy is practiced through diplomats. He is the eyes and ears of his government in other countries. Diplomatic negotiations are employed to reconcile the different interests of the states through the process of mutual give and take.
2. ALLIANCES

There are usually concluded by two or more states for the promotion and protection of their common interests. Thus the character and the tenure of the alliance will depend on the relative strength of those interests, Robinson observes: “the advantage of pursuing the national interests through alliances, of course, lies in the translation of inchoate, common or complementary interests into common policy and in bringing the nation’s power directly to bear on questions of national interests.”

3. PROPAGANDA

In the twentieth century propaganda has become a major instrument for the promotion of national interest. In the most general terms “any attempt to persuade persons to accept certain points of view or to take a certain action” is propaganda.

Lasswell says, “Propaganda is the manipulation of symbols to control controversial attitudes; education is the manipulation of symbols to transmit accepted attitudes”.

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL WARFARE

Eisenhower associated psychological warfare with “the struggle for minds of men”. Linebarger defined psychological warfare in the broad sense as “the application of parts of the science of psychology to further the efforts of political, economic, or military action,” and in narrow sense as “the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such
other operational measures of military, economic, or political nature as may be required to supplement propaganda”.

5. ECONOMIC METHODS

Economic methods states deliberately follow certain policies in pursuit of their national interests. Economic methods are regularly employed to fulfill national interests both in peace and war.

6. IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM

From sixteenth century till the middle of twentieth century European nations used imperialism and colonialism as a tool to further their national interests.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND IDEOLOGY

It has always been a serious problem in international politics to determine the precise nature of relationship between national interest and ideology. With the growth of communism and the emergence of the concern for peace in the twentieth century, this problem has become even more serious. In order to understand the relationship between ideology and national interest, it is necessary to be as precise as possible about the meaning of national interest and ideology.

The concept of national interest is closely related to the concept of ideology. But in order to be able to understand this relationship, it is necessary to be clear about the meaning of ideology. There are two different senses in which the term ideology is used. In the first sense, ideology is defined as a self-contained and self-justifying belief system based on a definite worldview; it claims to provide a basis for explaining
the whole of reality. Thus the present definition of ideology does not have anything to do with world ideologies as communism, fascism, and democracy. The sense in which the term ideology is used here is borrowed from Karl Mannheim’s concept of particular ideology. Mannheim believes that whenever we are sceptical of the ideas and their interpretations advanced by our opponents, we take those ideas as a set of particular ideology.

Ideologies in the context of power are thus a cover to hide real nature of the objectives of a foreign policy. But ideologies are not the accidental outgrowth of the hypocrisy of certain individuals. It is a matter of continuous development of a nation’s interests, practices, and capabilities.

In our times three other such ideologies have developed:

A. Ideologies of the United Nations
B. National self-determination
C. The ideology of peace

The above account of ideology as a means for the attainment of maximum possible power would show that a study of international politics, especially of the process of struggle for power, is fraught with difficulties. The discussions of national interest and ideology would show how closely the two are interrelated. This interrelationship has, however, been the dominating characteristic mainly of traditional international politics. The only possible ideology would then the one related to peace and international integration.
CONCLUSION

All these means can be used by all the nations for securing their national interests. Nations have the right and duty to secure their national interest and they have the freedom to choose requisite means for this purpose they can use peaceful or coercive means and when they may desire. In the interest of international peace, security and prosperity they are expected to use peaceful or coercive means and when they may desire. In the interest of international peace, security and prosperity they are expected to use peaceful means.

Summary:

National interest is one of the ingredients of international relations. It often acquire a central focus of enquiry because the importance of each nation in the international arena is primary based on his national interest.

Instrument/ methods for the promotion of national interest

1. Diplomacy
2. Propaganda
3. Alliances and treaties
4. Economic aid and loans
5. Coercive means

Idealist considers national interest to be a dangerous view. If every state starts promoting its own interest the interest of other states may be
hindered. Prof. Ronald has criticised the idea of national interest on the ground that it often denies the individual interests. Hence, it becomes crucial that everyone should acknowledge the broader interests of international society while giving shape and momentum to their national interest.

Questions:

1. Discuss various power base elements?
2. Power base of a nation is always issue’s specific and situational?
3. Discuss the limitations and measurement of power?
4. Critical examine national interest?
5. Discuss types of national interest on the means adopted to achieve it?
6. Point out the relevance of ideology in international politics?

UNIT-III

BALANCE OF POWER

INTRODUCTION

Balance of power is one of the oldest concepts of international relations. The presence of states with varying degrees of power makes it necessary to study the pattern of relationship among them. If one goes by the realist assumption, the international system is unrestrained and
unprotected by any international, government, where states have to look after their own national interests and, obviously, national security thereby including insecurity in others. Contemporary writers have called this theory ‘a basic principle of international relations’, ‘a fundamental law of politics’.

Thus the theory of balance of power is widely held. It is an overused theory in international relations. Claude has aptly remarked that it is an “ambiguous concept” as it is virtually meaningless”.

Wight says, “The notion of the balance of power is notoriously full of confusions”. The key to the puzzle, as the realists suggest, is the principle of balance of power which is “a basic principle of international relations and a fundamental law politics as it is possible to find.” The political relations of independent nations, especially the great powers, traditionally have been explained by the theory of the balance of power.

MEANING AND DEFINITIONS

To know the meaning of balance of power one may take the analogy of a balancer with a pair of scales. The balance of power is one notion which is central to the study of international relations. The term is in no way an innovation of the present times and can be traced to the sixteenth century, only to be theorized in the eighteenth century and after. In the twentieth century it has been invoked many a times but the problem is that there is a lack of unanimity on the exact meaning of the term.

George Schwarzenberger (1951) viewed balance of power as “equilibrium’ or a certain amount of stability in international relations.”
According to Professor Sidney B. Fay (1937), balance of power is such a “just equilibrium in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon others.”

Castlereagh referred to balance of power as “the maintenance of such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as should prevent any of them becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest.”

**BALANCE OF POWER**

Power was distributed in such a way that each state was able to balance the others. In theory, if any state tried to increase its power, thereby posing a threat, all the others would unite to prevent it. This was what came to be known as the balance of power.

In such a case, the balancing power, either by one single nation or by a group of nations, will prevent any particular nation, from imposing its will upon others. If state A increases its power, state B must try to equalize it. If B alone cannot match A’s might, it can join other states and together they can offset the power of A.

**Basic assumptions**

Quincy Wright has enumerated five major assumptions:

1. First assumption is that states are committed to protect their vital interest by all possible means including war, though it is up to each nation to decide what its vital interest are and which methods it would adopt to protect them.
2. The second underlying assumption is that the vital interests of states are or may be threatened. If not threatened, no need for state to protect them.

3. The third assumption is that balance of power helps the protection of vital interest either by threatening other states with committing aggression or by enabling the victim to achieve victory in case an aggression occurs.

4. The fourth assumption is that the relative power position of various states can be measured to a great degree of accuracy and that this measurement can be utilized in balancing the world forces in one’s own favour.

5. The fifth assumption is that statesmen formulate their foreign policy decisions on the basis of an intelligent understanding of power considerations.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF BALANCE OF POWER**

1. Equilibrium
2. Temporary
3. Active intervention
4. Status quo
5. Difficult to determine existence
6. Subjective and objective approaches
7. Conflicting aims
8. Big power game
9. Unsuitable for democracies
10. The balancer
11. Operation questionable
THE PREREQUISITES FOR BALANCE OF POWER

A. A multiplicity of states.
B. Absence of a centralized legitimate and strong authority over these sovereign actors.
C. Relatively unequal distribution of national power
D. Requirement of a balancing power
E. Perpetuation of existing power distribution which benefits the balancer nations mutually, i.e., status quo.

TYPES OF BALANCE OF POWER

The balance of power has the following forms:

1) Simple balance
2) Multiple balance
3) Local, regional and global
4) Flexible and rigid

1. SIMPLE BALANCE

If power is concentrated in two states or in two opposing camps, the balance of power is said to be simple. The chief characteristics of this type are that states or group of states are divided into two camps like the two scales of the balance. In simple balance of power distribution between two opposing camps is almost equal.

2. MULTIPLE BALANCE: When there is a wide dispersal of power among states and a number of states or groups of states balance each other,
the balance is called multiple or complex. A simple balance may turn into a multiple or complex balance and vice versa.

3. LOCAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL

Balances may, terms of their geographical coverage, be spoken of as local, regional and global. The balance is local, if it is at local level, like we may speak of the balance of power between India and Pakistan.

4. FLEXIBLE AND RIGID

Sometimes, balances have also been known as rigid or flexible. In the monarchical days when princes could make sudden and radical shifts in their alliances, the balance was generally flexible. With the coming of ideologies and greater economic interdependence, patterns of balance of power have tended to become rigid.

TECHNIQUES/DEVICES AND METHODS

Writers on international politics have generally identified six various ways in which nations try to maintain balance of power in their favour.

1. **Amassing of armaments**
   
   This is considered to be the most visible and effective way of gaining a power advantage. This way is important because war is the ultimate arbiter of the destinies of nations. Whenever a nation increases its military power base its rival and opponent nations try to match it up with similar scramble for more military weapons. The present state of increasing budget allocations for more armament including nuclear weapons among great powers is an
indication of gaining an edge over others in military strength and power.

2. **To seize more and more territory**
   Whenever this method is used, a nation increases its power unless nations on the other side take immediate steps to increase their own power also. Sometimes it so happens that a powerful nation which can swallow a smaller nation may have to share the territory of the smaller nation in question amongst other rival nations. For example, when Russia divided Poland, Austria could not stay away but join and share in the partition of Poland.

3. **Establishing a Neutral buffer state**
   The third way is to set up such a neutral buffer state which is weak and which is situated between two large and unfriendly nations. Geo-strategically, some states may be placed in between some powerful states in such a way that they tend to keep rival powers out of direct contact with each other. They come to constitute a buffer between the two. Palmer and Perkins point out those buffer states are of great importance because of their cushioning effect between the great powers. They may be neutral or neutralized states, satellite states or dependent territories. The function of such a buffer state is to keep the large unfriendly nations apart and thus minimize the chances of war between them. For example, Poland was a buffer between Russia and Germany; Tibet was also a buffer between China and India during the British India and even during the initial period of independence of India.

4. **Alliances and counter alliances**
   These are the most commonly used devices for maintaining the balance of power. If one state increases its strength, its adversaries have no other option but to balance it by forming coalitions against it. This has happened quite often in Europe. Coalitions of one group of states may be met by counter coalitions formed by
another group of states. Twentieth century Europe witnessed formation of two such coalitions and counter-coalitions—Triple entente and Triple alliances. Alliances can be both offensive and defensive and even a world balance or a regional balance.

5. **Intervention**

Nations always choose new friends and allies as dictated by their self-interest. As such, it often happens that a major nation tries to regain a lost ally or pick up a new ally by intervening in the internal affairs of a smaller country and establishing there a friendly government. History is a witness to many such interventions by the great powers. During the cold war period and after the post cold war period America and Russia have intervened in many countries to protect their own interest.

6. **Altering the distribution of power by detaching allies from the opposite side**

There is a method of altering the distribution of power by detaching allies from the opposite side, compelling them either into neutrality or isolated position or winning their friendship. Britain has pursued this policy with great success in many of her colonies. Soviet Union and America pursued this policy during the cold war. Even today great powers try to pursue this policy through various ways to win friends.

**PURPOSE, UTILITY AND MERITS**

1. Guarantees peace
2. Discourages war
3. Curbs imperialism
4. Meets justice
5. Maintains international law
6. Preserves independence
7. Preserves state system

Criticisms

1. The greatest difficulty one faces in the field of international politics is in the application of theories derived from other disciplines. Therefore, it becomes difficult to accept the idea of balance of power just because it is old and a respectable theory.
2. Many scholars are of the view that the principles of the theory are correct but the altered conditions prevent the balance of power system from operating correctly. As Morgenthau pointed out that “the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign states”.
3. Organski points out several drawbacks of the concept. To him the concept is based on erroneous assumptions that nations are fundamentally static units whose power is not changed from within and also the assumptions that nations have no permanent ties with each other but move freely motivated primarily by consideration of power. Given the modern changes in the pattern of international relations nations can change by mobilizing national sentiments, improving the efficiency of social organizations and by industrializations. Such increase and shifts in power cannot be counteracted through traditional mechanisms of
the balance of power because of variety of changes in economic, social, political, cultural and technological sphere.

He further contends that nations are not free to make and break alliances at will for power considerations alone. The truth is that a nation selects its friends and foes depending on its national interest. It supports a nation as long as its national interest is best served from the preservation of the present international order and opposes those that seek to change the status quo.

The other truth is that balance of power does not ensure peace. All greatest wars have occurred at times when one of the challengers balanced the preponderant power.

4. Morgenthau has adduced threefold criticisms of the concept of balance of power:

a. **Uncertainty:** Morgenthau points out that if balance of power is conceived mechanically, it means that the relative power of a number of nations can be measured quantitatively and compared. The national power is composed of so many elements that the quality of these components is also subject to constant change. Thus the calculation of relative strength of several nations is subject to a series of guesses and fraught with uncertainty. The uncertainty of power calculation is inherent in the nature of national power itself.

b. **Unreality:** The uncertainty of power calculations incapacitates the balance of power system from operating and also leads to its very negation in practice. In such a situation of uncertainty of power calculations all the nations try to acquire
more and power so that superiority over others can be acquired to prevent the possibility of being attacked. This kind of calculation among nations it is said can lead to balance of power. But in practice the limitless aspirations for power among nations transforms the situation into a dangerous arms race which ultimately leads to war.

c. **Inadequacy:** The balance of power prevalent in 17th, 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe has helped in the establishment of stability of modern state system and preservation of independence of its members. But it was not the balance of power system alone that helped in achieving these things, there were other factors such as the restraining influence of moral consensus present in Europe.

**DEFECTS, CRITICISM AND DEMERITS**

1. Does not bring peace
2. Divides the world
3. No real security
4. Does not increase power
5. Does not meet justice
6. Wrong assumption
7. Uncertainty
8. Unreality
9. Inadequacy
10. Big power game
RELEVANCE OF BALANCE OF POWER

Richard Cobden (1867) commented, “The balance of power of power is a chimera. It is not a fallacy, a mistake, an imposture- it is an undescribed, indescribable, incomprehensible nothing; mere words, conveying to the mind not ideas, but sounds.”

Even the rules or the basic principles propounded by the balance of power theorists are not applicable in the ever-changing scenario of international relations. For example, the principles propounded by Morton Kaplan in 1957 hardly hold today. Prof. Palmer and Perkins pointed out the difficulties that balance of power faced in a bipolarized world.

1. The confusing bipolar-multiplier pattern of power and the disappearance of a balancer.
2. The sudden increase in the power of the offensive over the defensive and the character and the frightening implications of total war.
3. Ideological considerations and other less tangible elements of power.
4. The increasing disparities in the power of the states, with the superpowers becoming more powerful and the lesser states becoming weaker, at least in relative terms.

CONCLUSION

Presently, with the dissolution of one of the superpowers, the post-cold war situation drastically changed the power equation between the two
poles. There was no such power transition as suggested by Organski when he said that “if great change occurs within a single lifetime, both challenger and dominant nation may find it difficult to estimate their relative power correctly, and may stumble into a war that would never have been fought if both sides had foreseen where the victory would lie.” Therefore, the functioning of the balance of power system in such a multipolar world cannot be ruled out completely. As US Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger proclaimed in 1989 that “we are now moving into a world in which power and influence diffused among a multiplicity of states— multipolar world”. They envisage that such multipolarity will result in an enlarged global chessboard of multiple bilateral geo-strategic relationships.

THEORIES OF DETERRENCE

INTRODUCTION

No single concept dominated international strategic theory during the four decades of the cold war so much as that of nuclear deterrence, from late sixties, there is a general shift in east-west relations from the tensions of the cold war to the compulsions and imperatives of détente, especially in the matter of military strategy and security.

Though the word détente had appeared on the horizon of international relations in (1961-62) and engaged the attention of political observes yet it did not bring the cold war to a complete end. The period between (1962-69) can be characterized as thaw in cold war, as during all this period the cold war went on limping.
As we show subsequently, those who use statistical or comparative case study methods to test hypothesis about deterrence success and failure must rely on the history of conventional deterrence cases.

Success and failure must rely on the history of conventional deterrence cases.

**MEANING OF DETERRENCE:** Deterrence means two things: A. as a policy, it is a calculated attempt to induce an enemy to do something or refrain from doing something by treating a penalty for non-compliance.

B. as a situation, deterrence refers to a position where conflicts are contained within a boundary of threats which are neither executed nor tasted.

**DEFINITION**

Henry Kissinger, the architect of détente on the American side, qualified it as “a long step away from the post-war period.”

Thus, in the words of Baral, “as opposed to the cold war which sought to keep the tension in the central balance at a high pitch, the détente is a conscious and deliberate attempts to reduce this tension significantly”.

**FEATURES AND ELEMENTS OF DETERRENCE**

Main characteristics and elements of deterrence can be discussed as below:

1. Deterrence
2. Peaceful co-existence
3. Elements of conflict
4. Negative and positive elements
5. Mutual trust out of mutual fear
6. Multiple levels of détente
7. Kinds of detente

1. DETERRENCE

By mutual consent the two sides may agree of effect mutual reduction of forces and armaments. Nixon observes, peace is the by-product of “mutual respect for each other’s strength.” So, détente does not exclude maintaining adequate capability by each side. He further says: “our policy must combine deterrence with détente. Détente without deterrence leads to appeasement and deterrence without détente leads to unnecessary confrontation and saps the will of western peoples to support the arms budgets deterrence requires.”

2. PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE

Another element of détente in the seventies was peaceful co-existence. Kissinger has rightly observed: “the US and the soviet-union are ideology rivals. Détente cannot change that. The nuclear age compels us to coexist. Rhetorical crusades cannot change that either”.

3. ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT

The advent of détente does not imply disappearance of conflict and hostility altogether. The period from 1979 to 1985 was marked by new cold war and détente reached its lowest abb. Thus, for a long
détente combined elements of conflict, competition and cooperation.

4. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE ELEMENTS

Détente has both negative and positive elements. A negative element signifies substantial reduction of tensions between the two power blocs in general and between the two superpowers in mutual trust and understanding between them and the brightening of prospect for world peace.

5. MUTUAL TRUST OUT OF MUTUAL FEAR

The creation of mutual trust between the US and the Soviet Union was one of the chief objectives of détente. But, it is worth mentioning that there was little trust between them when they realized the need of détente. To a great extent détente was grown out of mutual fear and not out of mutual trust.

6. MULTIPLE LEVELS OF DÉTENTE

Originally, the term détente was used to signify the apparent relaxation in the otherwise tense relations between the two super powers the USA and the USSR. But it will be too parochial to associate détente with the gradual improving of relationship between these two powers. In a broad and loose sense this process found favor with Moscow and Peking in 1972, albeit it was not attended with a spectacular success.
7. KINDS OF DÉTENTE

There are three kinds of détente e.g. military, economic, scientific and cultural. Though détente revolves mainly around military aspects yet its other aspects are not insignificant. Partial test ban treaty (1963), NPT (1968), SALT-I (1972), SALT-II (1979), INF treaty (1987), START (1991) etc. are part of military détente.

EVOLUTION AND PHASES OF DETERRENCE

The process of détente witnessed several ups and downs. Its evolution can be studied by dividing its short history into the following chronological phases. No doubt these phases are somewhat arbitrary yet they point out reasonably grouped diplomatic facts and events.

1. Period of thaw, 1959-1969
2. Heydays of détente, 1970-76
4. Setback to détente, 1979-1985
5. Re-emergence of détente, 1985-onwards.

This deterrence has eliminated war as a national policy. The overkill potentiality of the nuclear powers has brought a change in the efficiency of this principal. Now, the policy makers of every state think twice before deciding for use of force against the opponent.
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR WELL FUNCTIONING OF DETERRENCE

The deterrence system has certain conditions to functions.
i. There must be scope for the adjustment of threat within the framework of the set goal.
ii. There must also have the existence channels of communication between adversaries.
iii. The dictator must actually possess the means for doing injury to its enemy.
iv. It causes for availability of large power then the actual use of power or war against the rival.
v. Both the parties should be aware of the impact of threat as well as the expected response.
vi. Deterrence is a system of two way threats; the theater can impose and apply force.

CAUSES OF DETERRENCE

In sixties, détente was the by-product of several factors such as:

1. Nuclear nightmare
2. Nuclear proliferation
3. USA’s compulsions
4. USSR’s compulsions
5. Principle of peaceful co-existence
6. Roll of non-alignment
7. Rise of multipolarism
8. Sino-soviet rift
9. Fall and rise in American influence
10. Gorbachev factor
11. Linkage theory

IMPACT OF DETERRENCE

Soviet-American détente had a wide-ranging impact; it not only influenced their bilateral relations but embraced the whole gamut of international relations. The relation of tension has led to the following trends in the contemporary international relations.

1. End of the cold war
2. Progress towards disarmament
3. Irrelevance of the military alliances
4. Proliferation of détente
5. Resolving regional conflict
6. Irrelevance of NAM
7. De-ideologisation of international relations
8. Other unifications
9. Economic development and other issues
10. Impact on UNO

RETHINKING DETERRENCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Nuclear and conventional deterrence in the post-cold war period has some general, elements in common with, but in many respects differs considerably from, the earlier model of the U.S-Soviet-NATO-Warsaw pact confrontation.

According to Keith Payne, several important assumptions guided the cold war superpower deterrence setting, contributing to stability. Their absence following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the potential for proliferation in a multinuclear world enhances the need to rethink deterrence requirements for this new era. In summary form, there cold war assumption included the following:

1. Rational leaderships, in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, are capable of making decision on the basis of cost-benefit, or risk-versus-gain, calculations and in control of the decision-making process and able to execute their decisions;
2. The ability of each side to communicate a threatened sanction effectively to an opponent is clearly understood and is regarded as decisive and in developing cost-benefit calculations;
3. Both parties share a level of mutual understanding and communication about behavioral expectations and about the responses that actions taken by one side will elicit from the other;
4. The threatened retaliatory action has a level of plausibility sufficient to influence in a desired fashion the behavior of the adversary.

CONCLUSION

During most of the cold war and since its demise Western policy makers and academic theorists have come to believe as an article of faith that nuclear war is unthinkable and that deterrence backed by a nuclear threat cannot fail. Yet all theorists agree that deterrence presupposes a rational decision process. In fact, opponents of the past were certain
that someday it would break down as a result of irrational behavior under conditions of stress, miscalculation, misinterpretation of intelligence data, technical malfunction of command, control, and communication systems, and so on.

It is better understood that from the above analysis of deterrence on various points that deterrence refers to the ability to deter aggression by matching by power of opponent through the possession of matching weapons and armament system.

**Summary:**

Deterrence is a psychological relationship between two or more actors in which an attempt is made by one or more actors so to structure the environment of other actor through the manipulation of threats actor to follow a policy option in accordance with goals of the deter. Despite the difficulties of demonstrating causality we must add the caveat that deterrence only occurs when it appears reasonable to assume that the target chooses the policy option required mainly as a result of the threats that have been made. It is important to note that the decision-making process of the target remains intact. In derrence the decisions to conform or not rests with the target. Deterrence only occurs if the target recognises and confers upon a threat a compelling significance. In order to achieve this deterred must frame its threat in such a way as the target
will firstly perceive it, then interpret it and finally act upon it in the desired fashion. These requirements are both fundamental and formidable.

*Questions:*

1. *Discuss various theories of deterrence?*
2. *Discuss the limitation of deterrence?*
3. *Point out the relevance of deterrence after the end of cold war?*
UNIT-IV

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the explosion of the first atomic bomb on the morning of 6 August 1945 over the Japanese city of Hiroshima, the world is aware of a horrific threat, called nuclear warfare. The device exploded there was crude, unsophisticated and low-powered by modern standards, but it caused several thousand deaths, both immediate and in the aftermath, as well as in conceivable affliction for the survivors and their descendants. People all over the world had to decide between the several options namely war and peace, security and vulnerability, extinction and survival, disarmament and development etc. Even today, the terror of Hiroshima has not lost its tremendous impact and is still a memorial, reminding the world of the horrors of nuclear warfare. It is the mission of international diplomacy, to let this reminder not be in vain but to ensure that something like that can and will never happen again.

“The first atom-bomb also symbolized”, according to Bilgrami “the ever widening gap” between man’s dynamic progress in the attainment of the destructive capacity through science and technology and his corresponding lack of progress in the area of peace and security”.
THE BARUCH PLAN

The first international approach after these events was to found the UN atomic Energy commission in 1946 by the first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy”. In June 1946, Bernard Baruch, the United States representative to the Commission made a proposal called the Baruch plan that the US world destroy its nuclear arsenal on condition that the UN imposed sufficient controls on atomic development which would not be subject to UN Security Council veto. These controls would decline any non-peaceful use of atomic energy. The US would hand over all scientific data to the commission, which would in turn have the sole right to mine Uranium and Thorium, owning materials, refining the ores, and constructing and operating plants necessary for the use of nuclear power.

ATOMS FOR PEACE

In 1949, the USSR became a nuclear power, the United Kingdom in 1952. East and west, which had been allies only ten years ago, were now adversaries. In this menacing situation US president Eisenhower said in highly regarded speech on 8 December 1953 in front of the UN General Assembly “to the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you-and therefore before the world-its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma-to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life”. The government principally involved” (explicitly including the Soviet Union) should transfer fissionable
material from their stockpiles to an “international atomic energy agency”, set up as part of the UN. This agency should then make use of the material “to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities.” The idea of the IAEA was born.

PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION

The United States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear bombs until 1949, a condition which many western statesmen including Winston Churchill regarded as the chief shield for Western Europe. In September 1949 the Soviet Union exploded her first atomic bomb. Britain became the third member of the ‘nuclear club’ on October, 3, 1952; France, the fourth member on February 13, 1960; china, the fifth on October 16, 1964; India, the sixth in May, 1974 and Pakistan, the seventh in may 1998. India’s successful nuclear explosion showed that states with civilian and peaceful nuclear energy programmes could simultaneously and surreptitiously pursue a weapon’s capability. The United States experimented with the thermonuclear weapon in November 1952, and the USSR followed suit a few months later in august 1953.

FOUNDING THE IAEA

In 1956, the eight-nation-group of USA United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Belgium and Portugal, enlarged by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, India and Brazil to a twelve-nation-group laid down the statutes of the new agency which included:
Research and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose (article-iii.a.1)

Establish and apply safeguards to ensure that any nuclear assistance or supplies with which the idea was associated should not be used to further any military purposes-and apply such safeguards, if so requested, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement. (Article iii.A.5)

Foster the exchange of scientific and technical information (Article iii.A.3)

Establish or adopt nuclear safety standards (Article-iii A.6)

On 29 July 1957 the statute entered into force, when 26 states had deposited their instruments of ratification.

EMERGENCE OF THE NPT

In the following years several new nuclear weapon states emerged; France tested its first nuclear weapon in February 1960, China followed in 1964. France supposedly also helped Israel acquiring atomic weapons during this period. Foreseeing this development Ireland proposed in 1961 a UN resolution which called upon all states, especially the nuclear weapon states to negotiate an agreement of non-proliferation. The resolution adopted unanimously.
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

After about three years of negotiations the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was voted by the General Assembly in the June 1968. The NPT was, finally signed on 1 July, 1968 and came into force on 5 March, 1970; when 44 non-nuclear and 3 nuclear powers completed the process of ratification. Later on the number of signatories rose to about 187 states, making it the most widely adhered to arms control agreement in world history. It aims at ruling out any possibility of the further spread of the nuclear weapons. The main provisions of the Treaty are:

i. It obliged all the countries possessing nuclear weapons not to disseminate nuclear knowledge, and transfer manufactured nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear countries.

ii. Nuclear countries agreed to give preferential treatment to non-nuclear countries who signed NPT in supplying information and material aid in nuclear field, not for purposes of manufacturing nuclear weapons, but for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

iii. Nuclear countries undertook to give immediate assistance to the non-nuclear countries if they were attacked or threatened to be attacked by any other country.

iv. Non-nuclear countries should accept the verification and safeguard control set up by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent the transfer of nuclear energy from peaceful to military purposes.

v. It expresses the determination of the parties that the treaty should lead to further progress in comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures.

vi. This treaty is valid for a term of 25 years (i.e. up to 1995) with a five yearly conference for the purpose of verifying its usefulness.

At the fifth NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, states parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions.
The NPT fulfils two related objectives:

1. The countries already possessing nuclear weapons agree not to transfer, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons or their control to a country not in possession of them. Any form of incitement to possess them is also prohibited.
2. Those nations not in possession of nuclear weapons undertake neither to accept their transfer, nor to manufacture them, nor seek any aid to procure them.

CRITICISMS

This treaty is also not free from criticism as it suffers from many drawbacks. Owing to these snags, countries like France, China, India, Pakistan, Spain, Brazil, Argentina and the Republic of South Africa refused to sign it. With the change in world’s security environment after the end of the cold war South Africa (1991) , China (1992), France (1992), Belarus (1993), Ukraine (1994), Kazakistan, Argentina and Brazil signed and joined this treaty between 1991 and 1997. After 1998 only four countries (India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba are outside this cornerstone of non-proliferation efforts. They dub it as monopolistic and discriminatory. It monopolizes the right of the existing nuclear powers to manufacture weapons and possess them, while the non-nuclear countries not only cannot manufacture and possess the nuclear weapons, but cannot even obtain nuclear knowledge for peaceful purposes. Its discriminatory nature enables the already existing nuclear powers to carry out nuclear tests without any restraint. Thus it creates imbalance between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. This imbalance is further accentuated by the fact that by signing that NPT, the countries belonging to the second group agree to allow the International Atomic Agency to monitor their internal nuclear activities. This results in an international
control only for the countries of the second group, whereas the nations already owning nuclear weapons are freely allowed to increase their warheads in quantity as well as in quality.

I. This treaty lays down the limits of nuclear proliferation yet it does not forbid its dissemination. The signatory nuclear powers remain free to place their weapons in friendly or allied countries provided these countries do not have the “use of the keys”, i.e. the power to decide the use of these weapons. Their territory can only be used as a repository; the original country remains in sole control of the nuclear game.

II. The big five members of the nuclear club believed that they had a limitless right to hoodwink the less privileged signatories to the NPT by renewing their “unequivocal commitment” to eliminate nuclear weapons during the Sixth Review Conference in 2000. The Big-5 are allowed to retain nuclear weapons. Even 30 years after the signing of the NPT, the nuke club is not evolving a fixed time frame for eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

III. Some signatory states have also specified under certain circumstances they would denounce it. One reason most frequently alluded to is a desire to have access to nuclear weapons of a power in a particular region. Countries like Libya and Iran have reserved their right to withdraw in certain conditions classified as “extraordinary events”. With these weaknesses, the NPT remained only a limited disarmament measure. No doubt, this treaty is biased in favour of nuclear powers and is therefore unequal and patently discriminatory, yet it is an important landmark on the long road to disarmament.

Except four (India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba) all other countries of the world have joined and accepted it. It is not a small thing.
DISBANDED NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

UP to 1967 there were a total of five nuclear powers, and in 1990 there was only one more, India, which had never been party to the NPT; par less than president Kennedy predicted, thanks to the NPT-regime. Instead, a lot of states disbanded their nuclear ambitions or dismounted their military programs. The latter took place in Algeria, Argentina, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Switzerland, the Republic of China, and Yugoslavia. The former happen die in Italy, Germany, Japan and Norway. Likewise, the former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan abandoned their inherited Weapons and Toned the NPT as NNWS. ALL these states could today have been Nuclear Weapon states for long. The reason that this did not happen is among others the existent of the NPT and this is one of its greatest and most unnoted successes.

IRAQ

Following the 1990 gulf war came the first real challenge for the NPT and with it for the IAEA. By the cease-fire resolution no.687 in April 1991 the idea was requested to scrutinize the iraqinuclear programmer and to close down everything. But it was a much longer way than the Security Council initially thought.

Iraq had joined the NPT in 1970 and had concluded a safeguard5 agreement with the IAEA. So in 1991 inspectors had comprehensive rights to ensure their success. For the first time ever, inspectors had access to every site and every person whenever they wanted, and they
were backed by the international community every time Iraq did not comply.

The consequence was an initiative to provide this meaningful verification system, which came to be known as safeguard under an additional protocol agreement which is now the standard verification procedure in most countries.

NUCLEAR BRINKMANNSHIP-NORTH KOREA

Basically the same underlying problem diversity of opinions inside the security council and lack of back-up for the IAEA makes the Iranian and Korean situations as difficulties as they are with respect to all differences between both processes, the reasons why both states could often exploit their positions are discrepancies inside the security council with assistance of the USSR the construction of the Nyongbym reactor complex, which was finished 3 years later.

In 2003 after the 2002 “axis-of-evil” speech of us President Bush the situation escalated truly, with North Korea testing missiles and even withdrawing from the NPT. In 2006 the DPRK even ignited a nuclear test explosion which fizzed in facts but shook the word thoroughly nevertheless.

REHABILITATION OF INDIA

India did never sign the NPT, when the country ran its first nuclear weapons test in 1974, it became under the NPT regime some sort of nuclear outcast. India was a nuclear weapon state without being able to count as such under the rule of the NPT. Therefore the world demanded over decades India’s renunciation of nuclear weapons to be
able to trade again nuclear materials and technology meanwhile, the world’s largest democracy has become a very important trading partner for the international economy. India’s economic growth has few equals in the world, which also implies a growing energy shortage throughout the country. Of course India is trying to acquire China’s status as well. And because of India being an important market as well as a strategic counterweight in Asia against China, the United States is currently supporting that quest. The nuclear deal between India and US added a new dimension to India’s status as a power to be reckoned with.

THE NPT-REVIEW-PROCESS

Since the NPT’s entry into force, every five years a review conference was held in the seventies and eighties, cold-war issues like the nuclear arms race, SALT, the ABM-treaty etc. were debated. The need for a compressive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was formulated and later, after negotiation in the conference on Disarmament (CD), implemented. From the eighties on, several NWFZ’s (Nuclear weapons force zone) were formed. But from the first conference on, several issues could not be resolved. These are

- The treaty obligations to enter into negotiations on nuclear disarmament under Article VI.
- Nuclear cooperation under Article IV and
- Universality or the case of Israel, Pakistan and India

In 2000, the next review conference was then the first to adopt a final resolution since 1985. The document included the so called “Thirteen
practical steps” for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI. These steps require interracial.

1. Earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT.
2. FMCT, negotiated at the conference on disarmament (CD)
3. Establish a mandate so that CD will deal with nuclear disarmament.
4. Implement the principle of irreversibility with respect to nuclear disarmament, arms control and reduction measures.
5. Undertake unequivocally to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament.
6. Early entry into force of START II and conclusion of START III a.s.a.p., while preserving and strengthening the Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty.
7. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk of their usage.
8. Place excess weapon fissile material irreversibly under IAEA or other international verification arrangements to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.
9. Develop further verification capabilities.

These measures all had the support of the United States at the time of their adoption. But that changed in January 2001 when the Bush administration look office. The US left the START tacks and withdrew from the ABM-Treaty.
Beyond the 2010 NPT Review conference

Avoidance of concrete disarmament measures

During the third week of the four week review conference, the delegations of the nuclear weapon states- most probably France, Russia, United Kingdom and the united States- staged a concerted attack on many of the progressive or concrete elements on disarmament. These interventions were a stark revelation of their intention to accept lavish praises for post cold war arms reduction measures while refusing to commit to any serious steps toward actual nuclear disarmament. For example, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States were vehemently opposed to commit to cease the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. US was opposed to nuclear sharing while France rejected a reporting obligation on the composition of nuclear arsenals or fissile material stocks. Both the US and Russia objected to a call for the closure of nuclear weapon test sites.

Unwillingness to set benchmarks or timeframes

The above nuclear states clearly expressed their unwillingness to set benchmarks or timeframes for implementing their obligations under Article VI of NPT. The French delegation argued that the imposition of artificial deadlines in nuclear disarmament has never worked and said that timelines would weaken the nonproliferation regime because nothing is gained by imposing deadlines and then not meeting them.

Double standard

A critical look at this assertion reveals the double standard: that deadlines or timeframes for disarmament cannot be established or if established cannot be met because they are artificial. This contrasts with expectations from regarding NPT’s non-proliferation obligations. The comprehensive IAEA safeguards
agreement, for example, must be concluded within 90 days of ratification and provides a clear benchmark by which to measure state compliance.

**Undermining the treaty obligations**

There is currently no benchmark to measure the pace at which nuclear weapon states comply with their Article VI obligations. Also there is no scope for measuring the degree, sustainability, verifiability and irreversibility of compliance. At the same time, some of the nuclear weapon states engage in activities that undermine the treaty such as nuclear sharing, supplying nuclear technology and materials to non-state parties, conducting subcritical nuclear tests and modernizing or refurbishing their nuclear weapons and related infrastructure.

**Mismatch between reality and rhetoric**

Most of the nuclear weapon states contend they have acted in accordance with Article VI. At the Review conference, the US and Russia characterized the new START as a concrete demonstration of Article VI compliance. The French delegation routinely points to its arsenal reduction as fulfillment of Article VI. The non nuclear states become increasingly disappointed with the mismatch between reality and rhetoric of the weapon states. Both the South African and Irish delegations pointed out that arsenal reduction do not automatically translate to a commitment to nuclear disarmament.

**From rhetoric to reality**

Most of the nuclear weapon states fall short of their pronouncements on nuclear disarmament. While Obama administration in its first term submitted New START to Senate for ratification, it along with this provided a report containing a comprehensive plan to maintain nuclear weapon delivery system, sustain a safe, secure and reliable US nuclear
weapons stockpiles and modernize the nuclear weapons complex. The US and Russia possess 96 percent of this global nuclear arsenal. All the five of the NPT nuclear weapon states intend to modernize or are already modernizing their nuclear weapons, delivery systems or related infrastructure. US is the only country to have deployed its nuclear weapons on foreign soil with approximately 200 nuclear bombs at six air bases in five NATO countries-Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.

**Nuclear free world mere platitudinous**

Lack of concrete action on the part of nuclear weapon states towards complete disarmament makes the non-nuclear states desperate and doubt the continuity, maintenance and extension of NPT regime as they have lost faith in the NPT process and sincerity of the nuclear weapon states. The vision of a nuclear free world looks far away from reality.

**Priority to deterrence over nuclear disarmament**

By emphasizing the importance of maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent until non-proliferation is absolutely assured, the nuclear weapon states have twisted the concept into arms control as the pursuit of military advantage by diplomatic means. They argue that modernization of and investment in nuclear weapon infrastructure are necessary precursor to disarmament. In reality these projects are designed to lock in spending, committing successive administrations to nuclear weapons for decades to come.

**Nuclear weapons as instruments of power** The arguments for deterrence and necessity of nuclear weapons serve only to further
entrench the perception and role of nuclear weapons as instruments of power attractive to those who hold them and those who do not hold. This heightens the risk of proliferation and undermines disarmament. The current stagnation in conference on disarmament and NPT is due to the fact that the nuclear weapon armed and protected states are not willing to relinquish their nuclear weapons and the non nuclear states are no longer willing to accept further non-proliferation commitments in the absence of substantial progress on disarmament.

**Changing security perception**

The values and roles still assigned to nuclear weapons—deterrence, power, prestige and wealth—are grounded in a state centric, balance of power world view that is out of synchronization with the changing interdependent world. The rise of non-traditional security threats such as climate change has challenged the effectiveness and logic of nuclear weapons as instruments of power and security.

**CONCLUSION**

The NPT-regime was a great success story for over 30 years. Most of its achievements have gone nearly unnoticed, but they are real nevertheless. There are, in fact, fewer states seeking nuclear weapons today than at any point since World War II. During the time then the NPT was formed, the situation was much worse. The number of countries seeking nuclear weapons capabilities was a lot higher and the quality of resulting threat incomparable to the problems of the present.
Another often missed fact is the role the NPT played in the change of public perception of nuclear weapons over the years. In the 1960s, for any power “to be of importance” meant having nukes.

Today, few armies would employ those kinds of weapons in any tactical context outside their utilization by certain strategic plan. However, it would be short-sighted not to mention the flaws and failures of the NPT-regime. First of all, it is repressive in its haphazardly section of “haves” and “have-nots” without leaving any possibility of “advancement” between the different castes.

Second, the NTP-community fails to overcome the imbalance imposed to national security by nuclear weapons. Those weapons are the ultima ration of national security to all their possessors and an implicit threat to everyone else. The idea of NSA tries to biological WMD’s; nuclear weapons are the sole credible assurance for military unassailability of their possessor’s homelands.

Non-proliferation and eventually nuclear disarmament can only work if all states concerned work together and link their actions, acquiring mutual trust and collaboration. Unilateralism, even if sometimes beneficiary in the short term- if used widely-will carry the world into a new of dangers of unimagined magnitude. Key to the nuclear disarmament is our ability to focus on the causes that sustain nuclear weapons and how they relate to other social, economic, political and ecological crises facing the world. Andrew Lichterman has said, reducing the nuclear danger needs to focus not just on the weapons themselves but on the global order that is currently rooted in injustice, inequity and violence. Further, he said, decisions on all major policy
issues are made at a great remove both socially and geographically from the places where the human and ecological impacts are felt. Achieving nuclear disarmament will require concerted action to end the status quo from people resolved to face the challenges of our time with a focus on injustice, peace and international security.

WAR AND PACIFISM

INTRODUCTION

War is a condition of armed conflict between two or more parties. The emergence of the modern form of war as an organized and goal directed activity stems from the development of the European state system in the early modern period. War has a formal or quasi-legal character in that the declaration of a state of war need not necessarily be accompanied by an outbreak of hostilities. In the post-cold war era it has been common to refer to ‘new’ wars. These have been characterized, variously, as being linked to intra-state ethnic conflict, the use of advanced military technology, and the involvement of non-state actors such as terrorist groups and guerrilla movements.

NATURE OF WAR

First of all, war is a conflict between or among political groups. Traditionally, these groups have been states, with inter-state war, often over territory or resources-was of plunder-being thought of as the archetypal form of war.

Second, war is organized, in that it is carried out by armed forces or trained fighters who operate in accordance with some kind of strategy,
as opposed to carrying out random and sporadic attacks. However modern warfare seems to be less organized.

Third, war is usually distinguished by its scale or magnitude. A series of small-scale attacks that involve only a handful of deaths is seldom referred to as a war. The UN defines a ‘major conflict’ as a war in which at least 1000 deaths occur annually. Similarly, although World War I and World War II are usually portrayed as separate conflicts, some historians prefer to view them as part of a single conflict interrupted by a twenty-year truce.

Finally, as they involve a series of battles or attacks wars usually take place over a significant period of time.

**TYPES OF WAR**

**CIVIL WAR**

An armed conflict between politically organized groups within a state usually fought either for control of the state or to establish a new state.

**CONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

It is a form of warfare that is conducted by regular, uniformed and military weapons and battlefield tactics.

**BLITZRIEG**

Literally, lightning war; penetration in depth by armored columns, usually preceded by aerial bombardment to reduce enemy resistance.
TOTAL WAR

A war involving all aspects of society, including large-scale conscription, the gearing of the economy to military ends and the aim of achieving unconditional surrender through the mass destruction of enemy targets, civilian and military can be called total war.

HEGEMONIC WAR

It is fought to establish dominance of the entire world order by restricting the global balance of power.

GUERRILLA WAR

Literally, ‘little war’; an insurgency or ‘people’s’ war, fought by irregular troops and tactics that are suited to the terrain and emphasize mobility and surprise rather than superior firepower.

WHY DO WARS OCCUR?

Each war is unique in that it stems from a particular set of historical circumstances. It seems to be a historical constant. Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War (1979) tries to encapsulate all theories about war into three levels of analysis depending on whether they focus on human nature, the internal characteristics of states or structural or systemic pressures.

Human instincts

The most common explanation for war is that it stems from instincts and appetites that are innate to human individual. Thucydides thus argued that war is caused by the lust for power arising from greed and
ambition. War is therefore endless because human desires and appetites are infinite, while the resources to satisfy them are finite; the struggle and competition that this gives rise to will inevitably express itself in bloodshed and violence.

**Survival of the fittest**

Scientific support for human self-interestedness has usually been based on the evolutionary theories of the British biologist Charles Darwin (1809-82) and the idea of a struggle for survival, developed by social Darwinians such as Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) into the doctrine of the’ survival of the fittest’. Evolutionary psychologists, such as the Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz (1966), have argued that aggression is biologically programmed particularly in men, as a result of territorial and sexual instincts that are found in all species. Whatever may be the causes of war it provides a necessary and inevitable outlet for aggressive urges that are hard wired in human nature.

Such assumptions underpin classical realist theories about power politics, which portray contention amongst states or other political groups as a manifestation, on a collective level, of individual selfishness and competitiveness. The biological theories of war offer an unbalanced view of human nature that places too much emphasis on nature which is fixed or given. They put little emphasis on nurture, the complex range of social, cultural, economic and political factors that shape human behavior.

**Liberal theory of war: Inner characteristics of political actors** The second range of theories suggests that war is best explained on terms
of the inner characteristics of political actors. Liberals, for example, have long argued that states’ constitutional and governmental arrangement incline some towards aggression while others favors peace. This is very clearly implied in democratic peace thesis that democratic states do not go to war. The authoritarian regimes on the other hand are more inclined towards militarism and war.

**Social constructivists**

Social constructivists place particular stress on cultural and ideological factors that make war more likely. The emphasis is put either on international environment as threatening and unstable or by giving a state or political group a militaristic or expansionist self image. Doctrines of racial superiority and idea of German world domination contributed to Nazi aggression in the lead up to Second World War. Jihadist theories about a fundamental clash between the Muslim world and the west have inspired Islamistic insurgency and terrorist movements.

*Alternative internal explanations* for aggression include that war may be used to prop up an unpopular regime by diverting attention away from domestic failure.

*Increasing youth bulge* may be the cause of war at a time of economic stagnation and social dislocation.

**Neo realist view of war**

According to neo realists war is an inevitable consequence of an anarchic international system that impels states to rely on self help. As argued by offensive realists states regardless of their constitutional or
governmental structures seek to maximize power not merely security. States are always in a situation of security dilemma that arises from fear and uncertainty among states. Defensive actions by other states seem as offensive. Thus all states are caught in a state of struggle for power which ultimately results in conflict or war.

**Marxist interpretation of war**

Other structural theories of war place a heavier emphasis on economic factors. Marists, for instance, view war as a consequence of the international dynamics of the capitalist system. Capitalist states will inevitably come into conflict with one another as each is forced to expand in the hope of maintaining profit levels by gaining control over new markets, raw materials or supplies of cheap labor. However, economic theories of war have become less influential since 1945 as trade has been accepted as a more reliable road to prosperity than expansionism and conquest. Insofar as economic pressures have encouraged interdependence and integration, they are now seen to weaken the impulse to war, not fuel it.

**War as a continuation of politics**

The most influential theory of war was developed by Clausewitz in his master work, *On War* ([1831]1976). In Clausewitz’s view, all wars have the same ‘objective’ character: ‘war is merely a continuation of politics by other means’. War is therefore a means to an end, a way of forcing an opponent to submit to one’s will. Such a stance emphasizes the continuity between war and peace. The only difference between peace and war is the means selected to achieve one’s goals and that is
decided on an instrumental basis. States thus go to war when they calculate that it is in their interest to do so. The image of war as the ‘rational’ pursuit of state interest was particularly attractive in the nineteenth century when wars were overwhelmingly fought between opposing states and roughly four-fifths of all wars were won by the state that started them. Clausewitz has been condemned for presenting war as a normal and inevitable condition that can be justified by reference to narrow self interest rather than wider principles of justice.

WAR AND PEACE: THEORITICAL APPROACHES

1. Realist view

For realists, war is an enduring feature of international relations and world affairs. The possibility of war stems from the inescapable dynamics of power politics: as states pursue the national interest they will inevitably come into conflict with one another and this conflict will sometimes be played out in military terms. Realists explain violent power politics in two ways. First, classical realists emphasize state egoism, arguing that rivalry between and among political communities reflects inherent tendencies within human nature towards see-seeking, competition and aggression. Second, neo-realists argue that, as the international system is anarchic, states are forced to rely on self-help in order to achieve survival and security, and this can only be ensured through the acquisition of military power. All realists however agree that the principal factor distinguishing between war and peace is the balance of power.
2. LIBERAL VIEW

Liberals believe that peace is a natural, but by no means an inevitable, condition for international relation. From the liberal perspective, war arises from three sets of circumstances, each of which is avoidable. First, echoing realist analysis, liberals accept that state egoism in a context of anarchy may lead to conflict and a possibility of war. However, liberals believe that an international anarchy can and should be replaced by an international rule of law, achieved through the construction of supranational bodies. Second, liberals argue that war is often linked to economic nationalism and autarky, the quest for economic self-sufficiency tending to bring state into violent conflict with one another. Peace can nevertheless be achieved through free trade and other forms of economic interdependence. Third, the disposition of a state towards war or peace is crucially determined by its constitutional character. Authoritarian states tend to be militaristic and expansionist while democratic states are more peaceful in their relation with other democratic states.

3. CRITICAL VIEWS

Critical theorists in the Marxist tradition have tended to explain war primarily in economic terms. World War I for instance, was an imperialist war fought in pursuit of colonial gains in Africa and elsewhere. The origins of war can thus be traced back to the capitalist economic system, war, in effect, being the pursuit of economic advantage by other means. Such an analysis implies that socialism is the best guarantee of peace, socialist movements often having a marked anti-war or even pacifist orientation, shaped by a commitment
to internationalism. Critical theorists in the anarchist tradition, such as Chomsky, have shown a particular interest in the phenomenon of hegemonic war, believing that the world’s most powerful states use war, directly or indirectly, to defend or expand their global economic and political interests. War therefore is closely associated with hegemony. Peace can be built only through a radical redistribution of global power. Feminists hold state as masculinist. The realist image of international politics as conflict and violence ridden reflects masculinist assumptions about self interest, competition and quest for domination. According to difference feminists, the origins of war stem either from the war like nature of male sex or from the institution of patriarchy. By contrast feminists draw a close association between women and peace.

**CHANGING FACE OF WAR**

**FROM ‘OLD’ WARS TO ‘NEW’ WARS**

One of the most widely debated features of the post-cold war era is how it has affected war and warfare. Modern wars are often considered to be ‘new’, ‘post-modern,’ ‘post-Clausewitzian’ or ‘post-Westphalia’ wars.

**FEATURE’S OF NEW WARS**

They tend to be civil war rather than inter-state wars.

Issues of identity are usually prominent.

Wars are asymmetrical, often fought between unequal parties.

The civilian/military distinction has broken down.

They are more barbaric then ‘old’ wars.
INTER-STATE WARS

The decline of traditional inter-state war and the rise of civil war has been a marked feature of the post-cold war era. About 95 percent of armed conflicts since the mid-1990s have occurred within states, not between states. Recent exceptions to this trend have included the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) and the 2008 Russian war with Georgia. The decline of war in some parts of the world, obsolescence of war in some parts of the world, can be explained by a variety of factors. These include the spread of democracy, the advance of globalization, changing moral attitudes to war, the role of the United Nations and developments in weapons technology especially nuclear weapons. On the other hand, civil wars have become more common in the post colonial world where colonialism has left a heritage of ethnic or tribal rivalry, economic underdevelopment and weak state power.

IDENTITY WAR

Earlier wars were motivated by geopolitical or ideological goals; modern wars often arise from cultural discord expressed in terms of rival identities. A war in which the quest for cultural regeneration, expressed through the demand that a people’s collective identity is publicly and politically recognized, is a primary motivation for conflict. According to Sen, identity politics is most likely to lead to violence when it is based on a solitaristic form of identity, which defines human identity in terms of membership of a single social group. This encourages people to identify exclusively with their own monoculture, thereby failing to recognize the rights and integrity of people from
other cultural groups and is evident in the rise of militant ethnic, religious and nationalist movements.

**ASYMMETRICAL WAR**

Modern wars are frequently asymmetrical in that they pit industrially advanced and militarily sophisticated states against enemies that appear to be third rate. US led wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Kosovo and Russian war against Chechnya can come under this category. Asymmetrical wars are characterized by the adoption of military strategies and tactics designed to create a more level playing field between opponents with very different military and economic capabilities. This means that asymmetrical wars do not have assured and inevitable outcomes. Guerrilla warfare supplemented by the use of terrorist tactics has been effective in defeating much better resourced enemies with greater fire power because of their emphasis on manoeuvre and surprise.

**CIVILIAN/MILITARY DISTINCTION**

The civilian/military divide has been blurred in a variety of ways. Since the thirty year’s war [1618-48], a clear distinction has been recognized between combatants and civilians, which were relatively easy to respect while warfare was largely confined to the battlefield and strictly military personnel.

Modern wars have a greater impact on civilian populations. This has occurred partly because of the diffuse nature of modern warfare. The blurring has also occurred because civilian populations have increasingly been the target of military action, its objective being to
create economic and social dislocation and to destroy the enemy’s resolve.

The civilian/military divide has also been blurred by the changing nature of armies and security forces. The guerrilla warfare, mercenaries and privatized military forces have brought a great change in the nature of military forces.

BARBARIC OLD WARS

Finally, new wars have often been more barbaric and horrific than old ones as the rules that have constrained conventional inter-state warfare have commonly been set aside. Practices such as kidnapping, torture, systematic rape and the indiscriminate killings that result from landmines, car bombs and suicide attacks have become routine features of modern warfare. Added to these are religious and ethnic militancy and ethnic cleansing which have violated all the nuances of conventional warfare.

POSTMODERN’ WARFARE

War and warfare have always been affected by changes in the technology of fighting. Two historical examples of such radical changes were the use of the longbow at the Battle of Agincourt (1415), which enabled heavily outnumbered English men-at-arms and archers to defeat the French cavalry, and the emergence of ballistic missiles and long-range nuclear weapons in the post-1945 period. It is widely argued that advances in weapons technology and military strategy from the 1990s onwards, particularly undertaken by the USA, have had a similar significance, amounting to a revolution in military affairs
Modern war has therefore been replaced by postmodern war sometimes called virtual war, computer war or cyber war. Despite divergent views post modern war is usually taken to be a reliance on technology rather than mass conflict. Postmodern wars keep weapons development to a maximum and actual conflict between major powers to a minimum.

JUSTIFYING WAR

While the nature of war and warfare have changed enormously over time, debates about whether, and in what circumstances, war can be justified have a much more enduring character, dating back to ancient Rome and including medieval European philosophers such as Augustine of Hippo [354-430] and Thames Aquinas. Three broad positions have been adopted on this issue. These are as follows:

I] Realpolitik – suggesting that war, as a political act, needs no justification

ii] just war theory – suggesting that war can be justified only if it conforms to moral principles.

iii] Pacifism – suggesting that war, as an unnecessary evil, can never be justified.

Realpolitik

The defining feature of realism sometimes referred to as realpolitik is that matters of war and peace are beyond morality and in that they are determined by the pursuit of national self interest. This derived from
innate human aggression. In this view war is accepted as a universal norm of human history. Peace is temporary. When there is a mismatch between unlimited human appetites and the scarce resources available to satisfy them, war of conflict starts. Absence of war is considered as peace. Liberalism or idealism will not usher in peace. The sole reliable way of maintaining peace is through balance of power. Only power can be a check on power. It is also misleading to hold that realpolitik as amoral. Rather, it is an example of moral relativism.

Its emphasis on power politics, conflict, greed and violence to justify war makes realpolitik look as part of the natural order of things. Feminists argued that emphasis on the national interest and military might reflects an essentially masculinist view of international politics rooted in myths about ‘man and the warrior’. To say that matters of war and peace are beyond morality reflects insensibilities to ethical imperatives.

Just war theory

The idea of just war is based on the assumption that war can be justified and should be judged on the basis of ethical criteria. It stands between realpolitik and pacifism. Those who subscribe to just war theory base their thinking on two assumptions:

First, human nature is composed of an unchangeable mixture of good and evil propensities. People may strive to be good but they are always capable of immoral acts which include killing of other human beings. War in other words is inevitable.
Second, the suffering that war leads to can be ameliorated by subjecting warfare to moral constraints.

Just war theory addresses two separate but related issues. The first of these deals with the right to go to war in the first place, or what in Latin is called jus ad bellum. The second deals with the right conduct of war fare or what in Latin is called jus in bello.

**Principles of jus ad bellum**

- **Last resort**- All non-violent options must have been exhausted
- **Just cause**- The purpose of war is to redress a wrong
- **Legitimate authority**- It means a lawfully constituted government of a sovereign state. Right intention- Wars must be based on aims that are morally acceptable.
- **Reasonable prospect of success**- War should not be fought in a hopeless cause.
- **Proportionality**- War should result in more good than evil.

**Principles of jus in bello**

- **Discrimination**- Force must be directed at military targets only.
- **Proportionality**- Force used must not be greater than that needed to achieve an acceptable military outcome.
- **Humanity**- Force must not be directed ever against enemy personnel if they are captured, wounded or under control.
Pacifism

While just war theory attempts to reconcile war with morality by placing war within a framework of justice, pacifism views war and morality as irreconcilable. Pacifism, in short, is the belief that all war is morally wrong. It is based on the following lines of thought:

The first is that war is wrong because killing is wrong. This principled rejection of war and killing in all circumstances is based on underpinning assumptions about the sanctity or oneness of life, often rooted in religious conviction.

The second line of argument, sometimes called ‘contingent pacifism’ places greatest stress on the wider and often longer –term benefits of non – violence for human well-being. From this perspective, violence is never a solution because it breeds more violence through developing a psychology of hatred, bitterness and revenge.

Pacifism has served as an important force in international politics in two main ways. first ,in the form of so-called ‘legal pacifism; it has provided support for the establishment of supranational bodies , such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, which aim to ensure the peaceful resolution of international disputes through upholding a system of international law. For this reason, pacifists have been amongst the keenest advocates of a world federation, or even world government. In that pacifists have often sought to transcend a world of sovereign states, they have embraced the nation of positive peace linking peace to the advance of political and social justice
Second, pacifism has helped to fuel the emergence of a growing peace movement throughout the world.

Pacifism has nevertheless been criticized on a number of grounds for instance, pacifists have been criticized for being cowards, for being ‘free riders’ who remain morally uncontaminated whilst at the same time benefiting from the security that the existence of a military and the willingness of others to fight affords them. They thus subscribe to the deluded belief that it is possible to have ‘clean hands’ in politics. However, pacifism has also been associated with deeper moral and philosophical difficulties. First, pacifism has been regarded as inherent in that it is based on the right to life but this can only be defended in certain circumstances. Second difficulty concerns the implications of according overriding importance to the avoidance of killing. This implies giving secondary importance to other considerations such as liberty, justice, recognition and respect. But life is closely linked with the conditions in which people live.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

Many of today’s large-scale violent conflicts in the global south cannot be perceived as conventional ‘wars’ and longer. Neither are they clashes between states, nor are they congenital civil wars between a state government and an internal armed political opposition aimed at the overthrow of the government, regime change or secession. Rather they are characterized by an entanglement of a host of actors, issues and motives. Particular attention has been paid to the emergence of so-called war economies, with opposing groups fighting-in a sub-national and transnational framework-not over state-related issues, but over access to lucrative or essential resources. The political economy of armed conflict has generated a wide range of new players such as warlords, private military companies and mafia-type criminal networks which do not care about “states”, “boarders”, “sovereignty” or “territorial integrity” at all.

Moreover, many current large-scale violent conflicts emerge and are carried out in the context of so-called weak in fragile or even failed states. To speak of ‘weak’ states, however, implies that there are other actors on the stage that are strong in relation to the state. ‘the state’ is only one actor among others, the state order is one of a number of ‘orders’ claiming to provide security and frameworks for conflict regulation.
DEFINITION OF CONFLICT

Conflict in itself is neither good nor bad. The key is how we understand and response to conflict. The participants in a conflict establish the meaning of conflict with the ultimate results being determined by the feelings, beliefs and values of those involved.

Conflict is a state of unresolved differences within an individual, between individuals, an individual and a group, or two or more groups. Conflict of some kind will occur throughout your career. To turn it into a positive factor, it must be managed in a way that will benefit you and your organization.

Conflict is based on caring. Each of the parties involved in the difficulty desires something. Usually those involved are frustrated because they believe they should be able to give. It is also necessary that two parties be locked into some kind of interdependent relationship, where what one does affects the other.

The simplest way to reduce conflict is to eliminate the relationship, by leaving or by refusing to interact with the other party. In many situations, however, this is not only impractical, but may be impossible. So, leaders must learn how to address and manage conflict.

HOW DO PEOPLE RESPOND TO CONFLICT?

Physiologically we respond to conflict in one of two ways—we want to get away from the conflict or we are ready to “take on anyone who comes our way”. Think for a moment about when you are in conflict.
What is important to learn, regardless of our initial physiological response to conflict, is that we should intentionally choose our response to conflict.

Whether we feel like we want to fight or flee when a conflict arises, we can deliberately choose a conflict mode. By consciously choosing a conflict mode instead of to conflict, we are more likely to productively contribute to solving the problem at hand.

**TYPES OF CONFLICT**

The processes of resolving conflict are influenced to great degree by the situations in which the conflict occurs, for example within the context of the organization. Three types of possible conflict in an organization are intrapersonal, interpersonal and intergroup.

1. **INTRAPERSONAL CONFLICT**

An experience that takes place within an individual. It occurs in relation to temptations to stop dieting as well as in a major decision of getting physical shape to get good evaluation report.

2. **INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT**

Conflict between individuals in the same organization. It exists whenever people interact in some way to produce results or achieve goals. Because they differ, however, in many ways; attitude, personality, values, goals, background, experience, etc. The resultant conflict makes the attainment of the goals quite difficult. Therefore, learning to make the proper adjustments is an important factor in managing interpersonal conflict.
3. INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Conflict between groups in the same organization. It occurs whenever there is a contact or interaction between the groups. Three sources of intergroup conflict are: cohesion- “sticking together” within a group often causes out-group hostility; structure-type of leadership and status of individuals within a group are factors that increase conflict; power-taking actions which affect others and purposely influencing the welfare of others produce conflict with less powerful groups. Parties involved in conflict, by trying to find solutions acceptable to all, can reduce the dysfunctional aspects of conflict.

FUNCTIONS OF CONFLICT

Conflict serves many functions in organizations here are but a few.

(i). Conflict establishes identify. Through conflict individuals and –groups clearly establish their positions on issues.

ii) Conflict serves as a safety value to hold the group together. Through conflict, individuals and groups “let off steam” which in turn enhances the communication process leading to better understanding of the issues within the group.

iii) Conflict increases group cohesion. When there’s a higher level of communication brought about by conflict, groups strengthen and became closer.

IV) Conflict mobilizes energy. This concept adds credence to the old adage “I work best under pressure”. When there’s conflict in an organization, the pressures members feel cause them to work at greater efficiency and fervor.

v) Conflict enhances communication. As discussed above, the communication process improves because of the higher level of information exchange and there’s a higher level of understanding.
THE MAIN FEATURES OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

The institutions and mechanism of conflict transformation shall be termed “traditional” that have developed independently in the context of pre-modern societal structures in the global south and have been practiced in that context over a considerable period of time.

However, several caveats apply here: the ideal type of “traditional conflict transformation (Max Weber) will hardly be found in reality today. Traditional societies everywhere in the world have come under modern outside influence; they have not been left unchanged by the powers of originally European-capitalist expansion, colonialism, imperialism and globalization”. In real life, therefore there are no clear-cut boundaries between the realm of the exogenous “modern” and the endogenous “traditional”, rather there are process of assimilation, articulation, transformation and adoption in the context of the global/local/interface.

Another caveat: traditional approaches vary considerably from society to society, from region to region, from community to community. There are as many different traditional approaches to conflict transformation as there are different societies and communities with a specific history, a specific culture and specific customs in the global south. There is no one single general concept of “traditional conflict transformation”.

One has therefore to acknowledge that the modern western-style Westphalia state hardly exists in reality beyond the OECD world. Rather the ‘actual existing states’ in most parts of the global south are hybrid
political orders combining elements stemming from the local pre-colonial indigenous traditions of governance and politics.

In other words: many contemporary large-scale violent conflicts are hybrid socio-political exchanges in which modern state centric as well as pre-modern traditional and post-modern factors mix and overlap. The state has lost its control position in violent conflicts of this kind, both as an actor and as the framework of reference.

Up to now, traditional approaches to conflict transformation have not been adequately addressed by scholarly research and political practice. For the most part they are widely ignored, although empirical evidence from relatively successful cases of conflict transformation demonstrates their practical relevance.

**The Aim: Restoration of Order and Relationship**

From a traditional point of view, conflict is perceived as an unwelcome disturbance of the relationships within the community. Hence traditional conflict transformation aims at the restoration of order and harmony of the community. Cooperation between conflict parties in the future has to be guaranteed. The issue at stake is not punishment of perpetrators for deeds done in the past but restitution as a basis for reconciliation. Reconciliation is necessary for the restoration of social harmony of the community in general and of social relationships between conflict parties in particular. Reestablishing harmony implies reintegrating the deviant members... the ultimate matter is ...restoring good relations. This is why traditional approaches in general follow the line of restorative justice in stead of western centric punitive justice.
THE WAYS: HOLISTIC AND CONSENSUS-BASED

The orientation towards the future does not exclude dealing with the past. In the contrary; restitution, reconciliation and restoration of harmony and relationships can only be built on a common understanding of what went wrong in the past. Therefore conflict parties have to negotiate a consensus regarding the interpretation of the past. This is an often very lengthy endeavor. Facts have to be established and the truth has to be revealed. Only once a consensus about the facts and the truth has been achieved, perpetrators can confess their wrong doings, apologies and ask for forgiveness and victims can accept the apologies and forgive. Often such process leads to the exchange of material goods as compensation, be it “blood money” or other gifts; depending on the cultural context these might be cattle, goats, pigs, and garden produce or shell money. The importance of this exchange lies in the transformation of reciprocity; the reciprocity of revenge characteristic of traditional conflicts and which leads into vicious circles of violence is replaced by the reciprocity of gifts.

Traditional approaches cannot be compartmentalized into political or juridical or other rather they are holistic, comprising also social, economic, cultural, and religious-spiritual dimensions.

The Context: The We-group

Traditional approaches do not provide a panacea for conflict transformation that can be utilized at all times in all situations. They depend on the existence of a community of relationships and values to
which they can refer and that provide the context for their operation. This means that customary conflict resolution is targeted at problems in relatively small communities in the local context. It can work well within a given community with regard to the members of the community. Conflicts among the members of the ‘we group’ of the community can be addresses and solved by customary ways but conflicts between us and them are more difficult to tackle as they adhere to another law be it customary law or formal statutory law.

In order to make traditional approaches applicable beyond the confines of the local community context, the conflict constellation has to be reframed: the we- group has to be reconstructed in ways that allow for the inclusion of what used to be outsiders and adversaries. The reformation of we-groups in the traditional context was pursued by a variety of means: marriages, hostages and joking were simple devices for building relationships when conflict were on a personal level even the widespread use of gifts was effective in creating dependencies of indebtedness.

**STRENGTHS OF TRADITIONAL APPORACHES**

Five major strengths of traditional approaches to conflict transformation can be identified. Traditional approaches-

1. Fit situations of state fragility and failure;
2. are not state-centric and hence credited with legitimacy;
3. take the time factor into due accounts and are process-oriented;
4. provide for comprehensive inclusion and participation;
5. focus on the psycho-social and spiritual dimension of conflict transformation.

1. FIT SITUATIONS OF STATE FRAGILITY AND FAILURE

Traditional approaches fit situations of state fragility or collapse. As many of today’s large scale violent conflicts in the Global South are carried out in regions where the state is absent or merely a –relatively weak- actor among a host of other actors. In view of the absence of modern state-based institutions and mechanisms for the control of violence and the regulation of conflicts people take recourse to pre-state customary ways. Of course, this only is an option if custom has not been destroyed by but has survived previous processes of state-building and modernization and is still alive. The western view that where there is no state and no monopoly over the legitimate use of force there must inevitably be chaos and a Hobbesian war of everybody against everybody else is false. There is control of violence and non-violent conduct of conflict beyond the state and this holds true for contemporary constellations of weak, fragile and collapsing states.

2. ARE NOT STATE-CENTRIC AND HENCE CREDITED WITH LEGITIMACY

Traditional approaches are not state-centric and because of that they are credited with legitimacy by the communities in which they are sought. They can be pursued without recurrence to the task of state and nation building. Instead of trying to impose western models of the state and nation on societies one can draw upon existing indigenous forms of control of violence and conflict transformation which have proven their efficiency. Such a non-state-centric approach opens up possibilities for dealing with the issues of legitimacy. If must not be forgotten that legitimacy is at the care of problems of state weakness. Weakness of state is not only problems of structures, institutions and powers of enforcement and implementation, but also of perceptions and legitimacy. It is
often ignored that Max Weber’s famous definition of the state—“monopoly over the legitimate use of violence”—includes both: enforcement power and legitimacy.

3. TAKE THE TIME FACTOR INTO DUE ACCOUNT AND ARE PROCESS-ORIENTED

Traditional approaches are process-oriented and take the time factor into due account. “Melanesian time” or “African time” differs from European time regimes. “Circular time that predominates in traditional societies opposes vectoral time that prevails in modern industrial societies”. The process of conflict transformation— which can be very time consuming tends to be more important than solutions.“Traditional conflict management mechanisms tend to be process-oriented, not product-oriented that is, they focus on managing rather than resolving conflict. In this sense they are somewhat more realistic than standard international diplomacy with its emphasis on peace treaties that definitely end a conflict; one has to do with ongoing rounds of talks that revisit and renegotiate issues. This approach to conflict management more particularly the tendency to begin renegotiating freshly minted accords, fits poorly with international diplomatic time tables and approaches. Traditional approaches are characterized by their slowness. And their slowness, breaks and time outs are deliberately built into conflict transformations so as to give conflict parties time to calm down, to assess the state of the process so far and to reformulate their position.

4. PROVIDE FOR COMPREHENSIVE INCLUSION AND PARTICIPATION

In the same way as all parties are responsible for the conflict, everybody also has to take responsibility for its solution. A solution can only be achieved by consensus. Every side has to perceive the resolution as a win-win outcome compatible with its own interests— which are not confined to the material sphere, but also comprises issues such as honour, prestige, saving one’s face. To pursue an inclusive participatory approach at all levels of the conflict is extremely complex and time consuming but has greater chance of success than approaches that are confined to the leaders of the conflict parties. According to the holistic
nature of custom, it is not appropriate to isolate specific ‘political’ events from the overall context. “Leisure, visits, cultural events, amusements, attendance at plays, and participation can be part of them.” The mixing of the activities within the negotiation can be highly functional with regard to the relationship that it helps to establish, reestablish or strengthen.

5. FOCUS ON THE PSYCHOSOCIAL AND SPIRITUAL DIMENSION OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

This dimension tends to be underestimated by actors who are brought up and think in the context of western enlightenment. Conflict transformation and peace building is not only about negotiations, political solutions and material reconstruction, but also about reconciliation and mental and spiritual healing. Traditional approaches have a lot to offer in this regard. Reconciliation as the basis for the restoration of communal harmony and relationship is at the heart of customary conflict resolution. By means of reconciliation relations between conflict parties are restored, both the perpetrator and victims are re-integrated into the community. Traditional approaches are inclusive, not exclusive. Traditional methods of purifications and healing, carried out by customary healers, priests and other spiritual authorities are of utmost importance for the mental and spiritual rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators. Traditional approaches are well suited to address this dimension. They take into account that conflict transformation and peace building is not only an issue of reason, rationality and talk, but also of affects, emotions, imagination and of the spirit.

WEAKNESSES OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

The five major strengths of traditional approaches to conflict transformation are matched by five major weaknesses. Traditional approaches.

I. Do not terminate violence in the long term.
II. Often contradict universal standards of human rights;
III. Have a limited sphere of applicability;
IV. Are geared towards the preservation of the ‘good old’ order;
V. Are open to abuse

1. Traditional conflict transformation does not necessarily put an end to violence in the long run. In a traditional context recourse to violence- violent self help- is a normal option. A permanent pacification of the conduct of conflicts in the context of the modern state with its monopoly over violence is not achievable. Moreover, certain highly ritualized and thus controlled forms of violence are perceived not as violation of the rules but as integral to the societal order and as indispensable elements of conflict resolution.

2. Traditional approaches may contradict universal standards of human rights and democracy. More often the council of elders broking peace deals are constituted of old people excluding young male and females from the decision making process. This gerontocratic rule is problematic for young generations violating the international standards of human rights. Women sometimes are the victims of the customary conflict resolution processes that are dominated by male persons. Furthermore, the treatment of perpetrators according to customary rules can contradict universal human rights standards. These problematic features of traditional approaches may themselves lead to conflict.
3. Traditional approaches have a limited sphere of applicability. They are confined to the relatively small community context to the we group of family, clan, village or neighbouring communities. This problem can be addressed by reframing of the we-group. Boundaries of groups are not fixed but can be changed. The inclusion of far away external actors such as multinational enterprises, central state authorities and mercenaries will probably pose grave difficulties. The other problem is related to the fact that some members of we group have left the community and settle in a modern environment in cities. To reintegrate them in a post conflict scenario becomes very difficult.

4. Traditional approaches are preservative. They are geared towards the preservation of the status quo or the restoration of the good old order. Traditional approaches only work in the framework of that order and are only applicable to conflicts that occur within a given community. Traditional approaches are difficult to apply with regard to conflicts that challenge the framework of values and relations of the traditional order. The conservative character of traditional approaches does not sit well with modernizing influences from either within the community- young men and women challenging the traditional values- or from outside the community-western external actors intervening in the name of modern values and interests.

5. Traditional approaches are open to abuse. There are many examples of traditional authorities abusing their power for their own benefit and to the detriment of the weak members of the traditional communities. Biased approaches on the part of leaders
are sometimes motivated by personal greed and are often legitimized with reference to custom. Status and prestige stemming from the traditional context is instrumentalized to gain personal advantage. The relevance and applicability of traditional approaches have been greatly affected by politicization, corruption and abuse of traditional strategies.

Conclusion

Given the disintegration of traditional societal structures in many regions of the world, the potential of traditional approaches for conflict prevention and peace building is limited. Traditional approaches only are applicable in specific circumstances and in confined niches. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ignore that potential and not to make use of it wherever possible. Traditional approaches might give us wider insights for conflict transformation process more generally.

Such an approach challenges today’s fashionable mainstream discourse on failing states and its practical political fallout: conventional state-building and institution-building as the one and only avenue for nonviolent conduct of conflict- an approach which has reaped only poor results so far. It challenges the dominant thinking which assumes that all societies have to progress through western stages of state and society development and that weak incomplete states have to be developed into proper western style states.